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# **Procedural and Functional Sources of Political Trust in Europe**

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To all those parents who give their children all that they could not afford themselves!



# **Abstract**

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## **Procedural and Functional Sources of Political Trust in Europe**

Bilal Hassan

This thesis aims to answer the question: to what extent procedural and functional evaluations of the performance of their regimes explain political trust in Europe? It does so by paying close attention to the concepts of quality of democracy and quality of public services. Theoretically, it distinguishes political trust from its allied concepts and clarifies its meaning employed. It considers political trust as citizens' cognitive and affective evaluation that the political system or some parts of it will keep performing according to their expectations even in the absence of their constant scrutiny. The quality of democracy and the quality of public services refer to citizens' judgment of the performance of democracy and public services, respectively.

To answer the question stated above, it first argues that both democracy and public services are provided to the citizens and then suggests two mechanisms responsible for shaping political trust. The first mechanism is built on the expectancy-disconfirmation theory, which argues that expectancy, performance, and the gap between the former and the latter, also referred to as disconfirmation, are responsible for shaping trust in an object. This thesis argues that political trust is (1) an outcome of direct effects of citizens' democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation, and (2) disconfirmation mediates the relationship between democratic expectations, democratic performance, and political trust. It builds these models separately in the context of the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy. The second mechanism rests on micro-performance theory which states that citizens' experiences and perceptions of different public services shape political trust. Afterwards, it conceives the quality of public services in terms of citizens' judgments of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness and theoretically demonstrates the associations of these measures with political trust.

The thesis adopts a quantitative approach, uses the European Social Survey (ESS) data to explain variation in political trust, and employs a series of macro-level and micro-level analyses, with paying special attention to the multilevel analysis to explain the variation in political trust. The results support the main assumptions of this thesis. Political trust effects of the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy, presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively, are based on the analyses of ESS-6. The results reported in these chapters show that democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation directly affect political trust. However, democratic disconfirmation mediates the relationship between democratic expectations and political trust. Further, the analyses performed could not predict this mediating relationship between disconfirmation and performance due to strong multicollinearity between

these two measures. Combined, these results provide support to the expectancy theory in a comparative context in Europe. Second, to predict the political trust effects of the quality of public services, the thesis took the quality of schooling and the quality of policing as prime examples. The data about the quality of schooling and the quality of policing are extracted from the ESS-2 and the ESS-5, respectively. The results show that the procedural fairness and functional effectiveness of these two services explain political trust in Europe. Finally, only the measure of perceived distributive justice in the chapter on the quality of policing (Chapter 8) has a significant effect on political trust. It concludes that despite its operational and data limitations, the micro-performance theory works in explaining political trust in Europe.

In sum, besides providing support to the expectancy and micro-performance theories, these results show that the quality of democracy matters more than the quality of public services for European citizens.

**Keywords:** Political trust, quality of democracy, quality of public services, expectancy-disconfirmation theory, micro-performance theory, European Social Survey

# Résumé

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## Les sources procédurales et fonctionnelles de la confiance politique en Europe

Cette thèse vise à répondre à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure les évaluations procédurales et fonctionnelles des régimes démocratiques expliquent-elles la confiance politique en Europe ? Elle le fait en accordant une attention particulière aux concepts de qualité de la démocratie et de qualité des services publics. Sur le plan théorique, elle distingue la confiance politique des concepts proches et clarifie le sens qu'elle prend. Elle considère la confiance politique comme l'évaluation cognitive et affective des citoyens selon laquelle le système politique ou certaines de ses parties continueront à fonctionner conformément à leurs attentes, même en l'absence de surveillance constante. La qualité de la démocratie et la qualité des services publics font référence au jugement des citoyens sur les performances de la démocratie et des services publics, respectivement.

Pour répondre à la question posée ci-dessus, l'auteur affirme d'abord que la démocratie et les services publics sont des biens fournis aux citoyens, puis il suggère deux mécanismes responsables de la formation de la confiance politique. Le premier mécanisme est construit sur la théorie des attentes et de l'infirmité (*disconfirmation*) qui soutient que l'écart entre les attentes et la performance, également appelé *disconfirmation*, est responsable de la formation de la confiance envers un objet. Cette thèse soutient que la confiance politique est (1) un résultat des effets directs des attentes démocratiques des citoyens, de la performance démocratique et de la *disconfirmation* démocratique, et (2) que la *disconfirmation* est un médiateur de la relation entre les attentes démocratiques, la performance démocratique et la confiance politique. La démonstration repose sur des modèles construits séparément dans le contexte de la qualité de la démocratie électorale et de la qualité de la démocratie libérale. Le deuxième mécanisme repose sur la théorie de la micro-performance, selon laquelle les expériences et les perceptions des citoyens à l'égard de différents services publics façonnent la confiance politique. Il s'agit de concevoir la qualité des services publics en termes des jugements des citoyens sur la justice distributive, l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle et de démontrer théoriquement les associations de ces mesures avec la confiance politique.

La thèse adopte une approche quantitative, utilise les données de l'Enquête sociale européenne (ESS) pour expliquer la variation de la confiance politique, et emploie une série d'analyses au niveau macro et micro, avec une attention particulière à l'analyse multi-niveaux pour expliquer la variation de la confiance politique. Les résultats soutiennent les principales hypothèses de cette thèse. Les effets de la qualité de la démocratie électorale et la qualité de la démocratie libérale sur la confiance politique, présentés respectivement dans les chapitres 5 et 6, sont basés sur les

analyses de l'ESS-6. Les résultats présentés dans ces chapitres montrent que les attentes démocratiques, la performance démocratique et la *disconfirmation* démocratique affectent directement la confiance politique. Cependant, la *disconfirmation* démocratique joue un rôle de médiateur dans la relation entre les attentes démocratiques et la confiance politique. De plus, les analyses effectuées n'ont pas pu prédire cette relation médiatrice entre la *disconfirmation* et la performance en raison d'une forte multicollinéarité entre ces deux mesures. Combinés, ces résultats apportent un soutien à la théorie des attentes dans un contexte comparatif en Europe. Ensuite, pour prédire les effets de la qualité des services publics sur la confiance politique, la thèse prend la qualité de la scolarité et la qualité de la police comme exemples principaux. Les données sur la qualité de l'enseignement et la qualité de la police sont extraites de l'ESS-2 et de l'ESS-5, respectivement. Les résultats montrent que l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle de ces deux services expliquent la confiance politique en Europe. Enfin, seule la mesure de la perception de la justice distributive, dans le chapitre sur la qualité de la police (chapitre 8), a un effet significatif sur la confiance politique. L'étude conclut que, malgré ses limites en termes de données et d'opérationnalisation, la théorie de la micro-performance fonctionne pour expliquer la confiance politique en Europe.

En résumé, en plus de soutenir les théories des attentes et de la micro-performance, ces résultats montrent que la qualité de la démocratie importe plus que la qualité des services publics pour les citoyens européens.

**Mots-clés :** Confiance politique, qualité de la démocratie, qualité des services publics, théorie des attentes et de l'information, théorie de la micro-performance, enquête sociale européenne.



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## List of Acronyms

|     |                                |
|-----|--------------------------------|
| QG  | Quality of Government          |
| QPP | Quality of Public Services     |
| QS  | Quality of Schooling           |
| QP  | Quality of Policing            |
| QD  | Quality of Democracy           |
| QED | Quality of Electoral Democracy |
| QLD | Quality of Liberal Democracy   |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product         |
| GNP | Gross National Product         |
| WGI | World Governance Indicators    |
| CPI | Corruption Perception Index    |

# Appendices

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# Chapter 1 Introduction

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Contemporary democracies are facing a challenge today. This challenge does not come from enemies within or outside the nation. Instead, the challenge comes from democracy's own citizens, who have grown distrustful of politicians, skeptical about the democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions.

– Dalton 2004: 1

## 1.1 Research Question

Why citizens trust their political institutions is a centuries-old question (Grossman and Sauger 2017: 5; Newton 2007: 342). However, the recent theorizing about political trust as one of the main dimensions of political support started in the 1960s (Almond and Verba 1989; Easton 1965, 1975; Lipset 1960) and then in the 2000s (Dalton 2004a; Fuchs 2007; Norris 1999a). These theorizations were complemented with the publication of mass surveys that allowed researchers to test several theories about the origin of political trust.<sup>1</sup> Although political scientists have warned us that citizens' evaluation of the input and output side political system has consequences for political support (Norris 2011a; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; F. Scharpf 1999) yet we still lack, with a few exceptions (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Meer 2017), a comprehensive, systematic and comparative examination of how these two sources operate at the same time to explain political trust in general and in Europe in particular. This thesis contributes to filling in this gap by examining the procedural and functional sources of political trust in Europe. Though these two mechanisms work independently yet, they complement each other. On the one hand, we will look into democratic processes themselves, i.e., how rights and liberties are expected and perceived. On the other hand, we will pay very close attention to public services delivered by democratic systems, i.e., how education or security are expected and perceived. Together, these two streams will make up the core of our argument for understanding how and to what extent Europeans trust their governments.

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<sup>1</sup> The first survey containing questions on political trust (for example, the governments *do what is right*, they are *run by few big interests*, and they *don't know what they are doing*) was carried out under the auspices of American National Election Studies in 1962. This was followed by a series of comparative surveys such as European Values Studies (1981), World Values Survey (1981), Latino Barometer (1995), African Barometer (1999), Asian Barometer (2001), and European Social Survey (2002).

## 1.2 Main Concepts: Political Trust, Process Performance and Outcome Performance

Political trust, process performance, and outcome performance and some of their alternative terms will frequently appear in the subsequent sections. Though Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive account of each of these and related terms, they need to be briefly defined at the onset.

Political trust is one of the several types of political support that ranges from specific to diffuse (Dalton 2004a; Easton 1965, 1975; Fuchs 2007; Norris 1999a). These works differentiate between the types of objects and attitudes towards them. Political community, political institutions, norms and principles, performance evaluations, actors/authorities are objects of political support. Political trust is a combination of some components of an attitude and political objects. An attitude comprises cognition, evaluation, affect, and behaviour, and there are several types of political objects within a political system, including parliament, political parties, and politicians.

Political trust, in this thesis, stands for political trust, citizens' cognitive and affective orientations towards these political institutions. More precisely, *political trust* reflects citizens' belief that political institutions would keep producing their preferred outcomes by being responsive to their needs and expectations, even in the absence of constant scrutiny (Easton 1975; Miller 1974; Miller and Listhaug 1990). Thus, political trust represents citizens' beliefs that the existing political institutions are appropriate ones and their evaluations of the effectiveness of such institutions.

The evaluations of the democratic processes and public services are the two complementary sources of political trust. Defining the democratic process is closely linked to the very idea of *democracy*. Despite lacking any consensual definition (see, for example, Dahl 1985: 10-11; Lipset 1960:45; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Tilly 2007: 8-9), democracy can be conceived as a system of political recruitment resulting in the filling of positions in the executive and legislative branches of governments at various tiers through free, fair, repetitive and competitive elections and political constraints reducing the chances of abuse of public authority by various institutions and groups.

Three additional terms that will consistently appear in this thesis that need a brief commentary are democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation. *Democratic expectations* stand for the extent to which citizens recognize the normative principles of democracy and give importance to them. *Democratic performance* is their judgments about the practical execution of the normative tenets of their own countries and *democratic disconfirmation* of the gap between performance and expectations, i.e., the difference between the ideals of citizens and their evaluation of how things are in their country of residence. These developments align with the political science and service sector literature (Fuchs and Roller 2018; Gronroos 1984), which argues that quality can stand for expectations, performance and disconfirmation. These are the main concepts of our idea of the quality of democracy—also referred to as the American approach—and are expected to influence political trust independently and in a complex fashion under the assumptions of disconfirmation approach to political trust.

Like democracy, finding a standard definition of *public services* is a challenging task (Syvertsen 1991). Generally, all those goods and services provided by a government are referred to as public services. However, such a conceptualization suffers from a lack of cross-cultural validity. For instance, the government might provide health care in some countries; the private sector might cater this service in other countries. Our concept of public services is mainly guided by the idea of the public sphere (Syvertsen 1991): all those institutions about which members of society collectively deliberate and attempt to influence the design and working of such institutions might be called public services. Outside public services, such a concept can be applied to understand democracy as a service.

Our idea of the quality of public services is driven by three principles, namely distributive justice, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness. The principle of *distributive justice* demands the indiscriminate treatment of the citizens by the authorities delivering public services; the principle of procedural fairness calls for public services to base their decisions and actions as are stipulated in the rule or standard operating procedures governing them; and that of *functional effectiveness* emphasizes the organizations to deliver their mandated functions efficiently and effectively. Together, these three measures are the building blocks of our idea of quality as a performance-only approach to quality, which is also called the Nordic approach. These three measures of the quality of public services are expected to influence political trust positively under the influence of micro-performance theory.

We will use the quality of democracy and quality of public services as alternative terms to evaluate democratic processes and public services, respectively. Despite that, these two sources complement each other, yet they surprisingly miss the cross-national studies on political trust (Meer 2017: 137). Given that the quality stands for “consumer’s judgment about an entity’s overall excellence or superiority” (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988: 15), our concepts of quality of democracy and those of public services represents citizens overall excellent evaluation of the state of political rights and civil liberties, and public services, respectively. Our focus clarifies on the onset that this thesis is about evaluations of democracy and public services by the citizens having the ultimate power to bring in any government in power and rescind it back home.

The foregoing debate can be summed up in four points. First, our idea of the quality of democracy and those of public services is three-dimensional each. Democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation are expected to influence political trust independently and in a complex fashion under the assumptions of the disconfirmation approach (the American approach). Within this context, we expect that citizens would differentiate between electoral democracy and liberal democracy and that the disconfirmation model would explain political trust in these two domains.

Second, distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness as measures of the quality of public services are assumed to directly influence political trust under the guise of a micro-performance approach (the Nordic approach). Third, although we will control for the

country-level determinants, our focus is on citizens' evaluations of these measures of the quality of democracy and those of public services. Finally, we will use some terms alternatively: Process performance and quality of democracy on the one hand and outcome performance, functional sources, and quality of public services, on the other hand, would have the same meanings, respectively. However, functional effectiveness, which is one of the dimensions of the quality of public services, must be understood differently from the functional sources, which is the quality of public service approach to political trust.

### **1.3 Does Political Trust Matter?**

“The idea that trust is essential for social, economic and political life is a very old one going back to at least Confucius who suggested that trust, weapons and food are the essentials of government: food, because well-fed citizens are less likely to make trouble, trust because in the absence of food, citizens are likely to believe that their leaders are working on the problem, and weapons in case neither of the other two works” (Newton 2007: 342).

Whether loss of political trust matters is a contested question. Broadly, two approaches reflect on the saliency of political trust: constitutional and political culture (Bouckaert et al. 2002). The political culture approach views political trust as a form of generalized and diffused form of social trust. Since the members governing the political institutions are drawn from society, those societies with a higher degree of social trust tend to demonstrate a higher political trust level. On this view, though trust is exogenous in nature, i.e., it is produced outside the political institutions; however, the loss of trust can generate political instability, which can only be restored through authoritarian tactics (Parry 1976: 133).

The extent to which political trust matters, from the institutional perspective, can be looked into through Sztompka's (1998) two paradoxes of democracy. First, he argues that the very architecture of democracy as a form of regime organization works on the principle of the institutionalization of distrust. Besides serving as a disincentive for those (rulers) who contemplate breaching citizens' trust, political trust offers corrective measures if trust norms are violated. For instance, the very existence of the principles of division of powers and system of the check and balance reflects a suspicion that governors might be tempted to abuse their power; thus, requiring the mechanisms of mutual control to contain the abuse of power. That “greater the institutionalization of distrust, the more spontaneous the trust becomes” might end up in a culture of trust. To this, Sztompka calls the first paradox of democracy (Sztompka 1998).

The second paradox is that democracy requires consistent, invariable, and universal application of democratic principles on the one hand and applying checks and controls only as of the last or backup options on the other hand. Compared to any other political system where people do not have any expectations, loss of trust in political institutions in democratic regimes produces more serious consequences, including weakening of legitimacy of authorities, impeding turn over in power, the dominance of one institution over all others, deterioration of the rule of law, arbitrary

amendments in the constitution or laws, attacks on civil rights, and deterioration of the capacities on the output side of a political system.

The empirical works produced so far provide support to some of these consequences. It has been found the states lacking trust in political institutions tend to spend more resources and deploy coercion and force to maintain law and order, which, if further deteriorates, might result in a regime overthrow and the very collapse of the state (Gilley 2006); the rise of support for populist parties (Geurkink et al. 2020); cheating with the tax system and avoiding compliance with the laws (Marien and Hooghe 2011); invalid and blank voting and support for right-wing parties (Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011); withdrawal of support for government spending for health, education, and aid to mother programs (Rudolph and Evans 2005); increase in the chances of conventional political mobilization (Torcal and Lago 2006). Recently, several studies, mostly undertaken in Europe in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, have shown that the high level of political trust is associated with support for restrictive policies, more compliance with the health care regulation, and a lower perception of risk of being contaminated by the virus, and lower level of mortality rate (Bargain and Aminjonov 2020; Devine et al. 2020; Dryhurst et al. 2020; Lalot et al. 2020; Paolini et al. 2020; J. Weinberg 2020).

To the extent that loss of trust is sporadic, it helps voters send the “rascals” out of government through elections, thereby making the government responsive to the public demands (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000: 13). Even a fifty percent decline of political trust signifies a healthy democratic attitude if distrust does not destabilize the government and can be restored via consensus building, accountability, openness, and better information (Bouckaert et al. 2002). Such a sporadic form of political distrust actually enhances the culture of trust through a mechanism of effective accountability of political institutions (Sztompka 1998: 29). However, a perpetual and incremental decline of political trust accrues into a diffuse form of generalized distrust that might call for the replacement of the established political institutions such as parliament, political parties, and politicians with an autocratic form of institutions. In the longer run, this culture of distrust in political institutions may result in the degeneration of diffuse support for democracy as a form of the political system (Easton 1975).

To put it briefly: sporadic distrust is healthy for the effective functioning of political institutions, and a permanent decline in trust is destructive for political institutions and democracy.

## **1.4 Have Europeans Lost Trust in Their Governments?**

Survey research demonstrates that political trust is in decline in several European countries. Table 1.1 plots cross-national trends of trust in political institutions in Europe and shows that political trust is in decline in several European countries. The data sources of the descriptive statistics in this table (scale, mean, percentage of dis/trusting respondents) are extracted from the studies in which political trust was either a dependent or a predictor variable. Given that statistics are based on cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, they are expected to represent actual political trust trends. Although political trust, in some studies, was one of the dimensions of trust in various

political, regulatory, and private institutions, the descriptive analysis presented here focuses only on political institutions.

To begin with the individual countries, a look at the means shows that the trust in Dutch political institutions remained above the mean in the past few years (Blok, Meer, and Brug 2020; Geurkink et al. 2020). Finish citizens' trust in their parliament first declined from 65% to 42% between 1981 and 2000 and then jumped to 64% in 2004 (Bäck and Kestilä 2009). The crisis of institutional trust crippled the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe. In 1998, as high as 69% and 59% of the respondents from the eleven states distrusted their political parties and parliaments, respectively (Mishler and Rose 2001), and less than 10% of the citizens in Baltic states deposited trust in their political institutions, including parliament and political parties (Lühiste 2006). It has also been reported that political trust consistently declined in former Soviet Republics and other East European nations and the highly developed countries that witnessed a fall of trust in their parliaments between 1981–2001 (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Dalton 2005; Listhaug 2005; Schyns and Koop 2010).

A series of studies performed in the past two decades show the pervasiveness of the low level of political trust pervasive in Europe nations (Van Erkel and Van Der Meer 2016; Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Soren Holmberg, Lindberg, and Svensson 2017; Kołczyńska 2020; Obydenkova and Arpino 2018). The most recent studies demonstrate that although political trust declined between 2005–2015; however, compared to a relatively slow fall in the nations that gave loans, those nations who took loans faced a steep decline (Foster and Frieden 2017). Moreover, it has also been observed that Scandinavian and Swiss citizens deposit a higher level of trust in their political institutions than the other nations of Europe.

| <b>Table 1.1 State of Political Trust in Europe</b> |  |                                    |   |                           |      |
|---|--|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------|------|
| Sample  | Source                                 | Data – Year                        | Institutions  | Scale                     | Mean |
| Netherlands   | (Blok, Meer, and Brug 2020)            | Dutch Local Election Study: 2016   | Parliament, government, and legal system                        | 0–3                       | 1.59 |
| Netherlands   | (Geurkink et al. 2020)                 | Nationaal Referendumonderzoek 2018 | Government, the lower house, politicians, and political parties | 0–10                      | 5.23 |
| Finland   | (Bäck and Kestilä 2009)                | WVS: 1981–2000                     | Parliament  | Decrease: 65%–42%         |      |
| Finland   | (Bäck and Kestilä 2009)                | ESS: 2004                          | Parliament  | 64%                       |      |
| Finland   | (Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund 2016a) | ESS: 2004–2012                     | Parliament, political parties, and politicians                  | 0–10                      | 5.19 |
| 11 post-communist states (2001)                     | (Mishler and Rose 2001)                | New Democracy Barometer: 1999      | Six institutions (e.g., parliament)                             | 69% distrust parties; 59% |      |

|  |   |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| of Eastern Europe  |   |   |   | distrust parliament;                        |
| Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania                                       | (Lühiste 2006)                                | New Baltic Barometer: 2001                  | Parliament, political parties, courts, police, and army | <10% trusted                                |
| Former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe, and Established democracies | (Catterberg and Moreno 2005)                  | WVS: 1981–2001                              | Parliament  | Negative trend in all regions               |
| Norway, Sweden, Finland, West Germany, Spain, and Eastern Europe     | (Listhaug 2005)                               | EVS and WVS: 1981–1996                      | Parliament  | Negative trend except for Norway            |
| 16 advance democracies   | (Dalton 2005)                                 | Multiple sources and time frames: 1958–2000 | Several items (e.g., trust in politicians)              | Negative trend                              |
| 6 EU countries   | (Schyns and Koop 2010)                        | ISSP: 1981–1999                             | Parliament  | ~50%  |
| 15 EU countries  | (Van Erkel and Van Der Meer 2016)             | Eurobarometer: 1999–2011                    | National government and parliament                      | 0–1 0.42                                    |
| 32 EU countries  | (Goubin and Hooghe 2020)                      | ESS: 2004–2016                              | Parliament, political parties, politicians              | 0–10 3.82                                   |
| 73 countries   | (Kołczyńska 2020)                             | WVS and EVS: All rounds                     | Parliament  | 0–3 1.27                                    |
| 29 EU countries  | (Obydenkova and Arpino 2018)                  | ESS: 2002–2006                              | Parliament  | 0–10 4.66                                   |
| 29 EU countries  | (Obydenkova and Arpino 2018)                  | ESS: 2008–2012                              | Parliament  | 0–10 4.15                                   |
| 15 established democracies   | (Soren Holmberg, Lindberg, and Svensson 2017) | WVS: 2005/09–2010/14                        | Parliament  | 40%   |
| 23 EU countries  | (Foster and Frieden 2017)                     | 23 Eurobarometer surveys: 2004 onward       | National government                                     | fluctuates in creditors; decline in debtors |

## 1.5 The Puzzle: Procedural and Functional Sources of Political Trust

What accounts for the decline in political trust that the previous section outlines? Of the several explanations offered so far, the most notable ones are socio-psychological, socio-cultural, and performance theories (Mishler and Rose 2001; Kenneth Newton and Norris 1999; Norris 2017b; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose 2011; Shockley et al. 2016; Torcal

and Lago 2006; Ulsaner 2018).<sup>2</sup> Socio-psychological theories assume trust is a personality that develops over the course of a life span. Thus, children learn trust from their parents, which persists as they grow and changes slowly their social experiences expand. Some trustors and cynics carry their political perceptions around with them without reference to the performance of a political system or its leaders. The social and cultural model essentially argues that individual life situations and experiences create social trust and cooperation, civic-mindedness, and reciprocity between social organizations and institutions, including political groups and governmental institutions in which people can invest their confidence. Such organizations and institutions, in turn, help build trust, cooperation, and reciprocity, as well as confidence in other institutions. There are further two traditions within the cultural theory: compared to macro-cultural account, which locates the temporal or spatial variations in political trust in the broader national traditions, micro-cultural hypothesis focuses on the role of unique socialization processes and personal experiences. These socialization experiences might result in the formation of civic cultural, social capital, generalized trust, post-materialism, and critical citizens, which have been found to closely associated with political trust and democratic legitimacy (Almond and Verba 1989; Ariely 2015; Bäck and Kestilä 2009; B. Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal 2006; Norris 1999a; Schnaudt 2019; Zmerli 2013; Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007).<sup>3</sup>

Performance theories consider political trust as the endogenous property of institutions, which means that trust is rational and is the expected utility of individual citizens' performance and satisfaction of institutions. Thus, institutional trust is a public reaction to their performance. Citizens tend to trust those institutions that consistently perform well, and bad performing institutions are more likely to face public discontentment. There are two accounts of performance: macro or objective performance and micro or subjective performance (Christian 2019; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Foster and Frieden 2017; Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Kołczyńska 2020, 2021; Norris 2011). Compared to macro-performance theories that relate political trust with the aggregate performance of governments in promoting growth and employment, reducing poverty, containing corruption, providing security, and maintaining political and civil liberties, micro-performance accounts locate the origin of political trust with day to day working and perceptions of different public services.

The micro-performance might be related to the input side and output side of a political system. On the input side, citizens evaluate the performance based on how a government promotes and protects political rights and civil liberties. On the output side, micro-performance accounts focus on the role of citizens' tastes and experiences of government performance of the various public services

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<sup>2</sup> Other explanations include winner and loser (reference), Colin Hay and globalization (reference), policy distance, size of government (D. Denters 2002), international crisis (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993), indirect democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2004)

<sup>3</sup> Some of the other explanations include winner and loser (Martini and Quaranta 2019), globalization (Hay 2007), policy distance and size of government (Denters 2002), international crisis (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993), and indirect democracy (J. R. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2004).



(Bouckaert et al. 2002; Heintzman and Marson 2005; Van de Walle 2004). To put it in the words of Bouckaert et al. (2002), the public judgment of the government depends upon the citizens' interest in the efficiency and quality of the services being delivered by the government agencies. Improved perceptions and experiences of public service quality can serve as an important reservoir of political trust. A consistent decline in the performance of such services can deprive governments of citizens' confidence.

What happens on the input and output sides or procedural and functional sources of institutional trust are well documented in political science, criminal justice and public administration literature. Political scientists have applied these theories to political institutions both at national and transnational levels. Developed in the European Union context, Scharpf argued science (Olsen, Sbragia, and Scharpf 2000; F. Scharpf 1999; F. W. Scharpf 2010) that European integration could be advanced by improving upon the input-oriented and output-oriented legitimization beliefs. Input-oriented view maintains that political choices of the government are legitimate only 'if and because they reflect the will of the people.' Conversely, output-oriented choices are legitimate 'if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question.' These procedural and functional sources complement each other in promoting European integration, including trust in EU-level institutions.

These sources of trust have been examined at national and local levels. For instance, (Norris 2011a) demonstrated and showed that political satisfaction depends on the quality of democratic procedures as indicated by free and fair elections, responsiveness and accountability, and the quality of such outputs as economic performance, education and health services, and employment opportunities. (Denters 2014) found that Dutch citizens' satisfaction with local democracy resulted from such procedural utilities as effective representation and participation in the local council and functional utilities reflected by their satisfaction with local services and facilities and problem-solving capacities.

Tyler and his follower studies (Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 2003; Tyler and Folger 1980) focused on the institutions of the criminal justice system. They contended that citizens tend to accord trust and legitimacy with the decision of police only when they consider that those decisions were taken in a just and fair manner and that they were effective in reducing crime, apprehending criminals, and maintaining law and order. A rich body of empirical literature confirms procedural justice invariably explains trust in police; however, the effect of functional effectiveness varied—sometimes it significantly predicted trust, and other times it failed to produce any effect mixed (Bottoms and Tankebe 2013; Bradford 2014; Tankebe 2008; Tyler and Fagan 2008). Ryzin and his colleagues have also demonstrated and validated that both processes and outcomes matter in explaining citizens' trust in public agencies (G. G. Van Ryzin 2011, 2015; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink 2020).

Combined, these three strands of the literature suggest that input/output orientations, fairness/effectiveness, and process/outcome are aspects of both the democratic performance and

the service performance of a political regime. In line with Scharp, Norris, and others, the procedural sources of political trust include citizens' perceptions and evaluations of the performance of democratic regimes with respect to political rights and civil liberties. Conversely, the performance of the public agencies in terms of process and outcomes (G. G. Van Ryzin 2011, 2015; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink 2020) or distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness (Tyler 2003; Tyler and Folger 1980) are conceived as functional sources of political trust.

Citizens would tend to trust political institutions not only because that a political system provides them opportunities to influence the democratic process but also on account of what they receive and how they receive various public services from the output institutions (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Norris 2011a; Olsen, Sbragia, and Scharpf 2000; Rothstein 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2007; F. Scharpf 1999; F. W. Scharpf 2010). However, we are still far from presenting a comprehensive account of Europeans' evaluations of the input and output side of institutions and their effect on political trust. In other words, this thesis aims to answer:

**To what extent procedural and functional evaluations of the performance of their regimes explain political trust in Europe?**

## **1.6 Main Contributions**

This thesis contributes to the existing literature on political trust in two ways. The quality of democracy can stand for democratic expectations, democratic performance, and performance-expectations gap or disconfirmation (Section 1.2). Extant literature makes reference to these three quality measures and political trust. For instance, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser (2016) have examined the relationship between democratic expectations and political trust. In a related study, (Meer 2017) examined the effect of expectations and performance on political trust and satisfaction with democracy in Europe. (Job 2005) explored the role of government responsiveness, citizens' empowerment, and their perception of corruption in the Australian context and Mauk (2020) determined the role of electoral fairness in the global context.

Three studies have explicitly focused on the role of the gap. For example, Waterman and his colleagues have shown that the incumbent-ideal gap is a main predictor of the presidential approval and voting preferences in the American context (Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 1999). Sirovátka and her colleagues found that the inequality policy-deficit (i.e., the gap between citizens' orientation towards democracy reduces poverty and their governments make efforts to reduce poverty) is responsible for the loss or gain of political trust in Europe (Sirovátka, Guzi, and Saxonberg 2018). Finally, only one study examined the complex association between expectations, performance, and satisfaction with federal government services in the USA (Morgeson 2013).

However, these studies suffer from certain shortcomings. One, these are single country, regional or global studies that have examined the effect of one or other measures of quality of democracy on political trust, satisfaction with democracy, or public services, which we think are different

from each other (Chapter 2: Section 2.2.1). Second, although Meer's (2017) inquiry is more closely related to this part of the thesis, he focused only on those five items of expectations and performance related to the impartiality of the state's various institutions. Third, none of these studies have either examined the role of disconfirmation as a measure of the quality of democracy or the complex interaction between three quality measures and political trust. Finally, as researchers distinguish between various types of democracies, for instance, electoral and liberal democracy, there is a probability that citizens would differentiate between these two aspects of democracy and relate them with political trust independently. Surprisingly, the extant literature lacks any systematic and coherent inquiry examining the political trust effects of the various measures of the quality of democracy and interaction between them.

The first unique contribution of this thesis is that by synthesizing the service sector and political science literature, it conceives the quality of democracy as democratic expectations, performance, and disconfirmation (Chapter 2: Section 2.4.2). Besides testing their direct political trust effects, this thesis also examines the complex interaction between these three quality measures and political trust feelings. Additionally, it is the first kind of study testing the assumptions of disconfirmation theory in a comparative context in Europe (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).

The performance-only or the Nordic version of the quality concentrates on evaluating the performance without focusing on expectations. Thus, the quality might stand for the impartial implementation of the public policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), various perceptions of justice and fairness in case of police services (Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 2003; Tyler and Folger 1980), and process and outcomes in other public services (G. G. Van Ryzin 2011). Though multiple performance measures are quite pervasive in service sector literature, their combined effects on political trust have rarely been tested.

The second main contribution and what makes this thesis distinct from previous attempts is that it conceives the quality of public services in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness (Chapter 2: Section 2.4.2) and then tests their political trust effects in Europe. Testing the micro-performance theory with multiple performance measures by taking the quality of schooling (Chapter 7) and the quality of policing (Chapter 8) as prime examples of public services is the second main contribution of this thesis towards political trust literature.

## **1.7 Choice of Public Services**

The micro-performance theory's main assumption is that citizens consider that public services are provided by a government and relate the performance of such services with political trust (Bouckaert and Walle 2003: 308). A government provides a range of services, including protecting and promoting political rights, civil liberties, health, education, policing, road maintenance and transport, telecommunication, and postal services, and so on. One suggestion is that selecting an agency as a public service provider might be based on the size of budget it receives from a government, frequency of use, importance, visibility, and scandal (Van De Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert 2005). It might appear easier for a researcher to identify high-impact agencies and rank

them based on one or more of these criteria. Nevertheless, it is an extremely challenging task, at the same time, to empirically establish whether citizens would rank such selected services in the same order. For instance, health and public transport can be very important for citizens as these services are visible and frequently used; however, their ideological orientations and prevailing situations might condition choices and rankings, resulting in comparative variations.

In highly developed social welfare states, such as the Scandinavian nations, citizens might want these services to be provided by the government. Conversely, there is a plausibility that in well-established neo-liberal regimes, such as the United Kingdom, citizens might prefer these services to be provided by the private sector. Moreover, data unavailability makes it difficult to choose which of these services are understood as public services by the citizens. However, making a distinction between some of these services is less challenging than others. For instance, when it comes to political rights and civil liberties, citizens might directly hold their governments responsible for them. Therefore, treating and choosing democracy as a public service provided to the people makes sense. The selection of public services on output side institutions might be based on the impact and frequency of consumption. Public education is one of those services that directly and indirectly have the most significant impact on personal, social, and professional life. Citizens might less frequently use policing services. However, this service is so important that any country's internal security and stability depend upon effective and efficient policing services.

## **1.8 The Empirical Bases of the Political Trust**

This thesis examines the role of quality of democracy and quality of government/public services in Europe. Such a comparative inquiry requires cross-national evidence for political trust measures, quality of democracy, and quality of public services. It is possible to build and apply the same models of political trust, either based on a disconfirmation approach or performance-only approach, under the broader scheme of micro-performance theory that considers citizens' experiences and perception of public services the main antecedents of political trust. Importantly, it requires expectations, performance, and disconfirmation variables related to democratic services and public services to test a fuller model of disconfirmation approach to political trust.

Given that the focus of this thesis is on the long-term democratic states of Europe, it excludes Albania, Russia, and Ukraine, considering them either as non-democratic or in a state of democratic transitions. The sampled countries are a mix of old democracies and new democracies. The latter group of nations came into being after the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Freedom House ranks all these countries as free states. However, any contextual differences would be taken into account through multilevel modeling. There is no longitudinal data on the measures of quality of democracy (democratic expectations, performance, and disconfirmation) and quality of public services (distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness). The cross-sectional measures of these quality measures are available in three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS-6, ESS-2 and ESS-5). These rounds provide the necessary data to test the two models of political trust; however, it is challenging to establish the

causality of the results based on the cross-sectional data. Despite these shortcomings, these empirical results produced in this thesis provide first-time evidence of the relationship between quality of democracy and political trust in Europe through the disconfirmation approach. Moreover, this thesis also offers fresh evidence for the quality of public services and political trust through the lens of micro-performance theory.

## **1.9 Plan of the Thesis**

The remaining part of this thesis proceeds in eight chapters. *Chapter 2* presents the theoretical framework of this research. First, it mobilizes strands of literature from psychology, organizational sciences, and political science domains and demonstrates that though trust might encompass cognitive, affective, and behavioural elements, it defines trust as a combination of the first two elements. Second, after outlining the controversies surrounding the use of the terms trust, trustworthiness, and confidence, it justifies the choice of the term political trust. Then, it makes distinctions between a series of other terms such as legitimacy, satisfaction, political support, and social trust. The fourth section justifies using democracy as public services like many other services served by a regime to its citizens. The final section builds a theoretical model of political trust at the intersection of rational choice theory, quality of democracy, and government/public services quality. There are four subsections in this section. The first two parts make distinctions between the quality of democracy and government from objective and subjective perspectives. Then the next part, building on the American perspective on the quality of services, theories that citizens' feelings of public services are the outcomes of the interaction between democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation. It also argues that citizens would distinguish between electoral democracy and liberal democracy and that the quality of each of these democracies would affect political trust independently. The final subsection mobilizes the Nordic approach to the study of quality and demonstrates that political trust results from the citizens' perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Both models included a series of individual-level and country-level control variables under the guidance of previous literature.

*Chapter 3* provides a comprehensive account of the research design of this thesis. The first section provides a brief description of the European Social Survey and the suitability of quantitative research design as the main analytical framework. Then, advancing on the conceptual definitions presented in Chapter 2, it provides operational definitions of main concepts. Political trust is captured through trust in national parliament, political parties, and politicians. Quality of democracy is measured through items, each representing citizens' orientations towards global democratic norms and their evaluations of the democratic performance of their own countries, and the third measure, that is, disconfirmation will be calculated by subtracting additive index of performance from that of expectations. Schooling and policing are selected as prime services for testing the political trust effects of the quality of public services. The quality of these services is operationalized in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. The next subsection within this data operationalization scheme also included the operational

definition of individual-level and country-level variables. An examination of the missing values follows this. The final section presents a brief account of the analytical scheme, including exploratory factor analysis, descriptive analysis, macro-level and micro-level patterns of association between measures of the quality of democracy, public services and political trust. Then after briefly discusses the use of multivariate analysis, it develops a multilevel model of political trust. The final subsection describes how to analyze a model where disconfirmation acts as a mediator between democratic expectations, performance, and political trust.

*Chapter 4* is a baseline model of political trust with individual-level and country-level variables as main predictors. The five sets of individual-level controls are demographic characteristics, welfare performance, economic evaluations, political attitudes, and social capital. Communist past (a self-constructed variable), voice and accountability, and government effectiveness from the World Governance Indicators are main country-level controls. Since these variables are controlled for each of the proceeding four analytical chapters, a baseline model is developed to avoid repeating the same procedural in the main analytical chapters.

The next two chapters test the political trust effects of the quality of democracy. *Chapter 5* empirically demonstrates that the quality of electoral democracy is different from that of liberal democracy, supporting the claim advanced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). It operationalizes the quality of electoral democracy in terms of citizens' orientations towards electoral norms, their evaluation of the performance of their own democracies, and disconfirmation. Based on the strategy designed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6), series of empirical results suggest the assumption that citizens' feelings of political trust are associated with the three measures of the quality of democracy. However, due to the strong multicollinearity between electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation, it could only partly validate the assumption that electoral disconfirmation mediates the relationship between electoral expectations, performance, and political trust. *Chapter 6* is a replication of the same procedural in the context of liberal democracy. It theoretically demonstrates and empirically shows that citizens' feelings of political trust are related to the three measures of liberal democracy—liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation. This chapter, like the previous one, could not test a fuller model of liberal disconfirmation. However, it clearly shows that between liberal expectations and political trust.

The following two chapters examine the association between public service quality (with schooling and policing as prime examples) and political trust. First, these chapters conceptualize the quality of public services as citizens' assessments of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness of schooling and policing services by synthesizing political science, the criminal justice system, public administration, and service sector literature. Then, building on the micro-performance theory, they demonstrate the relationship of these quality measures with political trust. The relationship quality of schooling and political trust is tested in *Chapter 7* by analyzing the data from ESS-2 restricted to the students. The effect of distributive justice could not be estimated due to minimal variation in the items capturing students' perceptions of discrimination based on age, gender, religion, ethnic background, and so on. However, students'

perceptions of the teachers' procedural fairness and functional effectiveness significantly predicted political trust even after controlling for the individual-level and country-level variables.

*Chapter 8* plots the results of the political trust effects of the quality of policing based on the analysis of the ESS-5 data. Initially, both the economic prejudice and racial prejudice—two measures of distributive justice—were significantly associated with political trust; however, the final models demonstrated the relevance of economic prejudice only. Thus, those who view police treat the poor badly are more likely to distrust political institutions. Finally, political trust tends to increase with the improvement of perceptions that police treat everyone in a procedurally fair manner. In addition, they are effective in controlling crimes and apprehending criminals. These results are statistically significant even after control for a host of individual-level and country-level variables.

*Chapter 9*, the final one, concludes the whole thesis and outlines the future research agenda.

## Chapter 2 Literature Review

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The idea that trust is essential for social, economic and political life is a very old one going back to at least Confucius who suggested that trust, weapons and food are the essentials of government: food, because well-fed citizens are less likely to make trouble, trust because in the absence of food, citizens are likely to believe that their leaders are working on the problem, and weapons in case neither of the other two works.

– Kenneth Newton (2007: 324)

### 2.1 Introduction

Political trust is one of the widely and deeply studied topics in social sciences. Still, its conceptual boundaries are somewhat vague, and theoretical innovations are expanding. This chapter is about the meanings and the origin of political trust and is divided into six main sections. The next section presents the conceptual background of political trust and political support, followed by brief notes on how political trust is different from an array of other terms associated with it. The third section provides a descriptive account of the concept of public services, including democracy as a public service. The fourth section presents the theoretical association between the quality of democracy, the quality of public services, and political trust. Building on the expectancy-disconfirmation theory, it states that democratic expectations, performance, and disconfirmation influence political trust directly and indirectly. Then, mobilizing the micro-performance theory, it demonstrates that the quality of public services represented by distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness will positively affect political trust. The fifth section introduces the individual-level and country-level control variables and follows the summary of the whole chapter towards the end.

### 2.2 A Conceptual Background of Political Trust

The 1960s was an important decade in many ways. Two academic developments are worth mentioning with respect to this thesis: the first development is about the conception of the idea of political trust along with political legitimacy as a part of political support (Almond 1956; Easton 1965; Lipset 1960). The types of political support originally conceived by Easton remained essentially the same—diffuse and specific support; however, further subdimensions of these two types of support were introduced in the subsequent decades (Dalton 2004a; Fuchs 2007; Norris 1999a, 2017b). These developments were complemented by the publication of mass data such as the American Election Studies (1977), European Values Studies (1981), World Values Survey (1981), and the European Social Survey (2002), which provided researchers the opportunities to test various theories on the origin of political trust.



Despite these attempts, researchers contend that it is not only that political trust is a ‘vague and slippery concept, and theories and assumptions about it are tangled and complex’ (Ken Newton 2008: 242), but its alternative constructs such as political legitimacy, satisfaction with democracy and democratic value are not one and same things (Citrin and Stoker 2018; Kotzian 2010; Norris 2017b). Therefore, it is imperative to distinguish between different elements of political support and single out political trust as the main topic of investigation is a prerequisite before developing models at the intersection of disconfirmation and performance-only approaches to the quality of democracy and quality of government/public services.

There is an unannounced agreement amongst social scientists that trust reflects a psychic quantity reflecting citizens’ attitudes, dispositions, or beliefs towards different objects, including their fellow citizens, social organizations, or political institutions (Maloy 2009). Recognizing the constituent elements of an attitude having trust as a distinct component from a psychological perspective would help us better understand its political meaning—political trust. Political scientists distinguish between attitudes and behaviours (Easton 1975: 453-54); psychologists tend to define behaviour as a constituent element of an attitude (Breckler 1984). Such a distinction between attitudes and behavior constrains researchers from landing into tautological explanations of individual actions while doing micro-political analysis (Putnam, Leonardi, and Manetti 1988: 237). A beginning of this differentiation from the constituent elements of any attitude—cognition, affect, and behaviour—directed towards any socio-political and economic object would rather facilitate in comprehending the nature and composition of political trust as a distinct form of political support.

After clarifying political trust, it would be equally important to differentiate between political trust from its allied terms capturing other political support elements: political satisfaction and political legitimacy. The overall goal of this enterprise is to arrive, if not mechanically, yet roughly at the standardized meaning of these terms that are commonly understood and shared by the main authorities on this subject.

### **2.2.1 Political Attitudes: Cognitive, Evaluative, Affective, and Behavioural Elements**

Any attitude—in social, political, and organizational psychology—is a statement, either positive or negative, directed towards any object, whether it is an individual in a group, job in an organization, product/service in the market, or events happening around us (Breckler and Wiggins 1989; Coon and Mitterer 2013: 555; Locke 1969; Ottati, Steenbergen, and Riggle 1992: 424; Robbins and Judge 2017: 113). Accordingly, any given attitude consists of four components: Cognition, evaluation, affect, and behaviour. Information, knowledge, and belief system about an object make up the *cognitive component*. The positive or negative statement about the performance of that object stands for its *evaluative component*. The feelings and emotions about that object are called its *affective components*, and to act or intention to act in a certain way towards it constitutes its *behavioural component*.

Is political trust a cognition, affect, evaluation or behavior? Studies in individual and organizational psychology demonstrate that these components of attitudes are theoretically and empirically different from each other (Breckler 1984; D. J. McAllister 1995). Lewis and Wiegert (1985: 970-85) make a differentiation between cognitive and affective trust: Cognitive trust involves “whom we will trust in which respects and under what circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be ‘good reasons,’ constituting evidence of trustworthiness;” and affective trust is based on emotional bonds among people. The cognitive trust involves trustworthiness and encompasses competence, dependability, reliability, and responsibility; the affective trust comprises mutual emotional investment, expression of concerns of mutual welfare of partners, the worth of intrinsic advantages of these relations as well as a reciprocation of such sentiments (McAllister 1995: 26).

Positioning whether political trust represents political cognition, evaluation, affect, or behaviours might require a brief tour of the literature surrounding the legitimacy crisis, democratic consolidation, and political support. Of several types of legitimacy beliefs, ideological, functional, and behavioural are worth mentioning (Friedrichs 1980; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; T. Loveless 1997). Ideological legitimacy is concerned with recognizing the core values and principles of a political system (cognition); functional legitimacy represents citizens’ attitudes towards the effectiveness of the political system (evaluation), and the obligation to obey and comply with the laws and regulations stands for behavioural legitimacy (behaviour). If political legitimacy and trust are taken as alternatives, as some empirical works suggest (Anderson and Singer 2008), political trust is cognition, evaluation, and behaviour.

The democratic consolidation literature (Linz and Stepan 1996) contend that a regime achieves consolidation only when an overwhelming majority of its population believes democracy to be the only best form of government (cognition), constitutionally, all the major actors and institutions align with democratic norms and principles (affect) and behaviourally, they are not engaged in the activities resulting in the overthrow of regimes or secession of the state or some parts of it (behaviour). This body of literature does not explicitly express the position and role of political trust that researchers contend as the chief ingredient and crucial for the survival of any democratic regime (Miller 1974).

The third stream of literature views political trust as a distinct form of political support (Almond and Verba 1989; Carman 2010; Easton 1965, 1975; Fuchs 2007; Norris 1999b, 2017b). In this tradition, political trust is viewed as citizens’ cognitive and affective orientations towards a political system or some parts of it. However, other researchers observe that trust overlaps with the concept of legitimacy (Citrin and Stoker 2018), which encompasses such behaviours as complying with the laws (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; T. Loveless 1997). Miller (1974) calls for distinguishing between cognitive and affective orientation underlying political trust, and some researchers tried to align with him in their works (see, for instance, Hibbing 1998).

In summary, only the political support literature explicitly takes political trust as the cognitive and affective orientations toward a political system or some parts of it.

### 2.2.2 The Meanings of Political Trust

It is useful to begin with a note on the general notion of trust to understand the meanings of political trust clearly. It is contended that trust involves parties, probability, temporality, preference, and objects (Bauer 2015). It is a unanimous view of the scholars that trust is a *bi-party* contract: A trusts B to do X (Baier 1986; Russell Hardin 1992, 2002; Sztompka 2000). In other words, trust involves expectations of trustee A from trustor B to perform a function X. This three-parameter ABX function underpins the importance of trustworthiness that can be projected towards different objects, including individuals, groups, social and economic organizations, and political institutions. Second, several researchers, directly and indirectly, relate trust with the *subjective probability* that an agent will perform specific functions. For instance, for Gambetta Gambetta (1990: 217), trusting someone involves “the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us.” For Coleman (1994: 99), expectations as an essential criterion of placing trust in someone. Thirdly, trust always involves an expectation about future behavior that hinges on a *temporal dimension*.

Trust becomes political when the above arguments are projected on the association between public and political institutions. Political trust started gaining scholarly attention only after David Easton (1965, 1975) conceived it as one of the dimensions of diffuse support. Diffuse support is about recognizing the political institutions and positively orienting with them; conversely, specific support identifies authorities within those institutions and evaluates their performance. Researchers often employ several terms, including political trust and legitimacy, alternatively (Citrin and Stoker 2018) despite that these two constructs are different from each other. Easton defined political trust as ‘the probability that the *political system* (or some part of it) will produce preferred *outcomes*, even if unattended...The presence of trust would mean that *members* would feel that their own *interests would be attended* to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny’ (Easton 1975). There ensued a debate about the nature, causes, and consequences of political trust following the exchange of publications between Miller and Citrin regarding whether political trust represents cynical attitudes towards a regime or its incumbent authorities (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974). According to Miller,

trust is a basic *evaluative or affective* orientation towards the *government*. Distrust or cynicism is a statement of the belief that the government is not functioning and producing *outputs* in accord with *expectations*. These expectations are: fairness, honesty, equity, efficiency and responsiveness to the citizens’ needs (Miller 1974).

He showed that Americans’ loss of trust in the government resulting from scandals and poor policy performance actually reflects their loss of faith in the whole political system. Citrin responded by arguing that Miller’s conclusion was misleading, for it reflects attitudes towards specific political authorities rather than cynicism towards a political regime. For Hetherington (1998), political trust

reflects citizens' basic evaluative orientations that the governments perform up to their expectations. For Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012), political trust represents the public faith that institutions and actors within them would not cause harm to them. According to Uslaner (2018: 4), being responsive to the citizens' short-term variations in the economy of a country, political trust actually represents citizens' evaluations of the performance of a regime. For Citrin and Stoker, political trust is one of the family of terms related to feelings about politics. It overlaps with confidence, system support, and legitimacy on the positive side and with cynicism, political disaffection, and alienation on the negative' (2018: 50).

Two important understandings—one implicit and one explicit—demand a brief commentary before proceeding any further. One, whether a political trust is a measure of diffuse or specific support? Second, what expectations and risks that appear as keywords in these definitions have to do with trust?

To begin with the second question first, the two standard implicit features of the political trust appearing in these definitions are expectations and risk. Some scholars argue that expectations are starting point for exploring the meanings of trust (Fukuyama 1995; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Sztompka 2000; Whitener et al. 1998). In other words, trust involves predicting future outcomes based on existing information and knowledge. Disagreeing with such an approach of attributing to the meanings of trust, other researchers argue that the human capacity of prediction is constrained by the quantity and quality of information they possess to make a rational calculation about trust-related decisions (Thomas 1998; Whitener et al. 1998). Still, others argue that trust involves some elements of faith that might render invoking expectations and calculation as less meaningful criteria of understanding trust. However, an alternative account holds that expectations have rational origins (Forero and Gómez 2017; Manski 2004). Thus, trust involves situations where people have rank choices and make decisions keeping in view the possible shortcoming (Luhmann 1990). This implies that trust is not devoid of rationality (Williamson 1993).

The second implicit feature of any relationship involves risk or uncertainty. Tilly argues that since the outcomes of any association are at the risk of malfeasance, mistakes, or failures; therefore, we are bound to take risks regularly (2005: 12). One requires complete information about the intentions, motivations, moral commitments, and future behaviours of political institutions and authorities to grant or withhold trust in them (Hardin 2000, 2002). This means that decisions about trusting institutions require massive information and knowledge about the government, agents and actors, policies, processes, outputs, and outcomes, which ultimately demands ordinary citizens to possess expensive cognitive capacities. Being skeptical of the term, Hardin employs trustworthiness, which is the property of the institutions and actors, rather than trust reflecting an attitude towards them. 'Trust and trustworthiness are therefore distinct although, ideally, those whom we trust will be trustworthy, and those who are trustworthy will be trusted'(McLeod 2010). Levi (1998: 80) comments that when people say they trust an institution, they actually mean that

those institutions are trustworthy, suggesting that trust can be imputed with trustworthiness and confidence.

The first concern, whether political trust represents diffuse or specific support, requires how the concept of political support has evolved over time. Easton associated political support with support for a political system, which is equivalent to a nation-state. Commonly, political support stands for how a person orients himself to the various objects of a political system through his attitudes (Easton 1965): Cognition, affect, evaluation and behaviour. According to Almond and Verba, structures/roles (institutions), incumbents (authorities), and policies/decisions/enforcement are prime features of any political system (Almond 1956: 394; Almond and Verba 1989: 14). This thesis is only concerned with understanding the causes of political trust, which is one of the several dimensions of political support; however, juxtaposing it with other dimensions of support would further clarify its nature and meanings.

Figure 2.1 outlines the most notable conceptualizations of political support offered by Lipset (1960), Almond and Verba (1989, first published in 1963), Easton (1965, 1975), Norris (1999, 2017b), Dalton (2004), and Fuchs (2007). Legitimacy and effectiveness are important dimensions of Lipset's account of political support. Compared to the legitimacy, which involves engendering and maintaining the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society, effectiveness stands for the performance of a political system according to the expectations of the main stakeholders of the regime: population, big business, and armed forces.

Almond and Verba offered a slightly different, three-fold classification: system, output, and input affects. System affect stands for citizens' feelings towards the nation, its virtues, and accomplishments, which can be captured through citizens' pride in national institutions, type of economic system, contribution in arts and sciences, and so on. Output affect is concerned about their expectations, experiences, and perceptions of treatments at the hands of public servants. Examples of items measuring these feelings include expectations of equal treatment and respectful treatment by government officials and the police. Finally, citizens' feelings towards the agencies and processes responsible for administering the elections and enacting public policies. These feelings can be tapped into through such questions as communication frequency with politicians, voting behavior, and political affairs discussions.

For Easton, political support reflects citizens' attitudinal or behavioural responses towards political objects, including institutions and authorities. He dissected political support into diffuse and specific support. Through specific support—*what* the political authorities do and *how* they do it—the public evaluates the accomplishment of their demands against expectations and the performance of the authorities, and citizens' satisfaction with them can usually measure it. Second, people evaluate *what an object or authority is* rather than what it does via diffused support. This latter kind of support, measured through trust and political legitimacy, is directed towards the political community, institutions, and norms/principles. Conversely, performance and satisfaction are important dimensions of specific support.

**Figure 2.1 Types of Political Support and Political Trust**

|                     | Lipset (1960)         | Almond (1963, 1989) | Easton (1965, 1975) | Norris (1999, 2017)                       | Dalton (2004)                             | Fuchs (2007)                           |
|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|---|--|
| Political Community | Diffuse support<br>↑  | Community           | Community           | Community                                 | Orientations and Evaluations<br>Community |  |
| Regime              | Institutions          | Institutions        | Institutions        | Institutions<br>Performance<br>Principles | Principles<br>Norms<br>Institutions       | Democratic values<br>Democratic regime |
| Authorities         |                       | Authorities         | Authorities         | Actors                                    | Authorities                               | Authorities                            |
|                     | ↓<br>Specific support |                     |                     |   |   |  |

Expanding on the previous operationalization, Norris (1999: 9-13) and Dalton (2004: 23-24) introduced fivefold frameworks but in distinct fashions. Norris argued that political support runs on a continuum from diffuse to specific support ranging from support for the political community (e.g., national pride, patriotism, and identity), regime principles (e.g., approval of democratic values and ideals), performance (e.g., democratic process performance, outcome performance), institutions (e.g., trust in the institutions of the state including parliament, political parties, political parties, courts, police and so on), and actors (e.g., party leaders, legislators, and bureaucrats). Norris writes about support only in terms of evaluation. Building on the difference between cognitive and affective beliefs (Almond and Verba 1989), Dalton differentiates between affective and evaluative orientations. Compared to affective beliefs, which involve recognizing, identifying, and accepting political objects and authorities, evaluative beliefs are associated with performance evaluations of these objects.

Dalton's (2004: 24) conceptual and operational definition of affective beliefs is problematic: 24). To reiterate, psychologically, cognitive orientations reflect information/knowledge of and beliefs in an object; affective orientations represent feelings and emotions directed towards that object; evaluation deals with the judgments about the performance of that object and is usually reflected through direct indicators as positive and negative ratings of those objects. The cognitive and evaluative orientations are similar to what Robeyns (2017) calls prescriptive and evaluative claims: A prescriptive claim is about the norms of behaviour related to an object, and an evaluative claim relies on evaluative terms, such as good or bad, better or worse, or desirable or undesirable. Thus, it is more appropriate to label Dalton's affective beliefs as cognitive or prescriptive orientations. It is important to note that performance is an important indicator of political support for Norris. She also puts regime norms into the category of regime principles. Conversely, Dalton differentiates between regime norms and principles and converged regime performance into the institutions. Finally, Fuchs' framework comprises only three regime support dimensions, namely democratic values, democratic regime, and political authorities.

Capturing support through cognitive and affective orientations is a fruitful framework of analysis to discern political support. This bifold orientation suggests that each of the objects of political support has its own diffuse and specific support. For example, it makes sense to idealize, recognize, and provide unconditional support to each of the institutions of liberal democracy and having positive emotions and feelings towards them. This collective recognition of regime principles and showing positive emotional attachment with them represents diffuse support for regime principles. Likewise, the belief system that politicians are *sin quo none* for democracy and exhibiting positive emotions towards them reflects diffuse support for them.

Conversely, the evaluation of the performance of democracy and political institutions, including politicians, represents specific support for them. From this angle, institutional trust represents both cognitive and affective orientations, and it makes less sense to put political trust either in the category of diffuse or specific support. Moreover, what matters is that it has a system-level

consequence (Hetherington 1998). A consistent deterioration of trust feelings while depriving the significant political support system necessary for the survival of any system (Miller 1974).

An additional point also needs attention: Whether institutions are treated as a broadly defined set of principles, values, and norms collectively governing a polity or narrowly conceived as structures performing specific roles through designated actors/authorities as suggested by the organizational theorists might change the conceptual boundaries between the different objects of political support. On this latter view, each of the institutions, either political or administrative, has a specific vision, mission, and objectives. Organizational norms, procedures, and rules collectively referred to as standard operating procedures binding authorities to perform their duties to realize organizational goals through different strategies. If this is the case, it is also important to determine whether procedures and norms produce organizations or vice versa. In the first case, political trust represents specific political support, as Dalton and Norris suggested (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999, 2017). If norms are the product of institutions, then the order of political support elements can be such that institutions produce norms, and citizens evaluate institutional performance against these norms. In this case, the political trust will fall closer to diffuse support for the political system, as Easton suggested (Easton 1965; Feldman 1983).

In summary, our concept of political trust falls in Easton's dimensions of diffuse support. At the same time, this thesis positions political trust as a form of diffuse support of its own type. More precisely, it represents citizens' cognitive orientations that the existing political institutions of democracy are appropriate ones and their positive and deeper affectations in the form of being happy, grateful, and proud for having them. It excludes Miller's (1974) conception that trust reflects evaluation of performance and legitimacy in the form of intention to comply with or actual compliance with these political institutions.

### **2.2.3 Political Trust Includes Confidence and Excludes Satisfaction**

Some researchers employ trust and confidence alternatively. Others call for making distinctions between them. For instance, Russel Hardin (1999, 2013) argues that any decision relating to conferring trust in large-scale institutions requires a deep and thorough understanding of the trust objects. Given the challenges, complexities, and capacities to understand the motives, intentions, and abilities of those holding the public offices, trustworthiness or confidence is appropriate for capturing the underlying construct. A more recent body of literature (Cao 2015; Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Möllering 2013; Norris 2017b; PytlikZillig and Kimbrough 2016; Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007) offers varying perspectives on nature, uses and applicability of confidence and trust at various levels of the society and state. Probably, it is not entirely possible to have profound, inner, rich, thick, thorough, and direct or even indirect experiences of political institutions of a state that house massive bureaucracies; work under complicated rules and procedures; encounter complex institutional frameworks; and involve myriads of actors and factors that are instrumental in shaping the political life of a country. Meeting these conditions is only possible in dyads relationships where two people know each other's demographic profiles, social status,



organizational position, job description, structures and functions of the organizations where they work, and so on.

Hierarchical structures interlock individual citizens and higher-level institutions. In such structures transcending total knowledge to either of the ends is neither necessary nor feasible under normal conditions. A state of total knowledge would render trust useless and trusting while completely being ignorant of the object would make rational explanations useless (D. J. McAllister 1995). However, building on rational explanations, it is plausible to make political trust an object of inquiry by invoking the principle of bounded rationality (Simon 1990), good reason (D. J. McAllister 1995), and global perceptions or reputations (Levi and Stoker 2000). In line with Barnes and Gill (2000), political trust “is the level of confidence citizens have in their government (both politicians and public officials) to ‘do the right thing,’ to act appropriately and honestly on behalf of the public.”

Likewise, satisfaction with democracy and government are other terms employed to tap into political trust (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Christensen and Lægreid 2005; Kaase 1999; G. Van Ryzin 2007). Customer services literature treats satisfaction as ‘a judgment that a product/service feature, or the product or service itself, provided (or is providing) a pleasurable level of consumption-related fulfillment, including levels of under or over fulfillment (Oliver 2010: 8). This overall post-purchase decision (Fornell 1992; Giese and Cote 2014) reflects the extent to which a product/service met the customer’s expectations, needs, and wants. Satisfaction comprising expectations, fulfillment, and overall orientation, overlaps with Hardin’s notation of trust: ‘A trusts B to do X (or with respect to X)’ (1999: 12). It is sufficient to argue that as a measure of specific support, satisfaction requires concrete experiences and is the retrospective evaluation of the institutional performance compared to the political trust, which captures diffuse support, is future-oriented and does not necessarily requires concrete experiences (Easton 1975; Grönlund and Setälä 2007).

## **2.2.4 Political Trust Excludes Political Legitimacy**

According to Lipset (1960: 77), legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for a society. For Easton (1965: 278, 1975: 451), legitimacy stands for ‘[. . .] the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere.’ Compared to the Lipset account, where legitimacy might be confused with feelings towards the political system and, therefore, an affective orientation, Easton, and several other researchers, particularly those studying the criminal justice system, focus on behavioural intention to accept and obey the institutions. Political scientists often use these two terms interchangeably; researchers in the criminal justice system make a clear distinction between them: trust reflects feelings of the effectiveness of institutions, and legitimacy stands for the obligation

to obey the laws and complying with the laws and regulations (Jonathan Jackson et al. 2012; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Tyler 2011; Tyler and Huo 2003). Thus, this thesis concentrates only on political trust.

### **2.2.5 Political Trust Excludes Social Trust**

Researchers distinguish between different types of trusts: personal and system trust (Luhmann 1979); interpersonal and generalized trust (Realo, Allik, and Greenfield 2008; Steinhardt 2012); institutional and generalized trust (Irwin 2009); fiduciary, generalized, and mutual trust (Thomas 1998); and strategic/rational, group/identity based, moral and generalized trust (Stolle 2002).

Social trust refers to the trust in others around us, including friends, family, acquaintances, and social organizations. These forms of trust are essential for social cohesion, integration, and stability of mass-scale multicultural societies (Uslaner 2018). Though it is challenging to determine the nature of the relationship between social and political trust (Khodyakov 2007), many scholars argue that social trust is the precondition for developing institutional trust (Almond and Verba 1989; Fukuyama 1995). On the political level, there is also a tradition to make a distinction between trust in international (the EU and the UN), regulatory (police, courts, and civil services), and political institutions (politicians, political parties, and parliament). It is the set of these latter institutions that this thesis examines.

## **2.3 On Public Services**

This thesis is about the role of expectancy-disconfirmation and micro-performance theories in explaining political trust in Europe. It is important to define the concept of service, which is central to both of these theories. Generally, all those goods and services rendered by a government are considered public services. Some researchers fear that there is no standard definition of ‘public services’ (Syvertsen 1991); the others, especially the economists, have ventured to develop different categories of goods and services, notably public and private ones, based on their characteristics and features (Head and Shoup 1969; Samuelson 1954).

Jesse and Wildavsky’s (1991) and Syvertsen’s (1991) works might provide some important insights to reach the concept of services that can be employed to evaluate input and output services of a political system. Jesse and Wildavsky categorize public goods and services based on the criteria of *non-rivalry/rivalry*, *non-excludability/excludability*, and the *impossibility of rejection*. The consumption of non-rival goods influences the quantity or quality of the pleasures enjoyed by others. Rival goods bring joy only to those who consume them. Likewise, non-excludable goods are served even to those who do not pay for them compared to excludable ones, which are reserved only for the payers of the services. ‘Impossibility of rejection means that an individual cannot abstain from the consumption of a public good even though he may wish to.’ Noting the contestation amongst economists which of these criteria precisely define public services as such, Jesse and Wildavsky define public goods as: ‘public goods are public because and only because society chooses to put the goods in the public sector instead of the private sector.’ On this view,

democracy is such public service. It is non-rival for the consumption of civil rights, and the political liberties of one group of individuals do not reduce others' pleasure in most liberal democracies. Regardless of the amount of taxes one pays, these civil liberties and political rights can not be denied to any of the citizens of a country.

Syvertsen counts *public utility*, *public sphere*, and *audience* as prime features of public services. Technically, *public utilities* stand for all those services that are commonly supplied by a political regime. This criterion applies equally to democracy and public services. On the input side, full or liberal democratic regimes ensure political rights and civil liberties. Suppose a regime that guarantees only political rights and denies civil liberties becomes electoral democracy. Likewise, denying political rights and ensuring civil liberties turn it into a liberal autocracy. Thus, a liberal democratic regime consistently provides the bundle of these rights and liberties and ensures to protect them if an individual or group tries to undermine the supply of these services. Likewise, through its output institutions, for example, police and schools/universities, a political system ensures the supply of such public services as security, law and order, and education, respectively.

While one can classify certain goods and services as public services and not others based on criteria laid down by Jesse and Wildavsky and Syvertsen's criteria are of public utilities. However, it is a big challenge to apply these schemes of classifications on democracy as a service provided to citizens. One such challenge is that constitutions of democratic regimes confer certain inalienable rights, such as the rights of minorities, as human rights that must be protected from the onslaught of majority authoritarianism. Second, political rights and civil liberties are those services that are hard to define and allocate based on the treatment of individual citizens either as clients or electorate.

Syvertsen's remaining two criteria—public sphere and audience—are appropriate for classifying democracy as a service like other public services rendered by a democratic regime. The public sphere refers to all those institutions where the general public can discuss and make those decisions that influence their collective wellbeing. Democracy is a public service for it provides them opportunities not only to elect their political leaders on polling days, but they can also exercise the various rights and liberties guaranteed to them by the constitutions in their everyday life to press their demands. Agencies on the output side of a political system responsible for providing services also come into the public sphere. The recent public demonstration against the employment reforms bill and its subsequent withdrawal in France shows that citizens can influence the design of policies relating to public agencies by taking their concerns into the public sphere. Not only this, they can also raise their voice against unjust working practices in the various public agencies, for example, police, healthcare, and education. Finally, both democracy and public services have the same *audience*—citizens. The poor performance of these input and output services can cause damages to the political elite and institutions in the short run, for disaffected citizens might draw their specific support. Moreover, consistent and perpetual bad performance might erode public confidence in them, resulting in swirling up the feeling of system change (Miller 1974).

To sum it up, a political system on its input side provides the services of ensuring, protecting and promoting political rights and civil liberties and its output institutions provide several services, including security, education, health, post services, and roads.

## **2.4 Theory: Quality of Democracy, Quality of Government and Political Trust**

The main assumptions of this thesis are guided by the rational choice account of political trust, which argues that trust is related to the performance of political regimes: thus, those regimes that consistently show better performance or quality tend to generate higher political support, including political trust (Bouckaert et al. 2002; Russel Hardin 1999; Russell Hardin 1996, 2002, 2006; van der Meer 2010; Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 2011a). Trust defines the boundaries of political offices and outlines performance targets and neglect of duties (Parry 1976); thereby, those who fail to meet citizens' expectations of performance and neglect their duties are more likely to face distrust.

Performance evaluation is one of the widely studied subjects in politics and public services despite its ambiguous definition (Gilley 2006; Putnam, Leonardi, and Manetti 1988). However, researchers are well conscious of the distinction between democratic performance/quality of democracy and government effectiveness/quality of public services. Democratic performance refers to evaluating input side institutions of a political system encompassing electoral and liberal democracy; quality of government constitutes an assessment of what happens on the political system's output side (Foweraker and Krznaric 2003). These two aspects are also referred to as process performance and policy performance (Norris 2011a). The qualities of these aspects can be measured objectively and subjectively.

### **2.4.1 Objective Quality of Democracy and Quality of Government**

There are two approaches to studying quality: Static and dynamic quality (Walsh 1991) and technical and functional quality (Gronroos 1984). Examining the technical features of products and services are common to both approaches. However, who evaluates these technical features are different. According to Walsh, the static view emphasizes the conformance of the product with technical aspects and is more likely to be assessed by experts. Thus, high-quality products would be those that have no or minor faults. However, Grönroos defines technical quality in terms of consumers' perceptions of outcomes. Compared to the dynamic view of the quality that concentrates on realizing the purpose for which a product or service was designed, the functional dimension emphasizes the nature and dynamics of interaction between producers and consumers of a service.

The technical version of the quality of democracy will hold that contemporary democratic regimes are in line with the international norms and standards of democracy as defined, operationalized, and evaluated by the experts and authorities. For instance, the quality of democracy refers to the extent to which a given polyarchy realizes its goal (for example, participation, competition, the rule of law, and individual rights) as a political system (Dahl 1971, 1989). Several institutions,

including Polity IV, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Varieties of Democracy, employ teams of country-level experts to assess the extent to which various democratic regimes meet these conditions.

Likewise, the definition of the quality of government usually concentrates on institutional and economic development in a macro context. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) notes that a good government protects property rights and provides effective bureaucracy and democracy. A similar view appears in Kaufmann and his colleagues' work: the quality of government stands for all those traditions and institutions associated with the election of a government and its effectiveness in the design and implementation of public policies (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). They have developed the World Governance Indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) dataset for the World Bank. These datasets are used to produce various kinds of ranking and have extensively been used to predict political support directed towards political objects, including trust in political institutions (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Keele 2004; Kelleher, Wolak, and Kelleher 2007; Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 2011a). Combined, this body of scholarship indicates that the quality of democracy and quality of government indicated by political rights and civil liberties, governance, unemployment, inflation rates, economic growth, poverty, and corruption are linked with political trust.

The objective quality of democracy and government are not the direct subject of this thesis for two reasons. First, the countries included in this analysis are highly developed Western democracies that are similar in terms of the levels of democracies, with few exceptions. For instance, though elections are highly contested in European polities, they manifest electoral integrity at the same time. Second, liberal democracy is standard norm and practice in many countries of Europe, with Hungary and Poland recently showing signs of illiberalism. Despite these similarities, these countries differ in indicators of the technical quality of liberal democracy, including voice and accountability, government effectiveness, economic development, political background indicated by communist legitimacy, the level of corruption, and. These are included as country-level control variables.

#### **2.4.2 Subjective Quality of Democracy and Quality of Public Services**

The service sector literature conceives quality as the consumers' perceptions and experiences of the superior performance of the services rendered to them (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988). This means that past the technical quality level evaluated by experts, citizens can better judge the quality of democracy provided as a service by a political system and public services both as political stakeholders where democracy might have its own intrinsic values for them and as financiers and consumers in the form of a taxpayer (Beetham et al. 2008: 9; Hill 1977). This calls for exploring the role of citizens' everyday perceptions and experiences of democratic services and public services. It is important to reiterate that these performance-related evaluations are different from the feelings of satisfaction or trust. Compared to performance measurements, which

ranks citizens' positive or negative assessments of the various aspects of public services and does not tell what to do with these evaluations, satisfaction is an emotional response reflecting the degree of likeness or happiness after achieving the values that are attached with the democracy and public services.

There are two versions of the subjective quality: American and Nordic versions (Gronroos 1984). The American perspective focuses on comparing performance standards, actual performance, and the gap between the two or disconfirmation. On this view, the quality of democracy would mean citizens' strong support for democratic norms or principles, their superior evaluation of the democratic performance of their political regimes, and a positive gap between performance minus expectations. In other words, while support for norms is an important source of diffused legitimacy, they might serve as a cognitive yardstick against which citizens might evaluate the subjective quality of their democracy (Dalton 2004b; Norris 2000; Palacios 2018). History of democracy, political socialization, and direct experiences of living under democratic regimes might be instrumental in promoting support for regime principles in established democracies within countries. A retrospective promotion of these values occurs when democratic norms of behaviour are reflected in the day-to-day working of such polities.

The Nordic approach is the performance-only approach to assessing quality, which can be examined in three ways. The first version might be the policy performance account, representing citizens' superior evaluation of various public policies concerning employment generation, poverty evaluation, and welfare state performance. The second version might be citizens' evaluation of the impartiality of the public servants (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Finally, the quality of government can be examined from the perspective of what public agencies do and how they do (Bouckaert and Walle 2003; G. G. Van Ryzin 2011; Tyler 1988, 2003). Combined, this latter body of scholarship defines the quality of government in terms of citizens' perceptions and experiences of justice, fairness, and effectiveness of the various public services that a government provides.

Figure 2.2 plots a brief summary of the quality of the regime comprising quality of democracy and quality of government. Based on the American approach, the quality of democracy consists of democratic expectations, performance, and disconfirmation. Following the Nordic approach, the quality of public services can stand for citizens' perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. These subjective versions are the determinants of political trust in Europe.

### **2.4.3 Quality of Democracy and Political Trust**

I have only one passion, the love of liberty and human dignity. All forms of government are in my eyes only more or less perfect ways of satisfying this holy and legitimate passion of man.

– Tocqueville (Hall 1992)

Sociologist T.H. Marshall wrote a seminal essay on '*Citizenship and Social Class*,' concentrating on the historical evolution of three types of rights – civil, political, and social rights—that is worth mentioning here (Marshall 1950). Civil rights deal with citizens' relationships with each other; political rights are associated with the exercise of political power, both as an elector and elected; and social rights concentrate on the economic and social wellbeing. The extent to which these rights appear in the constitutional arrangement and everyday working of a political system led political scientists to define and categorize democratic political systems.

Democracy and its underlying constructs are contested concepts, as there is neither an agreed-upon definition nor any specific operational indicators of democracy.<sup>4</sup> Generally, it is conceived as a form of government ruled by the people and is 'completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens' (Dahl 1971: 2). Dahl's democracy is a polyarchy that offers opportunities to the citizens to (1) "formulate their preferences, signify those preferences to their fellow citizens through individual and collective actions, and (3) their preferences are weighted equally in the conduct of government." What is significant here is that a polyarchy ensures such institutional guarantees as: "freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and vote, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies depend on vote and other expressions of preferences."


Further, democracies not only provide a chance to the opposition to win the elections but who so even wins may occupy the office as is prescribed in the constitution (O'Donnell 2007). And finally, such a democratic regime exhibits a capacity to decide without being under pressure from non-elected officials from within and outside the boundaries of the state, referred to as internal and external political autonomy, respectively (Schmitter and Karl 1991). On the one hand, these opportunities are designed, developed, and socialized by the institutions in the form of regime principles, norms, and values. Citizens might learn them by living in democratic regimes in established political systems. On the other hand, the democracy promotion project is one of the important contributions of the international institutions and developed democracies to developing societies. Together, these socialization experiences are important cognitive and normative resources that help citizens learn the principles and norms on which the democracy project is built.

On the other hand, these norms and values are reflected in the day-to-day practices of democratic institutions. These everyday perceptions and experiences might shape citizens' judgments of the performance of their democratic regimes. On an objective level, the existence and working of these bundles of political rights and civil liberties qualify a regime to be democratic or any other system (Beetham 2004). On a perceptual level, citizens' cognition of the democratic norms and principles and their evaluation of working of democracies might be called democratic expectations and

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<sup>4</sup> See, for example Coppedge et al. (2011), for an overview of the existing operational definitions of democracy.

**Figure 2.2 Dimensions of the Quality of a Regime**



**Legend:** GDP=Gross domestic product; GNP=Gross national product; CPI=Corruption perception index; and WGI=World Governance Indicators.



democratic performance, which serve as the building block of the disconfirmation model of quality of democracy and political trust.

Democracies have been classified differently based on specific standards and methods (Bühlmann et al. 2008; Fuchs and Roller 2018; Kriesi and Ferrín 2016; Morlino 2004a, 2004b; Zhai 2019). Accordingly, there are constitutional, electoral, liberal, social, and direct democracies; there are hybrid, flawed and full democracies; then we have deficient, populist, and defective democracies and so on. Of particular interest here are the electoral and liberal conceptions of democracy both in terms of the existence of opportunities pertaining to political rights and civil liberties at the structural level and citizens' perceptions and experiences of working of these opportunities: these two aspects are referred to as objective and subjective quality of democracy (Fuchs and Roller 2018). The subjective quality of democracy ranges from electoral to liberal to direct democracy. The liberal dimension inherits electoral constituents, which has also been labeled as liberal-pluralism (Mayne and Geissel 2016). Given that these versions might operate differently and independently from each other in citizens' minds (Palacios 2018), their effects on political trust might vary as well.

There are two approaches to the study of quality: performance-only and disconfirmation. Suggestively, there are two approaches to examine its association with political trust. Social scientists have extensively examined the first account under the guise of process performance account guided by the rational choice theory. Trust is the function of expected utility of institutional performance (Mishler and Rose 2001). Those institutions that consistently perform according to citizens' expectations of promoting and protecting political rights and civil liberties are more likely to generate positive political trust feelings. On this view,

rational citizens will be more satisfied with democratic performance where regimes perform well against *the standard indicators* of democratic governance.... By contrast, dissatisfaction will be far stronger in states where governments routinely perform poorly, exemplified by repressive regimes which employ rigid coercion, abuse basic human rights and imprison opponents, profit from endemic corruption and crony capitalism, and govern by arbitrary rule (Norris 2011: 118).

However, critics believe that measuring "performance is more complicated than it first appears. Performance compared to what? Expectations? Past? Other countries? (Joseph S Nye Jr. 1997: 8). Expectations can serve as an important anchor against which citizens can rate their experiences and perceptions of the performance of democratic regimes. For a long, political scientists have been pressing on the role of expectations in explaining political trust (Citrin 1974). Of the several possible explanations of the decline of trust in government (Warren 1999: 350), democratic expectation and democratic performance are important for this inquiry. As Warren notes, political distrust might arise because citizens might believe that democratic institutions are not organized under democratic norms and principles or do not work according to them. Some earlier works hint at Warren's comments. Evidences suggest that democratic expectations not only have a direct role

in explaining political trust in Europe (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016), but a complex interaction between expectations, performance, and political trust operates as well (Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 1999).

The expectancy-disconfirmation approach to satisfaction, which was developed in the service sector literature and has gained tremendous empirical support (google citation index: 18416)<sup>5</sup>, is built on rational choice assumptions and can provide an alternative account of political trust based on citizens' evaluations of what happens on the input side of a political system. Developed by Richard L. Oliver (1980), this approach assumes that judgments about overall satisfaction with a product or service result from a complex cognitive process between expectations, performance, and disconfirmation or gap between the two. *Expectations* are what consumers want from the products or services. In other words, they are the standards or features that consumers attribute to the services and are developed through marketing campaigns, words of mouth, prior experiences, let alone representing only the needs. *Performance evaluation* means consumers' judgments of services—positive and negative. In other words, such assessments reflect the extent to which consumers' expectations are fulfilled or not. And *disconfirmation* is the gap between performance evaluation and expectation ratings. A positive disconfirmation results when performance ratings exceed expectations. Conversely, negative disconfirmation occurs when performance falls short of expectations.

Model 2.1 represents a political trust model based on the expectancy-disconfirmation theory. In this model:

- expectations are negatively (Path A) and performance evaluations positively (Path B) associated with disconfirmation,
- expectations are either negatively or positively associated (Path F), and performance assessments (Path C) and disconfirmation ratings (Path E) are positively related to political trust judgments, and
- disconfirmation mediates the relationship between expectations, performance, and political trust (Path ABC).

Two strands of literature appear within the service sector literature where such a model was initially developed and tested. Expectancy-disconfirmation theory examined sources of satisfaction rather than trust. As the service sector literature employs satisfaction as a dependent variable, for the sake of building a theoretical argument, we use satisfaction and trust alternatively, being very much conscious that trust and satisfaction are conceptually different constructs.

The American perspective assumes disconfirmation as a measure of quality. Under the rational choice assumption, a decrease in the gap between expectations and performance increases satisfaction and trust. This assumption has received empirical support in the studies that have been

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<sup>5</sup> Searched on google.scholar.come with this title: "A cognitive model of the antecedents and consequences of satisfaction decisions" on February 11, 2021.

undertaken so far. For instance, James' (2009) analysis of the data on local government services in England suggests that positive disconfirmation increases citizens' satisfaction with overall and waste collection services. Van Ryzin (2004, 2005), based on the analyses of survey data from the United States, found that expectations, performance, and disconfirmation influenced satisfaction with local public service in New York City (2004) and the whole country (2005) in the expected directions. The mediated effect of expectations via disconfirmation was smaller compared to their direct effects.

In a latter experimental survey involving manipulating of the expectations of respondents sampled from the USA, Canada, and some of the European states, Van Ryzin found that though the overall model performed in the expected direction yet the positive direct effect of expectations was offset by its mediated negative impact through disconfirmation, suggesting that expectations have zero effect on satisfaction (Ryzin 2013). Filtenborg and his colleagues replicated the same experiment with a sample of three Danish local public services: street cleanliness, library, and schools. Compared to the zero total effect of expectations on satisfaction reported by Van Ryzin (2013), Filtenborg et al. found that the direct effect of expectations on satisfaction for street and library services was much more salient than their indirect effect through disconfirmation. In contrast to the assumption that disconfirmation influences trust or satisfaction positively, their study showed mixed effects: this relationship (Filtenborg, Gaardboe, and Sigsgaard-Rasmussen 2017).

Political science literature can be organized in four different ways: expectations, performance, and disconfirmation influence political trust independent of each other; and a fuller model where the political trust depends upon the complex interaction between the three predictors. There are two ways in which democratic expectations can be conceptualized: a broader and idealistic view embracing democracy as a preferred form of government over any other system. It is important to note that the research suggests mixed direct consequences of democratic value orientations for political trust (Kończyńska 2020; Mauk 2020a).

Alternatively, democracy encompasses orientations towards the various norms and standards of democracy. These expectations might develop through multiple sources and in several phases spanning the history of a nation. For instance, one such source is the civic knowledge about the very idea and history of developing democratic institutions and its transmission for equipping the generations with the importance of political rights and civil liberties. Moreover, citizens' cognition of these rights and liberties might also result from their horizontal and vertical interactions to which researchers refer to as social capital and institutions, respectively. These orientations, reflecting citizens' cognitions of their rights and liberties, are referred to as democratic expectations. How a democratic regime performs against these global norms or expectations stands for democratic performance. And democratic disconfirmation refers to the difference between these two measures—the lower the gap, the better the quality of democracy.

The empirical literature so far produced supports these assumptions that three qualities of democracy are related to political trust. Decades ago, Almond and Verba showed that the stability,

effectiveness, and legitimacy of any political system depend upon citizens' orientations towards various political processes (Almond and Verba 1989). For instance, Hooghe and his colleagues predicted that variations in democratic expectations affect Europeans' political trust feelings (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016). Several studies suggest that institutional trust depends upon an assessment of the performance of political systems on aspects related to electoral democracy such as electoral fairness, political rights, feelings of powerless, political involvement and efficacy, and political discussions (Christian 2019; J. R. Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Job 2005; Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Magalhães 2006; Mauk 2020b). Studies also provide support to the effects of the state of various civil rights, including the state of human rights, voice, and accountability, the rule of law, freedom of the press, gender equality, corruption perceptions (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2009; Landman 2018; Mishler and Rose 1997; Norris 2011a).


Disconfirmation or a gap between expectations and performance is the third way to conceive quality (Park and Yi 2016). However, political science literature largely fails to recognize the role of such a measure in explaining political trust with two exceptions. The work of Waterman et al. (1999) examining the expectation gap effects on citizens' approval of the incumbent American President and their future voting intentions provides a hint that such a mechanism might work for explaining political trust elsewhere. An additional clue might come from Sirovátka et al. (2018), whose inquiry showed that the gap between welfare expectation and welfare performance was the key predictor of satisfaction with democracy in Europe.

The fourth line of inquiry in political science literature has tested the fuller disconfirmation model. In this view, citizens' feelings of political trust and satisfaction result from a complex cognitive process involving interaction between expectations, performance, and disconfirmation. Building on the works of Van Ryzin (2004, 2005) and others, Morgeson (2013) and Seyd (2015) performed their inquiries in the American and British contexts. Morgeson employed data from the American Customer Service Index for the year 2010 and subset it only to those citizens who have interacted with fifty-eight federal public services in one way or the other. His analysis showed that all the paths in the model were statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with public services except that expectations were positively associated with disconfirmation. Conversely, Seyd employed perceptions of the honesty of members of the British Parliament as a proxy of political trust and found that expectations measured as respondents' orientations towards different standards of behaviour from the Parliamentarians offer very little explanatory power. Rather, it was the perceptions of the actual performance against the expectations that account for citizens' feelings of political trust.

Figure 2.3 presents a fuller model of political trust based on the literature presented in afore paragraphs. It is expected that democratic expectations and democratic performance will have a negative (Path A) and positive association (Path B) with political trust, respectively. The disconfirmation will affect political trust positively (Path C). As disconfirmation reflects the gap between expectations and performance, increasing performance ratings will meet expectations or surpass them, increasing political trust. However, democratic expectations will influence political

trust positively (Path A). As some studies in service sector literature suggest, expectations have adverse effects (James 2009) compared to most studies showing a positive effect. Therefore, the direction of this relationship is not clear (Morgeson 2013; Van Ryzin 2004a, 2005). Moreover, performance will have a positive association with political trust and (Path E). Finally, it is plausible that the higher democratic expectation would have a pull effect on democratic institutions to enhance their performance, thus suggesting a positive correlation between expectations and performance (Path D).

**Figure 2.3 Relationship Between the Quality of Democracy and Political Trust**



**Source:** Adopted from Van Ryzin (2004)

**Legend:** QoD=Quality of democracy

### General Expectations

This section can be summarized in the form of three expectations: (1) Democratic expectations, democratic performance and democratic disconfirmation, as measures of the quality of democracy, will be associated with political trust; (2) however, as Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the relationship between democratic expectations, democratic performance and political trust will be mediated by democratic disconfirmation; and (3) these relationships are expected to perform in electoral democracy and liberal democracy separately as citizens are assumed to make a distinction between these two forms of democracy (Section 2.4.2). In-depth examinations of the existing literature and the direction of the relationships are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

#### 2.4.4 Quality of Public Services and Political Trust

How can people trust government to do big things if we can't do little things like answer the phone promptly and politely?

– Clinton and Al Gore

To be blunt, whereas what happens on the input side usually has little consequence for individual citizens, what the state does on the output side may be life-threatening.

– Rothstein (2009: 323)

This section develops an alternative view of the quality—performance-only/Nordic version—inspired mainly by the service sector literature that can be supported by the political science and public administration scholarship. Such a quality version is different from the technocratic version of quality primarily conceived and employed by economists and international institutions such as the World Bank. They alternatively and frequently use quality of government, state capacity, administrative capacity, and good governance (Back and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2007).

The Nordic approach defines quality in terms of consumers' superior evaluations of the products and service based on their experiences and perceptions (Gronroos 1984). On this view, the quality of government reflects citizens' excellent assessment of the performance of government. Another theory, advanced by political scientists Rothstein and Teorell (2008), conceived quality in the impartial implementation of public policies. The two approaches stand in tension with each other. The first version focusing only on superior evaluations, no matter these evaluations, precisely considers evaluators' views of justice or impartiality. The commonly used measure of citizens' judgments about the state of health, education, and economy (Lühiste 2014) assessment might be taken as measures the first conception of quality. Conversely, neglecting whether judgments of service effectiveness matter or not, the latter perspective focuses only on impartiality or fairness as criteria of judging quality. The underlying assumption of such an argument is that fair procedural leads to fair outcomes, and assumably, they should measure the one and the same thing with identical predictive powers.

The theoretical and empirical works advanced so far might be fruitful in further refining these arguments. Political science researchers primarily influenced by the development, maintenance, and improvement of quality of goods and services define democratic quality in terms of contents, procedures, and results (Diamond and Morlino 2014; Morlino 2004a). Public administration and criminal justice strands of literature define performance slightly differently. For instance, Van Ryzin (2011, 2015) distinguishes between the process and outcome aspects of performance. Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval (2003) the performance stands for citizens' perceptions of the managerial quality reflected by human quality, transparency and accountability, morality and ethics, and innovation and creativity. Still, those examining the criminal justice system understand

performance from the angle of justice and fairness (Tyler 2003; Tyler and Folger 1980). There are extensive discussion and debate over what justice is and whether justice and fairness are the same things (Goldman and Cropanzano 2015; Rawls 1958; Sen 2006).

These approaches can be condensed into a comprehensive perspective of quality that might be equally applicable to various public services. Thus, quality can be conceived in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. These three evaluations are based on some comparisons based on either equity, equality, or need (Beugre and Baron 2001). The principle of *distributive justice* calls for indiscriminate treatment, which means that public servants do not consider gender, race, ethnicity, class, and religious affiliation during the delivery of public services. There is a more substantial probability that citizens would compare what outcomes they receive vis-à-vis these referents. Second, *procedural fairness* norms demand that the civil servants must be impartial in disposing of their duties—the due process is applied in letter and spirit. The common referents are often the laid down organizational rules, norms, and norms whose violation by the public authorities might cause a feeling of unfair treatment amongst the citizens. Finally, *effectiveness* means that public organizations serve the very purpose they are mandated to perform. Measuring effectiveness is one of the most challenging tasks (Kelly 2003) not only because public managers might focus on outcomes, but they might also escape the application of rules in letter and spirit. While some people might evaluate agencies' performance in terms of fair implementation of procedures, for others, all is well when the end is well might matter more. Moreover, compared to the limited information and resources at the disposal of the public agencies, demands that citizens make on them are heterogeneous and unlimited.

Finally, they might have political dimensions: politicians might favour and actively pursue those policies and programs that help them win the next elections. Despite these issues, effectiveness is less challenging to measure in some public agencies. For instance, both schooling and policing are homogenous services, which means high-quality, trained staff caters to these services (Das, Das, and McKenzie 1995). There are limited chances of rejection of rendering these services in theory and law. For instance, the police effectiveness can be defined in terms of their mandated functions, i.e., to provide security, control crimes, and apprehend criminals. Likewise, the educational systems are usually aimed at preparing future generations of politicians, administrators, researchers and scientists, public intellectuals, and so on.

In line with these quality concerns, citizens' evaluation of the public services would have consequences for their own working and specific support and consequential for the whole political system (Morgeson III 2014). If continuing for a more extended period of time, these performance evaluations and attachments translate into generalized attitudes towards authorities and political objects resulting in generalized attitudes towards them labeled as diffused support or political trust (Easton 1975). As Rothstein points out, “what happens on the input side usually has little consequence for individual citizens, what the state does on the output side may be life-threatening.” A loss of legitimacy by this way could even end up in civil wars (Rothstein 2009: 323).

An overwhelming body of research shows that citizens' evaluations of the performance of various public services are related to institutional trust. The relationship between the quality of public services and trust has been conceived and tested under two theoretical assumptions. The first line of inquiry, mainly revolving around the criminal justice literature, was initiated by Tom Tyler and his colleagues in the 1980s (Tyler 2003; Tyler and Folger 1980). There is a strand of literature within this stream that views police and courts as political institutions. Such literature shows that citizens' experiences and perceptions of the performance influence trust in these institutions (Solar 2015). Another strand that builds around the micro-performance thesis notes that the quality of various public services, including police and courts, affect political trust (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003; Yang and Holzer 2006). Micro-performance theory assumes that citizens' trust in government results from their concrete experiences and perceptions of the quality of public services they receive from the government rather than their abstract judgments. It argues that enhancing the perceptions of public agencies' performance and their bureaucracies is key to strengthening trust in politics and government.

A series of studies undertaken across different places and times demonstrates the utility of this theory in explaining political trust. Given that, this thesis focuses on the political trust effects of the quality of schooling and policing, an in-depth investigation and subsequent hypotheses are presented in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. It is imperative and sufficient to submit a brief review of the literature underpinning the importance of the micro-performance approach in general. Before presenting these evidences, it is important to reiterate that performance and satisfaction are important dimensions of specific support, and they can be proxied for each other. Likewise, it is also important to recognize that political trust and legitimacy are key dimensions of diffuse support, and they will be alternatively. Such an enterprise is only for the sake of building comprehensive review literature.

To begin with single-country studies, Vigoda-Gadot and his colleagues designed many studies on the various consequences of the quality of public administration in Israel. Firstly, they demonstrated and showed that though the relationship between performance and trust is not unidirectional, the performance was a better predictor of trust than the other way around (Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003). In another study, they showed that managerial quality and public service performance significantly predict such outcomes as trust in public administration, community involvement, and democratic participation (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi 2008). Christensen and Lægreid (2005) hypothesized and found that Norwegians' overall employment experiences, health, and social services positively influence their level of political trust.

Likewise, in the context of local democracy, Denters showed that citizens' concerns for satisfaction that Dutch citizens' local output satisfaction (an index of perceptions of the capacity of local governments to solve public issues and satisfaction with local public services) positively influences political legitimacy of local government (2014). Moreover, Guerrero's (2011) study on trust local government in Columbia found that perceptions of procedural fairness (measured as the likelihood of being punished for tax evasion) and of improvement in education, health, water



services, and crime-fighting, as well as satisfaction with street lighting and crime level in the city were positively associated with trust in local government.

Beyond individual country studies, comparative analyses support the quality of government as a better predictor of political legitimacy than the quality of democracy. For example, for his study, Ariely (2013) employed data from International Social Survey Program for satisfaction with democracy, subjective measures of evaluation of the public administration (an additive index three items), objective measures of quality of governance were taken from the World Bank Governance Indicator Project, and Freedom House's state of political rights and civil liberties were used as indicators of quality of democracy. Ariely's multilevel analysis involving 35 countries revealed that public administration quality was a stronger predictor of satisfaction with democracy at the individual and country-level than the quality of democracy.

Several studies have been performed suggesting the link between health care delivery and political trust. Perhaps most notables are the ones undertaken by Weerakkody et al. (2016), Rockers and Laugesen (2012), and Chukwuma et al. (2019). Weerakkody et al. found that system quality and information quality are important determinants of trust in e-government services in the United Kingdom. Rockers and Laugesen analyzed the 2002/3 World Health Survey data for 38 low and mid-income developing societies. They showed that compared to the technical quality of health (index of provider skill, availability of equipment, and availability of drugs) and feelings of involvement in the health care provision positive effects on political trust, the perceptions of unfair treatment by the health authorities had adverse consequences. Likewise, Chukwuma et al. analysis of the 1999-2015 African Barometer data suggested that the quality of health care delivery was significantly associated with Nigerians' trust in the incumbent President and the ruling party. If healthcare is taken as part of a larger spectrum of political institutions, then Papanicolas et al. (2013) analysis of 11 very high-income societies is important to note. Their analysis of the 2010 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey suggested that various measures of perceptions of the healthcare system, including waiting time, quality of information and testing, the interaction between doctors and patients, and cost had mixed effects on confidence in the health care system in France, Germany, the UK and the USA.


Hooghe et al. (2015), Claes and Hooghe (2017), and Osler and Starkey (2001) performed some of the most notable studies on the association between quality of schooling and political attitudes. In both of their studies, Hooghe and his colleagues found that students' perceptions of open classroom discussion and instruction quality were significantly associated with political trust in Belgium. Osler and Starkey argued that civic education programs in France and England are declarative and implicit in nature. In France, the national identity is particularly shaped by the educational programs built around principles of freedom, equality, solidarity, and human rights. The UK program of study does not produce a clear sense of national identity.

Only fewer studies have directly examined the political trust effects of the quality of policing. For instance, Marien and Werner (2019) found that the Europeans' perceptions of the procedural

fairness and functional effectiveness of the police influenced their feelings of political trust. Following the tradition where trust in the police and criminal justice system might be assumed as dimensions of political trust, Hinds and Murphy (2007) study in Austrian and Hough et al. (2013) work in the European context suggested the citizens' perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness and police performance significantly influenced trust in the police, which strongly support the earlier investigations carried out by Tyler and his colleagues on trust and legitimacy of the institutions of the criminal justice system in the USA and elsewhere (Tyler 2002; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Folger 1980).

### General Expectations

Figure 2.4 provides a general set of expectations based on the literature review produced in the proceeding section. First, it is argued that the quality of public services is a three-dimensional construct including distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Then under the guise of micro-performance theory, it is assumed that citizens' judgments of these three measures of the quality of public services will positively affect political trust. In-depth examinations of the existing literature and the direction of the relationships for the quality of schooling and quality of policing are discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.



## 2.5 Control Variables

It is assumed that the relationship between quality of democracy, quality of public services, and political trust might be confounded by several individual-level and contextual-level variables. However, an extensive literature review suggests a series of individual-level demographic factors, welfare performance, economic and political attitudes, and social capital influence political trust. The country-level variables are communist past and quality of democracy/government. These variables are plotted in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. The subsections provide a comprehensive account of these variables.

### 2.5.1 Individual-Level Control Variables

#### Sociodemographic Factors

*Gender, age, religiousness, education, and domicile* are selected to control the sociodemographic variables. The traditional demographic variables (age, gender, and education) have more mixed pieces of evidence than religiousness and domicile. It has been found that men and women engage differently in politics and society: while women are more likely to participate in organizational life and activism, including signing petitions, making donations, and boycotting products for political reasons; conversely, men are more likely to engage in politics through party memberships and direct contacts which have been linked to political trust (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Schoon et al. 2010). Women are more trusting than men, not only because there are more women in the public sector than men<sup>6</sup> but also because they indirectly receive care services (Christensen and Læg Reid 2005). There are mixed results of gender effects on political trust: some studies show that women are more trusting (Arpino and Obydenkova 2019; Camões and Mendes 2019; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012); others reveal they are less trusting (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Kołczyńska 2020); still, others find that gender does not matter at all in explaining political trust (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Catterberg and Moreno 2005).

The relationship between age, education, and political support are somewhat ambiguous as younger and educated people in developed countries can be expected to be trusting and distrusting at the same time. Living and socializing in the democratic polities inculcate in them democratic norms and values; still, such experiences enhance their cognitive capacities and sharpen their skills, thus turning them critical towards working of the politics (Christensen and Læg Reid 2005; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Önnudóttir and Harðarson 2011; Schoon et al. 2010). Available results suggest that political support goes up (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Norris 2011a) falls with age and education (Camões and Mendes 2019; Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Esaiasson, Dahlberg, and Kokkonen 2020; Goubin and Hooghe 2020).

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.unece.org/info/media/news/statistics/2017/women-at-work-but-in-which-sector-assessing-persisting-gender-segregation-across-the-region/doc.html>

Given these evidences, it is not easier to predict the direction of the effect of any of these variables. It is an uphill task to expect the direction of the effect of any of these variables. However, in these studies, religiosity consistently influenced trust positively. Moreover, as those believing in traditional value structures hardly criticize the authority structure and institutions (Inglehart and Baker 2000), in line with the current findings, a positive relationship is expected between religiosity and political trust. Under the proximity hypothesis, those living in rural areas would show the least confidence than urban or semi-urban dwellers.

### **Welfare Performance**

Rational choice account assumes that citizens' feelings of political trust and satisfaction are based on what they receive from the government. Within the policy performance hypothesis framework, it is argued that citizens give the government credit if it provides them with safety and security and provides them with better health and educational facilities (Norris 2011: 115-35). It is not only that researchers have explored the role of the perceptions of the design of the welfare state institutions on several political orientations, including political trust and satisfaction, but the perceptions of their good or bad performance also matter in shaping citizens feelings of political trust and satisfaction (Berg and Hjerm 2010; Christensen and Lægreid 2005; Kumlin 2002; Lühiste 2014).

### **Socioeconomic Variables**

*Sociotropic* and *pocketbook* perceptions have been found to another important group of variables shaping several political behaviours. A large body of empirical literature has been produced so far following Lipset's (1960) observation of a close association between economic development and democratic development. The underlying argument of these investigations is that when economic performance goes down, citizens are more likely to believe that their parliaments and governments are less competent to handle the economy and vice versa (Van Erkel and Van Der Meer 2016), which is supported by a large body of empirical literature (Anderson and Guillory 1997; M. Loveless 2020; Mishler and Rose 1997). Moreover, in line with the existing literature (Haugsgjerd and Kumlin 2019; Kołczyńska 2020), it is expected that objective income or feelings about household income would affect political trust positively.

### **Political Variables**

The variables included in this block are *politics in politics*, *satisfaction with government*, and self-placement on the *political left-right* scale. There are two ways to conceive the role of political interest (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). One line of argument is that those interested in politics are more likely to enhance their knowledge about their country's politico-administrative system. This better integration into the political system would result in greater institutional trust. The reverse argument is that such an integration would expose them to the working of their political system. If they fail to bring in the desired change into it, the resulting frustration might cause more disaffection. Mostly, interest in politics or political knowledge positively influenced political trust

(Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Soren Holmberg, Lindberg, and Svensson 2017; Torcal 2014); however, it produced adverse effects (M. Loveless 2020).

Through cognitive schema, ideology plays a significant role in structuring political knowledge and attitudes. Concerning politics, two traditionally employed literature measures are *left-right* and conservative-liberal orientations; the latter frequently appears in American and the former in European scholarly traditions (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). A series of metaphors is associated with the left-right dichotomy (Bobbio and Cameron 1997): communism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism (Heywood 2017: 15). Still, for this thesis, in contrast to the right, those who identify themselves on the political left are progressives who favour change over the status quo and rejecting inequalities (Jost et al. 2003). These differences are associated with a range of political attitudes with some of the most recent studies showed it has positive (Dassonneville and McAllister 2019; Soren Holmberg, Lindberg, and Svensson 2017), negative (Camões and Mendes 2019; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), and mixed-effects (Torcal 2014). Given these findings, it is expected that the left-right orientation would be associated with political trust; however, the direction of causality of this relationship is not clear.

## **Social Capital**

Social capital theorists view that an efficient and effective democratic system requires reciprocity, mutuality, and trust amongst its citizens, and this virtuous circle spirals up to produce political trust (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). Whether social capital has any effect depends upon the measures which are being used to capture it. For example, in contrast to organizational membership, interpersonal trust positively influenced political trust (Camões and Mendes 2019; Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Magalhães 2016).

### **2.5.2 Country-Level Variables**

The country-level control variables are *communist past*, *democratic governance*, *gross domestic product (GDP)*, and *corruption perceptions (CPI)*. Earlier studies argue that the communist past might be correlated with political trust (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Mishler and Rose 1997). Arguably, the level of democratic governance improves political trust. Furthermore, some studies have shown that human rights and civil liberties play an essential role in producing satisfaction with democracy (Norris 2011a; Reher 2015). In other words, those polities have highly trusted political institutions demonstrating a track record of good democratic governance indicated by free and fair elections coupled with the abundance of civil rights and freedoms not only in the eyes of country-level experts but are highly appreciated so by such international forums as V-Dem, Freedom House, Polity IV, Economist Intelligence Unit, and World Bank. On this line, a higher level of democratic governance will predict political trust positively. Moreover, in line with several other studies, this thesis also controlled for the country's level of wealth indicated by GDP per capita and CPI (Daoust and Nadeau 2020; Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Kołczyńska 2020; M. Loveless 2020; Obydenkova and Arpino 2018). Combined, these studies offer mixed evidence suggesting that GDP might have

positive, negative, and no effect at all on political trust. Likewise, the effect of corruption control was either positive or not significant.

## **2.6 Summary**

Political trust in many European nations is declining. This chapter firstly explored the meanings of political trust and tried to distinguish it from a series of other terms that might conflate with it. It also demonstrated the possibility of considering democratic services like those offered by the public agencies. Then, the political trust effects of the quality of democracy and the quality of public services were demonstrated based on the rational choice literature.

More precisely, mobilizing the expectancy-disconfirmation literature, it demonstrated that while democratic expectations, performance, and disconfirmation might independently shape political trust, a complex interaction between them might account for any change in the feelings of trust as well. This standard theoretical model is expected to be applicable for examining the trust effects of the quality of electoral democracy (Chapter 5) and the quality of liberal democracy (Chapter 6) separately, given that citizens might differentiate between the electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy.

Conceiving quality in terms of citizens' superior evaluation of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness and mobilizing the Nordic approach to quality, the last section of this chapter demonstrated the association between public service quality and political trust. Though these three quality dimensions are expected to have their independent effects, they might mutually reinforce each other. The quality of schooling (Chapter 7) and the quality of policing (Chapter 8) were considered prime examples to test the underlying theoretical model. Given that existing studies suggest the role of individual-level and contextual-level variables, they were included in the justified and included in the theoretical models presented in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.

The next chapter plots a comprehensive overview of research design, data and analytical intervention.

## Chapter 3 Research Design

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### 3.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the association between citizens' evaluations of the quality of democracy, the quality of public services, and political trust in Europe. To do so, it firstly differentiates between regulatory and services institutions and representative institutions and then concentrates only on trust in three representative institutions: parliament, political parties, and politicians. The individual-level measures of the quality of democracy and the quality of public services are extracted from Round 6, 2, and 5 of the European Survey [hereafter: ESS-6 (2012), ESS-2 (2004), and ESS-10 (2010)], to which some country-level variables are added. ESS-6 contains a battery of questions capturing citizens' expectations from democracy in general and their specific evaluations of working of democracy in their home countries. Along with these, the gap between performance and expectations—disconfirmation—will serve as a measure of the quality of democracy. Following theoretical distinction, these items are divided into measures of quality of electoral democracy and quality of liberal democracy. Combined, they will test the political trust effects of these two frameworks of quality of democracy. In addition, ESS-2 and ESS-5 contain several questions measuring the quality of schooling and quality of policing, respectively. They will be employed to test the political trust effects of these two public services. Each of the empirical chapters will include five sets of individual-level and two country-level control variables.

### 3.2 Review of Theoretical Expectations

Chapter 2 outlined the main theoretical expectations underlying this thesis. However, a brief reiteration of those expectations would help us better understand and develop the methodological interventions. Firstly, it argued that process performance and outcome performance are the building blocks of producing political trust. Then it assumes that these two complementary aspects of performance could be represented by the quality of democracy and the quality of public services.

Afterward, building on the expectancy-disconfirmation approach and political science literature, it discussed that the quality of democracy could be represented by democratic expectations, democratic performance, and disconfirmation or performance-expectation gap. These measures of quality of democracy are expected to influence political trust in two fashions: Besides having their own independent effects, political trust might result from a complex interaction between these three measures, with disconfirmation acting as a mediating variable between democratic expectation, democratic performance, and political trust. A comprehensive account of these expectations for the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy are presented in Section 5.2 (Chapter 5) and Section 6.2 (Chapter 6), respectively.

On the output side of the political system, the performance of public services was conceived in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Building around the

micro-performance and performance-only approaches in the context of education and police services, it demonstrated that those who would consider that public service providers treat them indiscriminately. Section 7.2 (Chapter 7) and Section 8.2 (Chapter 8) provide a detailed account of these theoretical expectations concerning the quality of schooling and quality of policing, respectively.

### **3.3 Quantitative Research Design**

This inquiry is based on the quantitative research design, which involves quantitative data and mobilizes deductive reasoning (Creswell and Creswell 2018). The deductive method starts with building certain theoretical arguments supported by established literature, developing hypotheses and questions, and providing fresh support to them through quantitative data analysis. Quantitative data comprises numerical data that can not only be aggregated, quantified, and summarized but lent itself ready for even complex statistical analyses to arrive at generalizations about people, groups, events, and phenomena (Babbie 2016). There are several different ways for collecting quantitative data, including high-quality subjective questionnaires and surveys such as the ESS, the European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), and objective data prepared by individuals and organizations including Freedom House, Polity IV, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the World Governance Indicators (WGI). There are several ways of using such data, including experiments, single case studies, longitudinal, cross-sectional, and comparative research designs (David and Sutton 2011).

It was not until the publication of such high-quality global surveys as the EVS, the WVS, and the ESS that researchers began to investigate the origin of political trust across different times and spaces to test the generalizability of their theories and hypotheses. Following this tradition, the present thesis is a quantitative, cross-sectional, and comparative inquiry into the political trust effects of the quality of democracy and the quality of public services. Such an enterprise based on the secondary data concerning citizens' feelings of trust in their parliament, political parties, and politicians across several European countries will allow us to examine and generalize about the role of perception of the qualities of democracy and public services. The underlying theoretical argument of this thesis is that quality help improving political trust.

### **3.4 Data Operationalization**

The data for this thesis are extracted from three Rounds of the European Social Survey (<https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>). This high-quality biennial, multi-country survey taps into the Europeans' global orientations towards different social and political objects and their perceptions and experiences of the performance of these objects. Based on probability sampling, it interviews respondents who are not less than 15 years. Since its inception in 2002, the ESS has been fielded nine times in 38 countries, including Israel, Turkey, and the Russian Federation. The ESS-1 was the first Round floated in 2003–04 and the latest one in 2018–19. Each of these Rounds comprises two modules: a *core module* containing almost the same themes across every Round. This module provides a battery of questions about trust in various political institutions that are



employed as the dependent variable in this thesis. Additionally, it also provides a host of individual-level demographic and control variables that are used to develop a baseline model of political trust (Chapter 4) besides serving as control variables in the succeeding four chapters.

Then its *rotating module* is dedicated to specific themes that are sometimes repeated. Rotating modules from the ESS-6 (2012) will provide data to test the political trust effects of the quality of electoral and liberal democracy (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Likewise, the effects of quality of such public services as schooling (Chapter 7) and policing (Chapter 8) will be tested by mobilizing the data from the rotating modules of the ESS-2 (2004) and the ESS-5 (2010), respectively. These analyses are only performed after screening for the missing values, reliability, and validity analyses of the various measures of the quality of democracy and public services and adding country-level variables to the individual-level data ready for multilevel analyses. In line with other researchers (Quaranta 2018), Albania, Kosovo, and Russia were removed from the analyses being non-democracies, and Israel and Turkey were dropped for being geographically not part of Europe.

### **3.4.1 The Dependent Variable—Political Trust**

There are several operational definitions of political trust. The American researchers have usually operationalized political trust through such items appearing in the American Election Studies data as: (1) the government in Washington do what is right, (2) is pretty much run by a big few self-interested business, (3) people in government waste taxpayers' money, (4) those running the government know what they are doing, and 5) and are crooked (Miller 1974). Conversely, the European data, including the EVS and the ESS, asked direct questions about trust in national-level and supranational institutions. The empirical demonstration that trust in national political institutions does not fluctuate randomly in Western countries (Marien 2017) suggests that a battery of questions relating to trust in these institutions is a valid and reliable measure of political trust. Each of the ESS' Rounds employed a battery of questions about trust in national and international political institutions. These questions were introduced as:

Please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...

- a. The country's parliament
- b. Political parties
- c. Politicians
- d. Legal system
- e. Police
- f. European Parliament and
- g. United Nations

Both global and European researchers have found several different operational definitions of political trust. Some of them have employed a battery of trust in all these national and supranational

institutions to measure political trust (Zmerli and Newton 2008). The others have divided these questions into trust in the electoral system (additive index of a, b and c), trust in the legal system (additive index of d and e), and trust in the EU parliament (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008). Then there is a tradition of using just a single item—trust in parliament—as a measure of political trust (Kołczyńska 2020). Still, others have produced an additive index of all national-level institutions representing political trust (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016).

Still, some researchers differentiate between party-state or political institutions and services or regulatory institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Zmerli 2013). Following this theoretical distinction and in line with the established works (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund 2016b; Vilhelmsdóttir 2020), this thesis conceives political trust as trust in three political institutions, namely, the parliament, political parties, and politicians. After inspecting the missing values (Table 3.2), these items were converged to produce an average political trust index (Chapter 4: Section 4.3.1).

### **3.4.2 Independent Variables**

This thesis tests the political trust effects of the quality of democracy and those of public services. The quality of democracy is further discerned into the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy. Likewise, the quality of public services is tapped into through distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. The four empirical chapters provide a comprehensive account of each measure of the quality of democracy and the quality of public services. However, a summary of these measures is sufficient here.

#### **Quality of Democracy**

Based on the works of Morlino and his colleagues (Morlino 2004a; Morlino, Dressel, and Pelizzo 2011), ESS-6 floated sixteen items that captured citizens' orientations towards democratic norms or principles and introduced fourteen items that tapped into their judgments of working of their individual governments against these norms. In line with the concept of quality of democracy developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2), citizens' orientations towards norms are dubbed as democratic expectations and judgment of performance as democratic performance. Subtracting performance scores from those of expectations will generate democratic disconfirmation as a third measure of the quality of democracy.

A careful examination showed that some of the items of democratic expectations were not floated in democratic performance. Still, other items were considered irrelevant because they were related either to the output side of democracy or were not within the scope of this thesis. Finally, ten items were retained: six of them— free and fair elections, differentiated political offers, opposition criticizes the government, vertical accountability via elections, government responsiveness to the voters, and deliberation amongst voters before elections—were related to the quality of electoral democracy and four—equality before the law, protection of minority rights, freedom of media to criticize the government, and the government's reliability of the information—were about the

quality of liberal democracy. Section 5.3 (Chapter 5) and Section 6.3 (Chapter 6) plot fuller descriptions about the logic of inclusion and exclusion of these items and further data operationalization.

### **Quality of Public Services**

ESS-2 and ESS-5 contain batteries of questions capturing students' and citizens' judgments of the performance of the schools and police, respectively. In line with Section 2.4.2 (Chapter 2), the qualities of these services are operationalized through judgments about distributive justice, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness.

The operationalization of quality of schooling was such that (1) the items about indiscriminate treatment captured distributive justice; (2) the question about fair treatment by their teachers measured procedural fairness; and (3) a three items index (interest in students, accepting students' criticism, and helping students) tapped into the functional effectiveness of the schools. A comprehensive account of these operational definitions of quality of schooling is given in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7.

The operationalization of the quality of policing was such that (1) perceptions of economic and racial profiling captured distributive justice; (2) a four items index (respectful, fair, responsive, and bribed free treatment by the police) measured procedural justice; and (3) an index of four items (police prevent crimes, catch burglars, and timely reach the crime scenes) captured functional effectiveness. Section 8.3 in Chapter 8 contains a detailed description of these operational definitions.

### **3.4.4 Control Variables**

In line with Section 2.5 (Chapter 2), this thesis employed five sets of individual-level and two country-level control variables.

#### **Individual-Level Controls**

Gender, age, education in years, religiousness, domicile, and citizenship were controlled for as individual-level demographic characteristics. An average index of the state of the healthcare and education system in the country was controlled for welfare performance. Economic satisfaction was captured through satisfaction with the economy and objective household income; however, due to a large number of missing values, objective income was replaced by the feelings of household income. Political interest, satisfaction with government, and self-placement on the left-right scale served as a battery of questions representing political attitudes. Finally, an average index of interpersonal trust, fairness, and helpfulness represented social capital.

#### **Country-Level Controls**

Communist past is a self-constructed variable. Initially, all measures of World Governance Indicators—voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government

effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption—were considered relevant to this thesis. However, due to high multicollinearity, only voice and accountability and government effectiveness were retained in the analyses. At the country-level, the former corresponds to the quality of democracy, and the latter reflects the quality of public services.

### 3.5 Setting the ESS Data for Analyses

The country-level variables were added to the individual-level measures of the quality of democracy, quality of public service, and five sets of control variables. Consequently, we had nested data where individual-level measures were embedded in the country-level factors generating hierarchical data ready for multilevel analysis. This detail is provided in data operationalization sections in each of the individual chapters. The following subsections give a brief overview of the weights and treatment of missing values.

#### 3.5.1 Weights

The European Social Survey provides two kinds of built-in weights: design weight and population size weight. While design weight corrects the possibility of over or under-representation of certain groups within a population, population size weight ensures that each country is represented according to its actual population in the overall sample. The results of descriptive and inferential analyses presented in this thesis were produced after applying design weights. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of country sample sizes before and after applying design weight.

| <b>Table 3.1 Frequency Distribution Before and After Applying Design Weight</b> |                   |                   |      |                   |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|------|-------------------|
|   | <b>QD (ESS-6)</b> | <b>QS (ESS-2)</b> |      | <b>QP (ESS-5)</b> |
| Countries   | BDW=ADW           | BDW               | ADW  | BDW=ADW           |
| EU-Level  | 45007             | 3874              | 3576 | 45638             |
| Austria   | a                 | 323               | 397  | a                 |
| Belgium   | 1869              | 130               | 130  | 1704              |
| Bulgaria  | 2260              | a                 |      | 2434              |
| Switzerland   | 1493              | 125               | 206  | 1506              |
| Cyprus  | 1116              | a                 |      | 1083*             |
| Czechia   | 2009              | 217               | 316  | 2386              |
| Germany   | 2958              | 283               | 285  | 3031*             |
| Denmark   | 1650              | 136               | 136  | 1576              |
| Estonia   | 2380              | 219               | 219  | 1793              |
| Spain   | 1889              | 147               | 147  | 1885              |
| Finland   | 2197              | 239               | 239  | 1878              |
| France  | 1968              | a                 |      | 1728              |
| UK  | 2286              | 114               | 162  | 2422              |
| Greece  | a                 | 145               | 166  | 2715              |
| Croatia   | a                 | a                 |      | 1649              |
| Hungary   | 2014              | 146               | 161  | 1561              |
| Ireland   | 2628              | 174               | 254  | 2576              |
| Iceland   | 752               | 58                | 58   | a                 |

|             |      |     |     |       |
|-------------|------|-----|-----|-------|
| Italy       | 960  | 58  | 77  | a     |
| Lithuania   | 2109 | a   |     | 1677* |
| Luxembourg  | a    | 203 | 176 | a     |
| Netherlands | 1845 | 97  | 149 | 1829  |
| Norway      | 1624 | 167 | 167 | 1548  |
| Poland      | 1898 | 235 | 235 | 1751  |
| Portugal    | 2151 | 162 | 162 | 2150  |
| Sweden      | 1847 | 234 | 234 | 1497  |
| Slovenia    | 1257 | 210 | 210 | 1403  |
| Slovakia    | 1847 | 51  | 51  | 1856  |

**Legend:** QD=Quality of Democracy; QS=Quality of Schooling, and QP=Quality of Policing. BDW=before design weight; and ADW=after design weight.

**Note:** The ESS did not survey countries corresponding to *a* in their respective modules. The data in ESS-2 was subset to the students only and therefore contains a limited number of observations.

\*The weighted observations in Cyprus, Germany, and Lithuania were 1082, 3032, and 1678, resulting in 45640 observations.

### 3.5.2 Inspection of Missing Values

There are four types of missing values in the ESS data: Not applicable, refusals, do not know, and no answers. *Not applicable* meant that the question was irrelevant for the respondents; *refusal* is a response where respondents refused to reply; there was an option of *don't know* when the subject didn't know the answer; and finally, *no answer* was a response stand for those missing values that were ascribed to some kind of error.

The percentage of missing values in the measures of dependent variables—trust the country's parliament, political parties, and politicians—is given in Table 3.2. First, the missing values in the measures of political trust, quality of democracy, quality of schooling are less than 10%. In some countries, the missing data in distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness of police were more than 20% (see details in Appendix 3.1–3.3).

**Table 3.2 Percentage of Missing Values in the Measures of Political Trust**

| Countries   | ESS-6 (2012)         |     |     | ESS-2 (2002)         |     |     | ESS-5 (2010)        |     |     |
|-------------|----------------------|-----|-----|----------------------|-----|-----|---------------------|-----|-----|
|             | Quality of Democracy |     |     | Quality of Schooling |     |     | Quality of Policing |     |     |
|             | PRL                  | PRT | PLT | PRL                  | PRT | PLT | PRL                 | PRT | PLT |
| EU-Level    | 2.3                  | 2.2 | 1.6 | 5.8                  | 4.7 | 3.5 | 2.7                 | 2.5 | 1.9 |
| Austria     | a                    |     |     | 7.7                  | 3.9 | 4.7 | a                   |     |     |
| Belgium     | 0.7                  | 0.4 | 0.4 | 3.9                  | 3.1 | 0.8 | 1.3                 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| Bulgaria    | 3.3                  | 3.5 | 3.4 | a                    |     |     | 4.4                 | 4.4 | 3.7 |
| Switzerland | 5.8                  | 4.9 | 3.1 | 9.7                  | 7.8 | 3.9 | 5.0                 | 4.8 | 3.1 |
| Cyprus      | 4.5                  | 3.6 | 3.0 | a                    |     |     | 5.8                 | 5.3 | 5.6 |
| Czechia     | 3.4                  | 4.0 | 3.3 | 8.4                  | 8.4 | 7.4 | 2.5                 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Germany     | 1.7                  | 1.2 | 0.7 | 8.9                  | 5.6 | 3.4 | 2.5                 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Denmark     | 1.5                  | 1.9 | 1.2 | 2.5                  | 4.2 | 2.5 | 1.8                 | 2.2 | 1.8 |
| Estonia     | 1.8                  | 2.5 | 1.5 | 6.5                  | 8.3 | 7.8 | 3.4                 | 4.3 | 2.7 |

|             |     |     |     |      |      |      |     |     |     |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| Spain       | 5.2 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 5.3  | 2.1  | 3.2  | 4.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Finland     | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 1.8  | 3.6  | 1.8  | 0.6 | 1.2 | 0.8 |
| France      | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | b    |      |      | 1.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| UK          | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 0.9  | 2.6  | 0.9  | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.2 |
| Greece      | a   |     |     | 2.1  | 1.0  | 1.0  | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| Croatia     | a   |     |     | a    |      |      | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Hungary     | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 1.6  | 1.6  | 0.8  | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.1 |
| Ireland     | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 7.9  | 4.6  | 2.6  | 6.3 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Iceland     | 3.4 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 4.5  | 4.5  | 4.5  | a   |     |     |
| Italy       | 0.9 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 5.7  | 5.7  | 3.8  | a   |     |     |
| Lithuania   | 4.0 | 6.0 | 3.9 | a    |      |      | 3.5 | 5.3 | 3.4 |
| Luxembourg  | a   |     |     | 16.8 | 16.6 | 11.6 | a   |     |     |
| Netherlands | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8  | 0.8  | 0.8  | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 |
| Norway      | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 2.1  | 2.1  | 0.7  | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Poland      | 3.9 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 3.9  | 3.1  | 3.1  | 3.5 | 4.9 | 3.2 |
| Portugal    | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 3.2  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 3.8 | 1.3 | 1.2 |
| Sweden      | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 9.5  | 5.5  | 3.5  | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.9 |
| Slovenia    | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 8.5  | 6.5  | 4.5  | 4.4 | 3.4 | 2.9 |
| Slovakia    | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.2 |

**Legend:** PRL=Trust in parliament, PRT=Trust in political parties, and PLT=Trust in politicians.  
**Note:** The ESS did not survey countries corresponding to *a* in their respective modules. The data in ESS-2 was subset to the students only and therefore contains a limited number of observations.  
*b* Questions about the quality of schooling were not floated in France, and therefore, the country was excluded from the analysis.

Except for objective household income and self-placement on the left-right scale, missing values account for less than 10% of the total values in demographic and control variables (see details in Appendix 3.4–3.7). Due to the high percentage of missing values, the objective household income was replaced by the feeling about the household's income. The left-right scale is a very important control variable and contains a high percentage of missing values.

The variables where missing values were more than 10% were systematically analyzed. First, these variables were dummified, such as missing=0; and complete=1. Afterward, independent sample *t*-tests were performed. Finally, where the means of political trust of complete observations were significantly different from those of missing observations, the latter were either replaced by the country-level modes or means depending upon the variable being analyzed was categorical or continuous. Although such an approach might be problematic but it is beneficial in saving and including main predictors of quality and control variables in the analyses.

### 3.6 Analytical Strategy

The analytical approach comprises five steps: reliability and validity analyses (confirmatory factor analyses), country-level descriptive statistics, macro-level and micro-level patterns of associations, multivariate and multilevel analyses. Such a laborious strategy systematically examines the

relationship between political trust and its quality-related predictors. Following is a brief description of each of these sections.

### **3.6.1 The Measurement Model of Quality of Democracy and Political Trust**

It is important that the item reliably measure the underlying constructs of political trust and the democratic expectations and democratic performance advanced in the preceding chapter (Section 2.4.3). For this purpose, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will be performed in each of the countries comprising this comparative inquiry. EFA identifies the underlying measures of a construct through convergent and discriminates validity, and CFA validates the association between those constructs by building on a theory and previous literature (Brown 2008: 1; Geurkink et al. 2020; Harrington 2009: 10).

EFA, with principal component as the factor extraction method, will be performed without specifying in advance to which construct an item or set of items “belong to.” The convergent validity will be assessed through the extent to which items representing specific constructs appropriately loaded together under a distinct factor ( $>.40$ ) and did not load on any other factor. Then the matrix table will be inspected: a very weak correlation provided a test of discriminate validity of each of the three factors. Finally, the reliability of the items appearing under the same factor will be tested through Cronbach’s alpha test ( $>.60$ ).

CFA will be estimated by structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood information on Amos 21. The models will be assessed through traditionally used fitness indices: chi-square to degrees of freedom ( $X^2/df$ ), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and comparative fitness index (CFI). Generally, in a good fitted model,  $X^2/df \leq 2$  or 3 with  $p > .05$ ,  $RMSEA < .08$ ;  $TLI \geq .95$  and  $CFI \geq .95$  (Schreiber et al. 2006). The items appropriately measuring each of the constructs in the measurement model will be converged to represent political trust, democratic expectations, and democratic performance.

Disconfirmation falls into subtractive and subjective types (Poister and Thomas 2011; G. G. Van Ryzin 2005; Spreng and Thomas J. Page 2003). Subjective disconfirmation is captured by directly asking respondents whether the performance equals, exceeds, or falls short of expectations, and subtractive disconfirmation is measured by subtracting expectations scores from performance evaluations. A lack of alternative measures drove the choice of subtractive expectations. Still, such a measure also allows for estimating the direct effects of expectation on satisfaction (Petrovsky, Mok, and León-Cázares 2016), which this study attempts to do concerning political trust. The additive index of electoral performance evaluations was subtracted from that of electoral expectations to represent electoral disconfirmation.

As the relationship between the quality of public services and political trust are not as complex as those of the quality of democracy, therefore, only Cronbach’s alpha scores will be observed to test the reliability of items measuring distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional

effectiveness—three measures of quality of public services—in each of the countries. In addition, the same test will be performed for welfare performance and social capital measures.

### **3.6.2 Standardization of the Variables**

There is an overarching goal and a subgoal of this thesis besides testing the significance of the quality of democracy and the quality of public services in explaining political trust. The overarching goal is to show whether the quality of democracy is a better predictor of political trust than the quality of public services or vice versa. The subgoal is to see which of the measures of the qualities in each of the empirical chapters performs better than its counterparts. It is not an easier task to perform these comparisons when predictor variables are measured on different scales. Standardization is one of the ways to overcome this challenge. Thus, the main predictors and the individual-level and country-level control variables measured on continuous scales were standardized by issuing ‘save standardized values as variable’ in SPSS while producing the descriptive statistics for separate countries included in this thesis.

As the standardized variables are centered around zero (with a standard deviation of  $\pm 3$ ), the descriptive statistics and macro-level patterns of associations are based on the original scale. The rest of the inferential statistics are based on the analysis of standardized data.

### **3.6.2 Descriptive Statistics: Country-Level Analyses**

The descriptive statistics present the distribution of political trust within countries and picture the comparative performance of countries with respect to each other. There are two views about attributing meanings to the scores measuring political trust. According to Gambetta (Gambetta 1990: 217), if the trust is measured on a scale from complete distrust (0) to complete trust (10), as this thesis does, then a score of 5 would reflect citizens’ expression of political trust. However, Listhaug and Wiberg (2002: 298-99) note that it is incredibly challenging to make sense of what low or high political confidence might mean unless some sort of comparisons—such as overtime, between countries, between different kinds of institutions—are made. Given the theoretical consideration developed in the preceding chapter that guided employing cross-sectional data from different ESS waves, it was possible to establish cross-country comparisons of political trust from these two angles. The descriptive analyses presented in the four empirical chapters begin with plotting the graphs of the means and confidence intervals of political trust and its main predictors, followed by showing the very same distribution in the tabular form in the appendices. The purpose of graphs is to facilitate comparisons between and with the country distribution of political trust.

### **3.6.3 Macro-Level Patterns of Associations**

Though most journal publications jump directly onto the micro-level analysis while studying the effects of individual-level variables on political trust, a few doctoral thesis and publication entered the more in-depth complicated analyses only after exploring the macro-level patterns of



association (Arancibia 2008; Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Kołczyńska 2020; Palacios 2018). Such an approach is more appealing as the individual-level observation is collected from several different countries. Moreover, showing macro-level patterns of the association through scatterplots gives a broader picture of the distribution at an overall level. Given this background, the four empirical chapters developed two types of patterns of associations. Firstly, country-level means of political trust were computed. Then, where individual-level variables about the quality of democracy and public services were on a continuous scale were converged to represent an additive index and their country-level mean scores were computed. These means were used to produce scatter plots reflecting macro-level patterns of association. Second, wherein the individual-level predictors of the quality of public services were captured on the categorical scale, the macro-level association was reflected by graphs showing the association between political trust per category of the predictor variable.

### **3.6.4 Micro-Level Patterns of Associations**

Micro-level analyses show a bivariate associations between political trust and its quality-related correlates at the EU-level and individual countries after showing macro-level patterns. These correlations were performed in two fashions. First, the correlations between political trust and its quality-related correlates were performed in the individual chapters. Likewise, these associations for individual-level and country-level control variables are presented in the Baseline Chapter.

### **3.6.5 Multivariate Analysis**

The multivariate analysis allows for testing the impact of more than two predictors on a dependent variable and examines the magnitude of their effects. In each of the chapters, except the one on the baseline model, four multivariate models have been performed: Two OLS models, each without and with country-fixed effects. The first two models predicted political trust based on the predictors-only, to which individual-level variables were added to develop a fuller model. The same strategy was repeated in the next two models through the country-fixed effect. The parameters were compared at three levels to establish whether a complicated model such as multilevel modeling is required. First, the estimates of the predictors-only models were compared with those of the fuller-models; then, models without and with fixed effects were compared to examine; and finally, the fluctuation in  $R^2$  was also compared. Together, they will justify performing multilevel analyses.

Variation inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance were also issued to examine the potential multicollinearity problem between the predictor variables. The rule of thumb is that one should not worry much about collinearity if VIF is less than 10 and tolerance is not less than .10 (Miles 2014).

### **3.6.6 Multilevel Analysis**

The data with one unit of analysis nested in another are called multilevel data (Snijders and Bosker 2003; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Multilevel analysis is the most appropriate analytical strategy

to avoid heteroscedasticity (Gelman and Hill 2007). Given that ESS is a multilevel data—individuals (survey respondents) are nested within contextual units (countries)—several inquiries into the sources of political trust are based on the multilevel analysis analysis (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Kołczyńska 2020; Zmerli 2013). The multilevel analytical strategy consists of three steps in the following order: (1) specification of null or no predictor model; (2) specification of the Level 1 model; and (3) specification of the Level 2 model. Executing a null model would allow us to partition the political trust variance between and within countries. This model of political trust for individual  $i$  in country  $j$  can be written as

$$PoliticalTrust_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad (3.1)$$

where  $\beta_0$  is the intercept and  $e_{ij}$  represents variation in political trust of individual  $i$  in country  $j$ . Between-country variation in the trust can be defined as

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} \quad (3.2)$$

A multilevel null model can be written as

$$PoliticalTrust_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad (3.3)$$

This model (3.3) not only provides an estimated mean political trust across all countries but also provides a partition of between-country ( $\mu_{0j}$ ) and within-country ( $e_{ij}$ ) variance of political trust. This model also explains between-country dependence through interclass correlation (ICC), which can be represented as

$$\rho = \frac{\sigma^2_B}{\sigma^2_B + \sigma^2_W}$$

where  $\sigma^2$  stands for variance and  $\sigma^2_B$  and  $\sigma^2_W$  between-country and within-country variances, respectively. The higher the ICC, the more the variance in political trust between the countries. Conversely, the smaller the variance, the little the need for conditioning a multilevel model; rather, an individual-level model would serve the purpose. Researchers also suggest performing a Log Likelihood ratio to test whether models at Level-1 and Level-2 significantly differ from each other (Steele 2008). A null hypothesis will assume that the individual-level model (3.1) and multilevel model (3.3) of political trust do not differ significantly:  $H_{0=\sigma_\mu^2}$ . Such a hypothesis can be tested by employing the Log Likelihood ratio test:

$$LR = -2 \log L_1 - (-2 \log L_2)$$

Where  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  are the likelihood values of the single (3.1) and multilevel models (3.3). LR is compared with a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of extra parameters, which in the present case is 1. A rejection of the null hypothesis means that there are real differences in political trust across different countries for which a multilevel model will be a more appropriate analytical strategy.

The proceeding chapters are based on the series of these analytical tools and the estimates reported hereafter were produced through SPSS.

### **3.7 Summary**

To conclude, this chapter presented the research design and methodology adopted in this thesis. It began with an overview of the theoretical framework, introduced research design and data operationalization, and discussed in detail the multistage analytical with special reference to multilevel modeling. The next chapter presents the results of a baseline model of political trust with individual-level and country-level control variables as the main predictors. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present the results of political trust effects of the quality of electoral and the quality of liberal democracy. Likewise, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 examine the role of the quality of schooling and the quality of policing in explaining political trust.

## Chapter 4 A Baseline Model of Political Trust

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### Summary

Researchers have employed a host of variables as predictors of political trust. This chapter aims to show their relevance to this thesis by taking them as control variables. To do so, it mobilizes the data from three waves of the European Social Survey [hereafter: ESS-6 (2012), ESS-2 (2004), and ESS-5 (2010)] and performs a series of analyses to identify whether these variables are relevant to control in the proceeding four chapters. Such an enterprise provides evidence that how individual-level and country-level features of the societies under study are related to changes in political trust themselves.

### 4.1 Introduction

The literature review chapter demonstrates that the quality could be conceived in two ways: One version, which is very well known by the service sector researchers, views it as a gap between citizens' expectations and performance evaluations. Alternatively, performance-only can reflect the quality of service as well. The proceeding two chapters test the political trust effects of both versions by focusing on the quality of democracy. The next two chapters mobilize only the second version of the quality and examine the role of public services. It is important to note that several studies have directly employed a host of demographic and control variables at the individual-level and country level. However, the main aim of this chapter is to plot their relevance for this thesis.

It is more logical and efficient to operationalize and show the effects of control variables in this chapter and then include them in various in the proceeding four chapters rather than getting into the same adventure in each of the empirical chapters. An alternative advantage of developing this separate baseline chapter is to show how each control variable matters for building political trust independent of the variables related to the quality of democracy and the quality of public services and discuss their relevance for the proceeding chapters.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the operationalization of the dependent variable—political trust—and sets of potentially relevant control variables based on the extensive review of the available literature (Chapter 2: Section 2.5). The *individual-level* control variables used are sociodemographic characteristics, welfare performance, economic and political variables, and social capital. While communist past, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness are *country-level* control variables. The third part presents the results: descriptive statistics, bivariate, multivariate, and multilevel analyses in the fourth section. Finally, the conclusion section wraps up the whole chapter.

## 4.2 Data Operationalization

This chapter uses the data from three rounds of the ESS, namely ESS-6, ESS-2, and ESS-5. The *rotating modules* of these rounds provide the variables related to the quality of democracy and the quality of public services. In addition, their *core module* contains the measures of political trust—dependent variable in this and subsequent chapters—and a host of demographic and control variables. Though the comprehensive description of each of these rounds is given in the succeeding chapter, a brief overview of these data is presented here. The number of observations reported below are calculated after applying design weight.

**ESS-6:** It was surveyed in 29 countries between August 2012 and December 2013. Israel is excluded for being non-European. Albania, Russia, Kosovo, and Ukraine were also dropped from the analyses for being non-democracies. Further, Denmark, Iceland, and Switzerland could not pass the tests of reliability and validity analyses in the context of the quality of electoral democracy (Chapter 5: Section 5.4.1) and were removed from the analyses. Consequently, there are 39134 individual-level observations from 20 countries for testing the relationship between the quality of electoral democracy and political trust. Likewise, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia could not pass the tests of reliability and validity analyses with reference to the quality of liberal democracy and were dropped from the analyses (Chapter 6: Section 6.4.1). As a result, there are 37634 individual-level observations from 20 countries. Compared to 39134 weighted individual-level observations in the first instance, 37634 observations were used in the second case.

**ESS-2:** This round was fielded from September 2004 to July 2006 in 26 countries. This round examined the relationship between the quality of schooling and political trust by subsetting the data to the students. Considering Turkey and Ukraine as geographically non-European polities, excluding France for missing data on the quality of schooling variables, a limited number of observations in Iceland (44), Italy (56), and Slovakia (46) and behaviour of Luxembourg, Poland, and Portugal as outliers, the final analyses are performed on 3576 observations from 17 countries.

**ESS-5:** Fielded in 27 countries between September 01 to December 31, 2010, the ESS-5 data is used to examine the relationship between the quality of policing and political trust. After removing Ukraine and Russia as non-democracies and Israel as non-European countries, the final data contained 45640 observations from 24 countries.

**World Governance Indicators:** Communist past (a self-constructed variable), voice and accountability, and government effectiveness from the World Governance Indicators—the country-level variables—are discussed in Section 2.4.3.

### 4.2.1 Dependent Variable: Political Trust

Political trust is operationalized using relevant questions asked in all ESS rounds: “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.” Respondents were asked

to express how much they trusted the parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, the political parties, the European parliament, and the United Nations. Trust towards the supranational institutions was excluded from the analyses. Considering that the trust in regulatory institutions, which are the service providers at the same time, is different from those in political institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008: 444-45), political trust is operationalized through trust in the national

**Table 4.1 Reliability Analyses of Political Trust**

| Country     | QED (ESS-6) | QLD (ESS-6) | QS (ESS-2) | QP (ESS-5) |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| EU-Level    | .92         | .92         | .89        | .92        |
| Austria     | a           | a           | .83        | a          |
| Belgium     | .90         | .90         | .87        | .88        |
| Bulgaria    | .89         | b           | a          | .92        |
| Switzerland | .85         | .85         | .77        | .86        |
| Cyprus      | .90         | .90         | a          | .91        |
| Czechia     | .95         | b           | .95        | .93        |
| Germany     | .88         | .88         | .86        | .89        |
| Denmark     | b           | .90         | .90        | .90        |
| Estonia     | .89         | .86         | .89        | .89        |
| Spain       | .86         | .86         | .86        | .87        |
| Finland     | .90         | .90         | .90        | .91        |
| France      | .86         | .86         | c          | .87        |
| UK          | .91         | .91         | .92        | .92        |
| Greece      | a           | a           | .91        | .89        |
| Croatia     | a           | a           | a          | .92        |
| Hungary     | .93         | .93         | .91        | .91        |
| Ireland     | .91         | .91         | .87        | .90        |
| Iceland     | b           | .91         | c          | a          |
| Italy       | .89         | .89         | c          | a          |
| Lithuania   | .90         | .90         | a          | .89        |
| Luxembourg  | a           | a           | e          | a          |
| Netherlands | .91         | .91         | .87        | .89        |
| Norway      | b           | .87         | .85        | .88        |
| Poland      | .87         | .87         | e          | .90        |
| Portugal    | .89         | .89         | e          | .90        |
| Sweden      | b           | .89         | .89        | .88        |
| Slovenia    | .90         | b           | .88        | .90        |
| Slovakia    | .94         | b           | c          | .88        |

**Legend:** QED=Quality of Electoral Democracy; QLD=Quality of Liberal Democracy; QS=Quality of Schooling; and QP=Quality of Policing.

**Note:** These countries were dropped due to one or more of the following reasons. *a* not covered in the ESS; *b* removed from the analyses due to model fitness issues; *c* missed data on the quality of schooling; *d* contained very small sample sizes; and *e* were inspected as outliers.

parliaments, political parties, and politicians (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund 2016b). An examination of the reliability analyses, as shown in Table 4.1, suggests that

these three items appropriately measure their underlying construct within each country. Thus, political trust is an average index of these three items.

#### **4.2.2 Individual-Level Control Variables**

The individual-level variables are background variables, welfare performance, economic satisfaction, political attitudes, and social capital. The following section plots the operational definitions of these variables based on the literature review produced in Section 2.5 in Chapter 2.

##### **Background Variables**

Gender, age, religiousness, education, and domicile are selected to control for the sociodemographic variables. Gender stands for 1 ‘male’ and 2 ‘female.’ How religious a person is measured on a scale from 0 ‘not at all religious’ to 10 ‘very religious.’ Education in years stands for full or part-time education that the respondent has acquired. In the domicile variable, respondents reported whether they lived in 1 ‘a big city,’ 2 ‘suburbs or outskirts of big city,’ 3 ‘town or small city,’ 4 ‘country village,’ or 5 ‘farm or home in the countryside.’ Finally, citizenship is a dichotomous variable with 1 ‘yes’ if they are citizens, otherwise 2 ‘no.’

##### **Welfare Performance**

An average index of education and health system evaluation has been employed in the previous studies to measure welfare performance. The respondents were required to rate the state health and education systems of their countries on a scale from 0 ‘extremely bad’ to 10 ‘extremely good.’ The reliability statistics revealed that these two items are adequate measures of welfare satisfaction measures (Appendix 4.1).

##### **Economic Satisfaction**

Sociotropic and pocketbook perceptions are employed to examine the role of economic performance. Although the household’s total net income variable sounds more appropriate for pocketbook perceptions, it contained a huge percentage of missing values and was replaced with household income feelings.<sup>7</sup> The responses to the question, “how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” are such that 1 ‘living comfortably on present income,’ 2 ‘coping on present income,’ 3 ‘difficult on present income,’ and 4 ‘very difficult on present income.’ Respondents’ satisfaction with the economies of their countries is measured on a scale from 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘extremely satisfied.’

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<sup>7</sup> The household income variable contained a large proportion of missing values. Though around 20% of the observations are missing at the, there are several countries where these values are between 30–50 percent. Still, in some other countries, these values are more than 50 percent. Therefore, this variable is replaced by feeling of the household income. Missing values in this variable on the EU-level are around 2 percent and none of the countries in the analysis contains more than 5 percent.

## **Political Attitudes**

Political attitudes are captured through political interest, satisfaction with government, and orientation on the left-right scale were employed. The extent to which respondents are interested in politics are 1 ‘very interested,’ 2 ‘quite interested,’ 3 ‘hardly interested,’ and 4 ‘not at all interested.’ Satisfaction with the government is measured on a scale from 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘extremely satisfied.’ Finally, self-placement on the left-right scale ranged from 0 ‘left’ to 10 ‘right.’ As it contains more than 20% missing values in some countries, therefore, it was first dummified (missing=0; and else=1) and then an independent sample *t*-test was performed. The results showed significant differences in the means of each of the measures of political trust in the categories of missing and complete observations. Therefore, these missing values were imputed by their country means.

## **Social Capital**

This is an average index of interpersonal trust, fairness, and helpfulness. Firstly, on a scale of 0 ‘means you can’t be too careful’ to 10 ‘means that most people can be trusted’ respondents are asked to express the extent to which most people can be trusted. They are then required to rate interpersonal fairness on a score from 0 ‘means you can’t be too careful’ to 10 ‘most people try to be fair.’ Finally, their rating of interpersonal helpfulness is captured on a scale of 0 ‘most people look out for themselves’ to 10 ‘people mostly try to be helpful.’ Reliability analyses confirmed that these three items perfectly capture social capital (Appendix 4.1). Consequently, they were converged to produce an average index of representing social capital.

### **4.2.3 Country-Level Variables**

Communist past, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness are the country-level variables. Communist past is a self-created dummy variable: ‘yes’ means a country had a communist past; otherwise, ‘no.’

The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks regimes into full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. Likewise, Freedom House ranks countries as free, partly free, not free. These rankings are of limited use as all the countries included in this thesis are established democracies. However, we focused on the World Governance Indicators that contains six indicators—voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption—of the quality of governance that capture the aspects of the quality of democracy and those of public services globally (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011).<sup>8</sup> As our analysis focuses on individual-level determinants, we considered only the voice and accountability, and government effectiveness as the most appropriate country-level measures. Further, considering these measures along with GDP

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<sup>8</sup> Also see: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>



and CPI (Goubin and Hooghe 2020; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012) was also impossible because of very high multicollinearity between them (Appendix 4.4-4.6).

According to Kaufmann and his colleagues (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011), voice and accountability refer to the citizens' ability to influence the political process, resulting in forming a new government accompanied by freedom of expression, association, and media. These elements reflect the levels of electoral and liberal democracy, and they are most likely to influence political trust like the quality of democracy measures.

Government effectiveness, according to these authors, "captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies." This is an appropriate measure of the level of government effectiveness and are expected to affect political trust.

The measure of the voice and accountability for 2012 was added to the individual-level data related to the quality of democracy (ESS-6). Likewise, Likewise, government effectiveness measures for the years 2004 and 2010 were added to the individual-level data on the quality of schooling (ESS-2) and quality of policing (ESS-5), respectively. These three hierarchical datasets are used to predict the political trust effects of individual-level and country-level control variables.

## **4.3 Results**

### **4.3.1 Descriptive Analyses: Political Trust**

The dependent variable—political trust—is an average index of trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians. Table 4.2 plots the distribution of political trust from the data used to examine the role of quality of democracy and public services for 2012/13. Column QED and QLD present this distribution for a group of countries where the quality of electoral democracy (Chapter 5) and the quality of liberal democracy (Chapter 6) are the primary predictor variables. The mean political trust scores in 20 countries under QED and QLD are 3.40 (SD=2.27) and 3.86 (SD=2.28), respectively. All the Scandinavian countries in the latter group, having the higher political trust scores, pulled up the overall trust level. Conversely, the absence of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in the former group is associated with a lower level of political trust. These three countries were dropped because they could not meet the threshold criteria of the measurement model (Chapter 5: Section 5.4.1). Amongst the countries, Switzerland and Finland were the best, and Portugal and Bulgaria were the worst-performing nations in the context of QED. Likewise, in the context of QLD, Denmark and Norway are the best, and Italy and Portugal are the worst-performing countries.

Column QS covers political trust distribution amongst students of seventeen countries in the year 2004/05. At the EU-level, the political trust scores are distributed with a means and standard deviation of 4.49 and 1.99. Danish and Finnish students expressed the highest level of political trust than Slovenians and Hungarians who stood at the bottom of this ranking. Finally, the

distribution of political trust for examining its relationship with policing quality is presented under the column QP. Trust in political institutions across 24 countries is distributed with a mean and standard deviation of 3.46 and 2.28, respectively. The two top-performing countries are Sweden and Denmark, and Croatian and Greeks deposited the lowest level of trust in their representative institutions.

### Table 4.2 Distribution of Political Trust

|             | QED (ESS) |      | QLD (ESS-6) |      | QS (ESS-2) |      | QP (ESS-5) |      |
|-------------|-----------|------|-------------|------|------------|------|------------|------|
|             | Mean      | SD   | Mean        | SD   | Mean       | SD   | Mean       | SD   |
| EU-Level    | 3.40      | 2.27 | 3.85        | 2.28 | 4.49       | 1.99 | 3.46       | 2.28 |
| Austria     | a         |      | a           |      | 3.82       | 1.83 | a          |      |
| Belgium     | 4.52      | 2.00 | 4.52        | 2.00 | 5.09       | 1.80 | 4.06       | 1.98 |
| Bulgaria    | 1.91      | 1.94 | b           |      | a          |      | 2.13       | 2.08 |
| Switzerland | b         |      | 5.43        | 1.73 | 5.46       | 1.57 | 5.21       | 1.87 |
| Cyprus      | 2.81      | 2.20 | 2.81        | 2.20 | a          |      | 3.89       | 2.19 |
| Czechia     | 2.82      | 2.33 | b           |      | 3.76       | 2.41 | 2.87       | 2.09 |
| Germany     | 4.13      | 1.93 | 4.13        | 1.93 | 4.10       | 1.70 | 3.69       | 2.02 |
| Denmark     | b         |      | 5.53        | 1.88 | 5.97       | 1.68 | 5.34       | 1.87 |
| Estonia     | 3.48      | 2.12 | 3.48        | 2.12 | 4.23       | 1.93 | 3.78       | 2.13 |
| Spain       | 2.39      | 2.05 | 2.39        | 2.05 | 4.22       | 1.64 | 3.23       | 2.04 |
| Finland     | 5.21      | 1.87 | 5.21        | 1.87 | 5.70       | 1.72 | 4.79       | 2.03 |
| France      | 3.47      | 1.94 | 3.47        | 1.94 | c          |      | 3.48       | 1.94 |
| UK          | 3.89      | 2.07 | 3.89        | 2.07 | 4.70       | 1.99 | 3.69       | 2.14 |
| Greece      | a         |      | a           |      | 4.15       | 2.13 | 1.59       | 1.82 |
| Croatia     | a         |      | a           |      | a          |      | 1.88       | 1.89 |
| Hungary     | 3.47      | 2.38 | 3.47        | 2.38 | 3.47       | 1.93 | 3.50       | 2.25 |
| Ireland     | 3.24      | 2.15 | 3.24        | 2.15 | 4.31       | 1.74 | 3.30       | 2.04 |
| Iceland     | b         |      | 3.89        | 2.07 | d          |      | a          |      |
| Italy       | 2.39      | 2.08 | 2.39        | 2.08 | d          |      | a          |      |
| Lithuania   | 2.99      | 2.03 | 2.99        | 2.03 | e          |      | 2.25       | 1.94 |
| Netherlands | 5.16      | 1.81 | 5.16        | 1.81 | 5.35       | 1.39 | 5.29       | 1.67 |
| Norway      | b         |      | 5.51        | 1.77 | 4.80       | 1.58 | 5.30       | 1.82 |
| Poland      | 2.47      | 1.91 | 2.47        | 1.91 | e          |      | 2.90       | 1.98 |
| Portugal    | 2.01      | 1.77 | 2.01        | 1.77 | e          |      | 2.28       | 1.92 |
| Sweden      | b         |      | 5.17        | 1.94 | 5.09       | 1.91 | 5.47       | 1.77 |
| Slovenia    | 2.51      | 1.99 | b           |      | 3.56       | 1.95 | 2.49       | 1.92 |
| Slovakia    | 2.89      | 2.15 | b           |      | d          |      | 3.00       | 1.93 |

**Legend:** QED=Quality of Electoral Democracy; QLD=Quality of Liberal Democracy; QS=Quality of Schooling; and QP=Quality of Policing.

**Note:** These countries were dropped due to one or more of the following reasons. *a* not covered in the ESS; *b* removed from the analyses due to model fitness issues; *c* missed data on the quality of schooling; *d* contained very small sample sizes; and *e* were inspected as outliers.

### 4.3.2 Descriptive Analyses: Control Variables

The four columns in Table 4.3 present the distribution of demographic and control variables and contextual variables. Columns QED and QLD show the distribution of control variables for the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy. Likewise, the distributions for

| <b>Table 4.3 Distribution of Individual-Level Demographic and Control Variables</b> |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
|---|------------|-------|------------|-------|-----------|------|-----------|-------|
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>   | <b>QED</b> |       | <b>QLD</b> |       | <b>QS</b> |      | <b>QP</b> |       |
|   | Mean       | SD    | Mean       | SD    | Mean      | SD   | Mean      | SD    |
| Gender  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Male  | 46.2%      |       | 47.0%      |       | 48.1%     |      | 46.3%     |       |
| Female  | 53.8%      |       | 53.0%      |       | 51.9%     |      | 53.7%     |       |
| Age   | 47.87      | 18.35 | 47.63      | 18.63 | 20.29     | 6.13 | 47.32     | 18.53 |
| Education in years  | 12.57      | 4.02  | 12.69      | 4.21  | 12.06     | 2.84 | 12.32     | 4.09  |
| Religiousness   | 4.71       | 3.05  | 4.67       | 3.01  | 4.00      | 2.91 | 4.70      | 2.97  |
| Domicile  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| A big city  | 21.1%      |       | 18.7%      |       | 24.9%     |      | 21.0%     |       |
| Suburbs of big city   | 10.2%      |       | 12.7%      |       | 10.7%     |      | 11.6%     |       |
| Town or small city  | 30.6%      |       | 31.9%      |       | 30.9%     |      | 29.4%     |       |
| Country village   | 32.6%      |       | 29.4%      |       | 26.0%     |      | 31.7%     |       |
| Farm/home in countryside  | 5.5%       |       | 7.3%       |       | 7.6%      |      | 6.4%      |       |
| Citizenship   |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Yes   | 95.5%      |       | 94.8%      |       | 95.5%     |      | 95.7%     |       |
| No  | 4.5%       |       | 5.2%       |       | 4.5%      |      | 4.3%      |       |
| Welfare performance   | 5.42       | 2.19  | 5.75       | 2.10  | 5.92      | 1.90 | 5.32      | 2.20  |
| Felt income   |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Living comfortably  | 22.3%      |       | 29.7%      |       | 40.8%     |      | 25.9%     |       |
| Coping  | 46.7%      |       | 45.7%      |       | 41.5%     |      | 44.3%     |       |
| Difficult   | 21.6%      |       | 18.2%      |       | 13.7%     |      | 20.2%     |       |
| Very difficult  | 9.5%       |       | 6.4%       |       | 4.0%      |      | 9.6%      |       |
| Sat: economy  | 3.86       | 2.50  | 4.38       | 2.58  | 5.43      | 2.13 | 3.93      | 2.53  |
| Political interest  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Very interested   | 9.3%       |       | 10.7%      |       | 5.8%      |      | 9.5%      |       |
| Quite interested  | 33.2%      |       | 35.6%      |       | 29.4%     |      | 33.3%     |       |
| Hardly interested   | 36.2%      |       | 34.7%      |       | 42.1%     |      | 35.3%     |       |
| Not at all interested   | 21.4%      |       | 19.0%      |       | 22.8%     |      | 21.8%     |       |
| Sat: government   | 3.90       | 2.54  | 4.23       | 2.52  | 4.88      | 2.08 | 3.82      | 2.47  |
| Left-right orientations   | 5.12       | 2.07  | 5.16       | 2.04  | 4.93      | 1.85 | 5.16      | 2.00  |
| Social capital  | 5.02       | 1.93  | 5.41       | 1.87  | 5.61      | 1.61 | 5.06      | 1.98  |
| <b>Country-Level Variables</b>  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Communist past  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |
| Yes   | 34.0%      |       | 22.3%      |       | 25.3%     |      | 25.0%     |       |
| No  | 60.0%      |       | 77.7%      |       | 74.7%     |      | 75.0%     |       |
| Voice and accountability  | 1.14       | 0.30  | 1.29       | 0.28  |           |      |           |       |
| Government effectiveness  |            |       |            |       | 1.58      | 0.53 | 1.22      | 0.55  |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight.  |            |       |            |       |           |      |           |       |

these variables related to the quality of schooling and the quality of policing are presented under QS and QP columns, respectively.

Overall, females with an average age of around 47 years are dominated in these four groups, except that a student is 20 years old on average. On average, students are less religious than all respondents in the remaining three groups. Around 60 percent of the respondents in all groups live in villages and small towns, and more than 20 percent live in big cities. Moreover, about 11 percent of them are inhabitants of the outskirts of big cities, and the remaining 6-7 percent live in the countryside. An overwhelming majority of the respondents are citizens of the countries where the surveys are administered. Overall, the Europeans rate the welfare performance, an average index of the state of health and education systems, above average, with students being more satisfied than the rest of the groups.

Concerning the group of variables about economic satisfaction, except students, most respondents expressed they are coping on their present income, followed by those who feel they live comfortably, and it is difficult to live on their present income. Almost equal proportions of students live comfortably or cope on the present income, and only a smaller proportion of them suffer from economic hardships. On average, students are more satisfied with the overall state of the economy compare to the other three groups.

Of the three political variables, around one-fifth of the respondents in four groups are not at all interested in politics. Except for students, approximately one-third of respondents are either hardly interested or quite interested, and only one-tenth of them are very interested in politics. On average, students are more satisfied with their national governments than other groups. Moreover, except for student data, where students are slightly inclined towards the right, the respondents in the rest of the data are somewhat inclined towards the right. Finally, the European score average on social capital—an average index of interpersonal trust, fairness, and helpfulness.

The distribution of the country-level variables (Appendix 4.2) is such that the majority of the countries had no communist background. Both voice and accountability are measured on a scale from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The voice and accountability being employed in the context of the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy have means of 1.14 (SD=0.30) and 1.29 (SD=0.28), respectively. Likewise, the government effectiveness means, being used with reference to the quality of schooling and the quality of policing chapters, have means of 1.58 (0.53) and 1.22 (0.55), respectively.

### **4.3.3 Bivariate Regressions Analyses**

After having shown in the preceding section that political trust varies within and between countries in the three rounds of the ESS providing the primary measures of the quality of electoral and liberal democracies (ESS-6) and quality of schooling (ESS-2), and quality of policing (ESS-5), this section plots the bivariate relationships between five sets of individual-level demographic and control variables and a host of country-level variables. Columns QED, QLD, QS, and QP in Table

4.4 plot the associations between demographic and control variables in the data specified to test the association between qualities of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, schooling, and policing.

Table 4.4 suggests that the five sets of individual-level variables relating to demographic factors, welfare performance, political and economic variables, and social capital are powerfully associated

| <b>Table 4.4 Bivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on Control Variables</b>   |               |               |       |               |               |       |
|--|---------------|---------------|-------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>  | <b>QED</b>    |               |       | <b>QLD</b>    |               |       |
|  | Constant      | Beta (SE)     | $R^2$ | Constant      | Beta (SE)     | $R^2$ |
| Gender   | 3.53 (.04)*** | -.02 (.01)*** | .00   | 4.00 (.04)*** | -.02 (.02)*** | .00   |
| Age  | 3.40 (.01)*** | -.01 (.00)    | .00   | 3.86 (.01)*** | -.02 (.01)*** | .00   |
| Education in years   | 3.40 (.01)*** | .07 (.01)***  | .02   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .08 (.01)***  | .01   |
| Religiousness  | 3.40 (.01)    | .09 (.01)***  | .01   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .09 (.01)***  | .01   |
| Domicile   | 3.34 (.03)    | .01 (.01)*    | .00   | 3.91 (.03)*** | -.01 (.01)*   | .00   |
| Citizenship  | 2.77 (.06)*** | .05 (.06)***  | .00   | 3.44 (.06)**  | .04 (.05)***  | .00   |
| Welfare performance  | 3.40 (.01)*** | .32 (.01)***  | .10   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .32 (.01)***  | .10   |
| Felt income  | 4.96 (.03)*** | -.28 (.01)*** | .08   | 5.48 (.03)*** | -.30 (.01)*** | .09   |
| Sat: economy   | 3.40 (.01)*** | .42 (.01)***  | .17   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .40 (.01)***  | .16   |
| Political interest   | 5.15 (.03)*** | -.26 (.01)*** | .07   | 5.80 (.03)*** | -.30 (.01)*** | .09   |
| Sat: government  | 3.40 (.01)*** | .52 (.01)***  | .27   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .51 (.01)***  | .26   |
| Left-right orientation   | 3.40 (.01)*** | .09 (.01)***  | .01   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .08 (.01)***  | .01   |
| Social capital   | 3.40 (.01)*** | .29 (.01)***  | .08   | 3.86 (.01)*** | .31 (.01)***  | .09   |
| <b>Country-Level Variables</b>   |               |               |       |               |               |       |
| Communist past   | 1.90 (.04)*** | .20 (.02)***  | .04   | 2.19 (.05)*** | .17 (.03)***  | .03   |
| Voice and accountability   | 3.40 (.01)*** | .37 (.01)***  | .14   | 3.85 (.01)    | .42 (.01)***  | .18   |
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>  | <b>QS</b>     |               |       | <b>QP</b>     |               |       |
|  | Constant      | Beta (SE)     | $R^2$ | Constant      | Beta (SE)     | $R^2$ |
| Gender   | 4.74 (.11)*** | -.04 (.03)*   | .00   | 3.61 (.03)*** | -.02 (.02)*** | .00   |
| Age  | 4.50 (.03)*** | -.03 (.04)*   | .00   | 3.46 (.01)*** | -.00 (.01)    | .00   |
| Education in years   | 4.51 (.03)*** | -.04 (.03)*   | .00   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .05 (.01)***  | .00   |
| Religiousness  | 4.50 (.03)*** | .10 (.03)***  | .01   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .10 (.01)***  | .01   |
| Domicile   | 4.44 (.08)*** | .01 (.03)     | .00   | 3.18 (.03)*** | .05 (.01)***  | .00   |
| Citizenship  | 4.26 (.18)*** | .02 (.16)     | .00   | 2.69 (.06)*** | .06 (.05)***  | .00   |
| Welfare performance  | 4.50(.03)***  | .31 (.03)***  | .10   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .30 (.01)***  | .09   |
| Felt income  | 4.93 (.09)*** | -.10 (.04)*** | .01   | 5.12 (.03)*** | -.31 (.01)*** | .10   |
| Sat: economy   | 4.41 (.03)*** | .33 (.03)***  | .11   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .36 (.01)***  | .13   |
| Political interest   | 5.92 (.12)*** | -.21 (.02)*** | .05   | 5.42 (.03)*** | -.29 (.01)*** | .08   |
| Sat: government  | 4.51 (.03)*** | .49 (.03)***  | .24   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .49 (.01)***  | .24   |
| Left-right orientation   | 4.50 (.03)*** | .07 (.03)***  | .00   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .08 (.01)***  | .01   |
| Social capital   | 2.77 (.14)*** | .22 (.08)***  | .05   | 3.46 (.01)*** | .27 (.01)***  | .07   |
| <b>Country-Level Variables</b>   |               |               |       |               |               |       |
| Communist past   | 2.77 (.14)*** | .22 (.08)***  | .05   | 1.63 (.04)*** | .23 (.02)***  | .05   |
| Government effectiveness   | 4.47 (.03)*** | .30 (.03)***  | .09   | 3.45 (.01)*** | .44 (.01)***  | .20   |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |               |               |       |               |               |       |

with political trust. Of the five demographic characteristics, gender and age are negatively related to political trust; education and religiosity bear positive effects; and the relationship of domicile is very weak yet controversial. It is positively and negatively associated in the context of QED and QLD, respectively. This relationship is highly significant regarding QP and is insignificant in the case of QS. Additionally, citizenship affected political trust positively except in the QED.

Likewise, welfare performance is a very powerful predictor of political trust. Among the two measures of perceptions of economic performance, the felt income influenced political trust negatively, and the effect of satisfaction with the economy is positive. Furthermore, the effect of political trust is negative, and that of the left-right orientation is positive. Finally, the effect of social capital is quite powerful and positive.

At the country-level, communist past, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness are significantly associated with political trust. The proceeding section demonstrates the extent to which these bivariate regression estimates remain stable after introducing the country-fixed effects.

#### **4.3.4 Multivariate Analyses**

Before performing the multivariate analyses, correlation matrices were produced and are reported in Appendix 4.3 to 4.6. Political trust is significantly associated with all individual-level and country-level variables in the four datasets used in this thesis.

Table 4.5 predicts the political trust using only the individual-level variables in the four datasets related to the role of the quality of electoral democracy (QED), the quality of liberal democracy (QLD), the quality of schooling (QS), and the quality of policing (QP). Model 1 contains simple OLS-only estimates. The estimates after controlling for the country-fixed effects are presented under Model 2.

All individual-level variables are associated with political trust, with a few exceptions. First, gender, religiousness, citizenship, welfare performance, satisfaction with the economy, satisfaction with government, and social capital are positive and consistent predictors of political trust in each model under QED, QLD, and QP. Conversely, age, domicile, and left-right orientation negatively affected the felt income could not affect these models. Some of the estimates reported under the QS column behave differently compare to these effects. For instance, gender is negatively associated, and citizenship and satisfaction with the economy are insignificant compared to their significant association in the other models. It can also be observed that original estimates under Model 1 dropped in Model 2. The proceeding section takes into the role of individual-level and country-level variables in explaining political trust.

| <b>Table 4.5 Multivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on Control Variables</b>  |                                |               |                              |               |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|---------------|
|  | Quality of Electoral Democracy |               | Quality of Liberal Democracy |               |
|  | Model 1                        | Model 2       | Model 1                      | Model 2       |
| Constant   | 4.75 (.07)***                  | 3.74 (.07)*** | 5.71 (.07)***                | 5.98 (.07)*** |
| Gender   | .14 (.02)***                   | .11 (.02)***  | .13 (.02)***                 | .11 (.02)***  |
| Age  | -.08 (.01)***                  | -.06 (.01)*** | -.15 (.01)***                | -.11 (.01)*** |
| Education in years   | -.08 (.01)***                  | .01 (.01)     | -.08 (.01)***                | .01 (.01)     |
| Religiousness  | .07 (.01)***                   | .07 (.01)***  | .09 (.01)***                 | .08 (.01)***  |
| Domicile   | .03 (.01)***                   | -.03 (.01)*** | .00 (.01)                    | -.04 (.01)*** |
| Citizenship  | .51 (.05)***                   | .09 (.04)*    | .31 (.04)***                 | .07 (.04)     |
| Welfare performance  | .22 (.01)***                   | .22 (.01)***  | .22 (.01)***                 | .23 (.01)***  |
| Felt income  | -.38 (.01)***                  | -.01 (.01)    | -.40 (.01)***                | -.01 (.01)    |
| Sat: economy   | .21 (.01)***                   | .25 (.01)***  | .17 (.01)***                 | .22 (.01)***  |
| Political interest   | -.51 (.01)***                  | -.35 (.01)*** | -.59 (.01)***                | -.38 (.01)*** |
| Sat: government  | .80 (.01)***                   | .83 (.01)***  | .80 (.01)***                 | .83 (.01)***  |
| Left-right orientation   | -.01 (.01)                     | .00 (.01)     | .00 (.01)                    | .02 (.01)*    |
| Social capital   | .24 (.01)***                   | .28 (.01)***  | .25 (.01)***                 | .30 (.01)***  |
| N: Individuals   | 36550                          | 35582         | 35581                        | 53581         |
| N: Countries   | 20                             | 20            | 20                           | 20            |
| Country fixed-effect   | No                             | Yes           | No                           | Yes           |
| R <sup>2</sup>   | .38                            | .55           | .40                          | .57           |
|  | Quality of Schooling           |               | Quality of Policing          |               |
|  | Model 1                        | Model 2       | Model 1                      | Model 2       |
| Constant   | .73 (.11)***                   | 5.11 (.24)*** | 5.16 (.07)***                | 3.87 (.07)*** |
| Gender: Male   | -.06 (.03)*                    | -.11 (.06)    | .12 (.02)***                 | .10 (.02)***  |
| Age  | .01 (.03)                      | .01 (.05)     | -.10 (.01)***                | -.07 (.01)*** |
| Education in years   | -.04 (.03)                     | -.06 (.05)    | -.12 (.01)***                | -.02 (.01)*   |
| Religiousness  | .06 (.02)***                   | .11 (.03)***  | .11 (.01)***                 | .10 (.01)***  |
| Domicile   | -.03 (.01)*                    | -.04 (.02)    | .07 (.01)***                 | -.01 (.01)*   |
| Citizenship  | -.06 (.08)                     | -.04 (.14)    | .55 (.05)***                 | .13 (.04)**   |
| Welfare performance  | .12 (.02)***                   | .22 (.03)***  | .24 (.01)***                 | .24 (.01)***  |
| Felt income  | .01 (.02)                      | .01 (.04)     | -.49 (.01)***                | -.03 (.01)**  |
| Sat: economy   | .04 (.02)*                     | .08 (.04)*    | .14 (.01)***                 | .20 (.01)***  |
| Political interest   | -.18 (.02)***                  | -.36 (.04)*** | -.59 (.01)***                | -.39 (.01)*** |
| Sat: government  | .41 (.02)***                   | .74 (.03)***  | .78 (.01)***                 | .81 (.01)***  |
| Left-right orientation   | .03 (.01)                      | .04 (.03)     | -.04 (.01)***                | -.01 (.01)    |
| Social capital   | .17 (.02)***                   | .30 (.03)***  | .24 (.01)***                 | .28 (.01)***  |
| N: Individuals   | 2786                           | 2786          | 41621                        | 41621         |
| N: Countries   | 17                             | 17            | 24                           | 24            |
| Country fixed-effect   | No                             | Yes           | No                           | Yes           |
| R <sup>2</sup>   | .36                            | .45           | .41                          | .57           |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses. Country-fixed parameter included in all models. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |                                |               |                              |               |

### 4.3.5 Multilevel Analyses

#### Assessment of Model Fitness

Section 4.3.1 demonstrated within and between-country variances in political trust that are estimated by employing three rounds of the ESS. The ANOVA results reported in Table 4.6 fit well into this null multilevel equation

$$\text{PoliticalTrust}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

where  $\gamma_{00}$  is the grand mean of political trust at the EU-level, and  $\mu_{0j}$  and  $e_{ij}$  are all country-level and individual-level unique political trust sources, respectively. Firstly, it can be observed from the estimates reported under the QED column that political trust is distributed with a mean and a standard deviation of 3.35 and .23, respectively. Second, political trust is distributed under the QLD column with an overall mean of 3.85 and a standard deviation of .25. Next, QS data, the means and standard deviations of political trust are 4.60 and .18. Finally, political trust has an overall mean of 3.55 and a standard deviation of .24 in the QP dataset. The Wald test parameters showed that these intercepts vary significantly between countries in each of the groups.

| <b>Table 4.6 ANOVA Results</b>   |               |               |               |               |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Fixed Effects</b>   | <b>QED</b>    | <b>QLD</b>    | <b>QS</b>     | <b>QP</b>     |
| Intercept ( $\gamma_{00}$ )  | 3.35 (.23)*** | 3.85 (.25)*** | 4.60 (.18)*** | 3.55 (.24)*** |
| <b>Variance Components</b>   |               |               |               |               |
| Individual-level ( $e_{ij}$ )  | 4.10 (.03)*** | 3.96 (.03)*** | 3.37 (.08)*** | 3.92 (.03)*** |
| Country-level ( $\mu_{0j}$ )   | 1.06 (.36)**  | 1.30 (.41)**  | .57 (.20)**   | 1.34 (.30)**  |
| ICC  | .21           | .25           | .14           | .24           |
| –2 Log-Likelihood  | 8666.73       | 9926.65       | 432.24        | 12419.66      |
| N: Individuals   | 35415         | 35073         | 3289          | 44600         |
| N: Countries   | 20            | 20            | 17            | 24            |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |               |               |               |               |

Second, the country-level and individual-level variance components are statistically significant across four groups. That the individual-level variance in the political trust is much larger than country-level variations is not surprising in those research designs where data are collected from individual citizens (Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 99; Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 231). The Interclass Coefficient Correlation (ICC) reveals that compared to 21% and 25% in the first two groups, the country-level accounts for 14% and 25% of the variance in the latter two groups. Next, –2 Log Likelihood ratio statistics suggested that the nested models are statistically significant from their non-nested counterparts (note: one additional degree of freedom is associated with a chi-square distribution of 6.636 at a significance level .01) in each of the groups. It can also be observed that that the intercept-only models in Table 4.6 are statistically different from their counterparts in Table 4.7. Finally, including individual-level and country-level variables substantially bring down the ICC (Table 4.7). Together, these statistics suggest that the country



context might account for variation in political trust, which can be examined through multilevel analyses.

### Political Trust Effects of Demographic and Control Variables

Most of the estimates of individual-level variables reported in Table 4.7 are consistent with those produced through fixed-effect models in Table 4.5 (Model 2).

| <b>Table 4.7 Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Effects Based on Control Variables</b>  |               |               |               |               |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Fixed Effects</b>   | <b>QED</b>    | <b>QLD</b>    | <b>QS</b>     | <b>QP</b>     |
| Intercept  | 2.68 (.17)*** | 3.05 (.14)*** | 4.04 (.26)*** | 2.78 (.16)*** |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b>   |               |               |               |               |
| Gender: male   | -.11 (.02)*** | -.11 (.02)*** | .10 (.06)     | -.09 (.02)*** |
| Age  | -.06 (.01)*** | -.11 (.01)*** | .01 (.05)     | -.07 (.01)*** |
| Education in years   | .01 (.01)     | .01 (.01)     | -.06 (.05)    | -.02 (.01)*   |
| Religiousness  | .07 (.01)***  | .08 (.01)***  | .11 (.03)***  | .10 (.01)***  |
| Domicile: suburbs  | .17 (.04)***  | .15 (.04)***  | .08 (.12)     | .11 (.04)**   |
| Domicile: town/small city  | .08 (.04)     | .16 (.04)***  | -.01 (.13)    | .09 (.04)*    |
| Domicile: country village  | .12 (.04)**   | .11 (.03)**   | -.05 (.12)    | .12 (.03)**   |
| Domicile: countryside  | .07 (.04)     | .04 (.03)     | -.06 (.12)    | .09 (.03)*    |
| Citizen: yes   | -.10 (.04)*   | -.07 (.04)    | .05 (.14)     | -.13 (.04)**  |
| Welfare performance  | .22 (.01)***  | .23 (.01)***  | .22 (.03)***  | .24 (.01)***  |
| Income: living comfortably   | .04 (.04)     | .06 (.04)     | -.09 (.15)    | .06 (.03)     |
| Income: copying  | -.01 (.03)    | .03 (.04)     | -.13 (.15)    | .02 (.03)     |
| Income: difficult  | .00 (.03)     | .07 (.04)     | -.04 (.16)    | -.02 (.03)    |
| Sat: economy   | .25 (.01)***  | .22 (.01)***  | .08 (.03)*    | .20 (.01)***  |
| Interest: very interested  | 1.03 (.03)*** | 1.11 (.03)*** | 1.11 (.13)*** | 1.15 (.03)*** |
| Interest: quite interested   | .81 (.02)***  | .88 (.02)***  | .70 (.09)***  | .88 (.02)***  |
| Interest: hardly interested  | .51 (.02)***  | .53 (.02)***  | .29 (.08)***  | .52 (.02)***  |
| Sat: government  | .83 (.01)***  | .82 (.01)***  | .74 (.03)***  | .81 (.01)***  |
| Left-right orientation   | .00 (.01)     | .02 (.01)*    | .04 (.03)     | -.01 (.01)    |
| Social capital   | .28 (.01)***  | .30 (.01)***  | .30 (.03)***  | .28 (.01)***  |
| <b>Country-Level Controls</b>  |               |               |               |               |
| Communist past: yes  | .45 (.30)     | .75 (.32)*    | .37 (.38)     | .44 (.28)     |
| Voice and accountability   | .99 (.15)***  | 1.06 (.12)*** |               |               |
| Government effectiveness   |               |               | .72 (.17)***  | 1.12 (.14)*** |
| <b>Variance Components</b>   |               |               |               |               |
| Individual-level variance  | .43 (.00)***  | 2.18 (.02)*** | 2.04 (.05)*** | 2.27 (.01)*** |
| Country-level variance   | .01 (.00)**   | .22 (.07)**   | .12 (.06)**   | .05 (.06)**   |
| ICC  | .03           | .09           | .07           | .08           |
| -2 Log Likelihood  | 1047.33       | 3195.18       | 167.41        | 3438.23       |
| N: Individuals   | 33298         | 33295         | 2271          | 37840         |
| N: Countries   | 20            | 20            | 17            | 24            |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |               |               |               |               |

It would be more appropriate to summarize the results produced by analyses of QED, QLD, and QP. This is because they have almost similar parameter estimates and then report the outcomes of the analysis of the QS dataset.

Being male and increase in age were negatively associated with political trust, and any change in education produces no effect. Any change in years of education does not affect except in QP, where is very weakly and negatively associated with political trust. An increase in religiosity tends to increase political trust. Those living in suburbs of big cities are more likely to trust than their fellows who either live in smaller cities, villages or countrysides. Likewise, being a citizen of a country is negatively related to political trust. Moreover, welfare performance tends to increase political trust. Of the two economic variables, felt income could not affect and satisfaction with economy consistently predicted political trust positively across all groups. Concerning the three political variables, political interest appears one of the main predictors. Those who are very much interested in politics are more likely to trust political institutions than those who are quite or hardly interested in politics. The left-right orientation produced no effect at all to a very weak to strong effect. Finally, political trust tends to increase as social capital improves in a society.

In the context of QS, any changes in variables such as gender, age, education, domicile, and left-right produced no effect on political trust. The effects of religiosity, welfare performance, satisfaction with the economy, interest in politics, and satisfaction with government produced positive effects on political trust. However, their coefficients are different from those reported above.

On the country-level, voice and accountability and government effectiveness were highly significant predictors both in the context of the quality of democracy (QED and QLD) and the quality of public services (QS and QP). However, have a communist past is not related to political trust except in the context of QLD, where it showed a statistically very weak yet positive effect.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

This chapter investigated various demographic and control variables in explaining political trust in Europe. It performed a series of analyses, which showed that these variables are statistically associated with political trust with a few exceptions. Most of the findings align with the literature produced elsewhere. Thus, the result that religiousness affects political trust positively supports the assumption that religious people tend to accept authority (Inglehart and Baker 2000). However, it is interesting that domicile/place of residence is related to political trust in different fashions for the consumers of democracy and public services. For instance, the inhabitants of big urban cities are more likely to trust than those living in smaller towns in democratic services.

Conversely, those living in smaller cities are likely to express more trust in political institutions. The proximity effect might account for this discrepancy: those living in big cities interact with democratic services in more open, visible, and interactive fashions. It is not only that they might have better access to various sources of information and communication, but their direct experiences of the multiple forms of democratic participation might also equip them with the

necessary cognitive abilities to understand how democracies work in practice. However, this proximity effect works in a reverse direction in the case of police. Their interactions with the police in urban spaces are probably more violent, and their perceptions might be more adverse, given that big cities have higher crime rates. It is also possible that besides facing fewer crimes, the people in smaller cities or rural localities have less information about the working of the police, which results in an overall positive image of them. However, the role of this rural-urban divide does not matter when taken as a control variable for the student-level data.

The role of politics also needs to be stressed. The likelihood of trusting political institutions is high when individuals are highly interested in politics. This likelihood decreases with a decrease in interest in politics; such an impact behaves differently for students. Congruence hypothesis might work here: Open classroom discussion and debates might work as a replica of political institutions. However, such an image might get weaker once they are done up with their studies, and other than political concern might become more important for them.

On the country-level, in line with the extant literature (Goubin and Hooghe 2020) communist past could not produce any effect on political trust except in the context of the quality of liberal democracy. The findings that voice and accountability and government effectiveness significantly predict political trust align with previous results that the quality of democracy and the quality of government play a pivotal role in building political trust (Norris 2011a). This means that governments can increase political trust by raising the level of democracies and public services in their countries. These findings lay the foundations for the next chapters that political trust varies within and between countries and is significantly associated with individual-level and country-level factors.

## **Chapter 5 Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**

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### **Summary**

This chapter investigates the political trust effects of the quality of electoral democracy in Europe. Firstly, relying on the service sector and political science literature, the quality of democracy is conceived as a service provided to the citizens. It then elaborates that the quality of electoral democracy can be understood as citizens' electoral expectations and perception of electoral performance as well as the gap between expectations and perceived performance, i.e., disconfirmation. Afterward, it demonstrates that these three quality measures may directly influence political trust and that disconfirmation can mediate between the other two predictors. The analyses of the data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey (hereafter: ESS-6) support these assumptions.

### **5.1 Introduction**

Understanding the quality of democracy and its consequences is increasingly becoming the cause of concern for many political scientists (Mattes 2014; Mauk 2020b; I. McAllister and White 2015; Norris 2014; Teorell et al. 2016). It is not until recently that researchers have started making distinctions between the level of democracy and the quality of democracy that have traditionally been employed interchangeably. The level of democracy reflects experts' evaluations of the features and workings of democratic regimes. Conversely, in line with the service sector literature (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988), the quality of democracy can be conceived as a service provided to the citizens. This body of literature suggests three ways to evaluate such a quality concept. One argument is that the quality of democracy might refer to the superiority of democracy as conceived by the citizens (Fuchs and Roller 2018; Park and Yi 2016). A second view takes perceptions and experiences of performance as a measure of quality. A final version views quality as a gap between democratic expectations and democratic performance or what service sector researchers call disconfirmation.

The rational choice account of political support holds that citizens extend support to the political objects based on what they receive from them (Hoffman 2011; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2009; Morlino 2009a; Norris 2011b); the values and rights that a regime confers upon them (Almond and Verba 1989; Oser and Hooghe 2018); and the extent to which it meets up to their expectations or reduces the gap between their expectations/orientations and evaluations (Sirovátka, Guzi, and Saxonberg 2018; Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 1999). Under this approach, these three versions of the quality of democracy can influence political trust in four ways. Compared to the positive effects of higher performance and disconfirmation, expectations can affect political trust either way. A fourth approach views trust formation judgments as a complex cognitive process

involving interaction between expectations, performance, disconfirmation, and political trust. This chapter tests all these assumptions by focusing on the association between the quality of electoral democracy and political trust.

Researchers have already scrutinized the role of the quality of democracy in political trust. Those acknowledging the role of democratic expectations either did not make any difference between electoral and liberal expectations that might influence political trust in different fashions (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016) or focused only on a single aspect of electoral democracy such as electoral integrity (Mauk 2020b; Norris 2014). Besides expectations and performance dimensions, one study has used the gap between expectations and evaluations of free and fair elections and differentiated offers as dependent variables (Donovan and Karp 2017). According to the best of my knowledge, only two case studies produced so far have focused on trust formation as a cognitive process (Morgeson 2013; Seyd 2015). Thus, we lack a systematic and coherent study testing the direct and indirect effects of three measures of quality of electoral democracy on political trust in a comparative context.

This chapter precisely proposes to explore such a mechanism in Europe. After concentrating on the concept of the quality of electoral democracy, it argues that the citizen's electoral expectations are associated with political trust. However, in regimes where successive governments can generate positive perceptions of electoral performance and mitigate the gaps between electoral expectations and electoral performance are more likely to generate political trust. The third part concentrates on measurement issues and the empirical design at hand. The analytical part further comprises a series of analyses for systematically testing the political trust effects of three quality measures of electoral democracy. The conclusion section summarizes key findings and presents their implications.

The literature review chapter demonstrated that democratic value orientation and satisfaction with democracy refer to higher-level concepts and democratic norms and performance evaluations are their operationalization. This chapter focuses on the political trust effects of electoral norms and electoral performance evaluations.

## **5.2 Relationship between Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**

The quality of elections and institutions responsible for holding them are central to the concepts of electoral democracy (Teorell et al. 2016). Referred to as “institutional guarantees of polyarchy” (Dahl 1971), electoral democracy is a political recruitment process enabling a political system to fill in the executive and legislative offices through a legitimate process. This process is legitimate given that it is carried out in accordance with the international norms and conventions (Norris 2013b), including competition, vertical accountability, deliberation, and responsiveness. These norms and principles reflect citizens' orientations or expectations as to how the electoral process ought to perform under ideal conditions. Performance evaluation of electoral democracy refers to citizens' judgments of the perceptions or actual working of various dimensions of such a democracy. The electoral disconfirmation, which is the third dimension of the quality of electoral

democracy, represents electoral expectations minus electoral performance. Simply, rational citizens would shape their feelings of political trust based on the citizens' orientations or evaluations of each of these three dimensions. A more elaborate version suggests that the political trust proceeds a cognitive process where electoral disconfirmation would mediate the relationship between electoral expectations and performance evaluations.

### **5.2.1 Electoral Expectations**

Research suggests two mechanisms accounting for political trust effects of electoral expectations. Some researchers view expectations as rational orientations (Forero and Gómez 2017; Manski 2004), directed towards political processes such as electoral democracy and political institutions. Citizens would attempt to see a fit between what they believe the electoral democracy ought to be and what political institutions ought to do. Electoral democracy provides opportunities to the citizens to elect their leaders through a competitive process involving debates, discussion, deliberation, accountability, and so on. Among the various functions of representative political institutions are codification and modification of various norms into laws. Likewise, these institutions are guardians of democratic norms, including freedoms and rights through legislation, debates, and discussion within and outside the legislative chambers. Arguably, citizens attaching more importance to electoral norms are more likely to trust these institutions.

Additionally, in consolidated democracies, democracy is the only game in the town (Norris 2017a). There is a strong likelihood that political trust will emanate from accepting electoral norms as one of the main mechanisms for gaining membership in political institutions and governing through them. Even the supporters of a losing political party in particular elections would accept the authority of current institutions because believing in electoral norms might allow their political party to govern through the political institutions in the next elections (Rothstein 2009: 314).

Second, the relationship described above might become inverse if political trust is conceived as affective evaluations indicating the performance or effectiveness of representative institutions (Abeles 1976; Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016; Norris 1999b). Citizens believe that political institutions are filled with dishonest, corrupt, and ineffective political elite; the high electoral expectations are most likely to generate frustration with current representative institutions. Conversely, the duress of high expectations expressed in terms of demands can exert a pull effect on political institutions to perform better or improve their effectiveness.

It is increasingly being acknowledged that democratic values and norms predict political trust under different conditions and directions, respectively. For instance, Kołczyński's (2020) analyzed global data coming from the World Values Survey (2015) and the European Values Survey (2015). They found that democratic value orientation, indicated by a preference for a democratic regime over a non-democratic one, did not directly influence political trust. Rather, this relationship is moderated by years of education. Conversely, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser (2016) operationalized the ESS-6 battery of democratic expectations into low, medium, and high ideals and social and political rights. Their multilevel analyses suggest that in contrast to the null effect of low ideals,

high ideals and social rights were negatively, and political rights were positively associated with political trust.

As expressed in the previous paragraph, available literature demonstrated a correlation between democratic norms and political trust; however, the direction of causality is not clear. For instance, a comparative analysis by Shi (2001) suggested that citizens' beliefs about the responsiveness of their governments positively influenced political trust in China and Taiwan. In another study (Zhai 2018), it was found that holding traditional political orientations was negatively associated, and democratic orientations were positively associated with political trust in China. Mauk's (2015) analyses of the 2010 Asian Barometer and the 2013 African Barometer surveys showed that holding democratic value orientations (an additive index of vertical accountability, equality, and pluralism) consistently and negatively predicted political trust not only in Asian and African societies but also in authoritarian, hybrid, electoral and liberal regimes. Before demonstrating the relationship between electoral norms and political trust, it is noteworthy that by distinguishing between *would* and *should/ideals* expectations, service sector literature suggests a negative relationship between ideals and evaluations (Van Dyke, Kappelman, and Prybutok 1997). In view of the above discussion, it can be stated that:

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1a</sub>):** Electoral expectations will affect political trust negatively.

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1b</sub>):** Electoral expectations will affect political trust positively.

## 5.2.2 Electoral Performance

On the other hand, "[t]he most promising explanation for a change in trust is politics itself" (Citrin and Stoker 2018: 37), suggesting that the working of the politics in practice itself is the compelling force behind the rise of trust in government. It is increasingly acknowledged so far that the quality of democratic procedures and clean governments stimulate political satisfaction (Monsiváis-Carrillo and Cantú Ramos 2020). In other words, rational citizens would deposit trust in institutions based on their assessment of the performance of electoral democracy.

Compared to the confusion abounding the direction of association in electoral expectations, electoral performance predicted political trust positively across several countries. To begin with individual case studies, Job (2005) found that Australians' feelings of powerlessness, i.e., the government neither listening to them nor caring about their demands and trying to exploit them, were negatively associated with trust in local and remote political institutions. Torcal (2014) suggested a negative relationship between responsiveness indicated by the carelessness of public officials and trust in national parliaments, political parties, regional parliaments, and courts in Spain and Portugal. Similar results were reported by Christian (2019: 117-153): His country by country analyses predicted a positive relationship between responsiveness and political trust in the 21 countries. Likewise, Catterberg and Moreno's (2005) comparative inquiry of established democracies, post-Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, and Latin America found a positive association between responsiveness and public trust. Moreover, while Hibbing and Patterson's

(1994) study suggested a negative relationship between political involvement and efficacy in nine Central and Eastern European societies, Magalhães' (2006) analyses showed that political discussions positively affected political trust in 16 European polities. Finally, a recent study by Mauk (2020b) of global data analyses predicted the positive political trust effect of electoral integrity indicated by free and fair elections.

**Hypothesis 2 (H<sub>2</sub>):** Electoral performance will influence political trust positively.

### **5.2.3 Electoral Disconfirmation**

The disconfirmation approach has received tremendous empirical support in service sector literature (e.g., James 2009; Van Ryzin 2006). However, according to the best of my knowledge, only two studies in mainstream political science literature concentrated on the role of a gap between expectations and performance, i.e., disconfirmation in explaining political trust and satisfaction. For instance, Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva (1999) found that citizens such expectations from the president as “(1) sound judgment in a crisis, (2) experience in foreign affairs, (3) high ethical standards, and (4) an ability to work well with Congress,” their evaluation of performance and the gap between these two attitudes were significantly associated with his approval rating and vote preferences in the United States. For Sirovátka, Guzi, and Saxonberg (2018), the inequality policy deficit (i.e., the gap between citizens' orientation towards democracy reduces poverty and their governments make efforts to reduce poverty) was responsible for citizens disaffection with democracy in Europe. Following these two lines of arguments, it is plausible that

**Hypothesis 3 (H<sub>3</sub>):** Electoral disconfirmation will influence political trust positively.

However, like the service sector literature, which is not clear either the performance-only measure of quality is a better predictor than the disconfirmation measure (Parasuraman et al. 1994), we still do not know which of these two measures will be a better predictor of political trust in Europe.

### **5.2.4 Role of Electoral Disconfirmation as a Mediator**


The assumption of the disconfirmation approach that the performance-expectation gap shapes consumers' attitudes towards the produces or services (Oliver 2015) has extensively been tested in the service sector literature (Filtenborg, Gaardboe, and Sigsgaard-Rasmussen 2017; G. G. Van Ryzin 2004a, 2005). However, only a few political scientists have shown that disconfirmation mediates the relationship between political expectations, performance, and political satisfaction (Morgeson 2013; Seyd 2015). There are two versions of the disconfirmation approach (Oliver 2015: 96-134): A simpler version comprises expectations, disconfirmation, and satisfaction, and a fuller model containing performance as an additional variable.

In the context of political trust, paths FAC in Figure 5.1 represents this simpler model. It is likely that in the presence of very strong orientations towards the norms of electoral democracy or electoral expectations accompanied with far lower perceptions of electoral performance, the disconfirmation would knock out the effects of the latter. A fuller model is most likely to operate



when electoral expectations and electoral performance vary substantially. In such a situation, electoral expectations are negatively associated with electoral disconfirmation, and electoral performance is positively related to electoral disconfirmation, which in turn affects political trust positively. Such an approach suggests that these indirect effects of electoral expectations and electoral performance on political trust (paths AC and BC) might differ from those of their direct effects (paths F and E).

**Figure 5.1 Mediating Role of Electoral Disconfirmation**



It is plausible that electoral expectation and electoral performance would be associated, but the direction of this relationship is not clear. Higher electoral expectations might exert pressure on authorities for efficient and effective performance. Conversely, meeting very high expectations might be beyond the capacity of the system, thus generating frustration about the performance of the electoral system.

### 5.3 Data Operationalization

This chapter and the next one employ data from ESS-6 fielded between August 2012 and December 2013 in 29 countries. The dependent variable, political trust, is an average index of trust in the parliament, political parties, and politicians from the ‘core module’ (Chapter 4: Section 4.3.1).

Its ‘rotating module’ titled as “Understanding of democracy” contains a battery of sixteen items on citizens’ orientations towards principles of democracy in general and performance evaluations of their own countries against these expectations. These orientations and evaluations are dubbed as democratic expectations and democratic performance. Items pertaining to horizontal

accountability and immigrants' rights were only asked in the context of democratic orientations, thus rendering us unable to calculate their disconfirmation scores or the performance-expectation gap. Moreover, we contend that items related to poverty, income inequality reductions, referendum, and responsiveness to the other EU government correspond to the output side purview of this thesis. Finally, ten items each were retained: the first six items related to the quality of electoral democracy and the remaining four items capturing the quality of liberal democracy (see Appendix 5.1 for the exact description of these items). They appropriately serve the purpose of calculating disconfirmation or gap as a measure of the quality of democracy.

Israel (non-European), Albania, Russia, Kosovo and Ukraine (non-democratic) were dropped from the analysis (Quaranta 2018). Missing values did not exceed 10% of the data within individual countries and therefore are less likely to bias the results (Appendix 5.2). Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were dropped from the analysis for showing up poor reliability and model fitness indices (Section 5.4.1). Initially, four country-level variables—voice and accountability, government effectiveness GDP and CPI—were considered from the World Governance Index for the year 2012. Given the very high correlation between these variables, voice and accountability was retained for the analysis considering it is the most appropriate and relevant measure of the level of democracy (Chapter 4: Appendix 4.3). The final data from 20 countries contained 39134 individual-level and two country-level variables—communist past and voice and accountability—ready for multilevel analysis.

### **5.3.1 Measurement of Quality of Electoral Democracy**

Drawing on the service sector and political science literature (Fuchs and Roller 2018; Park and Yi 2016), the quality of electoral democracy was captured through electoral expectations, electoral performance, and electoral disconfirmation. Following Fuchs and Roller's contention that the quality of democracy stands for orientations towards democratic norms, the quality of electoral democracy was captured through citizens' orientations towards six electoral norms: free and fair elections, differentiated offers, viable opposition, vertical accountability, responsiveness, and deliberation. Then, citizens' evaluations of the performance of their governments against the democratic norms were used to capture performance-only measures of quality of electoral democracy. Finally, the performance scores were subtracted from those of expectations to represent electoral disconfirmation as the third measure of the quality of electoral democracy.

The first indicator of the quality of electoral democracy is free and fair elections, also referred to as electoral integrity, which means that the successive governments are replaced by open competition and free and fair elections that are held in accordance with international conventions and global norms (Norris 2013b). Several operational definitions of integrity or fairness exist (van Ham 2015): Some researchers have used an index of integrity (Norris 2013a; Teorell et al. 2016) and others have employed single items that capture all aspects of the electoral cycle (Birch 2010; Bowler et al. 2015). Two questions capturing citizens' orientation towards the importance of free

and fair elections for democracy in general and the extent to which elections are free and fair in one's own country were employed to measure the quality of electoral integrity.

The next two dimensions of the quality of electoral democracy are differentiated political offers and viable oppositions; both are integral constituent elements of electoral democracy (Bartolini 2000). Political parties compete based on their distinctive political programs, policies, ideologies, and issues. Political competition becomes almost meaningless, even if the political contest is opened, when parties offer more or less identical policies and programs. This dimension of quality of electoral democracy was measured through questions concerning citizens' orientation towards and evaluation of differentiated political offers: 'Different political parties in offer clear alternatives to one another' and 'Different political parties in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another.'

Viable opposition or vulnerability refers to "the possibility for an incumbent government to be ousted and replaced or otherwise modified in its composition as a result of changes in voters' choice," resulting in parties perceptions of gaining or losing access to the public authority and voters perceptions of having an impact on the formation and/or changes in the government (Bartolini 2000: 52). Vulnerability ensures that voters are available to different political parties based on different options offered to them, and not a single political party is protected by such means as gerrymandering and preferential allocation of funds. This means that democratic governments provide oppositions parties opportunities to criticise a sitting their programs, plans, and policies. The quality of viable opposition was captured by citizens' orientations that in democracy, "opposition parties are free to criticise the government" and their evaluations that "opposition parties in [country] are free to criticise the government."

Vertical accountability, the fourth dimension of our concept of quality of electoral democracy, is quite often alternatively used with responsibility (Bovens 2007). In democracies, accountability usually invokes a principal-agent relationship, whereby being the ultimate principals, citizens can elect and recall their governments (i.e., agents) through elections (Strøm 2000). In other words, through vertical accountability, voters control their representatives by invoking electoral sanctions if their incumbent governments do not produce their preferred outcomes. The orientation aspect of vertical accountability was operationalized, "Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job," and its evaluation dimension was captured through "governing parties in [country] are punished in elections when they have done a bad job."

Related to the concept of vertical accountability is transparency. It ensures that the public representatives justify their actions and decisions (Papadopoulos 2007: 450). One of the five Dahlian criteria of the democratic process is the 'enlightened understanding,' which can only be achieved when citizens have access to the relevant information about policy formulation and implementation processes, including the policy outputs and outcomes, and their evaluations from critical perspectives (Dahl 1989: 112). Given this, transparency stands out to be 'the most important concept of global democracy' (Fiorini 2005: 16). The items employed to tap into

orientation and evaluations are: “The government explains its decisions to voters” and “the government in [country] explains its decisions to voters.”

Deliberation, an integral part of political participation, is our last dimension of the quality of electoral democracy. Dahl’s criteria for effective participation require that all members have equal and effective opportunities to express their views about the design of a policy (Dahl 2000). In other words, the process of participation refers to a range of political behaviour relating to political life (Morlino 2009b), including referenda, public assemblies, and deliberation. Deliberation among citizens enables citizens to have more informed positions on the issues, policies, and programs. This whole process accord legitimacy to the political competition (Manin 1987). The two ESS-6 questions, “Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote,” and “Voters in [country] discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote,” were employed to capture citizens’ orientations and evaluations of deliberation, respectively.

Each item representing orientations is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that the item is ‘not at all important for democracy’ and 10 is ‘extremely important for democracy.’ Likewise, performance evaluations against these orientations were measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for item ‘does not apply at all,’ and 10 measures ‘applies completely’ in a respondents’ home country.

## **5.4 Results**

This section examines the political trust effects of electoral expectations, the electoral performance of electoral democracy, and electoral disconfirmation in Europe. The analytical approach comprises six steps. The first step is about a measurement model lying at the intersection of the quality of electoral democracy and political trust. The second step presents descriptive statistics. The third step shows macro-level plots of country-level mean scores of political trust and three measures of the quality of electoral democracy. Subsequently, macro and micro-level patterns of associations between political trust and its three determinants are presented. The fifth and sixth steps plot the results of multivariate analyses and multilevel analyses, including political trust effects of three measures of quality of electoral democracy, the role of electoral disconfirmation as a mediator between electoral expectations, and political trust and marginal effects.

### **5.4.1 A Measurement Model of Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**

Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis were performed to show: (1) that political trust, electoral expectations, and electoral performance are different constructs and (2) that such a model exhibits cross-national validity and reliability in each of the 24 countries initially shortlisted.

#### **Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)**

EFA was performed with twenty-three items (three items representing political trust and ten items each capturing democratic expectations and democratic performance) without specifying

underlying constructs of these items (Appendix 5.1 contains the exact wordings of these questions). Against our expectations of three-factor solutions, the results of the exploratory factor analysis suggested four-factor in seven, five-factor in fifteen, and six-factor solutions in two countries. Repeated the analysis with fifteen items (three items representing political trust and six items each capturing electoral expectations and electoral performance) revealed a three-factor solution in five, a four-factor solution in eighteen, and a five-factor solution in one country. However, a three-factor solution appeared when the analysis focused only on three items: political trust, electoral expectations, and electoral performance (differentiated political offers, vertical accountability, and responsiveness). Table 5.1 shows the items measuring political trust and electoral performance cross-load sufficiently ( $>.30$ ). However, performing this analysis separately in 24 countries showed that in most countries, with a few exceptions—for instance, Denmark where items cross-loaded on different factors and Switzerland suggesting a two-factor solution—three sets of items sufficiently loaded under their respective constructs.

**Table 5.1 Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis**

| Variables and indicators   | Factor Loadings (9 Items) |            |            |
|--|---------------------------|------------|------------|
|  | Factor 1                  | Factor 2   | Factor 3   |
| <b>Political Trust</b>   |                           |            |            |
| T1: Trust in parliament  | <b>.89</b>                | .01        | .03        |
| T2: Trust in political parties   | <b>.94</b>                | .00        | .00        |
| T3: Trust in politicians   | <b>.95</b>                | .00        | .00        |
| <b>Electoral Expectations</b>  |                           |            |            |
| E1: Differentiated offers  | .11                       | −.07       | <b>.74</b> |
| E2: Vertical accountability  | −.15                      | <b>.10</b> | <b>.76</b> |
| E3: Responsiveness   | .05                       | −.01       | <b>.83</b> |
| <b>Electoral Performance</b>   |                           |            |            |
| P1: Differentiated offers  | .01                       | <b>.74</b> | .04        |
| P2: Vertical accountability  | −.09                      | <b>.85</b> | .03        |
| P3: Responsiveness   | <b>.15</b>                | <b>.77</b> | −.08       |
| <b>Note:</b> Factor loadings were extracted through principal component methods. |                           |            |            |

### Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

CFA was performed to test the three-dimensional structure of political trust and the quality of electoral democracy that appeared in EFA. The validity and reliability of the three constructs are based on the standard factor loading scores and alpha values. Likewise, the traditional fitness indices such as chi-square to degrees of freedom ( $X^2/df$ ), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and comparative fitness index (CFI) are employed to test the coherence of the measurement model. A reliable construct shows factor loadings and reliability of  $\geq .30$  and  $\geq .60$ , respectively. Likewise, in a good fitted model,  $X^2/df \leq 3$  with  $p > .05$ ,  $RMSEA \leq .08$ ;  $CFI \geq .95$  (Schreiber et al. 2006).

Table 5.2 present the results of confirmatory factor analysis within individual countries. All except four countries met these indices of reliability and model fitness. Standard factor loading scores and

Cronbach's alpha value were above .30 and .60, respectively. The values of RMSEA and CFI, the two measures of model fitness indices, were within the cut-off range of  $\leq .08$  and  $\geq .95$ , respectively. Finally,  $X^2/df$  is not less than 3 in any of the countries. 'Chi-square statistic is, in essence, a statistical significance test is sensitive to sample size, which means that the Chi-Square statistic nearly always rejects the model when large samples are used' (Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen 2008: 54). Thus, a discrepancy in the measurement and final models presented in this chapter can be attributed to the large sample size in each of the countries vis-à-vis the estimated parameters.

**Table 5.2 Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses**

| Countries      | Standardized Factor Loadings |     |     |       |                        |     |     |            |                       |     |     |            | Fitness Indices |            |            |
|----------------|------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|------------------------|-----|-----|------------|-----------------------|-----|-----|------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
|                | Political Trust              |     |     |       | Electoral Expectations |     |     |            | Electoral Performance |     |     |            |                 |            |            |
|                | T1                           | T2  | T3  | Alpha | E1                     | E2  | E3  | Alpha      | P1                    | P2  | P3  | Alpha      | X2/DF           | CFI        | RMSEA      |
| Belgium        | .75                          | .91 | .93 | .90   | .52                    | .58 | .81 | .64        | .67                   | .57 | .76 | .70        | 10.924          | .96        | .07        |
| Bulgaria       | .77                          | .87 | .95 | .89   | .50                    | .60 | .83 | .63        | .63                   | .35 | .79 | .58        | 5.679           | .98        | .05        |
| Switzerland    | .70                          | .84 | .91 | .85   | .40                    | .54 | .63 | .48        | .50                   | .69 | .64 | .59        | 7.089           | .95        | .06        |
| Cyprus         | .71                          | .93 | .98 | .90   | .40                    | .70 | .81 | .62        | .53                   | .64 | .76 | .69        | 3.201           | .99        | .04        |
| Czechia        | .87                          | .94 | .97 | .95   | .54                    | .72 | .91 | .76        | .41                   | .70 | .83 | .66        | 12.738          | .97        | .08        |
| Germany        | .75                          | .87 | .91 | .88   | .38                    | .61 | .59 | .49        | .46                   | .54 | .77 | .59        | 10.057          | .97        | .05        |
| <b>Denmark</b> | .77                          | .89 | .93 | .90   | .45                    | .48 | .53 | <b>.44</b> | .49                   | .42 | .70 | <b>.53</b> | <b>13.447</b>   | <b>.93</b> | <b>.09</b> |
| Estonia        | .77                          | .89 | .93 | .89   | .56                    | .70 | .74 | .69        | .48                   | .63 | .83 | .67        | 6.261           | .98        | .05        |
| Spain          | .66                          | .90 | .96 | .86   | .47                    | .68 | .82 | .65        | .53                   | .53 | .78 | .64        | 6.596           | .98        | .05        |
| Finland        | .77                          | .89 | .94 | .90   | .52                    | .59 | .64 | .60        | .55                   | .70 | .71 | .64        | 15.431          | .95        | .08        |
| France         | .67                          | .84 | .94 | .86   | .67                    | .87 | .94 | .64        | .51                   | .59 | .74 | .67        | 8.568           | .97        | .06        |
| UK             | .79                          | .93 | .94 | .91   | .54                    | .61 | .79 | .67        | .61                   | .63 | .89 | .74        | 13.231          | .96        | .07        |
| Hungary        | .80                          | .94 | .98 | .93   | .58                    | .72 | .84 | .76        | .48                   | .66 | .91 | .72        | 6.862           | .98        | .05        |
| Ireland        | .78                          | .92 | .94 | .91   | .64                    | .69 | .71 | .71        | .61                   | .84 | .85 | .69        | 16.405          | .97        | .08        |
| <b>Iceland</b> | .80                          | .91 | .94 | .91   | .41                    | .44 | .49 | <b>.39</b> | .66                   | .53 | .71 | .66        | <b>4.366</b>    | <b>.96</b> | <b>.07</b> |
| Italy          | .75                          | .91 | .95 | .89   | .49                    | .61 | .63 | .58        | .67                   | .65 | .78 | .75        | 3.890           | .98        | .05        |
| Lithuania      | .75                          | .90 | .96 | .90   | .58                    | .72 | .88 | .75        | .56                   | .49 | .82 | .66        | 10.752          | .97        | .07        |
| Netherlands    | .82                          | .91 | .93 | .91   | .56                    | .59 | .77 | .66        | .58                   | .52 | .74 | .63        | 9.224           | .97        | .07        |
| <b>Norway</b>  | .71                          | .88 | .94 | .87   | .47                    | .47 | .66 | <b>.51</b> | .61                   | .52 | .75 | .65        | <b>16.045</b>   | <b>.92</b> | <b>.10</b> |
| Poland         | .71                          | .87 | .94 | .87   | .42                    | .68 | .71 | .58        | .41                   | .63 | .75 | .62        | 5.696           | .98        | .05        |
| Portugal       | .71                          | .92 | .95 | .89   | .66                    | .82 | .85 | .82        | .58                   | .74 | .75 | .72        | 5.040           | .99        | .04        |
| <b>Sweden</b>  | .75                          | .90 | .93 | .89   | .43                    | .55 | .54 | <b>.47</b> | .72                   | .55 | .78 | .71        | <b>13.337</b>   | <b>.95</b> | <b>.08</b> |
| Slovenia       | .75                          | .93 | .95 | .90   | .38                    | .72 | .71 | .59        | .49                   | .51 | .75 | .60        | 3.083           | .99        | .04        |
| Slovakia       | .85                          | .92 | .95 | .94   | .57                    | .78 | .81 | .76        | .61                   | .65 | .69 | .68        | 11.809          | .97        | .08        |

Legend: T1 to T3 represent trust in parliament, political parties and politicians, respectively. E1 to E3 stand for citizens' expectations in general that in democracy, different political parties offer clear cut alternatives (differentiated political offers), governing parties are punished in the elections for bad performance (vertical accountability), and the government explains its decisions to the voters (responsiveness). P1 to P3 stand for citizens' evaluations of the practicing of vertical accountability, differentiated political offers, and responsiveness in their home countries, respectively.

Four Scandinavian countries could not meet the above reliability and fitness criteria. Denmark showed poor reliability of electoral expectations (.44) and electoral performance (.53) and fitness criteria (RMSEA=.09); Iceland and Sweden demonstrated very poor reliability of electoral expectations (.39); and Norway had poor reliability of electoral expectations (.51) and fitness index (RMSEA=.10). Consequently, these four countries were dropped from the further analyses.

Combined, EFA and CFA suggest that constructs of political trust, electoral expectations, and electoral performance comprise three items each. Trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians are appropriate measures of political trust. The construct of electoral expectations comprises citizens' orientations that in democracy in general, political parties offer differentiated programs (differentiated offers), are punished in the elections for bad performance (vertical accountability) and government explains their decisions to the voters (responsiveness). Citizens' evaluations that political parties offer differentiated programs in their home countries are punished in elections by the voters and responsive to them capture the construct of electoral performance. Moreover, these three constructs are coherently associated with each other to represent the model at the intersection of electoral expectations, electoral performance, and political trust. The underlying items of these constructs were converged within each of the 20 countries to represent indices of electoral expectations, electoral performance, and political trust (Chapter 4: Section 4.4.1).

#### **5.4.2 Measuring Disconfirmations: Evaluations–Expectations Gap**


Subtractive and subjective disconfirmations are widely discussed in the literature (Oliver 2010; Poister and Thomas 2011; Van Ryzin 2006; Spreng and Thomas J. Page 2003). As the ESS-6 did not cover any measure of subjective disconfirmation—asking respondents directly whether the electoral performance of their own regimes equals, exceeds, or falls short of their electoral expectations—therefore, the index of the former was subtracted from that of the latter to represent subtractive electoral disconfirmations. Operationally this measure is similar to the one reported elsewhere in the service sector literature (James 2009; Van Ryzin 2013).

#### **5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Country-Level Analyses**

Figure 5.2 plots the distribution of political trust and the three measures of quality of electoral democracy. The dots and bars in Graph 1-4 represent country-level means and confidence intervals, respectively. Graph 1 observes substantial variations in political trust between and within 20 countries. The mean political trust score in the EU-20 is 3.40. Estonia, France, and Hungary fall closer to the EU-level mean; Switzerland and Finland were the best, and Portugal and Bulgaria were the least trusted countries. Overall, these statistics are in line with the comments that Western and Eastern European countries are the most and least trusted societies, respectively (Claes, Hooghe, and Marien 2012). Section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4 gives a detailed account of the descriptive statistics of political trust within each country.

Graph 2 outlines the distribution of electoral expectations. The EU-20 mean of electoral expectations in 2012 is very high, i.e., 8.39. Five out of twenty countries are closer to the mean line. Overall, nine of them stand above, and eleven fall below this line. Electoral expectations are the highest in Cyprus and Bulgaria and the lowest in Lithuania and Slovenia. Surprisingly, electoral expectations are quite higher in some post-communist countries such as Bulgaria and

**Figure 5.2 Country-Level Patterns of Political Trust and Quality of Electoral Democracy**



— Represents mean score across 20 countries in Graphs 1-4. Block dots and bars stand for country means and their standard deviations, respectively. Data weighted by design weight.



Poland than in some well-established democracies, including Finland and the Netherlands. Moreover, several post-communist countries are sandwiched between the well-established democracies of Western Europe, suggesting that the demand for electoral democracy in the former countries is quite high.

Graph 3 shows a pattern of distribution of electoral performance. It is distributed around the EU-20 mean of 5.17, with Poland and Slovakia falling close to this mean. Most Western countries stand above, and their Eastern and South counterparts fall below the mean line. Clearly, Sweden and Switzerland are the best-performing countries, and the Czech Republic and Italy are the worst-performing European nations.

Finally, Graph 4 plots the distribution of electoral disconfirmation. When subtracted from comparably lower values of electoral performance, the very high electoral expectations values produce negative electoral disconfirmation. The positive disconfirmation scores represent better quality of electoral democracy and vice versa. The EU-20 mean of electoral disconfirmation is – 3.22, with France falling closer to this line. Switzerland and Finland are the best, and Bulgaria and Italy are the worst-performing nations on this measure of electoral disconfirmation.

Combined, these graphs show the existence of substantial variance in political trust, electoral expectations, electoral performance, and electoral disconfirmation in 20 countries under study. The distribution of individual and country-level control variables is given in Section 4.4.2 in Chapter 4.

#### **5.4.4 Bivariate Analyses**


This section presents macro-and-micro patterns of associations between political trust and the quality of electoral democracy. To do so, firstly, the country-level means of indices of political trust and three measures of quality of electoral democracy are computed, and their bivariate regressions were plotted. Afterward, bivariate regression analyses are performed to see if macro-level patterns replicate at the micro-level.

##### **Macro-Level Patterns of Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**

Figure 5.4 plots the macro-level patterns of association between country-level means of political trust and three measures of the quality of electoral democracy. Plot 1 clearly shows a linear, statistically significant, negative, and weaker relationship ( $R^2=.38$ ;  $r=-.62$ ;  $p<.01$ ) between electoral expectations and political trust. The highest level of political trust is accompanied by comparatively lower-level electoral expectations in Switzerland. Conversely, Bulgaria demonstrates the highest electoral expectations along with a very low level of political trust. Most countries are loosely scattered around the main regression line, except the UK and Estonia, and France is located on this line. Switzerland, along with Finland and the Netherlands, appears outliers by standing farthest above the line. However, we retained these countries because they do not look like outliers in electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation measures.

Plot 2 presents the association between electoral performance and political trust. There is a very strong, positive, and linear association between performance and trust ( $R^2=.72$ ;  $r=.85$ ;  $p<.001$ ). This association is the strongest in Switzerland and Finland and the weakest in Bulgaria and Portugal. Moreover, this relationship performs better in West European nations than their Eastern and Southern counterparts. Most countries are scattered around the regression line, with Estonia and Ireland being the farthest above and below the regression line, respectively.

**Figure 5.3 Macro-Patterns of Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**



Like electoral performance, electoral disconfirmation and political trust are significantly, positively, and highly correlated (Plot 3:  $R^2=.75$ ;  $r=.87$ ;  $p<.001$ ). This relationship performs best in Switzerland and Finland and worst in Bulgaria and Italy. Italy and Ireland are farthest above

and below the regression line. This relationship performs slightly better than the association between electoral performance and political trust on the overall level. However, the close affinity of these two relationships is not surprising given that electoral expectations scores are very high, and a major portion of the variance in electoral disconfirmation would come from electoral performance measures.

Combined, the scatterplots presented above support the demonstration of this chapter that electoral expectations are positively or negatively associated with political trust ( $H_1$ ) and electoral performance and electoral disconfirmations influence political trust positively ( $H_2$ – $H_3$ ). Moreover, these findings showed that the latter is a slightly better predictor of political trust than the former. Before moving to the next section, it is important to reiterate that in line with the arguments in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.2), all the continuous variables in the data are standardized to facilitate the comparison of their effect sizes. One must be careful that the coefficient should be interpreted such that one standard deviation increase in a predictor variable increase or decrease political trust by one unit.

### **Micro-Level Patterns of the Quality of Electoral Democracy and Political Trust**

Table 5.3 plots the results of bivariate regression analyses. Electoral expectations are negatively, weakly, and highly significantly associated with political trust at the EU-20 level. This relationship is negative in eight countries. Portugal is an example of an adverse association. It is positive in four countries, including Belgium and Finland, which observed the most salient effects. And it is insignificant in the remaining eight countries.

As expected, political trust effects of electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation are positive and highly significant both at the EU-20 level and within the individual countries. The relationship of electoral performance with political trust is the strongest and the weakest in Hungary and Portugal, respectively. Likewise, the association of electoral disconfirmation and political trust is the strongest and the weakest in Hungary and Slovakia, respectively.

To conclude this section, the results presented above partly support the assumption that electoral expectations are associated with political trust ( $H_1$ ) and fully endorse the hypotheses that electoral performance ( $H_2$ ) and electoral disconfirmation ( $H_3$ ) are positively related to political trust. Additionally, the finding that electoral performance is a slightly better indicator of political trust in all countries except Bulgaria, Ireland, and Portugal aligns with the service sector literature (Park and Yi 2016).

The results of individual and country-level control variables are presented in Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4.

**Table 5.3 Bivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Electoral Democracy**

|             | Electoral Expectations |               |                | Electoral Performance |              |                | Electoral Disconfirmation |              |                |
|-------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------------------|--------------|----------------|
|             | Constant               | Beta (S.E)    | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant              | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant                  | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> |
| EU-20       | 3.41 (.01)***          | -.02 (.01)*** | .01            | 3.40 (.01)***         | .29 (.01)*** | .09            | 3.41 (.01)***             | .26 (.01)*** | .07            |
| Belgium     | 4.53 (.05)***          | .14 (.05)***  | .02            | 4.53 (.04)***         | .42 (.04)*** | .18            | 4.53 (.04)***             | .29 (.04)*** | .08            |
| Bulgaria    | 1.92 (.04)***          | -.11 (.04)*** | .01            | 1.92 (.04)***         | .27 (.04)*** | .08            | 1.93 (.04)***             | .29 (.04)*** | .08            |
| Switzerland | 5.45 (.05)***          | .05 (.05)     | .00            | 5.44 (.04)***         | .31 (.04)*** | .10            | 5.45 (.04)***             | .25 (.04)*** | .06            |
| Cyprus      | 2.80 (.07)***          | .03 (.07)     | .00            | 2.80 (.06)***         | .34 (.06)*** | .11            | 2.80 (.06)***             | .29 (.06)*** | .09            |
| Czechia     | 2.82 (.05)***          | .01 (.05)     | .00            | 2.82 (.05)***         | .24 (.05)*** | .06            | 2.82 (.05)***             | .17 (.05)*** | .03            |
| Germany     | 4.13 (.04)***          | -.05 (.04)*   | .00            | 4.12 (.03)***         | .38 (.03)*** | .15            | 4.12 (.03)***             | .37 (.03)*** | .14            |
| Estonia     | 3.50 (.04)***          | -.04 (.04)    | .00            | 3.50 (.04)***         | .43 (.04)*** | .18            | 3.50 (.04)***             | .36 (.04)*** | .13            |
| Spain       | 2.40 (.05)***          | -.09 (.05)*** | .01            | 2.40 (.04)***         | .38 (.04)*** | .14            | 2.40 (.04)***             | .37 (.04)*** | .14            |
| Finland     | 5.21 (.04)***          | .14 (.04)***  | .02            | 5.21 (.04)***         | .33 (.04)*** | .11            | 5.22 (.04)***             | .20 (.04)*** | .04            |
| France      | 3.48 (.04)***          | .01 (.04)     | .00            | 3.47 (.04)***         | .40 (.04)*** | .16            | 3.47 (.04)***             | .34 (.04)*** | .12            |
| UK          | 3.90 (.04)***          | .00 (.04)     | .00            | 3.88 (.04)***         | .32 (.04)*** | .10            | 3.89 (.04)***             | .28 (.04)*** | .08            |
| Hungary     | 3.47 (.05)***          | -.13 (.05)*** | .02            | 3.47 (.05)***         | .51 (.05)*** | .26            | 3.48 (.05)***             | .49 (.05)*** | .24            |
| Ireland     | 3.25 (.04)***          | -.05 (.04)**  | .00            | 3.24 (.04)***         | .24 (.04)*** | .06            | 3.24 (.04)***             | .25 (.04)*** | .06            |
| Italy       | 2.38 (.07)***          | -.03 (.07)    | .00            | 2.37 (.06)***         | .36 (.06)*** | .13            | 2.37 (.06)***             | .31 (.06)*** | .10            |
| Lithuania   | 2.98 (.04)***          | -.05 (.04)*   | .00            | 2.99 (.04)***         | .32 (.04)*** | .10            | 2.99 (.04)***             | .29 (.04)*** | .08            |
| Netherlands | 5.17 (.04)***          | .05 (.04)*    | .00            | 5.17 (.04)***         | .37 (.04)*** | .14            | 5.17 (.04)***             | .30 (.04)*** | .09            |
| Poland      | 2.48 (.04)***          | -.05 (.04)*   | .00            | 2.48 (.04)***         | .30 (.04)*** | .09            | 2.49 (.04)***             | .29 (.04)*** | .09            |
| Portugal    | 2.02 (.04)***          | -.21 (.04)*** | .04            | 2.02 (.04)***         | .15 (.04)*** | .02            | 2.02 (.04)***             | .25 (.04)*** | .06            |
| Slovenia    | 2.52 (.06)***          | -.02 (.06)    | .00            | 2.51 (.05)***         | .36 (.05)*** | .13            | 2.52 (.05)***             | .30 (.05)*** | .09            |
| Slovakia    | 2.89 (.05)***          | .09 (.05)***  | .01            | 2.89 (.05)***         | .19 (.05)*** | .04            | 2.89 (.05)***             | .10 (.05)*** | .01            |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

## 5.4.5 Multivariate Analyses

### Correlation Analyses

Table 5.4 plots the correlation between political trust and its three determinants. It suggests a weak and negative association between electoral expectations and political trust ( $H_1$ ). Moreover, electoral performance, electoral disconfirmation are moderately yet significantly associated with political trust ( $H_2$ – $H_3$ ). It also shows that the coefficient of association between electoral performance and political trust is slightly larger than that of electoral disconfirmation. Moreover, the multicollinearity, indicated by a very high correlation between electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation, might hinder us from regressing these two variables simultaneously in the subsequent analyses.

The correlation matrices of other individual and country-level variables are presented in Appendix 4.3 in Chapter 4.

| <b>Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix of Political Trust and the Quality of Electoral Democracy</b>           |          |          |          |   |
|---|----------|----------|----------|---|
|   | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> |   |
| 1. Political Trust  | 1        |          |          |   |
| 2. Electoral Expectations   | –.02***  | 1        |          |   |
| 3. Electoral Performance  | .29***   | .10***   | 1        |   |
| 4. Electoral Disconfirmation  | .26***   | –.53***  | .78***   | 1 |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |          |          |          |   |

### Political Trust Effects of Quality of Electoral Democracy

Multicollinearity exists between variables when the value of tolerance is less than .10 and that of the variation inflation factor (VIF) greater than 10 (Miles 2014). A full OLS model, including the three predictors, individual-level and country-level control variables, was estimated separately in 20 countries to detect the multicollinearity between electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation reported in the preceding section. The results (not shown here) showed that the value of tolerance in each country was .00, suggesting that multicollinearity is a real issue in the data analyzed. Consequently, it is not only that the remaining analyses are performed without regressing electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation simultaneously, but we could not estimate a fuller disconfirmation model as suggested in Figure 5.1.

Table 5.5 presents the result of OLS models. The first two models estimate the political trust effects of the three measures of the quality of electoral democracy. Electoral disconfirmation is the dependent variable in the third model to examine its role as the mediator between electoral expectations and political trust. Finally, columns A and B in each of these models excluded and included country fixed-effect parameters, respectively.

$H_1$  demonstrated a positive or negative association between electoral expectations and political trust. The effect of electoral expectations depends upon how it enters into a model. Model 1 shows

**Table 5.5 Multivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Electoral Democracy**

|                           | Political Trust  |                  |                  |                  | Disconfirmation   |                   |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                           | Model 1A         | Model 1B         | Model 2A         | Model 2B         | Model 3A          | Model 3B          |
| Constant                  | 4.75<br>(.07)*** | 3.70<br>(.07)*** | 4.75<br>(.07)*** | 3.71<br>(.07)*** | -2.12<br>(.09)*** | -2.44<br>(.09)*** |
| Electoral expectations    | -.09<br>(.01)*** | -.07<br>(.01)*** | .09<br>(.02)***  | .09<br>(.01)***  | -1.26<br>(.01)*** | -1.24<br>(.01)*** |
| Electoral performance     | .21<br>(.01)***  | .23<br>(.01)***  |                  |                  |                   |                   |
| Electoral disconfirmation |                  |                  | .14<br>(.02)***  | .26<br>(.01)***  |                   |                   |
| Gender                    | .15<br>(.02)***  | .13<br>(.02)***  | .15<br>(.02)***  | .13<br>(.02)**   | -.04<br>(.02)     | -.07<br>(.02)**   |
| Age                       | -.08<br>(.01)*** | -.06<br>(.01)*** | -.08<br>(.01)*** | -.06<br>(.01)*** | .02<br>(.01)      | .05<br>(.01)***   |
| Education in years        | -.05<br>(.01)*** | .03<br>(.01)**   | -.05<br>(.01)*** | .03<br>(.01)**   | -.19<br>(.01)***  | -.11<br>(.01)***  |
| Religiousness             | .06<br>(.01)***  | .06<br>(.01)***  | .06<br>(.01)***  | .06<br>(.01)***  | .08<br>(.01)***   | .07<br>(.01)***   |
| Domicile                  | .04<br>(.01)***  | -.03<br>(.01)*** | .04<br>(.01)***  | -.03<br>(.01)*** | .09<br>(.01)***   | .01<br>(.01)      |
| Citizenship               | .48<br>(.05)***  | .08<br>(.04)     | .48<br>(.05)***  | .07<br>(.04)     | .31<br>(.06)***   | .01<br>(.05)      |
| Welfare performance       | .20<br>(.01)***  | .20<br>(.01)***  | .20<br>(.01)***  | .20<br>(.01)***  | .22<br>(.01)***   | .23<br>(.01)***   |
| Felt income               | -.37<br>(.01)*** | -.01<br>(.01)    | -.37<br>(.01)*** | -.01<br>(.01)    | -.44<br>(.01)***  | -.05<br>(.01)***  |
| Sat: economy              | .19<br>(.01)***  | .23<br>(.01)***  | .19<br>(.01)***  | .23<br>(.01)***  | .08<br>(.01)***   | .12<br>(.01)***   |
| Political interest        | -.51<br>(.01)*** | -.35<br>(.01)*** | -.51<br>(.01)**  | -.35<br>(.01)*** | -.23<br>(.01)***  | -.08<br>(.01)***  |
| Sat: government           | .75<br>(.01)***  | .77<br>(.01)***  | .75<br>(.01)***  | .77<br>(.01)***  | .48<br>(.01)***   | .51<br>(.01)***   |
| Left-right orientation    | -.02<br>(.01)*** | -.01<br>(.01)    | -.02<br>(.01)    | -.01<br>(.01)    | .02<br>(.01)      | .03<br>(.01)**    |
| Social capital            | .23<br>(.01)***  | .27<br>(.01)***  | .23<br>(.01)***  | .27<br>(.01)***  | .03<br>(.01)*     | .07<br>(.01)***   |
| N: Individuals            | 36113            | 36113            | 36113            | 36113            | 36233             | 36233             |
| N: Countries              | 20               | 20               | 20               | 20               | 20                | 20                |
| Country fixed-effect      | No               | Yes              | No               | Yes              | No                | Yes               |
| R <sup>2</sup>            | .39              | .55              | .39              | .55              | .35               | .49               |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates were produced by including country-fixed parameters. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

that electoral expectations, when regressed along with electoral performance, influence political trust with a coefficient of  $-.09$ , which increases to  $-.07$  when the country fixed-effect parameter is considered. Conversely, the estimates in Model 2 show that irrespective of the fixed-effect parameter, electoral expectations affect political trust positively with a coefficient of  $.09$ .

H<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>3</sub> hypothesized positive relationships between electoral performance, electoral disconfirmation, and political trust. Model 1 shows a positive association between electoral performance and political trust. Column A shows that electoral performance affects political trust with a coefficient of  $.21$ , which becomes  $.23$  when the country fixed-effect parameter enters into the model. Model 2 suggests that unless the fixed effect parameter is considered, electoral disconfirmation influences political trust with a coefficient of  $.14$ . However, the inclusion of fixed-effect parameters almost doubles the coefficient of electoral disconfirmation. Together, these results clearly support the three hypotheses outlined in this chapter. Also, comparing the fixed-effect models suggests that electoral disconfirmation is a slightly better political trust than electoral performance.

The last model contains the estimates of the effects of electoral expectations on electoral disconfirmation. Model 3B shows that electoral expectations affect electoral disconfirmation with a coefficient of  $-1.24$ . Then electoral disconfirmation influences political trust with a coefficient of  $.26$  (Model 2B). These effects are significant and in the expected direction as suggested in paths A and C in Figure 5.1. Multiplying these two coefficients gives the indirect effect of electoral expectations via disconfirmation on political trust, which is  $-.32$ . These results suggest that the direct and positive effect of electoral expectations having a coefficient of  $.09$  is reduced by more than four times or 456% when passed through electoral disconfirmation. Combined, these findings indicate that electoral expectations play an important role in a simple political trust model.

When country fixed-effect parameters are considered, the changes in effect sizes and  $R^2$  show that the country-level variables might account for these variations. The next section examines how the extent to which inclusion of individual-level and country-level control variables explain the political trust effects of the quality of electoral democracy through multilevel analyses.

#### **5.4.6 Multilevel Analyses**

Table 5.6 present the results of five multilevel models. Political trust is a dependent variable in Models 1-4. Model 5 contains the estimates with electoral disconfirmation as a dependent variable to determine its role as a mediator between electoral expectations and political trust. It is useful to describe model fitness indices briefly before reporting the main results.

##### **Assessment of Models**

Section 5.4.1 observed substantial within and between countries variation in political trust in 20 societies under investigation. The ANOVA results reported in Table 4.6 in Chapter 4 showed that political trust was distributed with an overall mean of 3.35 and an estimated standard deviation of  $.23$ . The intercepts (grand means of political trust) varied significantly across the countries

(Wald=3.16,  $p < .001$ ). The interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) suggested that country-level accounts for 21% of the total variation in political trust. Together, these statistics suggest the appropriateness of the multilevel modeling technique for the individual-level and country-level determinants of political trust.

–2 Log Likelihood ratio statistics show that the nested models are statistically significant from their non-nested counterparts (note: one additional degree of freedom is associated with a chi-square distribution of 6.64 at a significance level .01). The intercept-only model (Chapter 4: Table 4.6) is statistically different from predictors-only models (Models 1-2), which are different from the full models (Models 3-4). Moreover, ICC comparisons suggest that country-level accounts for around 21% of the variance in political trust in an intercept-only model, which turns to 23% in the predictors-only models (Models 1-2) and drops to 10% when demographic and control variables were added to the models (Models 3-4).

### **Political Trust Effects of Quality of Electoral Democracy**

The results presented in Table 5.6 show that although the directions and significance levels of the three measures of quality of electoral democracy remain the same in all models, the size of the coefficient undergoes substantial changes when the control variables are considered in the fuller models. Models 1-2 contain the estimates of the predictors-only, and Models 3-4 presents the estimates of fuller models of political trust.

H<sub>1</sub> demonstrated either a positive or a negative relationship between electoral expectations and political trust. When regressed along with electoral performance, electoral expectations influence political trust negatively with a coefficient of  $-.11$ . This relationship becomes positive, having a coefficient of  $.37$  (an increase of  $.48$  points from the previous model) when electoral expectations and electoral disconfirmation enter the regression equation together). Furthermore, in the fuller model, the negative effect of electoral expectations becomes  $-.07$  and  $.09$  when this variable is regressed separately along with electoral performance and electoral disconfirmations.

H<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>3</sub> suggested positive effects of electoral performance and electoral disconfirmations, respectively, on political trust. In the predictors-only model, electoral performance affects political trust with a coefficient of  $.67$ , which becomes  $.23$  in the fuller model. Likewise, the initial effect of electoral performance having a coefficient of  $.78$  turns  $.26$  in the fuller model. The coefficients of these two variables are three times smaller than their predictors-only models.

To sum it up, the results reported above extend full support to our three hypotheses that electoral are positively or negatively associated (H<sub>1</sub>) and electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation affect political trust positively (H<sub>2</sub>–H<sub>3</sub>).



**Table 5.6 Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Electoral Democracy**

|                                       | Political Trust |               |               |               | Disconfirm     |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
|                                       | Model 1         | Model 2       | Model 3       | Model 4       | Model 5        |
| Intercept                             | 3.35 (.23)***   | 3.35 (.23)*** | 2.70 (.17)*** | 2.69 (.17)*** | -3.89 (.20)*** |
| <b>Quality of Electoral Democracy</b> |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Electoral expectations                | -.11 (.01)***   | .37 (.01)***  | -.07 (.01)*** | .09 (.01)***  | -1.24 (.01)*** |
| Electoral performance                 | .67 (.01)***    |               | .23 (.01)***  |               |                |
| Electoral disconfirmation             |                 | .78 (.01)***  |               | .26 (.01)***  |                |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b>      |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Gender: male                          |                 |               | -.12 (.02)*** | -.12 (.02)*** | .07 (.02)***   |
| Age in years                          |                 |               | -.06 (.01)*** | -.06 (.01)*** | .05 (.01)***   |
| Education in years                    |                 |               | .03 (.01)**   | .03 (.01)**   | -.11 (.01)***  |
| Religiousness                         |                 |               | .06 (.01)***  | .06 (.01)***  | .07 (.01)***   |
| Domicile: suburbs                     |                 |               | .17 (.04)***  | .17 (.04)***  | -.01 (.05)     |
| Domicile: small city                  |                 |               | .08 (.04)     | .08 (.04)     | -.03 (.05)     |
| Domicile: village                     |                 |               | .13 (.04)**   | .13 (.04)**   | -.01 (.05)     |
| Domicile: countryside                 |                 |               | .07 (.04)     | .07 (.04)     | .01 (.05)      |
| Citizenship: yes                      |                 |               | -.08 (.04)    | -.07 (.04)    | -.01 (.05)     |
| Welfare performance                   |                 |               | .20 (.01)***  | .20 (.01)***  | .23 (.01)***   |
| Income: comfortably                   |                 |               | .01 (.04)     | .01 (.04)     | .20 (.01)***   |
| Income: copying                       |                 |               | -.03 (.03)    | -.03 (.03)    | .21 (.01)***   |
| Income: difficult                     |                 |               | -.02 (.03)    | -.02 (.03)    | .18 (.01)***   |
| Sat: economy                          |                 |               | .24 (.01)***  | .24 (.01)***  | .12 (.01)***   |
| Politics: very interested             |                 |               | 1.03 (.03)*** | 1.03 (.03)*** | .26 (.04)***   |
| Politics: quite interested            |                 |               | .81 (.02)***  | .81 (.02)***  | .18 (.03)***   |
| Politics: hardly interested           |                 |               | .49 (.02)***  | .49 (.02)***  | .14 (.03)***   |
| Sat: national government              |                 |               | .77 (.01)***  | .77 (.01)***  | .51 (.01)***   |
| Left-right orientations               |                 |               | -.01 (.01)    | -.01 (.01)    | .03 (.01)**    |
| Social capital                        |                 |               | .27 (.01)***  | .27 (.01)***  | .07 (.01)***   |
| <b>Country-Level Controls</b>         |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Communist past: yes                   |                 |               | .46 (.30)     | .46 (.30)     | .73 (.34)*     |
| Voice and accountability              |                 |               | 1.00 (.15)*** | 1.00 (.15)*** | 1.20 (.17)***  |
| <b>Variance Components</b>            |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Individual-level variance             | 3.61 (.03)***   | 3.62 (.03)*** | 2.25 (.02)*** | 2.25 (.02)*** | 3.49 (.02)***  |
| Country-level variance                | 1.07 (.34)**    | 1.07 (.34)**  | .25 (.08)**   | .25 (.08)**   | .32 (.10)**    |
| ICC                                   | .23             | .23           | .10           | .10           | .08            |
| -2 Log Likelihood                     | 9611.80         | 9572.91       | 3563.74       | 3559.67       | 2713.5         |
| N: Individuals                        | 34733           | 34733         | 32893         | 32893         | 32997          |
| N: Countries                          | 20              | 20            | 20            | 20            | 20             |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

### 5.4.7 Electoral Disconfirmation as a Mediator between Electoral Expectations and Political Trust

A simple disconfirmation model involves mediation between electoral expectations, electoral disconfirmation, and political trust, which becomes a fuller one when included electoral performance (Section 5.2.4). A full model could not be estimated, given the strong multicollinearity between electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation.

**Figure 5.4 Mediated Effect of Electoral Expectations on Political Trust**




Figure 5.4 plots a simple disconfirmation model based on the coefficients from 5.6. It is important to note that Model 5 is performed to test the sample disconfirmation approach. The coefficients along paths F and C are taken from Model 4 and along path A from Model 5. The direct effect of electoral expectations is equivalent to a coefficient of .09. The effect of electoral expectations on electoral disconfirmation is  $-1.26$ , which in turn affects political trust with a coefficient of .26. Multiplying these two coefficients results in a total indirect effect of electoral expectations via electoral disconfirmation on political trust. This product is equal to  $-.33$ , which is around four and a half times or 467% points smaller than that of direct effects than its direct effect of .09.

### 5.4.8 Effects of Control Variables

Table 5.6 reports the coefficients of a host individual-level and country-level control variables. Only citizenship amongst the six demographic variables could not produce any statistically significant effect. Males are less likely to express political trust, and it tends to increase with an increase in age. Those who are domiciled in suburban areas express a higher level of political trust than those living in either small citizens or villages. Political trust also tends to increase with the improvement of perceptions of welfare performance. Feelings of household income play no role in explaining political trust. Moreover, satisfaction with the economy predicts political trust positively.

Of the three political variables, the likelihood of expressing is higher amongst those citizens who are very much interested in politics than those who are either quite interested or hardly interested in politics. Additionally, political trust tends to increase with an increase in satisfaction with the

government. Moreover, the initial very weak and negative effect (Model 4) of the left-right scale dissolved in subsequent models (Models 5-6). Finally, political trust tends to increase with an increase in social capital.

Amongst country-level variables, having a communist past is not significantly associated with political trust in all models. The level of voice and accountability appears to be only a significant predictor of political trust when electoral expectations, electoral disconfirmation, and a host of individual-level variables enter simultaneously in the regression equation.

## 5.5 Conclusions

This chapter examined the association between three measures of the quality of electoral democracy and political trust in Europe by analyzing a battery of questions from the ESS-6. Building on the strands of the service sector and political science literatures, it first conceptualized the quality of electoral democracy—expressed in terms of electoral expectations, electoral performance, and electoral disconfirmation—as a service provided to the citizens. It hypothesized, by relying on the rational choice theory and disconfirmation approach literature, that these three measures of electoral democracy would independently and significantly influence political trust ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ). Finally, it developed simple disconfirmation and full disconfirmation models. In the simple model, electoral disconfirmation mediated the relationship between electoral expectations and political trust. Such a model turned into a fuller one when electoral disconfirmation mediated the relationship between electoral expectations, electoral performance, and political trust.

A series of macro and micro-level analyses were performed to validate these assumptions empirically. The macro-level analyses showed that the three measures of the quality of electoral democracy were significantly associated with political trust in Europe, thus providing initial support to the three hypotheses ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ). At the micro-level, the bivariate analyses showed mixed effects of electoral expectations: the effect was positive in some countries, negative in others, and insignificant in still others. As expected, electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation consistently predicted political trust positively across all countries. The country fixed-effect models demonstrated the mixed effect of electoral expectations. However, electoral performance appeared as a consistent positive predictor of political trust. These analyses also provided unequivocal support to the expected and positive associations between electoral performance, electoral disconfirmation, and political trust.

In summary,  $H_1$  could only partially support the final analyses, and  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  received full support. Moreover, the final analyses clearly showed that electoral performance was a better predictor of political trust than electoral disconfirmation. Together, these results align with the findings of service sector studies: expectations influence trust in either direction, performance, and disconfirmation influence trust positively (James 2009; Morgeson 2013; Poister and Thomas 2011; G. G. Van Ryzin 2005).

Afterwards, the coefficients from respective models were assembled to test the simple disconfirmation model as a fuller model could not be computed due to multicollinearity between electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation. When passed through the electoral disconfirmation, the direct positive impact of electoral expectations became negative, with a coefficient almost four times larger than that of direct effect. This means that the trust formation process is not as straightforward as many studies show. Rather, citizens make interactive and complex comparisons when they decide to accord trust to their political institutions. This decision-making process involves interaction between their normative standards of political rights that are the cornerstones of electoral democracy and their perceptions or experiences of the performance of their countries against such standards. Thus, this chapter provides empirical support to the simple disconfirmation model.

It is important to note that the effects reported in this chapter are much smaller than those suggested in the existing scholarship in political science literature, which employed different operational definitions of main variables than this chapter did. For instance, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser (2016) estimated the effects of democratic expectations using the full battery of items from ESS-6. Conversely, Morgeson (2013) used single-item measures of expectation, performance, and disconfirmation and employed subjective rather than the subtractive measure of the latter. These points must be kept in view while interpreting the results of this chapter and guiding the design of future studies. Finally, one must be careful while interpreting these results as all the continuous variables are standardized. The results should be interpreted such that an increase in independent variables by one standard deviation is associated with coefficient times standard deviation increase or decrease in political trust.

Some of the implications of this study are straightforward. For instance, political trust can be increased by focusing on improving citizens' perceptions (and experiences) of electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation. Unless the latter is taken into account, increasing electoral expectations can negatively affect political trust. However, these relationships are not as straightforward, especially in the context of democracy. Electoral expectations are basically citizens' orientations towards the norms and principles of democracy that are fundamentally different from the products and services offered for sale and to be purchased in a market. Expectations from these products are the immediate and extrinsic rewards, thus making it easier for service providers to manipulate them through media campaigns or other means (Van Ryzin 2004a).

Conversely, the idea of electoral democracy as the embodiment of political rights is a unique one. Any effort aimed at negatively manipulating electoral expectations would mean an accomplice against democracy and its institutions. Initially, decreasing these electoral expectations might weaken diffuse support for democracy itself, which might result in regime change in the long run. As the final findings of this chapter suggest, increasing electoral performance might offer double dividends without manipulating electoral expectations. Besides directly increasing political trust, improved performance would increase positive disconfirmation. Such an attempt would reduce the

indirect negative influence of electoral expectations besides doubling the total net effect of the electoral performance.

It can be concluded that the quality of electoral democracy operationalized as electoral expectations, electoral performance, and electoral disconfirmation not only helps us to understand the complex process underlying the formation of citizens' feelings of political trust but suggest some ways of improving political trust based on the empirical manifestation of such a process. Future research should focus on using alternative data sources and measures of the quality of electoral democracy and times series analysis to examine further the potential of this theory explaining political trust.

## **Chapter 6 Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust**

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### **Summary**

This chapter aims to show the political trust effects of the quality of liberal democracy in Europe. In line with the preceding chapter, the quality of liberal democracy is conceived as a service provided to the citizens. Based on the examination of the quality of democracy and the quality of services literature, it contends that the quality of liberal democracy can be understood in terms of liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation. Afterwards, it demonstrates direct associations and argues that political trust might be an outcome of an underlying complex process of interactions. The analyses of the data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey (hereafter: ESS-6) provide support to these assumptions.

### **6.1 Introduction**

To what extent does the quality of liberal democracy determine political trust in Europe? This is the key question that this chapter aims to answer. An exhaustive body of literature that has been produced so far examines the causes and consequences of political trust, with some of the authors focusing on the role of democratic performance. Of the several facets of democratic performance, the role of quality of democracy, which might be conceived as a service provided to the citizens, has received less scholarly attention. Following the collapse of the communist state and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, the democratization process resulted in several new democracies that exhibited some distinctive features. Together, these developments attracted scholars to conceptualize democracies into electoral, liberal, deliberative, direct, social, egalitarian, consensual, majoritarian, and so on. The particular interests of this thesis are electoral and liberal democracies. The previous chapter showed that citizens differentiate between electoral and liberal components of democracy, unlike a single universal category.

Such differentiation is equally grounded in their underlying conceptions. In the abundance of definitions of democracy, drawing exact boundaries between electoral and liberal components is an ambitious task. However, for this thesis, electoral democracy stands for political processes relating to the recruitment of politicians to the executive and legislative branches of a political system. All those political and social processes and functions that ensure the protection of individual rights and civil liberties from the tyranny of the electoral majority might be referred to as liberal democracy. Projecting the concept of quality on a liberal dimension would mean that citizens recognize and show positive orientations towards these civil rights, evaluate the performance of their governments positively, and either performance equals or surpasses their expectations of protection and promotion of civil liberties.

Political scientists alternatively use expectations and orientations, i.e., support for the norms and principles of democracy, also referred to as diffuse support. Democracy begins to backslide when citizens' orientations towards these norms start to degenerate and political actors and institutions begin to violate them practically. The weakening of these norms and the bad performance of the governments on the democratic front results in what political scientists call democratic backsliding (Almond and Verba 1989; Easton 1975; Norris 2000). Illiberal democracies emerge when support for norms pertaining to individual civil rights and liberties begins to weaken and when institutions start to violate such rights routinely. Commentators have long been warning about the adverse consequences, including political satisfaction and democratic crisis, of illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997).

A general argument is that wherever the populist zeitgeist reigns, civil liberties decline. Several stable democracies have recently taken the illiberal path, with the United States and India serving as the prime examples outside Europe. There is debate about whether illiberal democracy is on the rise in Europe (Dawson and Hanley 2016; Krastev 2016). In this continent, where populist leaders seem to have been successful, such as in Hungary and in Poland, they are practically undermining Western liberal values. In other words, they are trying to break down the diffused support for the liberal principles of democracy.

Mapping the effects of democratic performance on political trust is a fashion these days. Scholars made efforts to examine the role of levels of democracy (Norris 2011: 118-135), democratic value orientations (Kończyńska 2020), or democratic expectations (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2016). Still, less is known as to how the quality of liberal democracy influences political trust and legitimacy. Like the previous one, this chapter adds to the existing literature in two ways. One, it shows how the three measures of quality of liberal democracy affect political trust. Second, some political scientists have stressed examining the role of criteria against which performance is evaluated (Nye 1997) and the cognitive process underlying the formation of feelings of political trust (Citrin 1974). Despite that some efforts at conceptualizing and testing these ideas have been made in the form of single case studies, particularly in the American and British contexts (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Morgeson 2013; Seyd 2015), this is the first comparative attempt at examining the role of quality of liberal democracy in Europe.

This chapter follows the theoretical and methodological stream outlined in the previous one. Firstly, it conceives quality in terms of liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disinformation or gap. It builds upon the expectancy-disconfirmation theory literature from the service sector (James 2009; Poister and Thomas 2011; G. G. Van Ryzin 2004a, 2005), process performance (Norris 2011: 118), and micro-performance approach embedded in political science discipline (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003), it argues that these three qualities of liberal democracies directly influence political trust. Moreover, it also demonstrates that disconfirmation acts as a mediator between liberal expectations, liberal performance, and political trust. A series of macro-and-micro level analyses were performed by employing batteries of questions about liberal expectations and liberal performance from the ESS-

6 to validate the assumptions that the quality of liberal democracy matters in explaining political trust in Europe.

## **6.2 Relationship between the Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust**

The availability and practice of political rights and civil liberties are the distinguishing features of electoral and liberal democracies. Electoral democracy refers to the degree to which a regime meets political contestation and competition requirements, which turns into a liberal one if it builds a good track record protecting individual rights and civil liberties. This latter bundle of social goods is at the core of defining liberal democracy by several researchers (Møller 2007; Rodrik 2016; Tilly 2007: 45). More precisely, liberal democracy also referred to as the consensual or pluralist model of democracy, “stresses the intrinsic importance of transparency, civil liberty, the rule of law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers), transparency, and minority rights” (Coppedge et al. 2011).

A synthesis of strands of the service sector and political science literature suggests that quality might stand for citizens' expectations, perceptions of performance, and the gap or disconfirmation between the two. In the latter case, higher quality is achieved when performance equals or exceeds expectations, which is referred to as confirmation. Conversely, disconfirmation occurs performance falls short of expectations, resulting in low-quality feelings. From the rational choice viewpoint, the quality of liberal democracy directly influences citizens' feelings of political trust. This relationship might perform in four possible ways. The direct effect version is that citizens would trust their political institutions based not only on their expectations of protections and promotions of political rights and civil liberties (Almond and Verba 1989; Oser and Hooghe 2018) and their perceptions of the performance of governments against these expectations (Hoffman 2011; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2009; Morlino 2009a; Norris 2011b) but also on the extent to which their expectations are confirmed or disconfirmed (Sirovátka, Guzi, and Saxonberg 2018; Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 1999).

The question concerning how citizens form judgments either to trust political institutions or not has been attempted in several ways (Seyd 2015). One line of argument is that citizens invoke normative criteria, including democratic norms, values, and principles, to support political institutions. Thus, those political systems that consistently promote and meet expectations of a host of civil rights and liberties, including but not limited to freedom of expression, academic freedom, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, minority rights, and so on, are more likely to generate political trust and legitimacy. Alternatively, the process performance account links political trust with the political performance of their regimes. On this view, while rational citizens would be more satisfied with democracy when it performs on its standard indicators, a consistent record of poor democratic performance, including rigid coercion, abuses of human rights and imprisoning of opponents, endemic corruption, crony capitalism, and governing by arbitrary rule generate democratic disaffection (Norris 2011: 118). Moreover, frustrations coming out of higher expectations and low performance also deprive a polity of the due political support necessary for



its proper functioning. A fourth approach, which is relatively nascent in political science discipline but has gained tremendous empirical support in service sector literature (James 2009; Poister and Thomas 2011; G. G. Van Ryzin 2004a, 2005) holds that expectations, performance, and disconfirmation—the gap between expectations and performance—are key associates of political satisfaction (Morgeson 2013; Seyd 2015).

In summary, the service sector literature studies quality as a determinant of satisfaction in two ways: A simple method in which each of three measures of quality of democracy independently influences satisfaction (James 2009) and another one where disconfirmation mediates the relationship between expectations, performance, and political trust (G. G. Van Ryzin 2005).

### **6.2.1 Liberal Expectations**

The origin of diffuse support for the political system, such as orientations towards democracy as a form of regime organizations, and its principles have intensely been scrutinized (Almond and Verba 1989; Kołczyńska 2020). However, there is a less rigorous inquiry into how democratic expectations influence political trust with few exceptions. For instance, based on latent class analysis, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser (2016) divided democratic expectations into low, medium, and high ideals and political and civil rights. Their results suggested that political rights positively influenced political trust compared to the adverse effects of high ideals and social rights.

Building on the idea of orientation-orientation fit and orientation-evaluation match floated in the previous chapter; liberal expectations might influence political trust in two ways. First, where liberal expectations have rational origins and political trust represents affective evaluations of the performance of political institutions, higher expectations might mean a lower level of political trust. Conversely, citizens might perceive a fit between their personal value orientations of liberal democracy and the founding principles of political institutions; this orientation congruence might serve as a deep reservoir of political trust. Thus, those citizens who consider political institutions might be conceived as guardians of liberal norms, including various freedoms and individual rights and civil liberties, and consider liberal democracy having the very same foundations would deposit more trust in them. To sum it up

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1a</sub>):** Liberal expectations will affect political trust positively.

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1b</sub>):** Liberal expectations will negatively affect political trust.

### **6.2.2 Liberal Performance**

Compared to the scarcity of research in the previous strand, several studies have examined the political trust effects of the performance of liberal democracy. For instance, Evans and Whitefield (1995) found that evaluations and experiences of several political factors, including the working of democracies, responsiveness, competition, and accountability, influenced support for democracy positively in eight post-communist societies of Eastern Europe. In a related study, Mishler and Rose (1997) concluded that those regimes that provided citizens with the highest level

of civil liberties and political rights and maintained the rule of law and curbed corruption enjoyed the highest levels of political support. Results of Hofferbert and Klingemann's (1999) study of East European societies suggest that rather than economic performance, citizens' perceptions of the state of human rights were a better predictor of satisfaction with democracy. Bratton and Mattes' (2001) analysis of African societies suggested such democratic services as political equality and individual rights were important predictors of political support in African countries.

Similar results reverberate in Norris' (2011) and Landman's (2018) inquiries suggesting voice and accountability, the rule of law, corruption, freedom of the press, and gender equality as some of the key political support associates across the globe. In their global study, Chu et al. (2008) found that though both economic and political goods affect political support statistically; however, the former lag behind the latter in terms of the size of the effect. They concluded that

people's acceptance of democracy as legitimate hinges mostly on whether certain key political institutions command citizens trust, and on the political system's ability to meet such basic requirements of liberal democracy as free and fair elections, the provision of equal rights under law, and the empowerment of citizens to make changes of government by lawful means Chu et al. (2008).

These inquiries suggest that

**Hypothesis 2 (H<sub>2</sub>):** Liberal performance will positively affect political trust.

### **6.2.3 Liberal Disconfirmation**

Notwithstanding the observations that the disconfirmation theory has received clear support in the service sector literature (James 2009; G. G. Van Ryzin 2005), and as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, the process performance has been intensely examined across several countries (Magalhães 2016), how the disconfirmation as a quality measure affects political trust remains an unexplored area with few exceptions. Though not precisely relevant to this study yet the works of Waterman, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva (1999) and Sirovátka, Guzi, and Saxonberg (2018) need a brief survey. Waterman et al. inquiry in the American context suggested that the gap between expectations and performance of the President influenced his approval rating and vote preferences. Likewise, Sirovátka et al. showed that the gap between welfare expectations and performance rating was responsible for satisfaction with democracy in Europe. In the light of the argument that disconfirmation as a measure of the quality of democracy, and these findings, it is stated that


**Hypothesis 3 (H<sub>3</sub>):** Liberal disconfirmation will positively affect political trust.

Given that there is a debate whether the performance-only or disconfirmation is a better predictor of organizational support (Parasuraman et al. 1994), this chapter will also see how one of these dimensions of liberal democracy would be a better predictor of political trust than the other.

### 6.2.4 Role of Liberal Disconfirmation as a Mediator

The secondary purpose of this chapter is to show whether liberal expectations, liberal performance, liberal disconfirmation independently affect political trust, or a complicated process underlies these interactions? The demonstrations of these associations are driven by the arguments developed in the preceding chapter (Chapter 5: Section 5.2.4). To reiterate: (1) disconfirmation mediates the relationship between expectations, performance, and political trust and (2) in only the relationship between expectations and political trust is mediated central to *simple disconfirmation*, which becomes *full disconfirmation* when accounted for the role of performance.

**Figure 6.1 Mediating Role of Liberal Disconfirmation**



**Source:** Van Ryzin (2004)

Figure 6.1 presents a cognitive process model at the intersection of interaction between the quality of liberal democracy dimensions and political trust. Liberal expectations might influence political trust in either direction—positive or negative (F) and liberal performance (C) and liberal disconfirmation (E) affect political trust positively. Liberal expectations influence political trust negatively (A), and it is affected positively by liberal performance (B). It is plausible that citizens' very high liberal expectations would be coupled with their average or below average assessment of liberal performance, thus rendering simple disconfirmation as the only model to explain the association between electoral expectations, electoral performance, and political trust (Path AC). However, substantial variations in both liberal expectations and liberal performance might activate a fuller disconfirmation approach involving a complex interaction between these two predictors, liberal disconfirmation as a mediator and political trust (Path ABC). In this latter case, it is plausible that higher liberal expectations will negatively influence the liberal performance scores. Conversely, this relationship might turn positive when lower expectations are met with average

performance. Thus, the correlation between liberal expectations and liberal performance might work in either direction (Path D).

### **6.3 Data Operationalization**

This chapter uses batteries of the question related to the quality of liberal democracy and test its association with political trust. Like the previous one, this chapter builds an average index of political trust, the dependent variable, based on trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians from the core module of the ESS-6 (Chapter 4: Section 4.3.1).

The previous chapter showed that citizens differentiate between electoral and liberal democracy (Chapter 5: Section 5.3.1). Four items about the rule law, minority rights, media freedom, and media reliability from the ‘Understanding of the democracy’ module were employed to calculate liberal expectations and liberal performance indices. The missing values in the measures of the quality of liberal democracy, being around or less than 10%, would not bias the results (Appendix 5.2). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed separately in 24 countries for testing a measurement model of the quality of liberal democracy and political trust. Inspection of reliability and measurement indices suggested for excluding Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia. These 20 countries contained 37634 individual-level observations to which communist past and voice and accountability (Chapter 4: Appendix 4.3) were added to produce a hierarchical data ready for multilevel analysis.

#### **6.3.1 Measurement of Quality of Liberal Democracy**

Studying the political trust effects of the quality of liberal democracy is vital because governments' lousy performance on these dimensions results in illiberal democracies, which might degenerate support for a political system (Diamond and Morlino 2005: xv; Zakaria 1997).

This section operationalizes the concept of quality of democracy in three ways: orientation towards democratic norms, evaluation of performance, and the gap between performance and evaluation. First, it uses orientation towards rule law, minority rights, media freedom, and media reliability as indicators of the quality of liberal democracy in line with Fuchs and Roller's (2018) comment that democracy's quality stands for unconditional support for democratic norms. Then, performance-only measures of quality are tapped into by citizens' evaluation of the performance of democracy in their home countries against these liberal norms. Finally, an index of liberal performance scores was subtracted from those of liberal expectation to represent disconfirmation/gap as a third measure of liberal democracy quality.

The first indicator of the quality of democracy is the rule of law. According to Bühlmann et al., the rule of law demands that individuals respect laws and guarantee individual freedoms against the state and other groups and individuals within it (Bühlmann et al. 2008). Morlino comments that beyond enforcement of legal norms, the rule of law “connotes the supremacy of law ... entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to make authorities respect the laws, and to have laws that are non-retroactive, of public knowledge, universal, stable, and unambiguous” (2009b: 8). The

rule of law can best be accomplished through “the effective protection of individual rights; actual equality before the law; and equal access to courts” (Bühlmann et al. 2008: 34). The poor state of the rule of law has adverse consequences for other dimensions of quality of democracy, including freedoms, corruption, accountability, and competition (Diamond and Morlino 2005: iv).

ESS-6 employed two questions tapping into the rule of law: individual security and civil order and accessibility, and equality of the justice system. One of the critical criteria of quality as a gap is that the same questions should tap both the orientations and evaluations. Unfortunately, the first question concerning civil order only captured orientation and did not meet quality as a gap criterion. Therefore, it was excluded from further analysis. Thus, our rule of law indicator of the quality of democratic services captures citizens' expectations that in democracy, in general, courts treat everyone the same and evaluate courts' working in their home countries.

The second dimension of the quality of liberal democracy is political equality, which implies that all citizens must have equal access to the political power that can be ensured by granting them equal access to the political process through representation (Bühlmann et al. 2008). Different types of representative systems aim to transform citizens' preferences for one kind of public policy over another through voting. Thus, representation involves protecting the interest of represented through their representatives. Literature offers different operational definitions of the concept of representations, including majoritarian and consensual systems, parliamentary and presidential systems, and women's access to elected and non-elected offices, protection of rights of minorities (Ersson 2013; Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). This chapter employed citizens' orientation towards and evaluation of protection of the rights of minorities as an indicator quality of political equality.

The third and fourth dimensions of our quality of liberal democracy are freedom of media and reliability and transparency of information it broadcasts. The importance of free media for democratic development for its supposed role as a forum for discussion of diverse ideas, a channel of expression of public opinions, a scrutinizer of government's performance on behalf of the public, and a watchdog that barks loudly when it encounters misconduct and corruption (Graber 2003: 143). An alternative and quite popular discourse are that media has turned into an industry controlled by private firms that need profit. Bühlmann et al. note that rather than informing the public about complex democratic process and performance, media channels prefer to present sensational, personal, conflictual, and scandalous events and give voice to those actors that meet these needs rather than informing people about complex political issues (Bühlmann et al. 2008). Respondents' perceptions of media freedom quality were captured through questions concerning the importance of free media for democracy and then their evaluation of free media in their home countries. The questions about media reliability were tapped into on the very same pattern.

The scale for capturing orientation was from 0 (not at all important for democracy in general) to 10 (extremely important for democracy). Likewise, the scale for evaluations was from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (apply completely).

## 6.4 Results

This section examines the extent to which liberal expectations, liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation influence political trust in Europe. The analysis proceeds in six steps. The first step tests a measurement model of the quality of liberal democracy and political trust separately in 24 countries. The second step is about descriptive statics. The third and fourth steps present macro-level plots of country-level means of political trust and its three correlate determinants followed by micro-level bivariate analyses within countries. Next comes the presentation of the results of multivariate analyses. The final step plots the results of multilevel analyses, including political trust effects of three measures of quality of electoral democracy, the role of electoral disconfirmation as a mediator between electoral expectations, and political trust and marginal effects.

### 6.4.1 A Measurement Model of the Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust

This section aims to show that the underlying constructs of liberal expectations, liberal performance, and political trust are different from each other through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Their underlying items reliably and validly measure these three construct, and ensuing measurement models coherently perform in 20 countries.

#### Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

The EFA was performed with three items of political trust and four items, each measuring liberal expectations and liberal performance without specifying to which constructs these items belong. The results of initial analyses, not shown here, although produced a three-factor solution, the items measuring the performance of media freedom cross-loaded on two factors in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. When the EFA was performed excluding this item, the issue of cross-loading was reduced to Slovenia only where

**Table 6.1 Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis**

| Variables and indicators       | Factor Loadings (9 Items) |            |            |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|
|                                | Factor 1                  | Factor 2   | Factor 3   |
| <b>Political Trust</b>         |                           |            |            |
| T1: Trust in parliament        | <b>.89</b>                | .05        | .01        |
| T2: Trust in political parties | <b>.95</b>                | -.01       | -.03       |
| T3: Trust in politicians       | <b>.96</b>                | -.01       | -.03       |
| <b>Liberal Expectations</b>    |                           |            |            |
| E1: Rule of law                | .01                       | <b>.81</b> | .00        |
| E2: Minority rights            | .06                       | <b>.82</b> | -.04       |
| E3: Media reliability          | -.05                      | <b>.84</b> | .05        |
| <b>Liberal Performance</b>     |                           |            |            |
| P1: Rule of law                | .30                       | -.05       | <b>.62</b> |
| P2: Minority rights            | -.09                      | .04        | <b>.83</b> |
| P3: Media reliability          | -.06                      | -.01       | <b>.83</b> |

**Note:** Factor loadings were extracted through principal component methods.

the item measuring the performance of the rule of law loaded strongly (loading: .51) under the factor measuring political trust rather than the one capturing liberal performance (loading: .33); resultantly, Slovenia was removed from the analysis at this stage.

Table 6.1 presents an overall picture of factor loadings of three factors in 23 countries. Items measuring political trust, liberal expectations, and liberal performance strongly loaded under their relevant constructs ( $>.60$ ). The rule of law cross loads under a factor measuring political trust due to accretion of the weaker cross-loadings across 23 countries.

### **Confirmatory Factor Analysis (EFA)**

CFA was performed with three items, each belonging to the prespecified constructs of political trust, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation. The validity and reliability of the three constructs were evaluated through standard factor loading scores and alpha values, and coherence of the measurement model was evaluated through traditional fitness indices such as chi-square to degrees of freedom ( $X^2/df$ ), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and comparative fitness index (CFI). A reliable construct shows factor loadings and reliability of  $\geq .30$  and  $\geq .60$ , respectively. Likewise, in a good fitted model,  $X^2/df \leq 3$  with  $p > .05$ ,  $RMSEA \leq .08$ ;  $CFI \geq .95$  (Schreiber et al. 2006).

The results of CFA, presented in Table 6.2, suggest that the three-dimensional measurement model of electoral democracy and political trust performs very well in all, except three countries. The factor loadings and reliability statistics were lower than threshold values of .30 and .60, respectively, for items measuring liberal performance in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The latter also performed very poorly on model fitness indices ( $RMSEA \geq .08$ ;  $CFI \leq .95$ ). Consequently, these countries were removed from the analysis.

The factor loadings and reliability statistics in each of the remaining 20 countries were above .30 and .60, respectively. Likewise, these countries showed  $RMSEA \leq .08$  and  $CFI \geq .95$ . However,  $X^2/df$  is not less than 3 in any of the countries. ‘Chi-square statistic is, in essence, a statistical significance test is sensitive to sample size which means that the Chi-Square statistic nearly always rejects the model when large samples are used’ (Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen 2008: 54). Thus, a discrepancy in the measurement and final models presented in this chapter can be attributed to the large sample size in each of the countries vis-à-vis the estimated parameters.

To sum it up, the above statistics show that the underlying items of liberal expectations and liberal performance, political trust are reliable and valid measures of their underlying construct and they coherently measure a model at the intersection of these constructs. The construct of liberal expectations comprises citizens’ orientations that in democracy in general, courts treat everyone the same (rule of law), the rights of minority group are protected (minority rights) and media provide reliable information about the government (media reliability). Citizens' evaluations of the state of rule of law, minority rights and media reliability constitute the construct of liberal

performance. Political trust can be tapped through trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians.

The underlying items of these constructs were converged within each of the 20 countries to represent indices of political trust (Chapter 4: Section 4.4.1), liberal expectations, and liberal performance (Section 6.4.1).

**Table 6.2 Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses**

| Countries       | Standardized Factor Loadings |     |     |       |                      |     |     |       |                     |            |            |            | Fitness Indices |            |            |
|-----------------|------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|----------------------|-----|-----|-------|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
|                 | Political Trust              |     |     |       | Liberal Expectations |     |     |       | Liberal Performance |            |            |            |                 |            |            |
|                 | T1                           | T2  | T3  | Alpha | E1                   | E2  | E3  | Alpha | P1                  | P2         | P3         | Alpha      | X2/DF           | CFI        | RMSEA      |
| Belgium         | .76                          | .91 | .93 | .90   | .61                  | .78 | .76 | .76   | .64                 | .75        | .62        | .70        | 8.18            | .98        | .06        |
| <b>Bulgaria</b> | .77                          | .87 | .95 | .89   | .67                  | .49 | .84 | .62   | .76                 | <b>.16</b> | .50        | <b>.43</b> | 8.72            | .97        | .06        |
| Switzerland     | .70                          | .83 | .92 | .85   | .59                  | .76 | .63 | .69   | .66                 | .70        | .59        | .67        | 3.38            | .99        | .04        |
| Cyprus          | .71                          | .92 | .99 | .90   | .57                  | .58 | .79 | .64   | .63                 | .46        | .58        | .58        | 4.89            | .97        | .06        |
| <b>Czechia</b>  | .87                          | .94 | .97 | .95   | .79                  | .48 | .77 | .71   | <b>1.36</b>         | <b>.19</b> | <b>.29</b> | .56        | <b>24.39</b>    | .93        | <b>.11</b> |
| Germany         | .75                          | .87 | .91 | .88   | .57                  | .70 | .74 | .69   | .61                 | .62        | .54        | .61        | 10.54           | .97        | .06        |
| Denmark         | .77                          | .89 | .93 | .90   | .53                  | .69 | .66 | .63   | .66                 | .78        | .54        | .69        | 7.99            | .97        | .07        |
| Estonia         | .77                          | .89 | .94 | .89   | .76                  | .75 | .84 | .82   | .67                 | .76        | .69        | .75        | 9.92            | .98        | .06        |
| Spain           | .65                          | .90 | .96 | .86   | .65                  | .76 | .82 | .78   | .73                 | .77        | .51        | .70        | 6.04            | .98        | .05        |
| Finland         | .77                          | .89 | .94 | .90   | .62                  | .70 | .74 | .72   | .64                 | .66        | .65        | .68        | 15.19           | .96        | .08        |
| France          | .67                          | .87 | .94 | .86   | .69                  | .78 | .72 | .73   | .58                 | .60        | .65        | .68        | 6.59            | .98        | .05        |
| Germany         | .79                          | .93 | .94 | .91   | .67                  | .71 | .76 | .75   | .65                 | .64        | .69        | .69        | 12.76           | .97        | .07        |
| Hungary         | .80                          | .94 | .98 | .93   | .80                  | .59 | .87 | .77   | .75                 | .53        | .81        | .73        | 13.11           | .97        | .08        |
| Ireland         | .78                          | .92 | .94 | .91   | .73                  | .82 | .75 | .80   | .65                 | .73        | .64        | .72        | 11.25           | .98        | .06        |
| Iceland         | .80                          | .91 | .94 | .91   | .63                  | .62 | .83 | .72   | .64                 | .74        | .66        | .72        | 1.43            | 1.00       | .02        |
| Italy           | .75                          | .91 | .96 | .89   | .62                  | .73 | .73 | .72   | .61                 | .75        | .65        | .70        | 3.88            | .98        | .06        |
| Lithuania       | .75                          | .90 | .96 | .90   | .79                  | .69 | .89 | .83   | .60                 | .66        | .69        | .70        | 10.88           | .97        | .07        |
| Netherlands     | .82                          | .91 | .93 | .91   | .70                  | .79 | .76 | .78   | .67                 | .58        | .64        | .66        | 5.89            | .98        | .05        |
| Norway          | .71                          | .88 | .95 | .87   | .44                  | .59 | .80 | .60   | .56                 | .62        | .65        | .64        | 8.16            | .96        | .07        |
| Poland          | .71                          | .87 | .94 | .87   | .59                  | .61 | .81 | .69   | .61                 | .67        | .64        | .69        | 5.13            | .98        | .05        |
| Portugal        | .71                          | .92 | .95 | .89   | .73                  | .85 | .82 | .85   | .65                 | .79        | .44        | .64        | 10.08           | .97        | .07        |
| Sweden          | .76                          | .89 | .93 | .89   | .58                  | .69 | .70 | .66   | .75                 | .77        | .75        | .80        | 5.91            | .98        | .05        |
| <b>Slovenia</b> | .75                          | .93 | .95 | .90   | .57                  | .75 | .67 | .68   | .72                 | <b>.13</b> | <b>.36</b> | .45        | <b>11.581</b>   | <b>.93</b> | <b>.09</b> |
| <b>Slovakia</b> | .85                          | .93 | .95 | .94   | .68                  | .68 | .79 | .77   | <b>.31</b>          | .44        | .68        | <b>.37</b> | <b>11.78</b>    | <b>.96</b> | <b>.08</b> |

Legend: T1 to T3 represent trust in parliament, political parties and politicians, respectively. E1 to E3 stand for citizens' expectations in general that in democracy, different political parties offer clear cut alternatives (differentiated political offers), governing parties are punished in the elections for bad performance (vertical accountability), and the government explains its decisions to the voters (responsiveness). P1 to P3 stand for citizens' evaluations of the practicing of vertical accountability, differentiated political offers, and responsiveness in their home countries, respectively.



### 6.4.2 Calculating Liberal Disconfirmation: Expectations—Evaluation Gap

There are two types of disconfirmations—subjective and subtractive (Oliver 2010; Poister and Thomas 2011; Van Ryzin 2006; Spreng and Thomas J. Page 2003). As ESS-6 does not provide any direct or subjective measure of liberal disconfirmation, we calculated the subtractive disconfirmation by subtracting the index of liberal performance from that of liberal expectations calculated at the end of the preceding section. Besides being used as a direct measure of the quality of liberal democracy, as conceived in Section 6.2.3, this variable would also serve as a mediator between liberal expectations, liberal performance, and political trust. The next section presents the results of univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses.

### 6.4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Country-Level Analyses


Figure 6.2 presents the distribution of political trust and three measures of quality of liberal democracy in 20 countries under investigation. Graph 1 shows that political trust is distributed with an overall mean of 3.86 across 20 European countries. UK and Ireland fall quite close to this overall mean. Denmark and Norway are the top-performing, and Italy and Portugal are the lowest-performing nations on our scale of political trust. South European nations perform poorly compared to the East and West European countries, and the two Scandinavian countries are the most trusted ones. These findings align with the comments that Scandinavian and Eastern European countries are the most and least trusted societies, respectively (Arancibia 2008; Claes, Hooghe, and Marien 2012). Section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4 gives a detailed descriptive statistic of political trust within each of the countries.

Graph 2 observes the distribution of liberal expectations. It can be observed that the liberal expectations having a mean of 8.78 falls within a narrow range of 8.10 and 9.50. Ten countries each fall above and below the overall means line. Liberal expectations are the highest in Iceland and Poland and the lowest in Ireland and Lithuania. Suppose the measures on which this index is based represents diffuse support for democracy as a form of government. In that case, these findings suggest that the Europeans have a strong attachment towards the norms of liberal democracy. Together, these results indicate that the long-standing fear that Eastern European nations face the challenges of diffuse support (Anderson 1998) has waned away over time. Citizens of even some of the post-communist states such as Poland have stronger attachments towards democratic norms than those of well-established democracies such as the UK.

Graph 3 plots the distribution of liberal performance. Liberal performance is distributed across 20 countries with an overall mean of 6.01, with Belgium closely resembling this overall mean. Eight countries falling below the overall mean are post-communist states, South European countries, and France. Those eleven countries falling above the line are West European and Scandinavian countries.

Graph 4 presents the distribution of liberal disconfirmation. Although the overall patterns of distribution resemble that of liberal performance, the order of countries is not the same. It is

important to note that the lower scores mean a lesser gap or disconfirmation between expectations and performance. In other words, the lower gap, the better the quality of liberal democracy. The overall mean of liberal disconfirmation is  $-2.76$ , with Cyprus standing quite close to this mean. Finland and Norway are the best, and Italy and Spain are the worst-performing nations on this scale of liberal disconfirmation. Nine Eastern and South European countries plus France and



Iceland fall below, and eleven West European and Scandinavian countries stand above the overall mean line.

See Appendix 6.1 for the detailed distribution of the quality of liberal democracy measures. Section 4.4.2 in Chapter 4 presents the distribution of the individual-level and country-level control variables.

#### **6.4.4 Bivariate Analyses**

This section examines macro-and-micro level patterns of political trust and determinants related to the quality of liberal democracy. For this purpose, firstly, the country-level means of indices of political trust and its three determinants were calculated, followed by plotting their bivariate regressions results. Afterward, bivariate regression analyses were performed within the individual countries to see if macro-level patterns replicate at the micro-level.


##### **Macro-Level Patterns of Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust**

This chapter assumes that the quality of liberal democracy affects political trust ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ). Figure 6.3 presents the country-level scatterplots of the association between political trust and its determinants. Plot 1 demonstrates no significant association between liberal expectations ( $R^2=.00$ ;  $r=.06$ ;  $p=.79$ ). This linear relation might work in different directions in different groups of countries. For instance, a positive linear or curvilinear relationship can be observed in eight Western well-established democracies (UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden) standing above the regression line and acts negatively in post-communist and post-authoritarian countries (France, Ireland, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia, Cyprus, Portugal, Italy, Poland and Spain) plus France and Ireland. Furthermore, this relationship appears not to work at all in Germany and Iceland. Unless these patterns are considered, this section fails to demonstrate any association between liberal expectations and political trust ( $H_1$ ).

Plot 2 sketches macro-level patterns of association between country-level means of liberal performance and political trust. There is a powerful, positive, and linear association between liberal and political trust ( $R^2=.78$ ;  $r=.88$ ;  $p<.001$ ). This relationship is the strongest in three Scandinavian countries and the weakest in Portugal, Bulgaria, and Iceland. It can also be observed that this relationship performs better in West European nations compared to their Eastern counterparts. Most countries are loosely packed around the regression line, with Cyprus and the Netherlands being the farthest below and above the regression line, respectively. Combined, these macro-level findings support  $H_2$ , i.e., liberal performance positively affects political trust.

The association between country-level means of political trust and liberal disconfirmation is given in Plot 3. Again, a very strong, positive, and linear association can be observed ( $R^2=.76$ ;  $r=.87$ ;  $p<.001$ ). This relationship does not perform as better as that of electoral performance and political trust. This macro-level analysis supports the third assumption of this chapter: liberal disconfirmation is positively associated with political trust ( $H_3$ ).

**Figure 6.3 Macro-Patterns of Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust**



The analyses reported above supported clearly support two of the three assumptions of this chapter, i.e., liberal performance ( $H_2$ ) and liberal disconfirmation ( $H_3$ ) are positively associated with political trust. Moreover, comparing the values of  $R^2$  suggests that liberal performance is a better predictor of political trust than liberal disconfirmation. To what extent these macro-level associations replicate within countries? This is the next task of this chapter.

## Micro-Level Patterns of Quality of Liberal Democracy and Political Trust

Table 6.3 plots bivariate regression analyses of political trust and three quality of liberal democracy measures. Macro-level patterns show no association between country-level means liberal expectations and political trust. However, the micro-level patterns reveal that the same relationship is statistically significant at the EU-20 level. This association behaves in three different ways: it is significant and positive in 10, with Norway showing the most salient effects; it performs negatively in 4 countries, with Portugal demonstrating the extreme adverse effects; and it is insignificant in the remaining six countries. These results partly support H<sub>1</sub>: liberal expectations positively or negatively influence political trust.

In contrast to the liberal expectations, liberal performance exerts a positive, linear, and relatively modest effect on political trust both at the EU-20 level and within individual countries. The sizes of these effects are the lowest and the highest in the UK and Estonia, respectively. These results provide a clear support to assumptions H<sub>2</sub>, that is, liberal performance affects political trust. It can also be observed that liberal disconfirmation affects political trust positively on an overall level and within all the countries, thus clearly supporting H<sub>3</sub>. The sizes of coefficients are the lowest and the highest for Norway and Estonia, respectively. Finally, liberal performance is a better indicator of political trust than liberal disconfirmation in all countries except Iceland and Portugal.

To conclude, this section provides a clear support to the hypotheses that liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation are significantly associated with political trust (H<sub>2</sub>–H<sub>3</sub>). However, the association between liberal expectations and liberal performance could find partial support (H<sub>1</sub>). It also showed that liberal performance is a superior predictor of political trust than liberal disconfirmation in most countries. Moreover, these results are in line with the arguments in consumer service that performance only is a superior indicator of quality than disconfirmation (Park and Yi 2016). Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4 presents the results of individual and country-level control variables.

**Table 6.3 Bivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Liberal Democracy**

|             | Liberal Expectations |               |                | Liberal Performance |              |                | Liberal Disconfirmation |              |                |
|-------------|----------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------|
|             | Constant             | Beta (S.E)    | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant            | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant                | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> |
| EU-20       | 3.86 (.01)***        | .04 (.01)***  | .00            | 3.86 (.01)***       | .29 (.01)*** | .08            | 3.86 (.01)***           | .23 (.01)*** | .05            |
| Belgium     | 4.52 (.05)***        | .15 (.05)***  | .02            | 4.52 (.04)***       | .41 (.04)*** | .17            | 4.52 (.04)***           | .26 (.04)*** | .07            |
| Switzerland | 5.45 (.05)***        | .03 (.05)     | .00            | 5.44 (.04)***       | .35 (.04)*** | .12            | 5.45 (.04)***           | .31 (.04)*** | .09            |
| Cyprus      | 2.80 (.07)***        | .07 (.07)*    | .01            | 2.80 (.06)***       | .28 (.06)*** | .08            | 2.80 (.07)***           | .21 (.07)*** | .04            |
| Germany     | 4.13 (.04)***        | .08 (.04)***  | .01            | 4.13 (.03)***       | .36 (.03)*** | .13            | 4.13 (.03)***           | .28 (.03)*** | .08            |
| Denmark     | 5.55 (.05)***        | .21 (.05)***  | .04            | 5.54 (.04)***       | .38 (.04)*** | .15            | 5.55 (.04)***           | .26 (.05)*** | .07            |
| Estonia     | 3.50 (.04)***        | .00 (.04)     | .00            | 3.50 (.04)***       | .45 (.04)*** | .20            | 3.50 (.04)***           | .37 (.04)*** | .14            |
| Spain       | 2.39 (.05)***        | -.09 (.05)*** | .01            | 2.40 (.04)***       | .34 (.04)*** | .12            | 2.40 (.04)***           | .33 (.04)*** | .11            |
| Finland     | 5.21 (.04)***        | .19 (.04)***  | .04            | 5.22 (.04)***       | .38 (.04)*** | .14            | 5.22 (.04)***           | .22 (.04)*** | .05            |
| France      | 3.47 (.04)***        | .07 (.04)**   | .01            | 3.47 (.04)***       | .39 (.04)*** | .15            | 3.48 (.04)***           | .28 (.04)*** | .08            |
| UK          | 3.90 (.04)***        | .08 (.04)***  | .01            | 3.89 (.04)***       | .26 (.04)*** | .07            | 3.90 (.04)***           | .17 (.04)*** | .03            |
| Hungary     | 3.47 (.05)***        | -.08 (.05)*** | .01            | 3.48 (.05)***       | .39 (.05)*** | .15            | 3.48 (.05)***           | .36 (.05)*** | .13            |
| Ireland     | 3.25 (.04)***        | .00 (.04)     | .00            | 3.24 (.04)***       | .20 (.04)*** | .04            | 3.24 (.04)***           | .18 (.04)*** | .03            |
| Iceland     | 3.89 (.08)***        | -.11 (.08)**  | .01            | 3.87 (.07)***       | .38 (.07)*** | .14            | 3.88 (.07)***           | .39 (.07)*** | .15            |
| Italy       | 2.38 (.07)***        | .03 (.07)     | .00            | 2.38 (.06)***       | .37 (.06)*** | .14            | 2.37 (.06)***           | .30 (.06)*** | .09            |
| Lithuania   | 2.98 (.04)***        | -.04 (.04)    | .00            | 2.98 (.04)***       | .27 (.04)*** | .07            | 2.98 (.04)***           | .26 (.04)*** | .07            |
| Netherlands | 5.17 (.04)***        | .14 (.04)***  | .02            | 5.17 (.04)***       | .34 (.04)*** | .12            | 5.17 (.04)***           | .21 (.04)*** | .04            |
| Norway      | 5.51 (.04)***        | .16 (.04)***  | .03            | 5.51 (.04)***       | .26 (.04)*** | .07            | 5.51 (.04)***           | .13 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Poland      | 2.48 (.04)***        | -.01 (.04)    | .00            | 2.47 (.04)***       | .34 (.04)*** | .11            | 2.48 (.04)***           | .31 (.04)*** | .09            |
| Portugal    | 2.02 (.04)***        | -.20 (.04)*** | .04            | 2.02 (.04)***       | .27 (.04)*** | .08            | 2.02 (.04)***           | .34 (.04)*** | .11            |
| Sweden      | 5.18 (.04)***        | .15 (.04)***  | .02            | 5.18 (.04)***       | .30 (.04)*** | .09            | 5.19 (.04)***           | .22 (.04)*** | .05            |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

## 6.4.4 Multivariate Analyses: Political Trust Effects of Quality of Democracy

### Correlation Analyses

Table 6.4 plots the correlation results of political trust and its quality of liberal democracy determinants. As expected, a very weak and positive association can be observed between liberal expectations and political trust ( $H_1$ ). Moreover, relatively modest positive associations can be noted between liberal performance ( $H_2$ ) and liberal disconfirmation ( $H_3$ ) and political trust. Additionally, the correlation between liberal performance and political trust performed better than that of liberal disconfirmation and political trust. The very high correlation between liberal performance and liberal expectations signals the potential problem of multicollinearity between liberal performance and liberal expectations.

The correlation matrices of other individual-level and country-level variables are presented in Appendix 4.4 in Chapter 4.

| <b>Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix of Political Trust and Quality of Liberal Democracy</b>                 |          |          |          |   |
|---|----------|----------|----------|---|
|   | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> |   |
| 1. Political Trust  | 1        |          |          |   |
| 2. Liberal Expectations   | .04***   | 1        |          |   |
| 3. Liberal Performance  | .29***   | .18***   | 1        |   |
| 4. Liberal Disconfirmation  | .23***   | -.48***  | .76***   | 1 |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |          |          |          |   |

### Political Trust Effects of Quality of Liberal Democracy

Multicollinearity exists between variables when the value of tolerance is less than .10 and that of the variation inflation factor (VIF) greater than 10 (Miles 2014). An OLS model was performed within 20 countries separately (not shown here) to detect the multicollinearity cautioned in the preceding section. The results showed that the value of tolerance was .00 in all countries. Given the issue of multicollinearity, the rest of the analyses are performed without regressing liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation simultaneously. This hindered us from estimating a fuller disconfirmation model, as suggested in Figure 6.1.

Table 6.5 presents the result of OLS models. The first two models estimate the political trust effects of the three measures of the quality of liberal democracy. Liberal disconfirmation is the dependent variable in the third model to examine its role as the mediator between liberal expectations and political trust. Finally, columns A and B in each of these models excluded and included country fixed-effect parameters, respectively.

These results provide clear support to three hypotheses of association between measures of quality of liberal democracy and political trust in Europe. However, the size and direction of the coefficients depend upon the way a variable is considered in a regression equation. Focusing on the country-fixed effect models suggests that the index of liberal expectations, when entered along

**Table 6.5 Multivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Liberal Democracy**

|                         | Political Trust  |                  |                  |                  | Disconfirmation   |                   |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                         | Model 1A         | Model 1B         | Model 2A         | Model 2B         | Model 3A          | Model 3B          |
| Constant                | 5.70<br>(.07)*** | 5.96<br>(.07)*** | 5.71<br>(.07)*** | 5.96<br>(.07)*** | -1.38<br>(.08)*** | -1.16<br>(.08)*** |
| Liberal expectations    | -.11<br>(.01)*** | -.08<br>(.01)*** | .06<br>(.01)***  | .10<br>(.01)***  | -1.11<br>(.01)*** | -1.08<br>(.01)*** |
| Liberal performance     | .23<br>(.01)***  | .25<br>(.01)***  |                  |                  |                   |                   |
| Liberal disconfirmation |                  |                  | .26<br>(.01)***  | .28<br>(.01)***  |                   |                   |
| Gender                  | .15<br>(.02)***  | .13<br>(.02)***  | .15<br>(.02)***  | .13<br>(.02)***  | -.14<br>(.02)***  | -.16<br>(.02)***  |
| Age                     | -.15<br>(.01)*** | -.11<br>(.01)*** | -.15<br>(.01)*** | -.11<br>(.01)*** | .01<br>(.01)      | .04<br>(.01)***   |
| Education in years      | -.06<br>(.01)*** | .02<br>(.01)**   | -.06<br>(.01)*** | .03<br>(.01)**   | -.11<br>(.01)***  | -.05<br>(.01)***  |
| Religiousness           | .09<br>(.01)***  | .07<br>(.01)***  | .09<br>(.01)***  | .07<br>(.01)***  | .02<br>(.01)*     | .01<br>(.01)      |
| Domicile                | .00<br>(.01)     | -.04<br>(.01)*** | .00<br>(.01)     | -.04<br>(.01)*** | .04<br>(.01)***   | -.01<br>(.01)     |
| Citizenship             | .30<br>(.05)***  | .06<br>(.04)     | .29<br>(.05)***  | .05<br>(.04)     | .04<br>(.05)      | -.14<br>(.05)***  |
| Welfare performance     | .19<br>(.01)***  | .19<br>(.01)***  | .19<br>(.01)***  | .19<br>(.01)***  | .32<br>(.01)***   | .33<br>(.01)***   |
| Felt income             | -.40<br>(.01)*** | -.01<br>(.01)    | -.40<br>(.01)*** | -.01<br>(.01)    | -.36<br>(.01)***  | -.05<br>(.01)***  |
| Sat: economy            | .15<br>(.01)***  | .20<br>(.01)***  | .15<br>(.01)***  | .20<br>(.01)***  | .12<br>(.01)***   | .16<br>(.01)***   |
| Political interest      | -.60<br>(.01)*** | -.38<br>(.01)*** | -.60<br>(.01)*** | -.38<br>(.01)*** | -.22<br>(.01)***  | -.04<br>(.01)***  |
| Sat: government         | .76<br>(.01)***  | .79<br>(.01)***  | .76<br>(.01)***  | .79<br>(.01)***  | .27<br>(.01)***   | .30<br>(.01)***   |
| Left-right orientation  | -.01<br>(.01)    | .00<br>(.01)     | -.01<br>(.01)    | .00<br>(.01)     | .07<br>(.01)***   | .09<br>(.01)***   |
| Social capital          | .24<br>(.01)***  | .29<br>(.01)***  | .24<br>(.01)***  | .29<br>(.01)***  | .08<br>(.01)***   | .11<br>(.01)***   |
| N: Individuals          | 35246            | 35246            | 36113            | 36113            | 35358             | 35358             |
| N: Countries            | 20               | 20               | 20               | 20               | 20                | 20                |
| Country fixed-effect    | No               | Yes              | No               | Yes              | No                | Yes               |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | .40              | .58              | .39              | .55              | .30               | .46               |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates were produced by including country-fixed parameters. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .



with that of liberal performance, predicts political trust with a coefficient of  $-.11$  (Model 1B), which reduces to  $.10$  (Model 2B). Electoral performance and liberal disconfirmation influence political trust with coefficients of  $.25$  and  $.28$ , respectively.

To sum it up, unless a complex interaction between the three measures of the quality of liberal democracy is considered, these results provide support to the assumptions that liberal expectations are associated with political trust ( $H_1$ ), and liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation affect political trust positively ( $H_2$ – $H_3$ ). Moreover, these findings suggest that liberal disconfirmation is a slightly better predictor of political trust than liberal performance.

Liberal disconfirmation is a dependent variable in the last model. Model 3B suggests that the liberal expectations influence liberal disconfirmation with a coefficient of  $-1.08$ , which in turn affects political trust with a coefficient of  $.28$  (Model 2B). These effects are significant and in the expected directions, as suggested in paths A and C in Figure 6.1. Multiplying these two coefficients gives the indirect effect of liberal expectations via disconfirmation on political trust, which is  $-.30$ . These results suggest that the direct and positive effect of liberal expectations having a coefficient of  $.10$  is reduced by four times or 400% when passed through liberal disconfirmation. Combined, these findings indicate that liberal expectations play an important role in a simple political trust model.

The effect sizes and  $R^2$  change when country fixed-effect parameters are considered to show that the country-level variables might account for these variations. The next section examines how the extent to which inclusion of individual-level and country-level control variables explain the political trust effects of the quality of liberal democracy through multilevel analyses.

#### **6.4.6 Multilevel Analyses**

Tables 6.6 present the results of different multilevel models. The first two models contain the estimates of predictors-only models; the estimates in the next models contain are those of fuller models; and the last model is performed with liberal disconfirmation as a dependent variable to examine its role as mediator between liberal expectations and political trust. The presentations of the main results follow a brief description of model fitness indices.

##### **Assessment of Fitness of the Models**

Graph 1 in Figure 6.2 observed substantial between and within countries variations in political trust in 20 countries under study. The ANOVA results reported in Table 4.6 in Chapter 4 showed that political trust was distributed with an overall mean of 3.85 and an estimated standard deviation of  $.25$ . The intercepts (grand means of political trust) varied significantly across the countries (Wald=3.16,  $p<.001$ ). The interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) indicated that 25% of the total variation in political trust lies between countries. These statistics suggest multilevel modeling as the appropriate technique of explaining between and within countries variance in political trust in Europe.

**Table 6.6 Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Liberal Democracy**

|                                       | Political Trust |               |               |               | Disconfirm     |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
|                                       | Model 1         | Model 2       | Model 3       | Model 4       | Model 5        |
| Intercept                             | 3.85 (.26)***   | 3.85 (.26)*** | 3.06 (.14)*** | 3.06 (.14)*** | -3.39 (.18)*** |
| <b>Quality of Electoral Democracy</b> |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Liberal expectations                  | -.04 (.01)***   | .43 (.01)***  | -.08 (.01)*** | .10 (.01)***  | -1.08 (.01)*** |
| Liberal performance                   | .66 (.01)***    |               | .25 (.01)***  |               |                |
| Liberal disconfirmation               |                 | .73 (.01)***  |               | .28 (.01)***  |                |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b>      |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Gender: male                          |                 |               | -.13 (.02)*** | -.13 (.02)*** | .16 (.02)***   |
| Age in years                          |                 |               | -.11 (.01)*** | -.11 (.01)*** | .04 (.01)***   |
| Education in years                    |                 |               | .03 (.01)**   | .03 (.01)**   | -.05 (.01)***  |
| Religiousness                         |                 |               | .07 (.01)***  | .07 (.01)***  | .01 (.01)      |
| Resident: suburbs                     |                 |               | .15 (.04)***  | .15 (.04)***  | .01 (.04)      |
| Resident: small city                  |                 |               | .14 (.04)***  | .14 (.04)***  | .10 (.04)*     |
| Resident: village                     |                 |               | .11 (.03)**   | .11 (.03)**   | .04 (.04)      |
| Resident: countryside                 |                 |               | .04 (.03)     | .04 (.03)     | .01 (.04)      |
| Citizenship: yes                      |                 |               | -.06 (.04)    | -.06 (.04)    | .13 (.05)**    |
| Welfare performance                   |                 |               | .19 (.01)***  | .19 (.01)***  | .33 (.01)***   |
| Income: comfortably                   |                 |               | .05 (.04)     | .05 (.04)     | .19 (.05)***   |
| Income: copying                       |                 |               | .02 (.04)     | .02 (.04)     | .19 (.04)***   |
| Income: difficult                     |                 |               | .07 (.04)     | .07 (.04)     | .11 (.04)*     |
| Satisfaction: economy                 |                 |               | .20 (.01)***  | .20 (.01)***  | .16 (.01)***   |
| Politics: very interested             |                 |               | 1.12 (.03)*** | 1.12 (.03)*** | .10 (.04)*     |
| Politics: quite interested            |                 |               | .88 (.03)***  | .88 (.03)***  | .13 (.03)***   |
| Politics: hardly interested           |                 |               | .52 (.02)***  | .53 (.02)***  | .06 (.03)*     |
| Sat: national government              |                 |               | .79 (.01)***  | .79 (.01)***  | .30 (.01)***   |
| Left-right orientations               |                 |               | .00 (.01)     | .00 (.01)     | .09 (.01)***   |
| Social capital                        |                 |               | .29 (.01)***  | .28 (.01)***  | .11 (.01)***   |
| <b>Country-Level Controls</b>         |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Communist past: yes                   |                 |               | .75 (.32)*    | .75 (.32)*    | .46 (.43)      |
| Voice and accountability              |                 |               | 1.07 (.12)*** | 1.07 (.12)*** | .88 (.16)***   |
| <b>Variance Components</b>            |                 |               |               |               |                |
| Individual-level variance             | 3.49 (.03)***   | 3.50 (.03)*** | 2.13 (.02)*** | 2.13 (.02)*** | 3.08 (.02)***  |
| Country-level variance                | 1.31 (.41)**    | 1.31 (.41)**  | .22 (.07)**   | .22 (.07)**   | .39 (.12)**    |
| ICC                                   | .27             | .27           | .09           | .09           | .11            |
| -2 Log Likelihood                     | 11039.29        | 10989.00      | 3268.74       | 3269.93       | 3761.59        |
| N: Individuals                        | 34558           | 34558         | 32984         | 32984         | 33083          |
| N: Countries                          | 20              | 20            | 20            | 20            | 20             |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

The intercept-only model (Chapter 4: Table 4.6) is statistically different from predictor-only models (Models 1-2), which are different from fuller models (Models 3-4). -2 Log Likelihood ratio statistics suggested that the nested models are statistically significant from their non-nested

counterparts (note: one additional degree of freedom is associated with a chi-square distribution of 6.636 at a significance level .01). Moreover, ICC comparisons suggest that country-level accounts for around 25% variance in political trust in intercept-only model, which increased to 27% in predictors-only models and then sharply dropped to 9% when control variables are considered.

### **Political Trust Effects of Quality of Liberal Democracy**

Models 1-2 show the political trust effects of the predictors-only models. Liberal expectations, when regressed along with liberal performance, influence political trust with a coefficient of  $-.04$ . This negative effect sharply jumps by  $.47$  when the liberal performance is replaced with a liberal.

Moreover, liberal performance and liberal disconfirmations influence political trust with coefficients of  $.66$  and  $.73$ , respectively, suggesting that the latter is a better predictor of political trust than the former.

What happens when the effect of control variables is considered? A comparison of the predictors-only (Models 1-2) and fuller models (Model 3-4) shows substantial changes in the size and significance level of three predictors after controlling for the effect of individual-level and country-level control variables. The negative effect of liberal expectations further reduces by 100% in the fuller model. Likewise, the coefficients of liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation each drop by 62%. In these models, liberal expectations influence political trust with a coefficient of  $-.08$ , and the effect of sizes of liberal performance and liberal disconfirmations were  $.25$  and  $.28$ , respectively.

In summary, liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation significantly affect political trust. The findings reported above support our hypotheses ( $H_1-H_3$ ). Moreover, these findings clearly show that liberal disconfirmation is a better predictor of political trust than liberal performance.


### **6.4.7 Liberal Disconfirmation as a Mediator between Liberal Expectations and Political Trust**

A simple disconfirmation model involves mediation between liberal expectations, liberal disconfirmation, and political trust, which becomes a fuller one when included liberal performance (Section 6.2.4). However, a full model could not be estimated, given the strong multicollinearity between liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation.

Figure 6.4 plots only a simple disconfirmation model, and a fuller one could not be estimated due to very strong multicollinearity between liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation. Panels F shows that liberal expectations directly affect political trust with a coefficient of  $.10$ . Path A and B show that liberal expectations influence liberal disconfirmation with a coefficient of  $-1.08$  and  $.28$ , respectively. These paths are in expected directions and in line with Figure 6.1. The products of coefficients along paths A and C give us the indirect effect of liberal expectations via

liberal disconfirmation on political trust, which is  $-.30$ . These results suggest that the positive effect of liberal expectations observe a 400% decrease when passed through liberal disconfirmation. These results show that liberal disconfirmation plays a significant role in determining European citizens' feelings of political trust. In summary, these findings provide very strong evidence simple disconfirmation model laying at the intersection of the quality of liberal democracy and political trust.

**Figure 6.4 Mediated Effect of Liberal Expectations on Political Trust**



## 6.4.8 Effects of Other Variables

Models 3-4 include estimates of five sets of control variables. Only citizenship amongst the six demographic variables could not produce any significant effect on political trust. However, males are less likely to express political trust, decreasing with an increase in age. Moreover, political trust increases with the increase in years of education. Additionally, those living in the suburbs of big cities are more trusting than their counterparts residing in smaller cities or villages.

Of three political variables, those citizens who are highly interested in politics are more trusting than those who are either quite interested or hardly interested in politics. Political trust tends to increase as the perceptions of welfare performance increase. Of the two economic variables, feelings of personal household income could not produce any significant effect, and political trust increases as satisfaction with the economy increases. Political trust increases with citizens' satisfaction with their national governments, and left-right orientations could not produce any significant effect. Finally, political trust tends to increase as perceptions of social capital improve.

Two country-level variables were employed. First, compared to the insignificant role of the communist past, political trust increases as voice and accountability improve in society.

## 6.5 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the political trust effects of the quality of liberal democracy in 20 countries of Europe by employing three questions of the ESS-6, each pertaining to liberal expectations and liberal performance. In line with the three-dimensional structure of the quality of democracy, it

conceived the quality of liberal democracy in terms of citizens' orientation towards norms of liberal democracy, perceptions of the performance of their regimes against these liberal norms, and the gap between the two, i.e., liberal disconfirmation. Building on the rational choice approach and disconfirmation theory, it proposed and tested models where these three measures of the quality of liberal democracy directly affect political trust (H<sub>1</sub>–H<sub>3</sub>). It also developed and tested two additional models: simple and full disconfirmation. Liberal disconfirmation was a mediating variable between liberal expectations and political trust in simple disconfirmation, and in full disconfirmation, liberal disconfirmation mediated the association between liberal expectations and liberal performance on political trust.

Several macro-level and micro-level analyses were performed to test H<sub>1</sub>–H<sub>3</sub> and test simple and full disconfirmation models. The macro-level analyses showed that compared to the insignificant relationship between liberal expectations and political trust, liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation were statistically associated with political trust. At the micro-level, bivariate analysis showed that while liberal expectations produced mixed effects, liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation influenced political trust positively within individual countries. Almost the same effects were observed in the country-fixed effect and multilevel models except when a complex interaction between three measures of the quality of liberal democracy was considered. These findings not only provide a clear support to our three hypotheses but suggest that liberal disconfirmation is a better predictor of political trust than liberal performance. Furthermore, these findings provide empirical support to the simple disconfirmation models of political trust. The direct positive effect of liberal expectations turned negative when passed through liberal disconfirmation.

These findings have important implications for the disconfirmation theory and the quality of liberal democracy literature. Services sector literature suggests that performance and disconfirmation influence trust positively compared to the mixed effects of expectations (James 2009; Morgeson 2013; Poister and Thomas 2011; Van Ryzin 2005). This chapter shows that liberal expectations negatively and positively affected political trust; and liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation consistently produced positive effects. Moreover, there is a debate in service sector literature whether performance is a better predictor of trust/satisfaction (Van Dyke, Kappelman, and Prybutok 1997). The findings of this chapter open this debate in the political science literature by suggesting that liberal disconfirmation is a better predictor of political trust than liberal performance. Finally, these findings also provide fresh evidence to the expectancy theory, that was primarily developed and tested in the service sector literature (Filtenborg, Gaardboe, and Sigsgaard-Rasmussen 2017; Morgeson 2013; Oliver 2015; Van Ryzin 2004a, 2005), from the lens of political science literature.

The size of coefficients reported in this study are different from those in earlier published works (Morgeson 2013; Van Ryzin 2004a) because it is not only that this chapter employed liberal expectations and liberal performance, which are different from the service sector expectations and performance measures. Instead predictive in nature, service sector expectations are most likely to

produce salient effects. Some researchers argue that having their own intrinsic importance, democratic orientations reflecting normative expectations from democracy, including liberal expectations, are less likely to influence political trust (Fukuyama 2013). However, the results reported in this chapter showed that liberal expectations have a very important role in shaping citizens' feelings towards political institutions. Second, the exclusion of control variables in earlier studies produced effects of large sizes.

There are two main implications of these findings. One, political trust can be improved by improving liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation. Focusing only on the first two measures involves some complications. For instance, there is an inherent paradox in the relationship between liberal expectations and political trust, i.e., enhancing liberal expectations suppresses political trust. Such an attempt to reduce liberal expectations to improve political trust is dangerous as it may weaken diffuse support for democracy as a political system and subsequently dismantle it. However, trust-building strategies that focus on improving the liberal performance by taking liberal expectation as benchmarks might improve disconfirmation, reducing the negative indirect effects of liberal expectations and enhancing the indirect effect of the liberal performance.

To conclude, the quality of liberal democracy understood as liberal expectations, liberal performance, and liberal disconfirmation are quite helpful in understanding how Europeans make judgments related to political trust. Therefore, future works should focus on using alternative data sources and scales measuring the quality of liberal democracy and times series analysis to further examine this theory's potential to explain political trust. Furthermore, given that subtractive disconfirmation invokes strong multicollinearity between liberal expectations and liberal performance, future works should also focus on employing subjective disconfirmation further to examine the explainability and generalizability of disconfirmation theory.

## Chapter 7 Quality of Schooling and Political Trust

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### Summary

This chapter examines the political trust effects of the perceptions of the quality of schooling by mobilizing the micro-performance literature and through the lens of European students. Firstly, this chapter conceptualizes the quality of schooling in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness of the schools. Then, by using the micro-performance theory, it demonstrates the association between these three measures of the quality of schooling and political trust. The analysis of data from Round 2 of the European Social Survey (hereafter: ESS-2) suggests that the perceptions of the students of their teachers' procedural fairness and functional effectiveness are significant predictors of political trust. However, this chapter could not plot the effects of proxies of distributive justice due to invariance in these measures. It concludes that despite its operational and data limitations, the micro-performance theory works in explaining political trust amongst students.

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the extent to which the quality of schooling affects political trust. Historically, distrusted students resisted authorities in Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, in the Middle Ages (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007); remained at the central stage of policy and regime changes in many countries in the past seven decades (Accornero 2013; Altbach 2007; Lipset 1968); and are demonstrating against many governments even these days. Historically, students were active supporters of Hitler, Mussolini, and Che Guevara (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007); more recently, 'the more educated, the younger and the richer' voted for Modi in the 2019 elections, who is attempting to bring about a regime change in India (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020).

These observations outline two facets of trust/distrust: a passive one that appears in the public opinion research being an enterprise of an overwhelming majority of political scientists and an active one to which sociologists have paid close and careful attention. This latter aspect is considered to take the form of protests, demonstrations, and signing petitions and has attracted the attention of some researchers in the context of the politics of student protests (Olcese, Saunders, and Tzavidis 2014; I. Weinberg and Walker 1969). However, this thesis is concerned with the perceptual and emotional sides of political trust grounded in public opinion research.

The questions concerning what happens in the classrooms that produces political trust consequences have been examined from the lens of socialization and civic education literature. The underlying argument of this body of literature is that besides enhancing cognitive capacities, classrooms serve as 'replica democracy' for students to learn standard norms and behaviours of

interactions with other society members (Claes and Hooghe 2017). Several studies undertaken by Belgian researchers on school level students found that many variables about civic education, such as having classes about politics, open classrooms discussions, or meeting in school councils, influenced various political orientations, including trust, positively (Claes and Hooghe 2017; Dassonneville et al. 2012; Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Marien 2015).

With a few exceptions (for example, Torney-Purta, Henry Barber, and Richardson 2004), these are usually single country studies, undertaken in a small number of highly developed countries (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017: 184), are based on data that was extracted from the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements (IEA) with only one comparative study (Ziemes, Hahn-Laudenberg, and Abs 2020). Down this tradition, some European researchers have either contributed to this scholarship by replicating IEA questions in their surveys or resorted to qualitative studies.

However, the argument that socialization tends to shape adolescents' attitudes at an early age (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld 2008) does not mean that performance remains an invalid explanation. A number of studies have shown the role of education achieved and satisfaction with the performance of the educational system in explaining political trust (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). In classrooms, students are engaged in rational calculations when they compare their own performance with those of their peers and teachers. Moreover, schools are the first place that provides information about politics and society, giving students opportunities to interact with bureaucratic procedures and public authorities (Claes, Hooghe, and Marien 2012). This line of argument suggests that students might link their perceptions and experiences with the institutions and authorities outside their schools.

Synthesizing classroom justice literature and micro-performance theory, this chapter examines the political trust effects of quality of schooling in Europe. Such a scholarship is different from the existing literature in two ways: One, rather than seeing justice as *equality of representation*, this study embodies the concept of justice as *equality before law* revolving around the teacher as exhibiter of authority. The empirical test of performance theory specified to the educational context shows that students' experiences of the quality of schooling in their home countries matters in explaining trust in political institutions. Second, a handful of studies compared either fewer countries (Deimel, Hoskins, and Abs 2020; Torney-Purta, Henry Barber, and Richardson 2004) or focused on youth without considering their student status (Chevalier 2019). This is one of the preliminary comparative studies on political trust amongst studies involving 17 European countries.

The next section begins with a commentary on the meaning of schooling quality. The expectations that quality of schooling matters in explaining political trust is mainly driven by classroom justice (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Horan, Chory, and Goodboy 2010; Nelson, Shechter, and Ben-Ari 2014) and political science literature (Claes and Hooghe 2017; Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007; Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Marien 2015). The third section is on operationalization of the data



extracted from the ESS-2. Political trust is a traditional average index in the trust in the three representative institutions—the country’s parliament, political parties, and politicians. Quality of schooling is operationalized in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness of teachers. This is followed by a systematic analysis of the political trust effects of the quality of schooling, focusing on multilevel analysis. Conclusions and implications are the last parts of this chapter.

## **7.2 Relationship between Quality of Schooling and Political Trust**

The quality of schooling can be conceived in more modern notions such as ‘classroom justice’ (Berti, Molinari, and Speltini 2010; Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Horan, Chory, and Goodboy 2010; Resh and Sabbagh 2014), or ‘classroom assessment’ (Rasooli, Zandi, and DeLuca 2019), which are primarily derived from the application of organizational justice literature to the academic environment. Relying on the analysis of dozens of texts, Rasooli, Zandi, and DeLuca concluded that researchers use fairness interchangeably with nondiscrimination, fairness, equality, equity, justice, equitable assessment, ethics in assessment. This depicts much of the ‘circularity’ and ‘fuzziness’ of classroom assessment definitions, reflecting that this novel theory is still evolving and needs to be defined with respect to classroom assessments.

Combined, this body of literature defines classroom justice as the fairness of processes or outcomes in the instructional context and comprises distributive, procedural, and instructional justice (For a detailed discussions on these aspects, see Rasooli, Zandi, and DeLuca 2019 and Appendix 7.1). *Distributive justice* refers to the students’ perceptions that fair distribution of outcomes that include grades, opportunities for improving grades, attention, and other rewards and punishment; *procedural justice* involves their concerns that appropriate procedures are employed to allocate those grades, and *interactional justice* focuses on interpersonal and communicative aspects of teachers and students. Besides equity and justice concerns, effectiveness and efficiency—that is the extent to which the academics are striving to achieve their goals—an essential part of citizens’ evaluation of governmental services, although one that is less intensely scrutinized by the classroom justice literature (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001: 23; Bouckaert and Walle Van de 2013: 309).

Whereas the functional effectiveness of police and health services can be measured in terms of, for example, crime control and disease control, respectively, it is relatively more challenging to measure this dimension of schooling. Notably, effective schooling aims at preparing students for the labour market and at performing such vital tasks as optimization, equal opportunity, and socialization (Labaree 1997; van de Werfhorst 2014); however, confusions still abound whether the teachers actually perform their tasks effectively (Lipsky 2010: 41). This task performance is hindered by the ever-changing labour market demands that render some skills obsolete over a certain period of time and socialization processes driven by societies’ social values structures (van de Werfhorst 2014). Despite these challenges in its measurement, the effectiveness of schools is

an important task that may be executed through what classroom justice scholar call as interactional justice.

However, how well the educational system performs these tasks has long-term social, political, and economic consequences for stakeholders in any educational system. Of these stakeholders, students and political systems are particularly relevant to this study: the latter being the designers, financiers, and implementers of educational policies and programs and the former as its beneficiaries. This chapter concentrates only on the political trust effects of students' assessments of their educational institutions.

Examples abound on applying rational explanations, driven by equality, social exchange, and performance, to understand various orientations of the students. For Chory-Assad and Paulsel (2004), indirect aggression towards teachers results from their bad classroom interactions with students. In another study, they showed that procedural injustice negatively predicted such attitudes amongst students as aggression, hostility, and resistance to the instructors through revenge (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004). Classroom injustice also accounts for such emotional responses as pain and anger and behavioral consequences ranging from getting slow on the course to verbally abusing the teachers (Horan, Chory, and Goodboy 2010). For Vallade, Martin, and Weber (2014), classroom justice, firstly, affects students' expectancy beliefs and affective learning that then influence their learning behaviours. These are American studies reflecting the individual, teacher and school-level consequences of classroom injustice.

The theoretical foundation of much of the empirical scholarship produced so far can be contested. For example, for Ziemer, Hahn-Laudenberg, and Abs (2020), socialization plays a key role in shaping students' political trust in Germany. Deimel, Hoskins, and Abs (2020) found that school socialization was an important predictor of engagement in political activities across four European democracies. For Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Marien (2015), schools, through their sorting functions, tend to shape political trust amongst Belgian students. These socialization experiences might be interpreted from a rational perspective, which means that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of each of their choices, rank them, and then choose one that is more beneficial to them in tangible and intangible terms. On this line, if democracy is promoted as a social choice at home or schools, it offers intangible benefits to the students by providing them opportunities to debate, negotiate, and deliberate on various issues. Besides serving as a 'replica of democracy,' educational institutions serve as important sites for making sense of justice and provide students with their first 'street-level bureaucracy' type of encounters exposing them to bureaucratic rules and procedures and issues of rewards and punishment (Norris 2017b). Classrooms are 'special spheres' of justice where teachers and students act as allocators and recipients of rewards and punishments—hence, both evaluate each other based on their performance (Resh and Sabbagh 2014).

While the objects of evaluation of classroom justice studies are teachers, political socialization and performance perspectives tend to evaluate political objects. Bringing micro-performance theory

(Bouckaert and Walle 2003: 305) into the perspective means that students: (1) make a distinction between politics and educational services, (2) have better information and knowledge about these services, (3) evaluate these services based on performance, and 4) make a causal nexus between performance and trust in government. In line with the existing literature on classroom justice, it is expected that these bureaucratic type of interactions would shape students' perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness that would then influence their trust in government. Thus, it is assumed that the quality of schooling will affect political trust in Europe positively. More precisely:

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1</sub>):** Students' perceptions of distributive injustice by the teachers will negatively affect their political trust feelings.

**Hypothesis 2 (H<sub>2</sub>):** Feelings of political trust amongst students will increase with the increase in the perceptions of procedural justice of their teachers.

**Hypothesis 3 (H<sub>3</sub>):** Feelings of political trust of students will increase with the effectiveness of their teachers.

### 7.3 Operationalizing Quality of Schooling

This chapter uses data from the ESS-2 that was fielded from September 2004 to July 2006 in 26 countries. Like the proceeding chapters, political trust—the dependent variables—is an average index of trust in the parliament, political parties, and politicians from the 'core module' (Chapter 4: Section 4.3.1).

Building on the previous works (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Marien 2015; Smith and Gorard 2006), quality of schooling is operationalized as the students' evaluations of the distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness of their teachers.

Four out of thirteen items in the "Family Work and Well-being" module of ESS-2 are selected to measure the quality of schooling. Some of the rest of the items, for example, students' interaction with their peers, the quantity of workload, and quality of physical environments, could not be included in the analyses because it would not only involve an additional theoretical framework (civic justice or social capital). Furthermore, different educational systems having different capacities would render analyses and comparability as an uphill task. The data were inspected for missing values.<sup>9</sup> Turkey and Ukraine were considered as geographically not parts of Europe and

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<sup>9</sup> Missing values in the measures of distributive justice in Slovenia were around 96 percent. However, the country was not dropped from the further analyses because there was a little variation in these items indicating this variable. Missing values in each of the remaining items measuring quality of schooling were less than 5 percent. Of the individual-level control variables, there were around 50 percent missing values in the objective household income. Despite being very important variable, it was replaced by feelings of household income, which missed only 6.1 percent. Further, satisfaction with government and democracy missed less than 7.5 percent of data. Finally, around 20

non-democratic regimes, respectively, in 2004. The items about the quality of schooling were missing in France. Iceland (44), Italy (56), and Slovakia (46) contained a limited number of observations, and Luxembourg, Poland, and Portugal behaved as outliers. Consequently, these nine countries were dropped from the analysis.

Communist past, government effectiveness, GDP, and CPI were initially selected as the country-level control variables. Correlation analysis suggested very high collinearity between the latter three measures. Consequently, government effectiveness, a measure of the quality of public services, and communist past were retained. The final data contained 3576 weighted individual-level observations from 17 countries, to which two country-level variables were added to produce a hierarchical dataset ready for multilevel analyses.

It is important to note that all the continuous variables, including political trust, were standardized to produce comparable estimates. However, the descriptive statistics and macro-level patterns of associations are based on original scales.

The following subsection is about the operationalization of the three quality of schooling measures.

### **7.3.1 Distributive Justice**

Distributive justice refers to the students' perceptions of their unbiased treatment by the authorities in educational institutions and can be measured directly and indirectly (Rasooli, Zandi, and DeLuca 2019). For instance, an EU-funded project on citizenship education amongst 13–14 years students in Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the UK tapped into it by asking students directly, for example, if 'the teachers treat the girls better than the boys' (Smith and Gorard 2006). Another well-known study employed a 14-items scale measuring the grade received/will receive vis-à-vis one's own and in comparison to the others in exams (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Chory 2007). ESS-2 did not ask any direct question about distributive justice; instead, it first proposed to the respondent if they were the "member of a group discriminated against in this country." Then, in the subsequent questions, the subjects were required to mention if they were discriminated against based on their color or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, disability, and other grounds. Subsetting the data to the students provided an opportunity to use these questions as proxies for distributive justice measures.

Statements capturing discriminatory treatments are key instruments for tapping into distributive justice (Sunshine and Tyler 2003), which independently shape attitudes towards legal authorities (Tyler and Huo 2003: 79). Given that the students spend a considerable part of their time in educational institutions, it is plausible that their responses are based on their perceptions of discrimination they might face and can be considered reasonable proxies for distributive justice.

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percent of values in the self-placement on left-right scale were missing. As there were no alternative measures; therefore, in order not to lose this important variable, its missing values were imputed by county-level means.

### 7.3.2 Procedural Fairness

Procedural justice has been measured in different ways in the existing literature. Chory-Assad and her colleagues tapped into this type of justice through a 17-items scale (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Chory 2007); Holmgren and Bolkan (2014) adopted questions from the consumer service literature, for example: ‘my instructor responded fairly and quickly’ (Maxham and Netemeyer 2003); and Smith and Gorard (2006) used such items as, for instance, ‘the teachers treat me fairly.’ This latter measure is similar to the ESS-2 question: “At study place, there are teachers who treat me badly or unfairly” (1 ‘strongly agree to 5 ‘strongly disagree’), which was employed as a measure of the procedural fairness of the teachers.

### 7.3.3 Functional Effectiveness

While the functional effectiveness of the educational institutions can be conceived of in terms of the supply of high-quality human capital to society and polity and promoting critical thinking, the extent to which a teacher attempts to achieve the stated objectives of a course reflects his/her functional effectiveness. Extant studies differentiate between global measures of effectiveness projecting, for example, the overall rating of the teachers, and instructional justice, which includes such aspects as giving clear explanations, promoting critical thinking, and providing assistance to the students (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Chory 2007; Galbraith, Merrill, and Kline 2012). Given that the ESS-2 did not contain any of the global measures of teachers’ effectiveness, the chapter relied only on the items measuring instructional dimension, which read as:

Thinking about the place where you study, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements

1. Teachers interested in students
2. When criticise something teachers listen to what I say
3. Get help you need from teachers about course.

The first two items were measured on a five-point scale from 1 ‘agree strongly’ to 5 ‘disagree strongly’, and the last item was measured on a four-point scale from 1 ‘always,’ 2 ‘often,’ 3 ‘not very often,’ and 4 ‘never.’ Theoretically, it is plausible that these three items capture the same underlying construct despite the fact that they could not cross the threshold value of Cronbach alpha, i.e., .60, in Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, and Norway (see Appendix 7.2). Consequently, these items were converged to represent an additive index reflecting the functional effectiveness of the schools ranging from 3 ‘least effective’ to 14 ‘most effective.’

## 7.4 Results


### 7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Country-Level Analyses

Table 7.1 suggests that students in Europe did not face any discrimination based on race, color, nationality, and so on in 2004/05. Past studies provide mixed support to this effect. For instance, a recent study reports no difference in discriminatory treatment of immigrants and local students

by school authorities in Germany (Ziemes, Hahn-Laudenberg, and Abs 2020). A 2006 study, undertaken around the time when the ESS-2 has finished collecting data, observed that rewards and punishments in schools of Belgium, Spain, Italy, France, and the UK are differently distributed (Smith and Gorard 2006). Had this round asked the questions in line with the previous studies, and had this data been represented as a sample of students at the country-level rather than that of the population, the results would probably have been different? This invariance of the variables resulted in dropping this variable from further analyses.


| <b>Table 7.1 Distribution (in Percent) of Measure of Distributive Justice</b> |     |      |                 |            |        |
|---|-----|------|-----------------|------------|--------|
| Measures  | Yes | No   |                 | Not Marked | Marked |
| Discriminated against based on  | 5.7 | 94.3 | 5. Ethnic group | 0.3        | 99.7   |
| 1. Colour/race  | 0.8 | 99.2 | 6. Age          | 0.5        | 99.5   |
| 2. Nationality  | 1.4 | 98.6 | 7. Gender       | 0.6        | 99.4   |
| 3. Religion   | 0.6 | 99.4 | 8. Sexuality    | 0.4        | 99.6   |
| 5. Language   | 0.3 | 99.7 | 9. Disability   | 0.1        | 99.9   |
|   |     |      | 10. Others      | 1.2        | 98.8   |

Figure 7.1 plots descriptive statistics of political trust, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. As can be observed from Graph 1, political trust in Europe is distributed with a mean and standard deviation of 4.49 and 1.99. Students of Denmark and Hungary exhibited the highest and lowest political trust levels (see detailed descriptive statistics in Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4).



Graph 2 suggests that overall, European students consider that their teachers treat them relatively fairly, as is indicated by means and standard deviation scores of 3.59 and SD=1.06. Again, Danish

and Hungarian students saw their teachers as respectively the most and the least procedurally fair ones in a sample of 17 countries. These results are similar to Smith and Gorard's (2006) findings of higher procedural fairness of teachers in five European countries. The scores of teachers functional effectiveness are distributed with means and standard deviations of 8.31 and 1.86, respectively, with Sweden and the Czech Republic scoring the top and bottom positions.




#### 7.4.2 Bivariate Analyses: Macro-Patterns of Quality of Policing and Political Trust

After observing between and within-country variance in political trust and its two correlates varies. This calls for exploring the macro-level and micro-level patterns of association between these variables. Given that distributive justice measures did not vary much, their association with political trust, i.e.,  $H_1$ , could not be tested. Country-level means of political trust and procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness were computed, and their correlations are plotted in the form of macro-level patterns, as shown in Figure 7.2.

The scatterplot in Graph 1 shows a linear, statistically significant, and moderate association between political trust and procedural fairness of the teachers in Europe ( $R^2=.56$ ;  $r=.79$ ;  $p<.01$ ). Compared to few countries fitting closely, most of them scattered around the regression line, with Finland and Ireland falling farthest above and below the mean line. Roughly, this relationship performed better in advanced Western democracies and poorly in Eastern Europe as well as in Austria and Germany. This macro-level analysis supports the assumption that procedural fairness positively affects political trust ( $H_2$ ).

Political trust and teachers functional effectiveness—an additive index of items measuring teachers’ interest in their students, their adaptability to face criticism, and their ability to provide help to the students—are statistically significant yet mildly correlated (Graph 2;  $R^2=.36$ ;  $r=.60$ ;  $p<.05$ ). Hungary and Denmark are farthest above and below the regression line. Few countries are less tightly packed around this line. It can be observed that this relationship performed differently in three groups of countries. It worked poorly in Eastern Europe, Austria, and Germany; there are five countries where high political trust is associated with high functional effectiveness; and still, there are four countries exhibiting high functional effectiveness and below-average political trust scores. It is important to note that our functional effectiveness scale ranges from 3 (most effective) to 14 (least effective), and all the differences in political trust values are associated with a smaller range of functional effectiveness scores varying between 7.00 to 9.00.



### 7.4.3 Bivariate Analyses: Micro-Patterns of Quality of Policing and Political Trust

After having shown a positive association between political trust and its two quality of schooling predictors at the macro-level, this section examines the extent to which these associations replicate at the individual-level within each of the seventeen countries.

Table 7.2 plots the results of bivariate regression analyses. Procedural fairness and functional effectiveness predicted political trust positively and significantly at the EU-level. However, these associations were statistically significant in fewer countries only. Except in the UK, showing a negative effect, the association between procedural fairness and political trust was positive in six countries. Likewise, the impact of functional effectiveness was significantly only in seven countries. Germany was the top performer in these relationships. However, in Austria and Finland, the respective effects of procedural justice and functional effectiveness, were least salient yet significant.



To sum it up, procedural justice and functional effectiveness showed a positive relationship at the macro-level. These patterns, at the micro-level, appeared in the expected directions except in the UK.

| <b>Table 7.2 Bivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Schooling</b> |                     |              |                |                          |              |                |
|---|---------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------------|--------------|----------------|
|   | Procedural Fairness |              |                | Functional Effectiveness |              |                |
|   | Constant            | Beta (SE)    | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant                 | Beta (SE)    | R <sup>2</sup> |
| EU-17   | 4.50 (.03)***       | .09 (.02)*** | .01            | 4.50 (.02)***            | .12 (.03)*** | .03            |
| Austria   | 3.85 (.09)***       | .17 (.10)**  | .03            | 3.84 (.09)***            | .14 (.10)**  | .02            |
| Belgium   | 5.17 (.16)***       | .04 (.16)    | .00            | 5.17 (.16)***            | -.05 (.16)   | .00            |
| Switzerland   | 5.43 (.12)***       | .08 (.12)    | .01            | 5.44 (.11)***            | .03 (.12)    | .00            |
| Czechia   | 3.77 (.15)***       | .06 (.16)    | .00            | 3.79 (.15)***            | .11 (.14)    | .01            |
| Germany   | 4.15 (.10)***       | .23 (.10)*** | .05            | 4.14 (.10)***            | .34 (.10)*** | .11            |
| Denmark   | 5.94 (.16)***       | .05 (.16)    | .00            | 5.94 (.16)***            | .01 (.16)    | .00            |
| Estonia   | 4.23 (.13)***       | .16 (.13)*   | .02            | 4.23 (.13)***            | .03 (.13)    | .00            |
| Spain   | 4.24 (.14)***       | .16 (.14)    | .02            | 4.25 (.14)***            | .09 (.14)    | .01            |
| Finland   | 5.85 (.11)***       | .21 (.11)**  | .04            | 5.85 (.11)***            | .17 (.11)*   | .03            |
| UK  | 4.81 (.16)***       | -.17 (.17)*  | .03            | 4.83 (.16)***            | .03 (.16)    | .00            |
| Greece  | 4.15 (.17)***       | .11 (.18)    | .01            | 4.14 (.16)***            | .23 (.17)**  | .05            |
| Hungary   | 3.36 (.15)***       | .06 (.15)    | .00            | 3.34 (.14)***            | .20 (.15)*   | .04            |
| Ireland   | 4.40 (.11)***       | .15 (.11)*   | .02            | 4.39 (.11)***            | .19 (.11)**  | .04            |
| Netherlands   | 5.35 (.11)***       | -.12 (.12)   | .01            | 5.35 (.11)***            | .00 (.11)    | .00            |
| Norway  | 4.85 (.13)***       | .08 (.13)    | .01            | 4.85 (.13)***            | .19 (.13)*   | .03            |
| Sweden  | 5.16 (.14)***       | -.01 (.14)   | .00            | 5.15 (.13)***            | .11 (.13)    | .01            |
| Slovenia  | 3.59 (.14)***       | .17 (.14)*   | .03            | 3.58 (.14)***            | .16 (.14)*   | .02            |

Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses.  
 \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

## 7.4.4 Multivariate Analyses

### Correlation analysis

A correlation analysis was performed before turning to multivariate and multilevel analyses, and results are plotted in Table 7.3. As expected, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness of the teachers, and political trust in Europe are positively and significantly associated. The correlation matrices of individual-level and country-level control variables and political trust can be seen in Appendix 4.5 in Chapter 4.

| <b>Table 7.3 Correlation Matrix of Political Trust and Quality of Schooling</b> |        |        |   |
|---|--------|--------|---|
|   | 1      | 2      | 3 |
| 1. Political Trust  | 1      |        |   |
| 2. Procedural fairness  | .09*** | 1      |   |
| 3. Functional effectiveness   | .12*** | .34*** | 1 |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

## Effect of Quality of Schooling in Political Trust

Table 7.4 reports OLS regression results. The first two models map the effects of predictors-only models without (Model 1) and with (Model 2) country-fixed effect parameters. The latter two models consider the role of individual-level demographic variables without (Model 3) and with (Model 4) country fixed-effects.

The predictors-only models show that procedural justice and functional effectiveness influence political trust with coefficients of .11 and .19, respectively. The coefficient of the former remained the same while that of the latter increased by .01 when the country fixed-effect parameter was considered. The effects of the sizes of these two predictors were further reduced to .04 and .15 in a model involving individual-level demographic and control variables and excluding country-fixed effects. The addition of the latter in the proceeding model increased the coefficient of functional effectiveness while that of procedural fairness remained unchanged. Thus, in the final model, an increase of procedural fairness and functional effectiveness by one standard deviation is associated with a .07 and .08 units increase in political trust, respectively.

| <b>Table 7.4 Multivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Schooling</b>  |                |                |                |                |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|   | <b>Model 1</b> | <b>Model 2</b> | <b>Model 3</b> | <b>Model 4</b> |
| Constant  | 4.53 (.03)***  | 3.58 (.13)***  | 5.97 (.23)***  | 5.09 (.24)***  |
| <b>Quality of Schooling</b>   |                |                |                |                |
| Procedural fairness   | .11 (.04)***   | .11 (.02)**    | .07 (.03)*     | .07 (.03)*     |
| Functional effectiveness  | .19 (.04)***   | .20 (.02)***   | .05 (.03)      | .08 (.03)*     |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b>  |                |                |                |                |
| Gender  |                |                | -.06 (.06)     | -.12 (.06)*    |
| Age   |                |                | -.01 (.05)     | -.01 (.05)     |
| Education in years  |                |                | -.06 (.05)     | -.06 (.05)     |
| Religiousness   |                |                | .07 (.03)*     | .10 (.03)***   |
| Domicile  |                |                | .00 (.02)      | -.03 (.02)     |
| Citizenship   |                |                | .09 (.15)      | -.03 (.14)     |
| Welfare performance   |                |                | .23 (.04)***   | .20 (.03)***   |
| Felt income   |                |                | .00 (.04)      | .01 (.04)      |
| Sat: economy  |                |                | .05 (.04)      | .07 (.04)*     |
| Political interest  |                |                | -.52 (.04)***  | -.36 (.04)***  |
| Sat: government   |                |                | .75 (.04)***   | .74 (.03)***   |
| Left-right orientation  |                |                | .05 (.03)      | .05 (.03)      |
| Social capital  |                |                | .29 (.03)***   | .30 (.03)***   |
| N: Individual   | 3371           | 3371           | 2778           | 2778           |
| N: Country  | 17             | 17             | 17             | 17             |
| R <sup>2</sup>  | .02            | .15            | .33            | .46            |
| Country Fixed-Effects   | No             | Yes            | No             | Yes            |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Country-fixed effect parameter included in all models. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |                |                |                |                |

In summary, these findings provide support to the assumptions that students' perceptions of procedural justice and functional effectiveness are positively associated with political trust (H<sub>1</sub>–H<sub>3</sub>). The size of  $R^2$  increases by including the country-fixed effect parameter, suggesting that country-level variables might account for changes in the feelings of political trust.

#### **7.4.5 Multilevel Analysis**

This section presents the results of multilevel analyses performed with political trust as the dependent variable. A brief description of model fitness indices is followed by a presentation of the main results.

##### **Assessment of Fitness of Models**

Graph 1 in Figure 7.1 observed a substantial between and within countries variations in students' feelings of political trust in the 17 countries included in this chapter. The ANOVA results revealed that political trust scores were distributed with a mean and standard deviation of 4.60 and .18, respectively, and intercepts (grand means of political trust) varied significantly between countries (Wald=2.81,  $p < .01$ ). Moreover, as shown by the ICC figure, country-level accounts for 14% of the total variation in political trust. This variance increased by 1% point when the two variables related to the quality of schooling were added to the equation, which was further reduced by 8% points by adding a host of control variables.

–2 Log-Likelihood statistics demonstrated that nested models were statistically significant from their non-nest counterparts in intercept-only, predictor-only, and fuller models (note: one additional degree of freedom is associated with a chi-square distribution of 6.64 at a significance level .01). Together, these statistics suggested the appropriateness of multilevel modeling as the next and final analytical strategy.

##### **Effect of Quality of Schooling on Political Trust**

Table 7.5 plots the results of multilevel models: Model 1 predicted political trust based only on the two quality of schooling measures, and Model 2 obtained estimates of procedural fairness and functional effectiveness controlling for individual and country-level variables.

The results reported here again clearly support the assumptions of this chapter. Estimates under Model 1 suggest that students' evaluations of the procedural fairness and functional effectiveness of their teachers affect political trust positively. In the predictors-only model, procedural fairness influenced political trust with a coefficient of .11, and the effect of functional effectiveness was equal to .20. However, when the individual-level and country-level control variables were considered, the effect of the former dropped by .04 points and that of the latter by .12 points. All else being constant, the procedural fairness and the functional effectiveness affect political trust with coefficients of .07 and .08, respectively. This suggests that students give almost equal weight to procedural fairness and functional effectiveness while shaping their feelings of political trust.

To sum it up, these findings undoubtedly endorse the hypotheses that political trust improves by an increase in procedural fairness (H<sub>2</sub>) and functional effectiveness (H<sub>3</sub>).

| <b>Table 7.5 Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Schooling</b>  |                |                |
|---|----------------|----------------|
| <b>Fixed Effects</b>  | <b>Model 1</b> | <b>Model 2</b> |
| Intercept   | 4.60 (.19)***  | 4.05 (.26)***  |
| <b>Quality of Schooling</b>   |                |                |
| Procedural fairness   | .11 (.03)***   | .07 (.03)*     |
| Functional effectiveness  | .20 (.03)***   | .08 (.03)*     |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b>  |                |                |
| Gender: male  |                | .12 (.06)*     |
| Age   |                | -.01 (.05)     |
| Education in years  |                | -.06 (.05)     |
| Religiousness   |                | .11 (.03)***   |
| Domicile: suburbs   |                | .08 (.12)      |
| Domicile: town/small city   |                | -.01 (.13)     |
| Domicile: country village   |                | -.03 (.12)     |
| Domicile: countryside   |                | -.06 (.12)     |
| Citizen: yes  |                | .04 (.14)      |
| Welfare performance   |                | .20 (.03)***   |
| Income: living comfortably  |                | -.09 (.15)     |
| Income: copying   |                | -.14 (.15)     |
| Income: difficult   |                | -.05 (.16)     |
| Sat. with economy   |                | .07 (.03)*     |
| Interest: very interested   |                | 1.08 (.13)***  |
| Interest: quite interested  |                | .68 (.09)***   |
| Interest: hardly interested   |                | .28 (.08)***   |
| Sat: national government  |                | .74 (.03)***   |
| Left-right orientations   |                | .04 (.03)      |
| Social capital  |                | .30 (.03)***   |
| <b>Country-Level Control</b>  |                |                |
| Communist past: yes   |                | .38 (.38)      |
| Government effectiveness  |                | .73 (.17)***   |
| <b>Variance Components</b>  |                |                |
| Individual-level variance   | 3.31 (.08)***  | 2.03 (.05)***  |
| Country-level variance  | .57 (.20)**    | .15 (.06)**    |
| ICC   | .15            | .07            |
| -2 Log-Likelihood   | 438.19         | 166.86         |
| N: Individuals  | 2632           | 2264           |
| N: Countries  | 17             | 17             |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |                |                |

#### **7.4.6 Effects of Other Variables**

Model 2 in Table 7.5 only demonstrates the estimates of individual-level and country-level demographic and control variables. Only two of the six demographic variables could produce statistically significant effects: male students are more likely to exhibit political trust than females, and trust tends to decrease with an increase in religiosity. Age, previous years of education that students had received, their residential status, and citizenship do not matter at all in explaining political trust.

Political trust tends to increase as students' perceptions of welfare performance improve. Of the two economic variables, only satisfaction with economy was a significant predictor of political trust, and feelings of household could not produce any effect. Two of the three political factors are significant predictors: those students being highly interested in politics are more likely to trust than quite interested and hardly interested one. Likewise, political trust increases with an increase in students' perceptions of satisfaction with national government. However, left-right orientation is not related to political trust significantly. Finally, social capital positively influences political trust. As all the continuous variables are standardized, it can be assessed from the size of coefficients that satisfaction with national government is the strongest predictor of political trust followed by social capital and welfare performance.

At the country-level, while having a communist past could not influence political trust, it tends to increase as the level of government effectiveness—that includes the quality of public services amongst other measures—improves.

### **7.5 Conclusion**

This chapter was aimed to understand the relationship between the quality of schooling and political trust. Under the guise of micro-performance theory and borrowing literature from the classroom justice literature, it has demonstrated that students' perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness would be positively associated with political trust ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ). These assumptions were examined by subsetting the ESS-2 data to the students.  $H_1$  could not be tested due to invariance in the proxies of distributive justice—age, sex, religion, and ethnicity. The support that  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  clearly received in the macro-level patterns of associations could not withstand at the micro-level. More in-depth analyses suggested that both procedural fairness and functional effectiveness significantly predicted political trust.

The findings reported in this chapter clearly support the assumption that the quality of schooling matters in explaining feelings of political trust in Europe. Firstly, it was found that the teachers procedural fairness improves students' feelings of political trust ( $H_2$ ). This finding confirms the previous research on the emotional and behavioral consequences of classroom injustice, including pain, anger, aggression, and hostility towards instructors, engaging in activities to deceive and take revenge on them, getting slow on course, and even verbally accusing the teacher (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Horan, Chory, and Goodboy 2010; R.

Kaufmann and Tatum 2018; Tripp et al. 2019). Then as expected (H<sub>3</sub>), students' perceptions of the teachers functional effectiveness were positively associated with political trust. In other words, feelings of political trust increase with improvements in the perceptions that teachers were interested in students, helpful, and open to criticism. This finding is in line with the existing literature suggesting the positive effects of the open classroom climate on political trust in Belgium (Claes, Hooghe, and Marien 2012).

Combined, these findings suggest the utility of micro-performance theory (Bouckaert and Walle 2003: 305), which, when applied to students, would mean that they make a differentiation between the schooling services and politics; and rationally hold political institutions responsible for *what* and *how* they receive in their educational institutions. To conclude, students want an egalitarian educational system that benefits all students equally. They also want their teachers to pass on to them the set of necessary skills to lead a better personal and professional life to express political trust (Smith and Gorard 2006). Beyond providing support to the developing micro-performance theory, this chapter suggests that enhancing the quality of schooling can be one of the reservoirs of political trust.

This chapter suffers from certain limitations. The lack of appropriate measures of distributive justice and procedural fairness could not help but use perceptions of discrimination based on, for example, age, sex, religion, and ethnicity, and teachers' unfair or bad treatment to capture the two variables, respectively. Organizational justice (Beugre and Baron 2001; Siu, Zhang, and Yau 2013), police performance (Sunshine and Tyler 2003b), and classroom justice (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004) literature offer well-developed batteries of operational definitions of each of these concepts. Compared to the single-item measure used in this chapter, most of these earlier studies used a procedural justice scale, consisting of 17 items developed by Chory-Assad and Paulsel. Thus, in the context of quality of schooling, procedural justice is a multidimensional concept that, when adopted, might produce different political trust consequences amongst the students

Future research should benefit from these definitions to capture students' perceptions of distributive justice and procedural fairness. Next, though this study conceived functional effectiveness through the lens of interactional justice (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004), more direct questions, for example, 'courses/teachers are equipping students with the necessary skills, knowledge, and abilities to take on future professional and social roles' could be used to measure functional effectiveness in the future research. Thirdly, and more importantly, the present study employed 3576 observations from 17 countries. Unless country-fixed effect or country-level variables were introduced, two schooling quality measures were positively associated with political trust. However, these observations kept on dropping when further complex models were introduced. These limited observations probably biased the parameter estimates.

Further research should focus on testing political trust effects of the quality of schooling variables on larger sample sizes. Finally, this study is about European schools. In order to increase its

validity, the future studies should focus on testing this theory in cross-cultural settings and from a comparative perspective.

## Chapter 8 Quality of Policing and Political Trust

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### Summary

This chapter aims to test the political trust effects of the quality of policing in Europe. Building on the procedural justice service sector literature, it conceived the quality of policing as citizens' superior evaluations of police performance, indicated by distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Then, concentrating on the micro-performance theory demonstrates the dependence of political trust on these three measures of quality of policing. A series of empirical analyses, performed by employing data from Round 5 of the European Social Survey (hereafter: ESS-5), shows the quality of policing matters in explaining political trust in Europe. Overall, this chapter provides a clear support for the nascent micro-performance theory.

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the association between the quality of policing and political trust in Europe. The quality of policing conceived as citizens' perceptions of the superior performance of the police has attracted the attention of citizens, researchers, and practitioners alike. The candidate challenges to police legitimacy, even in the developed societies, include their attitude towards the minority groups, excessive use of force, corruption, declining rates of crime detection, and prevention (de Maillard and Savage 2012). This manifests the public detestation of discrimination and unlawful performance of the police.

Criminologists have long been conveying the adverse consequences of the low quality of policing. Research produced so far suggests that the poor quality of policing undermines not only its legitimacy and trust but also produces problems related to compliance with the law and deters cooperation with the police in Europe and elsewhere (Craen and Skogan 2015; Haas et al. 2015; Kääriäinen 2007; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Reisig, Tankebe, and Meško 2012; Staubli 2017; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b). Compared to some researchers considering trust and confidence as indicators of effective performance (Goldsmith 2005), police performance can be measured through distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness.

One strand of research, primarily influenced by Taylorian (1988) tradition, finds the origin of trust and legitimacy of the police in its procedural fairness and functional effectiveness. Within this tradition, there is a debate about the utility of functional effectiveness and procedural fairness of the police. Some studies, mainly inspired by the service quality literature, understand performance as an important indicator of police trust. Based on the SERVQUL model, this strand views police performance through such dimensions of quality as tangible, reliable, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy (Donnelly et al. 2006; Ekaabi, Khalid, and Davidson 2020; Sarrico, Ferreira, and



Silva 2013). If police performance, quality, and trust are overlapping concepts, then what implications these policing qualities have for trust in the political institutions?

As suggested in the literature review chapter (Section 2.4), there can be two ways to get into this theoretical puzzle. Given its operational definition, police trust can be an indicator of a broader construct of political trust. In this view, procedural justice theory can explain trust in police, the criminal justice system, and political institutions. However, political and regulatory or service sector institutions work under different norms and rules. For instance, service sector institutions are accountable to the political ones and not vice versa. Likewise, political institutions have mandates to legislate and amend laws about police, and the latter is dependent upon the former for budgetary allocation and so on. If police trust, performance, and effectiveness are the same things as recommended by some of the researchers, it would be a big challenge to demonstrate what predicts what theoretically.

Considering these shortcomings in the previous literature, this chapter examines the effects of three measures of quality of policing—distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness—on political trust in Europe through the lens of micro-performance theory (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). This approach assumes that political trust depends upon citizens' satisfaction with and evaluation of different public services and agencies of the government. Police are one of such public services responsible for ensuring the internal security and stability of any democratic regime. Citizens might expect the police to protect them from crimes, treat them indiscriminately, and remain fair and impartial while making decisions. Unlike authoritarian regimes, where police act on despotic rulers' whims, citizens in democracies may expect their police to be indirectly responsible and accountable to them through their political institutions. Thus, it is plausible that the perceptions of the quality of policing will affect political trust. In other words, the primary goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how individual-level variations in the evaluations of police and country-level differences account for variation in political trust in Europe.

Fewer studies have explicitly examined the consequences of the quality of policing on trust in political institutions. Notably, Marien and Werner's (2019) paper, "Fair treatment, fair play? The relationship between fair treatment perceptions, political trust, and compliant and cooperative attitudes cross-nationally," needs special attention. It was a mere coincidence that this paper was in the publication process in March 2019 when the first version of this chapter was developed for presentation at the 15<sup>th</sup> Conference of the French Political Science Association in Bordeaux in July 2019. Despite this, the current chapter is different from Marien and Werner's work in two ways. Firstly, it invokes the concept of quality comprising distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. The said authors focused only on procedural fairness and did not consider the quickness of the police in arriving at the crime scene in their measure of the effectiveness of the police. This chapter employs a battery of three questions as against two in the said paper.

Second, some studies suggest the adverse effects of perceptions of discriminatory treatment on trust in the police (Van Craen and Skogan 2015), which Marien and Werner did not consider while mapping the effect of fairness on political trust. Finally, as reported in the next section, there is no conclusive evidence about the superiority of these quality measures in explaining police trust. An additional purpose of this study is to examine which of the three measures are better predictors of political trust in Europe.

After exploring the meanings of quality of policing, the next section theoretically demonstrates the nexus between distributive justice, procedural fairness, functional effectiveness, and political trust. The third section presents the operationalization of the quality of policing measures and analytical approach. The fourth part presents an overview of the results. The conclusion and implications of this chapter are presented in the final section.

## **8.2 Relationship between the Quality of Policing and Political Trust**

The service sector literature conceives quality as the customers' perceptions and experiences of the superior performance of their services (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988). Researchers distinguish between Nordic and American perspectives on quality (Sarrico, Ferreira, and Silva 2013). In the latter tradition, the quality is represented by a gap or disconfirmation between service expectations and performance evaluation. According to the Nordic approach, which this and the previous chapter follow, the quality stands for consumers' assessment of process and outcomes. The process stands for the beginning to the end of service delivery, and outcomes represent how the consumers receive what they expected because of the service transaction. Such quality aspects have been studied in public services (G. G. Van Ryzin 2011; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003).

The contemporary political communities are more diverse than ever, especially in terms of race and ethnicity. Along with process and outcomes, citizens' feelings about how public service providers treat them based on their economic and racial status might be considered important dimensions of the concept of quality of policing. In other words, the idea of the quality of public services encompasses distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness.

The rational choice theory expects that citizens' trust in institutions is based not only on "what" they get from a government but "how" they get it. According to procedural justice theory, distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness are important sources of trust in the regulatory institutions of the state (Tyler 1988). Simultaneously, these regulatory institutions, such as the police, are public service providers. The micro-performance hypothesis suggests that the quality of public services is an important source of political trust. On this view, improved performance of public agencies enhances satisfaction with the public services they provide, which can produce trust in government (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). These works deeply explore the dynamics of trust, sources, and controversies surrounding the very concept; and the roles that citizens can take while evaluating the performance of the agencies; and what performance might mean for them (see, for example, Van Ryzin 2015).

The micro-performance account is not very much different from that of Tyler's (1988) theory of procedural justice, which has been extensively studied in the context of such public services as police and courts across different cultures. There are various ways a fair process might be understood and categorized. It can stand for citizens' perceptions of 'neutrality, lack of bias, honesty, efforts to be fair, politeness and respect for citizens' rights' (Tyler 1990: 7). Conversely, distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness might represent a fair process. The fairness of distributions calls for indiscriminate treatment of the people based on, for example, their gender, race, ethnicity, class, and religious affiliation. By invoking their memory, citizens can compare outcomes they receive vis-à-vis their 'referents.' Second, procedural fairness norms demand that in disposing of any case that police are required to do so, the due process is applied in letter and spirit. Besides referring to the referents, institutional rules, regulations, and norms might serve as standards against which citizens can evaluate the performance of the police. Finally, effectiveness means that an organization, such as the police, serves the very purpose—controlling crimes and apprehending criminals—for which it is created.

The procedural justice and micro-performance account share two striking similarities and difference. Besides mobilizing either perceptions or experiences of performance, they operationalize performance in terms of process and outputs. However, in contrast to the procedural theory, which focuses only on trust sources in the criminal justice system, the micro-performance hypothesis builds assumptions about the whole governmental setup. Moreover, in contrast to the cross-cultural empirical support that the former theory has gained, the nascent micro-performance approach, which takes trust as a multidimensional concept, has yet to be tested. This latter aspect has been dubbed as trust in government or political trust.

This chapter narrows down the two theoretical accounts into one by operationalizing performance as suggested by Tylor and his colleagues (distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness) and by substituting trust in the legal authorities with political trust. Expecting that the police performance would have consequences for political trust is tenable because, unlike authoritarian regimes where police are supposedly more loyal towards regime actors, citizens in the democratic society of Europe believe that the police are responsible to them through democratic institutions. The next section presents an overview of the trust literature to build key hypotheses.

The relationships demonstrated in this chapter are based on an indirect body of literature produced in the police service literature, as fewer studies have directly examined the political trust effects of the quality of policing. A rich body of literature that has been produced so far suggests that the police performance, indicated by distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness, is an important source of trust in and legitimacy of police and courts (Akinlabi 2015;

Hougha, Jackson and Bradford 2013; Kampen, Maddens and Vermunt 2001; Tankebe 2009; Tyler 2002, 2011; Tyler and Folger 1980; Van Ryzin 2011).<sup>10</sup>

Distributive justice refers to the citizens' perceptions of the fair distribution of outcomes that they receive from a public agency. Fair distribution might include concerns for equity, equality, and needs (Beugre and Baron 2001) and is usually based on several types of comparisons that consumers of public services might make. They can compare the received outcomes from police across time, with prior expectations, with family, friends, and colleagues; and with others (Tyler 1988). Citizens' perceptions of discriminatory treatment by the police on any of these grounds adversely affects their feeling of police trust and legitimacy.

Beyond the fair distribution of outcomes, citizens' evaluation of the means and methods employed to achieve the same outcomes also shapes their overall opinion about those institutions. Police are seen as trustworthy when they provide enough opportunities for direct and indirect participation in the decision-making processes; exhibit objectivity and neutrality in their actions, and uphold the respect and dignity of those engaged with them (Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler and Fagan 2008). This means that perceptions and experiences of fair treatment and fair administration of decision-making processes are vital in building trust in the police. The unfair and disrespectful treatment of the citizens can damage their trust in the police (Hinds and Murphy 2007; Mike Hough, Jackson and Bradford 2013; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 1988: 2003). More precisely, "if legal authorities, such as the police, are seen by the public to be unfair and disrespectful, this damages trust in them" (Houghz, Jackson and Bradford 2013: 334).

Then, police are required to perform such essential functions as maintaining law and order, detecting and preventing crimes, and protecting the citizens' life, liberty, and property. The successful execution of these tasks produces support; ineffectiveness builds a negative image of the police in public eyes. 'Where residents perceive crime as high, where the official crime rate is high, and where fear of crime is high, confidence in the police is lower as a result' (Skogan 2009: 304). Effective policing ensures that criminal activities go unchecked, and police deserve credit for it (Wilson 2013: 49). On this view, functional effectiveness is vital for generating support for the police. The following section presents empirical evidence supporting the above three aspects and builds new hypotheses.

Several cross-cultural studies lend immense empirical support to the theory of procedural justice. A series of studies in the American context suggested the superiority of procedural fairness over distributive justice in explaining legitimacy and trust in the police (Gau et al. 2012; Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz 2007; Wolfe et al. 2016). In their recent study in the Netherlands, Craen and Skogan

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<sup>10</sup> Literature suggest different nomenclature for the very same concepts. Those who study organizational sciences or public services, for example Van Ryzin (2011), use such terms as outcomes and processes instead of distributive and procedural justice which appear quite frequently in the literature on police and courts. This study does not make any difference between outcome evaluation and distributive justice and procedural evaluation and procedural fairness/justice, respectively.

(2015) found that those respondents who felt their police unresponsiveness and discriminating were less likely to trust it.

There is a contestation about what matters more in explaining trust, with some findings supporting the superiority of procedural fairness over functional effectiveness and vice versa. For example, results of Tyler's study on the police of New York City and Bradford's analysis of police in the UK showed that in contrast to zero effect of police effectiveness, citizens' perceptions of procedural fairness such as fair treatment and fair administration of the decision-making process are positively associated with trust in the police (Bradford 2014; M. Hough et al. 2010; Tyler and Fagan 2008). In another inquiry into the police in the US, Tyler predicted that treatment quality is the strongest predictor of police legitimacy, followed by quality of decision-making, overall quality of procedural justice, police effectiveness, and distributive justice (Tyler 2002). An investigation into the Australian setting revealed that besides procedural fairness and distributive justice, citizens' assessment of the performance is the key predictor of police legitimacy (2007). A study involving a Belgian sample reported that citizens tend to morally align and oblige more with their police when they consider them procedurally fair than functionally effective (Van Damme 2017).

However, another body of research found that effectiveness be a stronger predictor of trust in police than procedural fairness. Independent of each other, Weitzer and Touch's (2005) and Sunshine and Tyler (2003) designed their studies to investigate police trust amongst White, Hispanic, and African Americans in the United States. These studies confirmed that procedural justice is an invariant predictor of trust. However, in contrast to the former study, which reported police's effectiveness in controlling crimes as the strongest predictor, the latter found that performance predicts trust for individual groups or the whole sample. It is argued that the ineffectiveness is responsible for the fall in trust in the past, and the contemporary disaffection is associated with crime control, crime prevention, problem resolution, the responsiveness of the police, treatment by the police as well as aftercare provided by them (Merry et al. 2012). Bradford and his colleagues found that the perception of disorder negatively influenced police trust in Northern Ireland (Bradford et al. 2018). Studies from developing Latin America and South Asia societies also suggested that procedural fairness, including police corruption and functional effectiveness, reduces trust in the state's regulatory and legislative institutions (Nalla and Nam 2020; Solar 2015).

It is essential to survey two European studies before demonstrating the fundamental hypothesis of this chapter. By analyzing the ESS-5 data from twenty-four European societies, Alalehto and Larsson (2016) found that procedural fairness, indicated by satisfaction with the fair treatment on interaction with the police, and functional effectiveness are key predictors of trust in police. Marien and Werner (2019), unlike Alalehto, used such indicators of procedural fairness as respect, impartial decision making, justification of decisions, and bribe-taking. Moreover, Alalehto measured functional effectiveness through preventing crimes, catching criminals, and quickness to arrive at the crime scene. Marien missed this latter measure. The former study found that those

Europeans who are satisfied while interacting with the police are more likely to trust it than any other group and that police effectiveness tends to increase trust in police. The latter study found that functional effectiveness matters more in explaining confidence in regulatory and legislative institutions.

Besides quantitative analyses, qualitative researchers have also attempted to advance our understanding of trust in police. For example, Stoutland analyzed 50 in-depth qualitative interviews in Boston's violence-ridden poor neighborhood and found that besides perceptions of shared priorities and respectfulness, most of the participants associated trust with knowledge and skills police possessed to maintain law and order in the neighborhood (Stoutland 2001)<sup>11</sup> which, according to Hawdon and his colleagues, are dimensions of procedural justice and functional effectiveness (2003). Such observations replicate in Elliott and her colleagues' work on Australian police. They noted:

The major point of dissatisfaction with the police response was not the fact that the police could not find or charge the offender, or retrieve stolen property, but occurred when participants perceived that the police were not going to do much about their cases (Elliott, Thomas, and Ogloff 2012).

These findings provide the basis of the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1</sub>):** Citizens are more likely to trust their political institutions when they perceive their police to treat them indiscriminately.

**Hypothesis 2 (H<sub>2</sub>):** Positive assessment of procedural fairness of the police will positively influence political trust.

**Hypothesis 3 (H<sub>3</sub>):** Positive evaluation of the effectiveness of the police will exert a positive effect on political trust.

### 8.3 Data Operationalization

The data for this chapter comes from the ESS-5, which was carried out in twenty-seven countries of Europe between September 01 to December 31, 2010. Three questions on trust in political institutions from the core module of ESS-5 are employed to construct an average political trust index as a dependent variable (Chapter 4: Section 4.2.1). Its rotating module on "Justice" contains several questions capturing three measures of quality of policing in Europe that are employed predictors variables.

In some countries, missing values of measures distributive justice, procedural fairness, and left-right orientations were more than 10 percent. These variables were first dummified (missing=0;

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<sup>11</sup> Shared priorities='Do the police share local residents' priorities and concerns?'; respectfulness='Are the police respectful, courteous, and fair in their interactions with residents?'; dependability='Are the police dependable?' and competency='Do the police have the knowledge and skills to effectively fulfil their tasks?'

and else=1) and then an independent sample *t*-test was performed. The results showed significant differences in the means of each of the measures of political trust in the categories of missing and complete observations. Therefore, the missing values in distributive justice measures (a categorical variable) were replaced by the medians of their countries and those in the rest of the variables were imputed by the country means. Afterward, two country-level control variables were added to the data to develop a hierarchical dataset ready for multilevel analysis. The final data are 45640 weighted observations from 24 countries. The estimates reported here were calculated by applying design weight.

### 8.3.1 Measurement of Quality of Policing

This chapter rests on three individual-level independent variables: Distributive justice, procedural fairness, functional effectiveness. Of the various operational definitions, Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) is a classic text. It is not only one of the most acclaimed studies on trust in the police, but it contained a list of items relating to police performance. Several researchers have adopted these items and the scales to proceed with their studies in the United States and elsewhere (see, for example, Tankebe 2008; Wolfe et al. 2016). Based on Tylor and his colleagues' work in the USA, the ESS-5 floated a series of questions about police performance in 27 European countries in its "Justice" module. Some of these items have already been used by researchers (Bottoms and Tankebe 2013; J. Jackson et al. 2010; Jonathan Jackson et al. 2011).

#### Distributive Justice

Distributive justice refers to the fairness of the distribution of outcomes to different individuals or groups (Tyler 2005). The Justice module asked respondents that when dealing with the victims of crimes, the police treat:

1. Rich people worse, poor people worse, or are rich and poor treated equally?, and
2. some people worse because of their race or ethnic group or is everyone treated equally?

These items are in consistent with the previous research (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Wolfe et al. 2016). In the first measure, only 1% of the respondents said that 'the rich people are treated worse.' Rather than treating them as separate categories in the analysis, the value corresponding to this category were first coded as missing values and then imputed with country medians. This is because the inspections of missing values were significantly associated with political trust, as noted in the proceeding section. However, on the overall level and within each of the sampled countries, these two items could not pass the test of reliability analysis ( $\alpha < .60$ ) except in Bulgaria (.60), Spain (.60), Croatia (.66), Hungary (.61), Ireland (.60) and Portugal (.67). Therefore, they are treated as separate variables labeled as *economic prejudice* and *ethnic/racial prejudice*.

## **Procedural Fairness**

Procedural justice refers to the extent to which police officers display respect and fairness while dealing with the public. Most of the researchers captured procedural fairness of the police through an index excluding corruption (Gau 2015; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 2005; Wolfe et al. 2016). However, following Marien and Werner (2019), this chapter used four items to construct the procedural fairness index.

1. How often the police treat people with respect?,
2. how often do police make fair, and impartial decisions?,
3. how often do police explain their decisions and actions when asked?, and
4. how often do police in country take bribes

These items are measured on a four-point scale ranging from ‘not at all often’ to very often. Perceptions of bribery were captured on a 0 ‘never’ to 10 ‘always’. This item was reversed coded and divided by 2.5 to match it with the remaining items. Cronbach’s alpha (Slovenia=.53; EU-24=.68; Cyprus=.71. See Appendix 8.2) values showed that these items reliably measured their underlying construct. Afterward, an additive index was generated, ranging from 3 to 17, to represent the procedural fairness of the police.

## **Functional Effectiveness**

Functional effectiveness refers to the performance of the police in fighting crimes and controlling disorder (Sunshine and Tyler 2003a). Consistent with previous (Mike Hough, Jackson, and Bradford 2013b; Tyler 2005), the functional effectiveness of police was measured by employing ESS-5 questions:

1. How successful police are at preventing crimes in country?,
2. how successful police are at catching house burglars in country?, and
3. how quickly would police arrive at a violent crime scene near to where you live?

These questions are measured on a scale of 0–10. For the first two questions, the scale ranged from ‘extremely unsuccessful’ to ‘extremely successful,’ and it went from ‘extremely slow’ to ‘extremely quickly’ for the third one. These items reliably measured their underlying construct at the EU-level and within individual countries (Alpha: Denmark=.65; EU-24=.72; Greece=.89. See Appendix 8.2), they were collapsed to represent an average index of functional effectiveness ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values reflecting more police effectiveness.

## **8.4 Results**

This section attempts to explain the extent to which political trust is affected by perceptions of the quality of policing in Europe. Political trust is an average index of trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians. The quality of policing is tapped into through distributive justice (economic and ethnic/racial prejudices), procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. The




analyses begin with the country-level description of political trust and policing quality, followed by bivariate, multivariate and multilevel analyses.

### 8.4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Country-Level Analyses

Figure 8.1 plots the distribution of political trust and three measures of quality of policing in twenty-four countries under investigation. Graph 1 shows that at the EU-level, political trust is distributed with a mean of 3.46. Eleven countries each stand above and fall below this mean line, and the levels of political trust in Hungary and France closely resemble to that of the EU-level. The two top-performing countries are Sweden and Denmark. Conversely, Croatians and Greeks express the lowest level of trust in their representative institutions.


Distributive justice is captured through feelings of economic and racial/ethnic prejudices. Overall, 51.7% of the respondents declared that poor people are treated worse, and 48.3% reported that rich and poor people are treated equally. Graph 2 shows that an overwhelming majority of Greeks (78.8%) and Lithuanians (73.6%) believe that poor people are treated worse by the police in their countries. Conversely, an overwhelming majority of Dutch (78.4%) and Denish (75.3%) respondents believe that their police treat rich and poor people equally.



Concerning racial prejudice, 39.0% viewed that people from a different race are treated worse, 10.0% of them reported that the people belonging to the same race are treated worse, and 51.1% of them perceived that people from all races are treated equally. Graph 3 shows that in contrast to the majority of Greeks (67.5%) and Swedish (66.5%) respondents who perceive that people from different races are treated worse. An overwhelming majority of Estonian (81.8%) and Lithuanians (75.7%) perceive that people from all races are treated equally by their police.

Graph 4 plots the distribution of the mean index of procedural fairness consisting of respectful treatment, impartial decision, responsiveness, and police corruption perception. On this index ranging from 3 to 17, procedural fairness is distributed with a mean of 10.75 (a higher score represents better assessment). Twelve countries stand above, and eleven countries fall below this mean line, with Estonia representing the EU-level mean of procedural fairness. Danish and Finnish respondents gave their police the highest score on this index. Conversely, Bulgarian and Greek police gained the lowest scores. Only the French and Portuguese police amongst the West European nations gained the lowest ranking and aligned with those of East European countries.


**Figure 8.1 Distribution of Political Trust and Quality of Policing**



— Represents mean score across 24 countries in Graph 1 and 4. Block dots and bars stand for the means and confidence intervals within each country.

Finally, Graph 5 presents the distribution of the average index of functional effectiveness of the police represented by preventing crimes, catching criminals, and quickly arriving at crime scenes. This index ranges from 0 to 10, with the higher scores reflecting better functional effectiveness.

The EU-level mean of functional effectiveness is 5.80, with Irish police closely resembling this overall mean. Slovakian and Slovenian respondents consider their police as the most effective ones. Conversely, Greeks and Portuguese perceive that they have the least effective police.



#### 8.4.2 Bivariate Analyses: Macro-Patterns of Quality of Policing and Political Trust

The previous section demonstrated that political trust and three measures of the quality of policing vary between and within the twenty-four countries. This section shows how the latter relates to the former at the country-levels and within the countries.

Plot 1 in Figure 8.2 relates economic prejudice and political trust within each of the countries. It can be observed that the means of political trust are different for the two categories of economic prejudice in all countries. The mean political trust scores in these categories are comparatively higher in Scandinavian countries than their East European counterparts, with the West European nations sandwiched between these two extremes. Moreover, *t*-test statistics shown in Pan A of Table 8.1 reveal that the mean political trust scores are significantly different in all countries. Pan B plot the ANOVA estimates of political trust by racial prejudice. It shows that the level of political

trust amongst those who view that the police treat all races equally (3.62) is higher compared to those who opine that people from different (3.32) or same races ( 3.14) are treated worse and that these differences are statistically significant [ $F(2,45062)=132.37, p<.001$ ).


| <b>Table 8.1 Political Trust by Economic Prejudice and Racial Prejudice</b> |                        |      |          |            |                 |
|---|------------------------|------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| <b>Pan A: Economic Prejudice</b>  | <i>T</i> -Test Results |      |          |            |                 |
|   | Mean                   | SD   | <i>t</i> | Difference | <i>p</i> -value |
| Poor people treated worse   | 2.85                   | 2.16 | −60.31   | −1.25      | .000            |
| Rich and poor treated equally   | 4.10                   | 2.23 | −60.25   | −1.25      | .000            |
| <b>Pan B: Racial Prejudice</b>  | ANOVA Results          |      |          |            |                 |
|   | Mean                   | SD   | <i>F</i> | DF         | <i>p</i> -value |
| People from different race treated worse                                    | 3.32                   | 2.25 | 132.37   | 2, 45062   | .000            |
| People from same race treated worse   | 3.14                   | 2.20 |          |            |                 |
| People from all race treated equally  | 3.62                   | 2.30 |          |            |                 |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight.                                |                        |      |          |            |                 |

Plot 2 captures the association between racial prejudice and political trust within each of the countries. It shows that political trust is the highest amongst all the categories of racial prejudice in the Scandinavian countries; it is relatively lower in West Europe and the lowest in East European countries. It also shows that in all countries, political trust is higher amongst those respondents perceiving that police treat people from all races equally than those who either opine that people from the same races or different races are treated worse. The ANOVA results presented in Pan B of Table 8.1 show that the differences in the three categories of racial prejudice are statistically significant in all countries except Slovakia.

The next two plots present the macro-level patterns of association between procedural fairness, functional effectiveness and political trust. These regression plots are based on the country-level means of these three variables. Plot 3 shows a strong correlation between procedural fairness and political trust ( $R^2=.65, r=.81, p<.001$ ). Very few countries lay close to the main regression line. Most of them are loosely scattered either above or below this line. Sweden and Croatia are the farthest away above and below this line, respectively. Greece exhibited the lowest level of political trust and adverse procedural fairness. Conversely, the Scandinavian countries showed the highest level of political trust, and their corresponding mean scores on procedural fairness fall after Ireland.

Plot 4 reports a very weak, significant, yet complex association between police effectiveness and political trust ( $R^2=.19; r=.44; p<.001$ ). It can be observed that some countries exhibit high political trust and usual effectiveness (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands), others show high political trust and high effectiveness (Switzerland and Finland), and still in other countries, political trust increase with the increase in police effectiveness. This relationship performs worst in Greece and Portugal and best in Finland and Switzerland.

**Figure 8.2 Macro-Level Patterns of Quality of Policing and Political Trust**



Combined, these results show that the quality of policing is associated with political trust. The two distributive justice measures are closely related to political trust. Moreover, compared to a very

strong and positive relationship between procedural fairness and political trust, the association of functional effectiveness is very weakly correlated. These observations provide initial clues about the significance of  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$ , and  $H_3$ . The next part of this chapter explores how this association performs at the micro-level within each country.

#### **8.4.3 Bivariate Analyses: Micro-Patterns of Quality of Policing and Political Trust**

Table 8.2 presents the political trust effects of three measures of quality of policing—distributive justice, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness—in twenty-four nations. These effects are statistically significant and in expected directions at the EU-level and within individual countries with few exceptions.

Economic prejudice is positively associated with political trust in all countries. This relationship is the most salient in Estonia and Slovenia and the least in Slovakia. Likewise, the relationship between racial discrimination is also significant in all countries except Belgium and Slovakia. The most and the least salient effects of this relationship can be observed in Portugal and Czech Republic. The index of procedural fairness is positively associated with political trust in all countries. The relationship performs the utmost and the least in Cyprus and Portugal, respectively. Moreover, most of the West European countries are better performers than their Eastern counterparts. Finally, functional effectiveness influences political trust positively in all countries except Slovenia and Slovakia, where it is insignificant. France and Netherlands are those two countries where this relationship performs the utmost and the least, respectively.

To sum it up, the results reported in Table 8.2 suggest that procedural fairness is a better predictor of political trust in some countries (for example, the Netherlands and Estonia) and functional effectiveness appears a better predictor in a host of other countries (for instance, Finland and France). These findings provide a clear support to our three hypotheses that distributive justice ( $H_1$ ), procedural fairness ( $H_2$ ), and functional effectiveness ( $H_3$ ) are significant predictors of political trust in Europe. The next section plots these effects through multivariate analyses with country fixed-effects.

**Table 8.2 Bivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Policing**

|             | Economic Prejudice |              |                | Racial Discrimination |              |                | Procedural Fairness |              |                | Functional Effectiveness |              |                |
|-------------|--------------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------------|--------------|----------------|
|             | Constant           | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant              | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant            | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> | Constant                 | Beta (S.E)   | R <sup>2</sup> |
| EU-24       | 1.61 (.03)***      | .27 (.02)*** | .07            | 3.14 (.03)***         | .06 (.01)*** | .00            | 3.46 (.01)***       | .20 (.01)*** | .04            | 3.46 (.01)***            | .15 (.01)*** | .02            |
| Belgium     | 3.32 (.17)***      | .11 (.10)*** | .01            | 4.04 (.11)***         | .00 (.05)    | .00            | 4.06 (.05)***       | .24 (.05)*** | .06            | 4.06 (.05)***            | .26 (.05)*** | .07            |
| Bulgaria    | 0.87 (.13)***      | .21 (.09)*** | .05            | 1.39 (.11)***         | .15 (.05)*** | .02            | 2.13 (.04)***       | .28 (.04)*** | .08            | 2.14 (.04)***            | .13 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Switzerland | 4.19 (.17)***      | .16 (.10)*** | .03            | 4.74 (.11)***         | .12 (.05)*** | .01            | 5.21 (.05)***       | .23 (.05)*** | .05            | 5.20 (.05)***            | .13 (.05)*** | .02            |
| Cyprus      | 3.02 (.20)***      | .14 (.14)*** | .02            | 3.53 (.14)***         | .09 (.07)**  | .01            | 3.90 (.06)***       | .34 (.06)*** | .12            | 3.89 (.07)***            | .22 (.07)*** | .05            |
| Czechia     | 1.90 (.13)***      | .16 (.09)*** | .03            | 2.60 (.12)***         | .05 (.05)*   | .00            | 2.87 (.04)***       | .21 (.04)*** | .04            | 2.86 (.04)***            | .14 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Germany     | 2.41 (.13)***      | .18 (.08)*** | .03            | 3.30 (.10)***         | .08 (.04)*** | .01            | 3.69 (.04)***       | .18 (.04)*** | .03            | 3.69 (.04)***            | .14 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Denmark     | 4.29 (.20)***      | .14 (.11)*** | .02            | 5.09 (.11)***         | .06 (.05)*   | .00            | 5.34 (.05)***       | .24 (.05)*** | .06            | 5.34 (.05)***            | .17 (.05)*** | .03            |
| Estonia     | 1.99 (.19)***      | .22 (.11)*** | .05            | 2.52 (.19)***         | .16 (.07)*** | .03            | 3.78 (.05)***       | .24 (.05)*** | .06            | 3.78 (.05)***            | .09 (.05)*** | .01            |
| Spain       | 2.37 (.14)***      | .14 (.09)*** | .02            | 2.81 (.11)***         | .09 (.05)*** | .01            | 3.23 (.05)***       | .22 (.05)*** | .05            | 3.23 (.05)***            | .21 (.05)*** | .04            |
| Finland     | 3.24 (.18)***      | .20 (.10)*** | .04            | 4.39 (.12)***         | .08 (.05)*** | .01            | 4.79 (.05)***       | .18 (.05)*** | .03            | 4.78 (.05)***            | .27 (.05)*** | .07            |
| France      | 2.73 (.14)***      | .13 (.09)*** | .02            | 3.05 (.10)***         | .12 (.05)*** | .01            | 3.48 (.04)***       | .30 (.04)*** | .09            | 3.48 (.04)***            | .38 (.04)*** | .14            |
| UK          | 2.57 (.15)***      | .16 (.09)*** | .02            | 3.38 (.12)***         | .06 (.05)**  | .00            | 3.69 (.04)***       | .28 (.04)*** | .08            | 3.70 (.04)***            | .24 (.04)*** | .06            |
| Greece      | 0.70 (.11)***      | .17 (.08)*** | .03            | 1.22 (.07)***         | .11 (.04)*** | .01            | 1.59 (.03)***       | .24 (.03)*** | .06            | 1.59 (.03)***            | .25 (.03)*** | .06            |
| Croatia     | 1.04 (.14)***      | .16 (.10)*** | .02            | 1.28 (.14)***         | .12 (.05)*** | .01            | 1.88 (.04)***       | .28 (.04)*** | .08            | 1.88 (.05)***            | .13 (.05)*** | .02            |
| Hungary     | 2.75 (.17)***      | .12 (.12)*** | .01            | 3.02 (.15)***         | .09 (.07)**  | .01            | 3.50 (.06)***       | .16 (.06)*** | .03            | 3.50 (.06)***            | .15 (.06)*** | .02            |
| Ireland     | 2.21 (.13)***      | .17 (.08)*** | .03            | 2.95 (.12)***         | .06 (.05)*** | .00            | 3.30 (.04)***       | .26 (.04)*** | .07            | 3.31 (.04)***            | .14 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Lithuania   | 1.68 (.14)***      | .10 (.11)*** | .01            | 1.69 (.16)***         | .09 (.06)*** | .01            | 2.25 (.05)***       | .31 (.05)*** | .10            | 2.26 (.05)***            | .22 (.05)*** | .05            |
| Netherlands | 4.18 (.17)***      | .15 (.09)*** | .02            | 4.94 (.10)***         | .09 (.04)*** | .01            | 5.29 (.04)***       | .26 (.04)*** | .07            | 5.29 (.04)***            | .10 (.04)*** | .01            |
| Norway      | 4.21 (.16)***      | .18 (.09)*** | .03            | 5.03 (.11)***         | .07 (.05)**  | .01            | 5.30 (.04)***       | .32 (.04)*** | .10            | 5.30 (.04)***            | .27 (.04)*** | .07            |
| Poland      | 1.99 (.14)***      | .16 (.10)*** | .03            | 2.41 (.12)***         | .10 (.06)*** | .01            | 2.90 (.05)***       | .16 (.05)*** | .03            | 2.90 (.05)***            | .12 (.05)*** | .01            |
| Portugal    | 1.30 (.12)***      | .18 (.09)*** | .03            | 1.61 (.09)***         | .19 (.04)*** | .04            | 2.28 (.04)***       | .13 (.04)*** | .02            | 2.28 (.04)***            | .13 (.04)*** | .02            |
| Sweden      | 4.78 (.15)***      | .13 (.09)*** | .02            | 5.27 (.09)***         | .06 (.05)*   | .00            | 5.47 (.04)***       | .27 (.04)*** | .07            | 5.47 (.04)***            | .26 (.04)*** | .07            |
| Slovenia    | 1.29 (.15)***      | .22 (.11)*** | .05            | 1.94 (.14)***         | .11 (.06)*** | .01            | 2.49 (.05)***       | .17 (.05)*** | .03            | 2.48 (.05)***            | .04 (.05)    | .00            |
| Slovakia    | 2.50 (.13)***      | .09 (.10)*** | .01            | 3.15 (.12)***         | .03 (.05)    | .00            | 3.00 (.04)***       | .19 (.04)*** | .03            | 3.00 (.04)***            | .02 (.05)    | .00            |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates along with standard errors in parentheses. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

### 8.4.3 Multivariate Analyses

Table 8.3 plots the correlation between three measures of the quality of policing and political trust in Europe. As expected, economic and racial prejudices, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness are positively related to political trust. The correlation matrices of individual-level, country-level control variables and political trust are reported in Appendix 4.6 of Chapter 4.

|                             | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5 |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---|
| 1. Political Trust          | 1      |        |        |        |   |
| 2. Economic prejudice       | .27**  | 1      |        |        |   |
| 3. Racial prejudice         | .06*** | .36*** | 1      |        |   |
| 4. Procedural fairness      | .20*** | .27*** | .24*** | 1      |   |
| 5. Functional effectiveness | .15*** | .13*** | .13*** | .27*** | 1 |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

Table 8.4 plots the political trust effects of quality of policing measures excluding and including country fixed-effects. Models 1A and 1B contain the estimates of predictors-only models. Models 2A and 2B present the estimates of fuller models. A comparison of the first two models suggests that economic prejudice is one the strongest predictor of political trust, having a coefficient of .95, which drops to .38 when the country-fixed effect is considered. However, the inclusion of this latter parameter turns the initially significantly negative effect (−.12) between racial prejudice and political trust into an insignificant one. Likewise, when the country fixed-effect parameter is considered, the coefficient of procedural fairness increases from .29 to .34 and that of functional effectiveness from .26 to .28.

Although the significance levels and direction of the associations in the fuller models are the same as those of predictors-only models, the size of the coefficient change substantially. In fuller OLS excluding country-fixed effect parameter (Model 2A), economic prejudice and racial prejudice affect political trust with coefficients of .56 and −.08, respectively. In the same model, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness have coefficients of .06 and .13, respectively. However, the inclusion of the country fixed-effect parameter in the final model (Model 2B) reduces the coefficient of economic prejudice by .43 points, racial prejudice becomes insignificant, and the effect of procedural fairness increases by .05 points, and that of functional effectiveness decreases by .01 point. Finally, the value of  $R^2$  in the simple model is .35, which turns to .58 when the fixed-effect parameter is considered.

Combined, these results provide clear evidence that positive perceptions of distributive justice ( $H_1$ ), procedural fairness ( $H_2$ ), and functional effectiveness ( $H_3$ ) affect political trust positively. The changes in the values of coefficient sizes and  $R^2$  suggest the country-fixed effect might play an important role in explaining political trust. This calls for examining the relationship between the quality of policing and political trust by paying attention to the country-level variables for which multilevel analysis is the appropriate technique.



| <b>Table 8.4 Multivariate Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Policing</b>  |               |              |               |               |
|--|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
|  | Model 1A      | Model 1B     | Model 2A      | Model 2B      |
| Constant   | 1.44 (.06)*** | 2.21(.07)*** | 4.04 (.09)*** | 3.63 (.08)*** |
| <b>Quality of Policing</b>   |               |              |               |               |
| Economic prejudice   | .95 (.02)***  | .38 (.02)*** | .56 (.02)***  | .13 (.02)***  |
| Racial prejudice   | -.12 (.01)*** | -.01 (.01)   | -.08 (.01)*** | .00 (.01)     |
| Procedural fairness  | .29 (.01)***  | .34 (.01)*** | .06 (.01)***  | .11 (.01)***  |
| Functional effectiveness   | .26 (.01)***  | .28 (.01)*** | .13 (.01)***  | .12 (.01)***  |
| <b>Individual-level controls</b>   |               |              |               |               |
| Gender   |               |              | .10 (.02)***  | .09 (.02)***  |
| Age  |               |              | -.11 (.01)*** | -.10 (.01)*** |
| Education in years   |               |              | -.12 (.01)*** | -.01 (.01)    |
| Religiousness  |               |              | .09 (.01)***  | .09 (.01)***  |
| Domicile   |               |              | .06 (.01)***  | -.01 (.01)    |
| Citizenship  |               |              | .49 (.05)***  | .11 (.04)**   |
| Welfare performance  |               |              | .19 (.01)***  | .21 (.01)***  |
| Felt income  |               |              | -.46 (.01)*** | -.02 (.01)*   |
| Sat: economy   |               |              | .12 (.01)***  | .18 (.01)***  |
| Political interest   |               |              | -.59 (.01)*** | -.40 (.01)*** |
| Sat: government  |               |              | .75 (.01)***  | .79 (.01)***  |
| Left-right orientation   |               |              | -.05 (.01)*** | -.02 (.01)**  |
| Social capital   |               |              | .21 (.01)***  | .26 (.01)***  |
| N: Individuals   | 38135         | 38135        | 36167         | 36167         |
| N: Countries   | 24            | 24           | 24            | 24            |
| Country-fixed effects  | No            | Yes          | No            | Yes           |
| R <sup>2</sup>   | .10           | .32          | .35           | .58           |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. Entries are estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; and *** $p \leq .001$ . |               |              |               |               |

#### 8.4.4 Multilevel Analyses

Table 8.4 plots political trust effects of the quality of policing measures without and with control variables. Model 1 estimates the effects of predictors-only variables, and Model 2 contains the estimates of a full model. A brief description of model fitness indices is followed by presenting the main results in the next sections.

##### Assessment of Fitness of Models

Graph 1 in Figure 8.1 observed substantial between and within countries variations in political trust in the twenty-four countries under study. The ANOVA results, presented in Table 4.6 in Chapter 4, show that political trust is distributed with an overall mean of 3.55 and an estimated standard deviation of .24. The intercepts (grand means of political trust) vary significantly across the twenty-four countries (Wald=3.46,  $p < .001$ ). An inspection of the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) suggests that the country-level accounts for 24% of the total variation in political trust, thus providing a firm ground for analyzing through multilevel analyses.

Further, a comparison of -2 Log-Likelihood ratio statistics suggests that the nested models are statistically significant from their non-nested counterparts (note: one additional degree of

freedom is associated with a chi-square distribution of 6.64 at a significance level .01). The intercept-only model (Chapter 4: Table 4.6) is statistically different from the predictor-only model (Model 1), which is again significantly different from the full model (Model 2). Moreover, ICC comparisons show that country-level accounts for 24% variance in political trust in the intercept-only model, 25% in the predictors-only (Model 1) and 8% in the full model

**Table 8.5 Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Policing**

| <b>Fixed Effects</b>             | <b>Model 1</b> | <b>Model 2</b> |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Intercept                        | 3.75 (.22)***  | 2.82 (.16)***  |
| <b>Quality of Policing</b>       |                |                |
| Poor people treated worse        | -.40 (.02)***  | -.13 (.02)***  |
| Different race treated worse     | .04 (.02)      | .01 (.02)      |
| Same race treated worse          | -.11 (.02)**   | .02 (.03)      |
| Procedural fairness              | .40 (.01)***   | .11 (.01)***   |
| Functional effectiveness         | .22 (.01)***   | .10 (.01)***   |
| <b>Individual-Level Controls</b> |                |                |
| Gender: male                     |                | -.09 (.02)***  |
| Age                              |                | -.09 (.01)***  |
| Education in years               |                | -.02 (.01)*    |
| Religiousness                    |                | .09 (.01)***   |
| Domicile: suburbs                |                | .13 (.04)***   |
| Domicile: town/small city        |                | .11 (.04)**    |
| Domicile: country village        |                | .13 (.03)***   |
| Domicile: countryside            |                | .09 (.03)**    |
| Citizen: yes                     |                | -.11 (.04)**   |
| Welfare performance              |                | .21 (.01)***   |
| Felt income: living comfortably  |                | .04 (.03)      |
| Felt income: copying             |                | .01 (.03)      |
| Felt income: difficult           |                | -.02 (.03)     |
| Satisfaction: economy            |                | .19 (.01)***   |
| Interest: very interested        |                | 1.16 (.03)***  |
| Interest: quite interested       |                | .89 (.02)***   |
| Interest: hardly interested      |                | .53 (.02)***   |
| Sat: government                  |                | .79 (.01)***   |
| Left-right orientation           |                | -.02 (.01)**   |
| Social capital                   |                | .26 (.01)***   |
| <b>Country-Level Controls</b>    |                |                |
| Communist past: yes              |                | .44 (.28)      |
| Government effectiveness         |                | 1.10 (.13)***  |
| <b>Variance Components</b>       |                |                |
| Individual-level variance        | 3.61 (.02)***  | 2.24 (.02)***  |
| Country-level variance           | 1.21 (.35)**   | .21 (.06)**    |
| ICC                              | .25            | .08            |
| -2 Log Likelihood                | 11058.36       | 3338.08        |
| N: Individuals                   | 44243          | 37647          |
| N: Countries                     | 24             | 24             |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

(Model 2). Together, these statistics suggest multilevel modeling's appropriateness as the next analytical strategy.

### **Effects of Quality of Policing on Political Trust**

H<sub>1</sub> demonstrates that distributive injustice perceptions would be negatively associated with political trust. Results reported in Table 8.5 suggest respondents' perceptions of economic prejudice are related to political trust. In the predictors-only model, perceptions that poor people are treated worse by police adversely affect political trust with a coefficient of  $-.40$ . In racial prejudice, the perceptions that people from the same race are treated worse by the police affect political trust with a coefficient of  $-.11$ . Conversely, the perception that different races are treated worse is not related to political trust.

H<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>3</sub> demonstrated that procedural fairness and functional effectiveness affect political trust positively. Unless control variables are considered, procedural fairness predicts political trust with a coefficient of  $.40$  and functional effectiveness influences with a coefficient of  $.22$ . Thus, the size of the effects of procedural fairness is almost double compared to that of functional effectiveness.

The size and significance level of these coefficients undergoes substantial changes once the effects of a host of control variables are considered in the full model. Although the perceptions that the police treat poor people worse are adversely associated with political trust, the size of the coefficient is  $-.13$ , which is around three times smaller than in the predictors-only model. The significant effect of racial prejudice totally dissolved in the fuller model. Moreover, the effect of procedural fairness  $.11$ , which is around three and a half times smaller than in the preceding model. Finally, the effect of functional effectiveness reduced from  $.22$  to  $.10$  in the final model.

In summary, these findings provide partial support to the hypothesis that distributive injustice affects political trust negatively (H<sub>1</sub>). However, a clear support exists in favour of the assumptions that procedural fairness (H<sub>2</sub>) and functional effectiveness (H<sub>2</sub>) influence political trust positively. These results also show that procedural fairness and functional effectiveness almost equally matter in shaping Europeans' feelings of political trust.

### **Effects of Other Variables on Political Trust**

Model 2 contains the estimates of five sets of control variables. Of the six demographic variables, being male is negatively associated with political trust. Political trust tends to decrease with an increase in the age and the education the respondents have acquired and increases with an increase in religiosity. Moreover, the domicile of the respondents is significantly associated with political trust: those living in suburbs and villages are likely to express a higher level of political trust than those living in smaller cities and countryside. Finally, being a citizen of a country is negatively associated with political trust.

Next, improvements in the perceptions of welfare performance affect political trust positively. Of the two economic variables, the feelings of household income could not predict political trust. Nevertheless, political trust tends to increase as citizens' perceptions of a country's economic performance improve. Of the three political variables, political interest appears to be

a very strong predictor of political trust: those who are very much interested in politics express a higher level of trust than those who are either quite or hardly interested in politics. While political trust tends to improve as respondents' satisfaction with their national government increases, it tends to decline as citizens tend to incline towards the *right* of the left-right scale. Finally, political trust tends to increase as social capital increases in society.

The analyses included two country-level variables: communist past and government effectiveness. While having a communist past could not predict political trust, government effectiveness acts as one of the most significant predictors.

## 8.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to map the political trust effects of the quality of policing in Europe by analyzing the data from the ESS-5. It synthesized the strands of the service sector, criminal justice, and political science literature to understand the meanings of the quality of policing in terms of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Afterward, building on micro-performance theory, it hypothesized that distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness would positively affect political trust ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ).

The analyses reported above showed that the three measures of quality of policing are significantly associated with political trust even after controlling for a host of individual-level and country-level control variables. The macro-level analyses revealed a negative relationship between distributive justice indicated by economic and racial prejudice and political trust. Procedural fairness and functional effectiveness were positively associated with political trust. These findings consistently appeared in a series of micro-level analyses. As expected ( $H_1$ – $H_3$ ), all else being equal, individual-level evaluations of the quality of policing were statistically associated with political trust in Europe.

Before discussing the academic and policy implications of this chapter, it is essential to discuss some discrepancies appearing in the results of economic and racial prejudices as measures of distributive justice. Economic prejudice predicts political trust negatively: those respondents who felt that the poor are treated worse are less likely to express political trust. This finding is in line with some of the existing studies suggesting a negative association between distributive injustice and trust in the regulatory institution (Gau et al. 2012; Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz 2007; Wolfe et al. 2016). Conversely, in racial prejudice, the perceptions that different races are treated worse were significant in the predictors-only model (Model 1). However, when control variables were considered, these effects disappeared totally. This can be due to several reasons. For instance, the meaning of the same race in the question is not quite clear. We are not sure whether race means being of different colour, nationality, and ethnicity and so on. Moreover, the data is not representative of racial/ethnic minorities; rather, it captures the perceptions and evaluations of the general masses of how police treat them. If the data had been collected from a sample of racial minorities, the result probably would have been different.

Except this, the rest of the findings are in line with the existing body of the criminal justice system and political science literature, demonstrating the positive effects of procedural fairness, functional effectiveness, and trust in the regulatory and legislative institutions of the state (Craen and Skogan 2015; Marien and Werner 2019; Solar 2015). While these studies contest

the empirical utility of procedural fairness over functional effectiveness and vice versa, the results produced in this chapter showed that citizens almost care equally for *what* they get from the police, *how* they get it, *whether* some groups get better than others do. While they might punish a bad-performing police force by lowering trust and protesting against it, they hold political institutions responsible for the poor quality of policing. Consequently, they might pack a sitting government home in the next election in the short term. A perpetual poor quality of policing might weaken the diffuse support for a political system in the longer run.

The size of procedural fairness and functional effectiveness coefficients are much smaller than those reported by Marien and Werner (2019), who have used the same dataset. Three reasons might account for these discrepancies. First, this chapter employed three rather than two items to measure functional effectiveness. Second, they employed multilevel structural equation modeling, and this chapter used simple multilevel regression analyses to estimate parameters. Third, compared to those authors who employed only three individual and two country-level variables, this chapter employed fourteen individual and four country-level control variables.

Together, these findings support the micro-performance hypothesis, which holds that political trust is a function of citizens' perceptions of the good or bad quality of the public services (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). The policy implication is that the European governments can increase political trust, which is the most needed in these crisis times, by improving the quality of their police force. However, these tasks are not easier ones. Besides financial resources, performance improvements require organizational changes in police and behavioral changes in their officials, which are challenging tasks.

Despite exposing the link between police performance and political trust, this study suffers from some shortcomings. Firstly, the racial/ethnic prejudice could not predict political trust because this question was asked from the general populace rather than ethnic minorities. Some of the established studies in organizational sciences and police service literature (McFarlin and Sweeney 2012; McLean 2020; Poon 2012; Sunshine and Tyler 2003a) could provide useful insight for designing and further refining the batteries of questions in the context of racial/ethnic prejudice. Second, the absence of longitudinal data did not allow us to make any causal inferences. Future studies should include time-series data.

## Chapter 9 General Conclusion

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### 9.1 Introduction

This thesis examined the procedural and functional sources of political trust in Europe. On the one hand, it aimed to investigate the extent to which the quality of democracy conceived as democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation/gap shape political trust. On the other hand, it attempted to determine how judgments of the quality of public services understood as perceptions of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness influence political trust. The theoretical demonstrations in the literature review and subsequent empirical chapters are based on disconfirmation and micro performance theories. The results reported in the preceding four chapters are produced by analyzing individual-level data from ESS-6, ESS-2, and ESS-5 and country-level variables from the World Governance Indicators through multilevel analyses. These findings support the existing literature and show that compared to the quality of public services, the quality of democracy is a better predictor of political trust in Europe. This chapter presents an overview of the main theoretical expectations, the discussion of findings in the light of established literature, the implications for these findings for policies and practices, and the limitations and future research agenda.

Two additional points need clarifications before proceeding to the next sections. The first two chapters of this thesis conceived the quality of democracy in terms of democratic expectations, democratic performance, and democratic disconfirmation. Then, these chapters discern it into electoral democracy and liberal democracy on these three-dimensional structures, which are the building blocks of theoretical debate and empirical evidence produced in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. This concluding chapter will assemble these separate results into the original three dimensions to build a more coherent picture of the procedural sources of political trust. Second, as the measures of the quality of democracy and those of public services—except economic prejudice in the case of quality of policing, which is a categorical variable—are standardized *z-scores*; therefore, the results discussed in this chapter are comparable.

### 9.2 Synopsis of Theoretical Background

Loss of trust in mainstream political institutions is one of the most recurring themes in global research on the crisis of democratic legitimacy literature since the 1960s. The underlying argument of this body of literature is that perpetual loss of political trust might weaken the diffuse support for democracy as the only game in town. However, it was not until the publication of several mass public opinion surveys in the subsequent years that attracted researchers to validate theories on the origins of political trust empirically.

Building on the political science and service sector literature, it conceived the quality of democracy in terms of citizens' expectations from democracy in general, their evaluations of democratic performance, and disconfirmation or gap between expectations and performance. Afterward, building on the disconfirmation theory literature, it argued that citizens' feelings of

political trust would not only depend on these three measures of quality of democracy but the close interactions between these measures would shape such feelings. Finally, it demonstrated that citizens would distinguish the quality of electoral democracy from that of liberal democracy.

Likewise, by employing strands of public services, criminal justice, and educational services, it argued that the citizens' understanding of the quality of public services might encompass their judgments of distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. Then, building on the micro-performance theory, it hypothesized that political trust in Europe would be an outcome of citizens' evaluations of these three measures of the quality of public services.

Additionally, it employed five sets of individual-level variables: demographic variables (gender, age, religiousness, education, domicile, and citizenship); welfare performance (average of the state of health and educational services); economic satisfaction (feelings of household income and satisfaction with economy); political attitudes (interest in politics, satisfaction with government and left-right orientation); and social capital (average of interpersonal carefulness, fairness, and helpfulness). Finally, it considered three country-level variables. Communist past was a common one in all chapters. Voice and accountability and government effectiveness were considered as important country-level control variables for the first and the last two chapters, respectively.

### **9.3 Overview of Data and Methods**

These individual-level observations for the first two empirical chapters were extracted from ESS-6, and ESS-2 and ESS-5 provided data for the latter two chapters. Three country-level variables were added to these individual-level observations. First, having a communist past—a self-constructed variable—was common to all chapters. Second, voice and accountability and government effectiveness from the World Governance Indicators were added to ESS-6 and ESS-2/ESS-4 to produce hierarchical data sets ready for multilevel analyses. The analyses proceeded from descriptive analyses, bivariate macro-level patterns, bivariate micro-level patterns, OLS models without and with country-fixed effect parameters, and multilevel analyses.

### **9.4 Findings: Lessons, Implications, Limitations and Future Directions**

This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection is about the descriptive commentary of political trust. The remaining two subsections focus on the explaining the association between the quality of democracy and political trust on one hand, and the quality of public services and political trust on the other hand. Each of these subsection plots the implications of the main lessons learned from the empirical findings, outlines the limitations faced and presents the future research directions.

#### **9.4.1 Variations in Political Trust**

The macro-level plots of distribution demonstrated in the four empirical chapters (Graph 1 in each chapter) show that political trust varies within and between the countries. These variations demonstrate that the people within each country do not make judgments of granting political

trust in a similar way and suggest that citizens do not need precise knowledge about the working of political institutions. Rather, they can make judgments under the conditions of a low level of political knowledge. These judgments are systematically related to individual-level and country-level variables about how their countries are governed (Arancibia 2008). The assumptions that citizens require complete knowledge about the structure, working, and intentions about the future behaviours of political institutions and authorities (Hardin 2000, 2002) appear to be an unnecessary condition. Thus, trust questions can be asked and should be asked from individual citizens.

Second, these results call for considering the individual-level and country-level role in explaining political trust. Those comparative studies that focus on either of these levels may produce incomplete results and, consequently, do not offer a fuller picture of the variations and correlates of political trust (Arancibia 2008). Therefore, a better research strategy is to produce the results by involving these two levels of analyses, which this thesis followed in the empirical chapters.

Graphs 1 in the preceding four empirical chapters show that the levels of political trust are relatively higher in some countries and very low in the other ones. The Scandinavian, along with Switzerland, are the high trust societies. Conversely, Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Greece are the lowest trust societies. These differences allow us to describe ‘how high is high’ and ‘how low is low’ comparative to each other.

Looking at the results of an individual country or comparative studies of fewer countries might set an alarming bell. For example, take the case of Switzerland in the context of the quality of electoral democracy and political trust. Graph 1 (Chapter 5) shows that the level of political trust is around 5.50, which is the mid-point of a scale ranging from 0 to 10. This average level of trust in a highly developed society might send a warning signal. However, this is a very high level of trust compared to that in Bulgaria (1.19) and Portugal (2.01). Thus, rather than caring too much for Switzerland or Scandinavian countries, the situation in Bulgaria and Portugal is really alarming.

#### **9.4.2 Quality of Democracy and Political Trust**

Combining the findings from the Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provides deeper insight into the role of the quality of democracy, through the lens of disconfirmation theory, in explaining political trust. It was argued in these chapters that (1) political trust would depend upon democratic expectations, democratic performance and democratic disconfirmation and (2) democratic disconfirmation would mediate the relationship between democratic expectations, democratic performance and political trust. A series of macro and micro-level analyses were performed to validate these assumptions, and results are reported in the said two chapters. The following subsections provide a brief summary of the main findings, their implications, limitations and future research directions.

##### **Overview of the Main Findings**

The country-level bivariate analyses showed that three measures of quality of electoral democracy—electoral expectations, electoral performance and electoral disconfirmation—



were significantly associated with political trust. However, in the case of the quality of liberal democracy, compared to the liberal performance and liberal disconfirmation having significant positive effects, the relation of liberal expectations with political trust was insignificant. Furthermore, the bivariate analyses within the countries observed that in contrast to the mixed effects of electoral and liberal expectations (the effect was positive in some countries, negative in others, and insignificant in still others), electoral and liberal performance and their corresponding measures of disconfirmation predicted political trust significantly in all countries.

The results of multivariate and multilevel models indicated that the directions of electoral and liberal expectations depended on how these variables were considered into the regression equations. Table 9.1 summarizes the results of multilevel analyses. It shows that both electoral expectations and liberal expectations affect political trust negatively when regressed along with electoral performance and liberal performance, respectively. However, the relationships of the former two measures turn positive when accounted for in the regression equations along with electoral disconfirmation and liberal disconfirmation, respectively. Finally, it shows that electoral disconfirmation and liberal disconfirmation are slightly better predictors of political trust than electoral performance and liberal performance. Together, these analyses supported the hypotheses that the quality of electoral democracy and the quality of liberal democracy matter in explaining Europeans' feelings of political trust.


**Table 9.1 Summary of Multilevel Estimates of Political Trust Based on the Quality of Democracy and the Quality of Public Services**

|                                       | Political Trust |              | Disconfirmation |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| <b>Quality of Electoral Democracy</b> | Model 1         | Model 2      | Model 3         |
| Electoral expectations                | -.07 (.01)***   | .09 (.01)*** | -1.24 (.01)***  |
| Electoral performance                 | .23 (.01)***    |              |                 |
| Electoral disconfirmation             |                 | .26 (.01)*** |                 |
| <b>Quality of Liberal Democracy</b>   |                 |              |                 |
| Liberal expectations                  | -.08 (.01)***   | .10 (.01)*** | -1.08 (.01)***  |
| Liberal performance                   | .25 (.01)***    |              |                 |
| Liberal disconfirmation               |                 | .28 (.01)*** |                 |
| <b>Quality of Schooling</b>           |                 |              |                 |
| Procedural fairness                   | .07 (.03)*      |              |                 |
| Functional effectiveness              | .08 (.03)*      |              |                 |
| <b>Quality of Policing</b>            |                 |              |                 |
| Poor people treated worse             | -.13 (.02)***   |              |                 |
| Different race treated worse          | .01 (.02)       |              |                 |
| Same race treated worse               | .02 (.03)       |              |                 |
| Procedural fairness                   | .11 (.01)***    |              |                 |
| Functional effectiveness              | .10 (.01)***    |              |                 |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. Entries are OLS or maximum likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parenthesis produced through multilevel analysis. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; and \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

Two additional models were performed in the empirical chapters to examine the potential role of electoral disconfirmation and liberal disconfirmation as mediators. It is important to note that the fuller models electoral disconfirmation (Chapter 5: Figure 5.1) and liberal

disconfirmation (Chapter 6: 6.1) because of their multicollinearity with electoral performance and liberal performance, respectively. Rather, only simpler models were computed where electoral expectations and liberal expectations were the main predictors. Models 2 in Table 9.1 were performed with the latter two measures as dependent variables to calculate the mediated effects of electoral expectations and liberal expectations. Figure 9.1 assembles these estimates and calculates mediated effects based on the path analysis. These results show that electoral disconfirmation negatively mediates the relationship between electoral expectations and political trust. They also reveal that the effect of liberal expectations on political trust is negatively mediated by electoral disconfirmation. Finally, the effect of electoral disconfirmation is slightly higher than that of liberal disconfirmation.



## Theoretical and Empirical Implications

Some descriptive statistics, especially about the electoral expectations and liberal expectations, should be mentioned before elaborating on the main findings. Recently, there has been a surge of literature suggesting that Western democracies have begun backsliding (Diamond 2015; Foa and Mounk 2016; Plattner and Plattner 2017). These studies, for example, argued that citizens' preference for living in democratic regimes is declining, as is their support for the democratic political system itself. Kriesi (2020) rejects their claims by showing through the ESS-6 data that Europeans still have a very high preference for living in democracies. The results reported in the studies on the quality of democracy show that Europeans have very strong orientations towards the principles of electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Such orientations were highest even amongst the citizens of such countries as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, and Italy, which were considered hotspots of populist politics (see Appendices 5.3 in Chapter 5 and 6.3 in Chapter 6). Together, these findings suggest that Europe is not passing through the crisis of democracy itself. While there is a need to be worried, there is no need to dramatize Kriesi (2020).

The findings summarized above bear on important implications for disconfirmation theory and political trust literature. First, the findings reported above suggest that democratic expectations influence political trust negatively when regressed along with democratic performance; and this relationship becomes positive when the former is regressed along with democratic

disconfirmation. They also suggest that democratic performance and democratic disconfirmation consistently influence political trust positively. Together, these findings fully align with the extant literature mainly produced in the consumer service literature, which suggests that expectations have mixed effects on trust and performance, and disconfirmation influences trust positively (James 2009; Morgeson 2013; Poister and Thomas 2011; Van Ryzin 2005).

Moreover, there is a debate in service sector literature whether performance is a better predictor of trust/satisfaction than disconfirmation (Parasuraman et al. 1994). These findings open this debate in the political science literature by suggesting that democratic disconfirmation is a better predictor of political trust than democratic performance. Finally, these findings also provide fresh evidence, from the political science literature to the disconfirmation approach that was mainly developed and tested in the service sector literature (Filtenborg, Gaardboe, and Sigsgaard-Rasmussen 2017; Morgeson 2013; Oliver 2015; Van Ryzin 2005). However, due to strong multicollinearity between democratic performance and democratic and democratic disconfirmations, these findings support only the simple disconfirmation models, leaving a fuller disconfirmation model untested.

The size and relationship of democratic expectations with political trust also depend upon theoretical claims and operational definitions. In contrast to services where expectations are most likely to be shaped by individual beliefs, whether public or private sectors should provide them, democratic expectations are normatively loaded and are less likely to vary. Having such a character, democratic expectations might have their own intrinsic rather than instrumental values for the citizens and are less likely to shape their political attitudes (Fukuyama 2013), including political trust. Compared to these arguments, the results reported in the chapters on the quality of democracy clearly show that expectations meaningfully shape citizens' feelings and emotions of political trust. The very high expectations scores show that democracy has its own intrinsic value for the Europeans. However, in whatever limited range their values vary, they have extrinsic consequences for the political system in the form of political trust.

Then the sizes of the effects of each of the three measures of the quality of democracy are different from those reported in earlier studies (Morgeson 2013; Van Ryzin 2004a). Firstly, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser's (2016) study operationalized democratic expectations into high and low ideals and political and social rights and found high expectations produced large negative coefficients. Conversely, Kołczyńska (2020) operationalized democratic norms as a preference for democracy over any other alternative forms of the regime, which did not significantly affect political trust unless it interacted with the education level. Second, Morgeson (2013) employed data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index, which captured expectations ("How would you rate your expectations of the overall quality of services from the agency/department?") and disconfirmation ("Considering all of your expectations, to what extent have the agency/department's services fallen short of your expectations or exceeded your expectations?"). Likewise, Van Ryzin (2004a) used a similar measurement model in the New York City Services context. Second, their dependent variable was satisfaction with agencies/departments. Third, they did not use any control variable.

Some of the implications of this study are straightforward. For instance, political trust can be increased by improving citizens' perceptions (and experiences) of democratic performance and democratic disconfirmation. Unless the latter is considered, increasing democratic expectations can negatively affect political trust. However, these relationships are not as straightforward, especially in the context of democracy. Democratic expectations are basically citizens' orientations towards the norms and principles of democracy that are fundamentally different from the products and services offered for sale and purchase in a market. Expectations from these products are the immediate and extrinsic rewards, thus making it easier for service providers to manipulate them through media campaigns or other means (Van Ryzin 2004a).

Conversely, the idea of democracy—electoral democracy and liberal democracy—as the embodiment of political rights and civil liberties is a unique one. In theory, lowering expectations might seem a sensible step to improve the direct negative effects of democratic expectations on political trust. However, devising any strategy at lowering democratic expectations in practice is meaningless. Rather, negatively manipulating expectations would mean an accomplice against democracy and its institutions. Initially, decreasing these expectations might weaken diffuse support for democracy itself, resulting in regime change in the long run. As the final findings of these chapters on the quality of democracy suggest, increasing democratic performance might offer double dividends without manipulating democratic expectations. Besides directly increasing political trust, improved performance would increase positive disconfirmation. Such an attempt would reduce the indirect negative influence of democratic expectations besides doubling the total net effect of the electoral performance.

It can be concluded that the quality of electoral democracy operationalized as electoral expectations, electoral performance, and electoral disconfirmation not only helps us to understand the complex process underlying the formation of citizens' feelings of political trust but suggest some ways of improving political trust based on the empirical manifestation of such a process. Future research should focus on using alternative data sources and measures of the quality of democracy and times series analysis to examine further the potential of this theory explaining political trust.

### **Limitations and Future Research Directions**

Given that there is no empirical work on using the disconfirmation approach to the study of political trust in a comparative context, this is the first such comparative attempt from a European perspective. Beyond the specific findings noted in the proceeding section, it suffers from limitations, including theoretical and methodological limitations.

First, a recent study was undertaken in the context of Danish public services that prior levels of expectations, performance and trust influence future expectations, performance and trust (Hjortskov 2019). This is equally plausible in the case of the quality of democracy. Given the extreme political polarization towards various issues, coupled with competing demands by citizens on the political system, it is plausible that the prior level of the quality of democracy and political trust might affect the future level of quality of democracy and political trust. ESS-6 is unique for providing several batteries of question that this thesis employed to develop and

test measurement models at the intersection of the quality of democracy and political trust within several European countries and predict political trust in the subsequent analyses. Unfortunately, the lack of comparable measures across time and space could not help us predict future attitudes from the past ones.

Second, without focusing too much on the predictive and normative expectations debate, this assumed that citizens would evaluate democratic performance vis-à-vis democratic expectations. Though this thesis controlled a host of variables that might compound the association between the measures of the quality of democracy and political trust; however, it is not fully sure whether citizens kept the democratic expectations as performance evaluation standards while evaluating democratic performance.

Third, the chapters on the quality of democracy and political trust assumed two models: a simpler model where democratic disconfirmation mediated the relationship between democratic expectations and political trust, which turned into a fuller model when democratic performance was modeled into the relationship. A fuller model could not be predicted because of the strong multicollinearity between democratic performance and democratic disconfirmation. Beyond the subtractive disconfirmation that these chapters employed, there is a subjective disconfirmation that taps into citizens' subjective feelings of disconfirmation. In the case of the quality of democracy, such a disconfirmation might take the form of whether democracies in the respondents' home countries performed *better than their expectations* (confirmation) or *worse than their expectations* (disconfirmation). Probably, a fuller model could only be tested by employing subjective rather than subtractive disconfirmation.

Finally, there is a possibility that citizens' evaluations of democracies are shaped by their perceptions and experiences of other democracies. This is plausible under the socialization effect of exposures to different forms of media and greater mobility that many Europeans might avail.

### **9.4.3 Quality of Public Services and Political Trust**

Under the assumptions of micro-performance theory literature, the second part of this thesis argued that the quality of public services understood as citizens' evaluation of the distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness will affect political trust positively (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). These assumptions were tested by performing a series of macro-level and micro-level analyses by employing the data relating to the quality of schooling and the quality of policing from ESS-2 and ESS-6, respectively. This section presents an overview of the main findings, their implications, and their limitations.

#### **Overview of the Main Findings**

Several proxies such as discrimination based on age, sex, ethnicity, and so on were employed as we could not find any direct measure of any measure of distributive justice in the context of quality of schooling. These measures could not be of any help due to limited variance in them and consequently were dropped from the further analyses. However, in the context of the quality of policing, distributive justice was captured through citizens' judgments that police discriminate against people based on their economic and racial status—dubbed as economic

prejudice and racial prejudice. Therefore, the following discussion takes into account the role of distributive justice with respect to the quality of policing only; the effects of procedural justice and functional effectiveness are examined in the context of two services.

The macro-level analyses observed a relationship between economic prejudice, ethnic prejudice, and political trust. These patterns also revealed that compared to the very weak association between functional effectiveness and political trust, this relationship was more salient in the case of procedural fairness. Combined, the results of the two chapters showed that students' and citizens' evaluations of the procedural justice and functional effectiveness of the teachers and police, respectively, were significantly associated with political trust in macro-level patterns. In micro-level bivariate analyses, while the schools' procedural fairness and functional effectiveness were significantly associated with political trust in fewer countries, the three measures of the quality of policing had a significant association in all countries except Slovenia and Slovakia.

In multivariate models involving country-fixed parameters, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness were related to political trust. Conversely, only the economic prejudice affected political trust in the case of the quality of policing. However, the sizes of their coefficients changed slightly, but their significance level and direction remained consistent when multilevel models were performed. In sum, the findings from these two chapters showed that procedural fairness and functional effectiveness matter in explaining political trust. Only the economic prejudice measure of distributive justice in the case of quality of policing was related to the political trust.

The macro-level bivariate analyses in these two empirical chapters showed that perceptions of procedural fairness were more saliently associated with political trust than those of functional effectiveness. When the micro-level bivariate analyses were performed within countries separately, both the procedural fairness and functional effectiveness were significantly only in a limited number of countries in the case of quality of schooling. However, these two measures were highly significant in all countries except in two countries. Racial discrimination was insignificant only in Slovakia. Functional effectiveness was insignificant in Slovakia as well as in Slovenia. In the rest of the analyses—the correlation, multivariate and multilevel analyses—functional effectiveness in the quality of schooling and procedural fairness in the context of policing were relatively better predictors of political trust.

### **Theoretical and Empirical Implications**

There are important implications of the findings reported above both for micro-performance theory and political trust. These findings suggest the utility of micro-performance theory (Bouckaert and Walle 2003: 305), which, when applied to in the context of schooling and policing, would mean that students and citizens not only make a differentiation between the quality schooling and the quality of policing services, respectively, and politics but rationally holds political institutions responsible for *what* they receive and *how* they receive in their educational and policing services. Extant literature in the context of schools suggests that judgments of injustice at the hands of school authorities result in negative emotional and behavioral consequences ranging from anger to verbal abuses (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004;

Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004; Horan, Chory, and Goodboy 2010; R. Kaufmann and Tatum 2018; Tripp et al. 2019). Likewise, the literature produced so far in the criminal justice system significantly affects police performance, including distributive justice, procedural fairness and functional effectiveness, and trust in the police (Van Craen and Skogan 2017; Marien and Werner 2019; Solar 2015).

This thesis goes one step further and shows that the quality of public services has important implications for the political system as a whole. In other words, citizens as evaluators of public services want more egalitarian institutions that benefit all equally. Beyond treating them fairly, they want certain institutions such as schools to impart and equip them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities that might help them get jobs but hold political institutions responsible for the good or bad performance of their schools. Additionally, the practices within the schools, including classroom participation, helpfulness, raising criticism and responding, train them in civic skills that are transferable to other domains of life such as deliberative democracy or participatory budgeting practices. In short, ensuring classroom justice and effectiveness plays an instrumental role in building political trust (Claes, Hooghe, and Marien 2012).

Similarly, the implication of the study on the quality of policing is that citizens give credit to political institutions in the form of political trust based on their judgments of police performance. This means that political trust can be increased by controlling the factors that induce discriminatory treatment of the citizens based on their economic status and guaranteeing that they would be treated in procedurally fair and uncorrupt manners and enhance the effectiveness reflected by the safety and security of the populace. In case police work falls short of these expectations, citizens might punish the police force by lowering trust and protesting against them and holding political institutions responsible for the poor quality of policing. Consequently, they might pack a sitting government home in the next election in the short term. A perpetual poor quality of policing might weaken the diffuse support for a political system in the longer run.

The policy implication is that the European governments can increase political trust, which is the most needed in these crisis times, by improving the quality of public services. However, these tasks are not easier ones. Besides financial resources, performance improvements require organizational and behavioral changes in their officials, which are challenging tasks. Improving organizational changes such as enhancing infrastructural capacities, for instance, supplying physical equipments and improving transportation facilities, might work. However, each organization has its own working culture where implementing new rules and procedures to enhance performance are confronted with daily working norms and work ethos. Developed and nurtured over long periods of time, it takes well designed, coordinated strategies and a long struggle to change behaviours of public employees towards citizens.

An additional commentary that needs attention is what matters more: procedural fairness or functional effectiveness; and quality of schooling or policing. The chapter on the quality of schooling suggests that students have almost equal concerns for the teachers' procedural fairness and functional effectiveness. Likewise, citizens give almost equal importance to procedural fairness and functional effectiveness while making their judgments of political trust

in the case of quality of schooling. These findings are different from those reported elsewhere that in well-developed Western countries where citizens care more about procedural fairness than functional effectiveness because fairer processes generate fairer outcomes (Van Ryzin 2011; Tankebe 2013). Moreover, comparing the final results in two chapters shows that the final coefficients of quality of policing are slightly better predictors than those of quality of schooling. This means that citizens, either as consumers of schooling or policing services, pay equal attention to public services.

Summing up all the debate suggests that government can adopt multipronged strategies to enhance political trust. On the one hand, they need to focus on various dimensions of the quality within each of the public services, and on the other hand, the different public services perform according to citizens' expectations. However, these are not easy-to-go tasks. Services such as schooling and policing have their own structural and cultural limitations and conditions under which they work.

### **Limitations and Future Research Directions**

Future studies could be designed and get the benefit from some of the limitations of this section. On the theoretical level, American (disconfirmation) and Nordic (performance-only) approaches have been discussed in the previous studies (Gronroos 1984). The former focuses on the first part of this thesis, and the current section is based on the latter approach. Though a couple of extant studies have examined the role of the disconfirmation approach but the lack of comparative data could not help to design such a study.

Rothstein and his colleagues contend that quality stands for the impartial implementation of public policies (Sören Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasiritousi 2009). This thesis further discerned the meanings of quality as distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness. While this thesis could not find a single direct measure of distributive justice in the case of quality of schooling, it employed a couple of proxies, which could not be of any help due to very limited variance in them. Likewise, only economic prejudice items were related to political trust. Moreover, in the former case, procedural justice was measured through a single item. The literature produced so far in the organizational justice (Beugre and Baron 2001; Siu, Zhang, and Yau 2013), and classroom justice (Chory-Assad and Paulsel 2004) conceives each of these concepts as multidimensional ones and offer well-developed batteries of their operational definitions of each of these variables.

Next, the data for the quality of schooling was collected in 2004 (ESS-2) and for that of police services in 2010 (ESS-5). Additionally, there were a limited number of observations in the quality of schooling data. ESS-2 was floated in 26 European countries that contained 47537 observations; however, after subsetting it to students and removing the certain countries due to limitations of reliability analyses and other reasons, we were left with only 3377 observations from 17 countries. Moreover, these observations kept on dropping when further complex models were tested. These limited observations probably biased the parameter estimates.

Further research should focus on testing political trust effects of the quality of schooling variables on larger sample sizes. Finally, this study is about European schools. Future studies



should focus on testing this theory in comparative and cross-cultural settings to validate it further.

#### **9.4.4 Effects of Individual-Level and Country-Level Control Variables**

Based on the earlier research (Chapter 2: Section: 2.5), five sets of individual-level and two country-level were selected as control variables. The individual-level variables included demographic variables (gender, age, education, religiousness, domicile and citizenship), welfare performance (average of the state of education and health services), economic satisfaction (satisfaction with economy and household income), political attitudes (interest in politics, satisfaction with government and left right orientation) and social capital (average of interpersonal carefulness, fairness and helpfulness). The first country-level variable was the communist past. Voice and accountability was the country-level variable in the chapters focusing on the quality of democracy and government effectiveness was included in the chapters relating to the quality of public services.

This thesis mapped the political trust effects of these control variables in two overarching fashions: Chapter 4 instituted baseline models plotting the effects of control variables only and the subsequent four chapters where these controls were considered along with the main measures of the quality of democracy (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) and the quality of public services (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8).

The order of magnitude of coefficient in the studies involving the quality of electoral democracy and quality of liberal democracy data is such that satisfaction with government appeared strongest positive predictor followed by social capital, satisfaction with economy, welfare performance and religiousness. The order of the coefficients of the first two variables remained the same in the quality of schooling and the quality of policing studies. However, the order of the remaining three variables was such that the coefficient of welfare performance was larger than that of religiousness and satisfaction with economy bearing on the least effect in these association in case of the quality of schooling. In the quality of policing study, the welfare performance was a better predictor followed by the satisfaction with economy and religiousness playing the least role in explaining political trust.

Compared to the positive association between being male and political trust in the chapter about the quality of schooling, this relationship turns negative in the remaining chapters. Likewise, an increase in age tends to decrease political trust amongst citizens except in students, where this relationship is insignificant. Political trust tends to increase and decrease with the increase in the number of years of education in the studies about the quality of democracy and the quality of policing, respectively. This relationship does not perform significantly in the study of the quality of schooling. Then citizenship bears no effect on the quality of policing study where citizens are negatively associated with political trust.

The results of the empirical chapters produced in this thesis suggest that those who live in big cities are more likely to report a higher level of political trust vis-à-vis those living either in suburbs, small cities and villages. Compared to much of the contemporary debate focusing on the role of inequalities in explaining political trust, the results of all the empirical chapters suggest that perceptions of feelings of household income do not matter at all. Likewise, the

level of trust is consistently higher in all studies amongst those who are more interested in politics than those who are quite interested or hardly interested in politics. Moreover, except in the study of quality of policing observing a negative association between left-right orientation and political trust, such a positioning does not matter when developing their feelings of political trust.

On the country-level, the communist past does not matter in explaining political trust except in the chapter on the quality of liberal democracy where a communist past was positively associated with political trust. Of the remaining two variables, voice and accountability was the strongest predictor of political trust in the studies on the quality of democracy. The government effectiveness produced highly significant effects in the chapters on the quality of public services.

## **9.5 Concluding Remarks: Quality of Democracy vs Quality of Public Services**

Since the measures of the quality of democracy—democratic expectations, democratic performance, democratic disconfirmation—and two of the quality of public services measures—procedural fairness and functional effectiveness—were converted into their *z-scores*; therefore, it deserves a commentary on whether the quality of democracy or that of public services/government matter more in explaining political trust.

People might accord trust to the authorities and institutions based on (a) traditions, (b) charisma, (c) quality of public services, and (d) the quality of democracy (Rothstein 2009). The first two points are less relevant to this thesis. Researchers have extensively pondered how traditions related to politics have degenerated the democratic legitimacy and have pushed the political system towards authoritarianism (Ziblatt and Levitsky 2018). However, there is still a room to dive deeply and explore how personality features of the political executives and legislators influence political trust across different nations.

The relative importance of the last two points can be looked into from Rothstein's (2009) comments that

whereas what happens on the input side usually has little consequence for individual citizens, what the state does on the output side may be life threatening.

Although his comment is with reference to developing democracies, the results produced in this thesis suggest that Europeans care more about the quality of democracy than those of public services while according to political trust. Based on the objective quality of democracy and public services, the previous research indicated that the former has a very limited role in explaining political trust (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014). Conversely, this thesis showed that although Europeans care for both what happens on the input side and the output side of the political system while developing their feeling of political trust. Rather, they pay more heed to what happens on the input side than on the output side. More precisely, the quality of liberal democracy features more prominently compared to the quality of electoral democracy in Europeans political trust formation process. This means that the questions of civil liberties,

including the rule of law, minority rights, and reliability of the media, are not less important than electoral programs, electoral accountability, and responsiveness.

The preceding sections discussed the individual limitations of the two sections. However, some collective limitations deserve scrutiny. First, it was possible to design this thesis around individual-level and country-level measures of the quality of democracy and those of public services and map their effects on political trust. However, this study focused on the former factors and included the latter factors only as control variables. Second, the chapter on quality of schooling a priori assumed the role of experiences in shaping political trust. Compared to studies show that political trust might differ depending upon whether citizens drive their judgments of public services out of perceptions or personal experiences (Kumlin 2004), this thesis could not do so.

Finally, theoretically, the quality of democracy and the quality of public services predict political trust. Such an assumption is pervasive in the majority of the causal mechanism underlying the social sciences research. However, it is really difficult to establish the said causality based on cross-sectional data on the political trust and its correlates. However, such a shortcoming is acceptable given that that hypothetical associations between political trust and its determinants are solidly driven by theoretical foundations (Vilhelmsdóttir 2020).

To wrap it up, future studies could benefit from the limitations outlined in the previous sections. Together, these studies should focus on developing more refined batteries of questions pertaining to the quality of public services; should strive to find time series individual-level measures of the quality of democracy and quality of public services; should develop cross-sectional models to examine individual-level features interact with country-contexts; should developing experimental designs to establish the causality of relationships; should include developing countries in their research agenda to test further to validate the claims of disconfirmation and micro- performance theories and test their utility in a different context.

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# Appendices

## Chapter 3

| Appendix 3.1 Missing Values (%) in the Quality of Democracy Measures |                         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |                        |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |
|--|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------------|-----|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|--|
|  | Democratic Expectations |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | Democratic Performance |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |
| Countries  | E1                      | E2  | E3  | E4  | E5  | E6  | E7  | E8  | E9  | E10 | P1                     | P2  | P3  | P4   | P5  | P6   | P7  | P8   | P9  | P10 |  |
| EU-Level   | 2.2                     | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 34                     | 5.0 | 4.3 | 5.5  | 3.5 | 5.1  | 4.1 | 5.4  | 3.1 | 3.6 |  |
| Belgium  | 0.8                     | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.2                    | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.0  | 1.7 | 2.0  | 1.1 | 1.6  | 1.8 | 1.3 |  |
| Bulgaria   | 2.4                     | 4.6 | 4.1 | 7.3 | 3.2 | 6.0 | 2.2 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 6.8                    | 8.6 | 5.2 | 10.3 | 4.7 | 6.9  | 6.0 | 5.8  | 6.1 | 6.8 |  |
| Switzerland  | 3.4                     | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 5.3                    | 7.1 | 8.5 | 8.4  | 5.8 | 7.4  | 6.9 | 5.8  | 4.6 | 4.7 |  |
| Cyprus   | 2.6                     | 3.0 | 3.8 | 5.1 | 2.8 | 5.1 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 4.7                    | 8.7 | 6.1 | 11.7 | 6.7 | 6.1  | 7.5 | 5.9  | 4.3 | 5.3 |  |
| Czechia  | 3.4                     | 7.3 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 3.4 | 5.2                    | 9.6 | 9.3 | 7.5  | 5.4 | 6.1  | 5.3 | 9.3  | 7.6 | 6.0 |  |
| Germany  | 1.1                     | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.6                    | 2.4 | 2.3 | 5.2  | 2.1 | 3.5  | 3.1 | 2.6  | 1.2 | 1.5 |  |
| Denmark  | 2.1                     | 2.8 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.6                    | 2.4 | 3.5 | 4.2  | 2.8 | 3.9  | 4.0 | 5.3  | 2.3 | 2.4 |  |
| Estonia  | 2.8                     | 5.9 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 4.4                    | 8.2 | 6.1 | 8.7  | 4.1 | 6.3  | 6.8 | 7.9  | 3.3 | 4.0 |  |
| Spain  | 3.3                     | 5.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 5.1                    | 7.0 | 5.2 | 5.8  | 4.6 | 6.3  | 3.2 | 6.8  | 4.7 | 5.4 |  |
| Finland  | 1.5                     | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.1                    | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9  | 2.8 | 2.9  | 2.7 | 3.0  | 2.3 | 2.5 |  |
| France   | 1.1                     | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.3                    | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.5  | 1.2 | 1.2  | 1.1 | 2.0  | 0.8 | 0.9 |  |
| UK   | 3.7                     | 5.8 | 5.0 | 6.6 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 3.3                    | 6.1 | 4.8 | 7.4  | 5.4 | 6.7  | 4.9 | 7.4  | 4.3 | 5.1 |  |
| Hungary  | 3.3                     | 5.5 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 5.9 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 9.3                    | 9.0 | 7.5 | 8.8  | 6.1 | 9.0  | 7.5 | 4.8  | 7.5 | 7.1 |  |
| Ireland  | 3.1                     | 5.1 | 3.0 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 4.6 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 3.0                    | 5.1 | 3.4 | 5.4  | 4.0 | 5.7  | 5.7 | 5.8  | 2.4 | 3.7 |  |
| Iceland  | 1.7                     | 4.3 | 1.7 | 4.3 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 1.7                    | 4.3 | 6.0 | 5.2  | 1.7 | 8.6  | 2.6 | 5.2  | 2.6 | 2.6 |  |
| Italy  | 2.4                     | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 4.0                    | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.3  | 3.2 | 4.6  | 4.1 | 5.3  | 4.2 | 3.6 |  |
| Lithuania  | 2.7                     | 4.8 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 2.1 | 7.0 | 2.6 | 6.1 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 5.6                    | 7.8 | 7.0 | 8.0  | 3.4 | 9.2  | 4.7 | 9.3  | 4.0 | 4.8 |  |
| Netherlands  | 0.9                     | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7                    | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.8  | 1.0 | 1.9  | 2.6 | 1.9  | 0.7 | 0.8 |  |
| Norway   | 0.9                     | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3                    | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.4  | 2.2 | 1.9  | 1.7 | 2.5  | 1.2 | 1.7 |  |
| Poland   | 3.3                     | 7.5 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 5.5 | 1.5 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 5.9                    | 7.6 | 5.8 | 8.5  | 3.5 | 7.5  | 3.2 | 14.7 | 3.1 | 4.3 |  |
| Portugal   | 1.6                     | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 3.8 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 5.6                    | 6.5 | 3.8 | 5.2  | 2.7 | 10.5 | 3.0 | 4.3  | 3.5 | 5.7 |  |
| Sweden   | 2.1                     | 2.3 | 3.5 | 5.6 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9                    | 2.8 | 3.8 | 5.8  | 2.8 | 4.4  | 4.0 | 5.1  | 1.7 | 2.6 |  |
| Slovenia   | 3.5                     | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.4                    | 9.2 | 7.5 | 6.3  | 5.6 | 7.7  | 5.2 | 10.3 | 4.4 | 6.5 |  |
| Slovakia   | 0.7                     | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 1.2                    | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.6  | 1.7 | 2.0  | 1.6 | 3.4  | 1.2 | 1.3 |  |
| Legend: See Appendix 5.1 for the description of E1 to P10.           |                         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |                        |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |

### Appendix 3.2 Missing Values (%) in the Quality of Public Services Measures

|             | Quality of Schooling (ESS-2) |     |     |     |     | Quality of Policing (ESS-5) |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |      |  |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|------|--|
| Countries   | S1                           | S2  | S3  | S4  | S5  | P1                          | P2   | P3   | P4   | P5   | P6   | P7  | P8  | P9   |  |
| EU-Level    | 6.5                          | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 7.4                         | 10.7 | 5.2  | 8.5  | 9.9  | 11.6 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 5.9  |  |
| Austria     | 2.6                          | 1.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 2.1 | a                           |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |      |  |
| Belgium     | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 2.3                         | 3.1  | 0.6  | 2.9  | 2.6  | 2.2  | 0.8 | 0.8 | 6.1  |  |
| Bulgaria    | a                            |     |     |     |     | 11.3                        | 15.6 | 8.5  | 17.2 | 18.3 | 23.1 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 10.5 |  |
| Switzerland | 0.5                          | 1.3 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 0.6 | 7.9                         | 8.8  | 2.3  | 6.1  | 6.0  | 5.6  | 3.5 | 5.2 | 5.0  |  |
| Cyprus      | a                            |     |     |     |     | 6.7                         | 1.4  | 10.0 | 12.7 | 12.9 | 21.8 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 7.1  |  |
| Czechia     | 0.5                          | 0.5 | 0.5 | 3.9 | 4.9 | 8.0                         | 12.4 | 10.8 | 12.4 | 13.6 | 13.9 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 9.9  |  |
| Germany     | 1.1                          | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 6.9                         | 9.3  | 5.1  | 8.3  | 11.3 | 8.7  | 3.4 | 2.7 | 4.8  |  |
| Denmark     | 0.0                          | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 3.2                         | 4.3  | 1.5  | 3.8  | 6.9  | 1.7  | 3.2 | 2.2 | 3.4  |  |
| Estonia     | 0.9                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.8 | 0.5 | 8.6                         | 11.0 | 7.3  | 10.7 | 11.4 | 13.7 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 8.2  |  |
| Spain       | 1.1                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 6.7                         | 11.4 | 1.6  | 5.4  | 6.6  | 11.8 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 4.9  |  |
| Finland     | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 3.2                         | 5.2  | 1.9  | 3.4  | 4.4  | 2.6  | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.0  |  |
| France      | a                            |     |     |     |     | 3.5                         | 2.0  | 2.0  | 4.8  | 3.2  | 4.2  | 0.7 | 0.9 | 3.8  |  |
| UK          | 0.9                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.2                        | 10.2 | 2.9  | 5.3  | 9.9  | 15.5 | 4.4 | 5.8 | 7.1  |  |
| Greece      | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.5                         | 5.5  | 4.8  | 7.6  | 9.8  | 18.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 9.9  |  |
| Croatia     | a                            |     |     |     |     | 9.2                         | 16.6 | 7.4  | 11.9 | 12.0 | 15.6 | 2.6 | 4.9 | 5.4  |  |
| Hungary     | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.0                        | 20.2 | 10.8 | 18.4 | 17.6 | 12.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 7.4  |  |
| Ireland     | 0.0                          | .07 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 8.5                         | 12.9 | 4.2  | 4.7  | 9.4  | 15.6 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 5.9  |  |
| Iceland     | 0.0                          | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | a                           |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |      |  |
| Italy       | 0.0                          | 3.8 | 5.7 | 7.5 | 3.8 | a                           |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |      |  |
| Lithuania   | a                            |     |     |     |     | 13.0                        | 28.3 | 13.5 | 16.8 | 15.2 | 15.2 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 7.3  |  |
| Luxembourg  | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | a                           |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |      |  |
| Netherlands | 0.0                          | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 3.9                         | 5.6  | 2.3  | 5.4  | 5.4  | 4.8  | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.6  |  |
| Norway      | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 2.1                         | 2.6  | 1.2  | 2.4  | 5.7  | 2.8  | 1.7 | 1.2 | 2.3  |  |
| Poland      | 0.8                          | 0.8 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 11.9                        | 24.7 | 10.4 | 12.4 | 15.4 | 27.1 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.9  |  |
| Portugal    | 0.0                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 10.8                        | 19.4 | 2.5  | 14.4 | 14.5 | 21.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 9.4  |  |
| Sweden      | 0.0                          | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.1                         | 5.3  | 3.2  | 5.6  | 10.2 | 7.3  | 3.7 | 2.7 | 3.8  |  |
| Slovenia    | 96.0                         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 10.2                        | 16.0 | 9.7  | 12.3 | 13.6 | 25.5 | 4.6 | 6.0 | 6.8  |  |
| Slovakia    | 2.2                          | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 8.4                         | 17.4 | 12.5 | 14.6 | 15.0 | 20.3 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.4  |  |

**Legend:** In Quality of Schooling: S1=discriminated against; S2=unfair treatment; S3=teachers interested in students; S4=teachers listens; and S5=teachers' helpfulness.

In Quality of Policing: P1=discrimination based on rich/poor; P2= discrimination based on ethnic background; P3=respectful treatment; P4=fairness; P5=explain descisions; P6=corruption; P7=prevent crimes; P8=catch burglars; and P9=quickness.

**Note:** The ESS did not survey countries corresponding to  $a$  in their respective modules. The questions about the quality of schooling were not floated in France in 2004.

**Appendix 3.3 Missing Values (%) in Control Variables of the Quality of Democracy**

|             | Demographic |     |     |     |     |     | Welfare |     | Economic    |     |     | Political |     |             | Soc. Capital |     |     |
|-------------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----------|-----|-------------|--------------|-----|-----|
| Countries   | D1          | D2  | D3  | D4  | D5  | D6  | W1      | W2  | E1          | E2  | E3  | P1        | P2  | P3          | S1           | S2  | S3  |
| EU-Level    | 0.1         | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 3.3     | 1.0 | 20.2        | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.2       | 2.6 | 12.2        | 0.3          | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| Belgium     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3     | 0.1 | <b>8.8</b>  | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.1       | 0.9 | <b>3.3</b>  | 0.0          | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Bulgaria    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.4    | 1.7 | <b>18.0</b> | 0.2 | 2.3 | 0.6       | 4.0 | <b>21.3</b> | 0.7          | 1.6 | 0.7 |
| Switzerland | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.4     | 0.8 | <b>17.1</b> | 0.4 | 2.0 | 0.0       | 3.2 | <b>6.0</b>  | 0.0          | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Cyprus      | 0.2         | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.1     | 2.0 | <b>28.7</b> | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.0       | 6.1 | <b>31.4</b> | 0.0          | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| Czechia     | 0.6         | 0.0 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 0.4 | 3.6     | 2.2 | <b>31.9</b> | 3.7 | 5.2 | 0.7       | 4.6 | <b>14.6</b> | 1.0          | 1.4 | 0.9 |
| Germany     | 0.2         | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.9     | 0.5 | <b>15.3</b> | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.0       | 3.2 | <b>5.8</b>  | 0.1          | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Denmark     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.8     | 1.2 | <b>14.7</b> | 1.4 | 2.0 | 0.1       | 2.2 | <b>3.9</b>  | 0.4          | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Estonia     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 4.2     | 1.4 | <b>17.2</b> | 0.2 | 1.6 | 0.3       | 2.4 | <b>18.7</b> | 0.5          | 1.1 | 0.3 |
| Spain       | 0.0         | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0     | 0.6 | <b>17.5</b> | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.2       | 2.0 | <b>8.5</b>  | 0.0          | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Finland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.5     | 0.3 | <b>6.2</b>  | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.0       | 1.3 | <b>4.6</b>  | 0.0          | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| France      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3     | 0.1 | <b>13.4</b> | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.0       | 1.7 | <b>4.7</b>  | 0.0          | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| UK          | 0.6         | 0.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 3.5     | 0.9 | <b>24.0</b> | 1.3 | 2.2 | 0.2       | 2.8 | <b>16.7</b> | 0.3          | 1.0 | 0.3 |
| Hungary     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 8.8     | 2.8 | <b>29.0</b> | 1.6 | 3.1 | 0.6       | 5.8 | <b>17.1</b> | 0.6          | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| Ireland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.7     | 2.9 | <b>43.1</b> | 3.0 | 0.6 | 0.2       | 2.4 | <b>14.6</b> | 0.1          | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Iceland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 4.3 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.9     | 0.9 | <b>22.4</b> | 6.9 | 4.3 | 0.9       | 5.2 | <b>7.8</b>  | 1.7          | 0.9 | 3.4 |
| Italy       | 2.2         | 1.4 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.5     | 0.7 | <b>39.2</b> | 3.4 | 2.2 | 0.5       | 3.6 | <b>16.8</b> | 0.5          | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Lithuania   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.5     | 3.4 | <b>18.6</b> | 3.2 | 2.8 | 1.2       | 6.1 | <b>33.5</b> | 1.1          | 4.2 | 0.4 |
| Netherlands | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.8     | 0.2 | <b>19.7</b> | 1.8 | 0.5 | 0.0       | 1.4 | <b>3.7</b>  | 0.1          | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Norway      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.2     | 0.2 | <b>4.2</b>  | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0       | 0.8 | <b>1.4</b>  | 0.2          | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Poland      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 4.8     | 0.6 | <b>21.4</b> | 1.0 | 3.3 | 1.1       | 2.0 | <b>16.8</b> | 0.4          | 1.2 | 2.3 |
| Portugal    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 4.7     | 0.2 | <b>59.6</b> | 2.1 | 0.4 | 0.0       | 0.5 | <b>32.9</b> | 0.1          | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Sweden      | 0.1         | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.9     | 0.6 | <b>9.3</b>  | 1.7 | 2.9 | 0.0       | 3.6 | <b>5.0</b>  | 0.2          | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Slovenia    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 7.2     | 1.5 | <b>25.8</b> | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.2       | 2.5 | <b>30.0</b> | 0.2          | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Slovakia    | 0.2         | 0.2 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.8     | 0.7 | <b>35.9</b> | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.3       | 1.3 | <b>5.5</b>  | 0.7          | 0.9 | 0.6 |

Legend: Legend: D1=age of the respondent; D2=gender; D3=education in years; D4=religiousness; D5=domcile; D6=citizens of the country; W1=state of education in the country; W2=state of health services in the country; E1= household's total net income, all sources; E2= feeling about household's income nowadays; E3=satisfaction with the present state of economy; P1=interest in politics; P2=satisfaction with the national government; P3=Self placement on left right scale; S1=interpersonal trust; S2=interpersonal fairness; and S3=interpersonal helpfulness.

### Appendix 3.4 Missing Values (%) in Control Variables of the Quality of Schooling

|             | Demographic |     |     |     |     |     | Welfare |      | Economic    |      |      | Political |      |             | Soc. Capital |     |     |
|-------------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|------|-------------|------|------|-----------|------|-------------|--------------|-----|-----|
| Countries   | D1          | D2  | D3  | D4  | D5  | D6  | W1      | W2   | E1          | E2   | E3   | P1        | P2   | P3          | S1           | S2  | S3  |
| EU-Level    | 0.0         | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 1.6     | 3.9  | 51.7        | 7.2  | 4.5  | 0.3       | 7.8  | 21.2        | 0.3          | 0.9 | 0.3 |
| Belgium     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0     | 5.2  | <b>66.5</b> | 8.6  | 5.2  | 0.4       | 14.2 | <b>18.9</b> | 0.9          | 3.0 | 0.9 |
| Bulgaria    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 1.6  | <b>55.9</b> | 9.4  | 2.4  | 0.0       | 2.4  | <b>12.6</b> | 0.8          | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Switzerland | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6     | 5.2  | <b>66.9</b> | 12.3 | 5.2  | 0.0       | 7.8  | <b>6.5</b>  | 0.0          | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Cyprus      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9     | 4.4  | <b>61.6</b> | 27.6 | 10.8 | 0.0       | 11.3 | <b>37.4</b> | 1.0          | 2.0 | 0.5 |
| Czechia     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6     | 7.3  | <b>54.7</b> | 4.5  | 3.4  | 0.6       | 12.3 | <b>16.2</b> | 0.0          | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Germany     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 5.0  | <b>32.5</b> | 5.0  | 5.8  | 0.0       | 4.2  | <b>9.2</b>  | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Denmark     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5     | 4.1  | <b>100</b>  | 0.9  | 3.2  | 0.0       | 10.6 | <b>27.6</b> | 0.5          | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| Estonia     | 0.0         | 1.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 3.2  | <b>46.8</b> | 2.1  | 1.1  | 1.1       | 6.4  | <b>12.8</b> | 0.0          | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Spain       | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 2.3  | <b>30.0</b> | 5.9  | 1.4  | 0.0       | 3.2  | <b>10.9</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Finland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.6     | 1.7  | <b>59.5</b> | 10.3 | 4.3  | 0.0       | 2.6  | <b>29.3</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.9 |
| UK          | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1     | 2.1  | <b>66.0</b> | 6.2  | 4.1  | 0.0       | 9.3  | <b>27.8</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hungary     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 4.8  | <b>24.8</b> | 0.8  | 0.8  | 0.0       | 1.6  | <b>19.2</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ireland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 3.3 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 0.0  | <b>56.6</b> | 5.9  | 5.9  | 0.7       | 4.6  | <b>31.6</b> | 0.0          | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| Iceland     | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3     | 4.5  | <b>52.3</b> | 9.1  | 6.8  | 0.0       | 6.8  | <b>11.4</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Italy       | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 5.7     | 7.5  | <b>56.6</b> | 15.1 | 5.7  | 7.5       | 15.1 | <b>28.3</b> | 5.7          | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| Lithuania   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.1     | 10.5 | <b>76.8</b> | 9.5  | 13.7 | 0.0       | 23.2 | <b>29.5</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Netherlands | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8     | 0.8  | <b>50.4</b> | 10.9 | 1.7  | 0.8       | 1.7  | <b>9.2</b>  | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Norway      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 2.1  | <b>14.5</b> | 0.7  | 2.1  | 0.0       | 4.1  | <b>7.6</b>  | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Poland      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 0.8  | <b>35.4</b> | 3.1  | 7.1  | 0.0       | 6.3  | <b>35.4</b> | 0.8          | 2.4 | 0.8 |
| Portugal    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 1.1 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 0.0  | <b>72.3</b> | 6.4  | 1.1  | 0.0       | 6.4  | <b>48.9</b> | 0.0          | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Sweden      | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0     | 2.5  | <b>31.8</b> | 5.5  | 4.0  | 0.0       | 10.0 | <b>10.0</b> | 0.0          | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Slovenia    | 0.0         | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.0     | 0.5  | <b>33.5</b> | 3.0  | 6.0  | 0.0       | 7.5  | <b>34.0</b> | 0.5          | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Slovakia    | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 39.1    | 41.3 | <b>34.8</b> | 0.0  | 2.2  | 2.2       | 0.0  | <b>13.0</b> | 0.0          | 2.2 | 0.0 |

Legend: Legend: D1=age of the respondent; D2=gender; D3=education in years; D4=religiousness; D5=domcile; D6=citizens of the country; W1=state of education in the country; W2=state of health services in the country; E1= household's total net income, all sources; E2= feeling about household's income nowadays; E3=satisfaction with the present state of economy; P1=interest in politics; P2=satisfaction with the national government; P3=Self placement on left right scale; S1=interpersonal trust; S2=interpersonal fairness; and S3=interpersonal helpfulness.

| Appendix 3.5 Missing Values (%) in Control Variables of the Quality of Policing  |             |     |     |     |     |     |         |     |          |     |     |           |     |      |              |     |     |  |
|--|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|-----|-----------|-----|------|--------------|-----|-----|--|
|  | Demographic |     |     |     |     |     | Welfare |     | Economic |     |     | Political |     |      | Soc. Capital |     |     |  |
| Countries  | D1          | D2  | D3  | D4  | D5  | D6  | W1      | W2  | E1       | E2  | E3  | P1        | P2  | P3   | S1           | S2  | S3  |  |
| EU-Level   | 0.3         | 0.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 3.9     | 1.2 | 23.8     | 1.1 | 1.9 | 0.3       | 2.9 | 13.4 | 0.4          | 0.7 | 0.4 |  |
| Belgium  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1     | 0.2 | 14.4     | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.1       | 1.2 | 3.6  | 0.0          | 0.1 | 0.0 |  |
| Bulgaria   | 0.2         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.4     | 2.0 | 26.2     | 0.1 | 5.5 | 1.1       | 5.2 | 27.7 | 0.4          | 0.2 | 1.2 |  |
| Switzerland  | 0.3         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.9     | 0.7 | 18.1     | 1.2 | 1.7 | 0.1       | 2.2 | 5.4  | 0.1          | 0.2 | 0.2 |  |
| Cyprus   | 0.2         | 0.2 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 6.7     | 1.6 | 24.2     | 1.1 | 1.3 | 0.0       | 2.7 | 26.0 | 0.2          | 0.7 | 0.9 |  |
| Czechia  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0     | 1.8 | 33.5     | 2.5 | 3.3 | 0.2       | 3.3 | 10.8 | 0.3          | 0.4 | 0.3 |  |
| Germany  | 0.2         | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 3.5     | 1.5 | 23.0     | 0.8 | 2.3 | 0.1       | 4.1 | 8.6  | 0.2          | 0.4 | 0.3 |  |
| Denmark  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3     | 1.3 | 14.0     | 0.9 | 2.1 | 0.2       | 2.7 | 4.4  | 0.2          | 0.3 | 0.2 |  |
| Estonia  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 4.0     | 3.1 | 15.2     | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.1       | 2.8 | 16.3 | 0.6          | 1.3 | 0.6 |  |
| Spain  | 0.3         | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.6     | 0.4 | 22.4     | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.0       | 2.3 | 11.2 | 0.4          | 1.0 | 0.4 |  |
| Finland  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.2     | 0.2 | 8.4      | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.1       | 1.4 | 4.8  | 0.1          | 0.4 | 0.4 |  |
| France   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.5     | 0.0 | 10.6     | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.0       | 0.8 | 5.3  | 0.1          | 0.2 | 0.0 |  |
| UK   | 0.2         | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 4.7     | 1.1 | 24.9     | 2.1 | 2.5 | 0.0       | 4.5 | 16.0 | 0.1          | 0.9 | 0.6 |  |
| Hungary  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 2.5     | 0.6 | 36.9     | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1       | 0.5 | 29.8 | 0.2          | 0.2 | 0.3 |  |
| Ireland  | 2.0         | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.3     | 1.7 | 30.4     | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.7       | 2.1 | 20.1 | 1.0          | 1.3 | 1.1 |  |
| Iceland  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.6     | 1.3 | 19.7     | 0.9 | 2.8 | 0.1       | 8.4 | 13.7 | 0.3          | 1.4 | 0.4 |  |
| Italy  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3     | 2.7 | 48.7     | 5.0 | 0.6 | 0.0       | 2.7 | 14.9 | 0.3          | 0.3 | 0.0 |  |
| Lithuania  | 2.3         | 0.0 | 3.2 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 8.5     | 3.9 | 26.8     | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.4       | 3.6 | 30.1 | 1.9          | 4.4 | 1.9 |  |
| Netherlands  | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 2.3     | 0.5 | 22.5     | 1.9 | 0.9 | 0.1       | 2.9 | 4.3  | 0.1          | 0.3 | 0.1 |  |
| Norway   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.7     | 0.3 | 5.7      | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.0       | 0.9 | 3.8  | 0.2          | 0.3 | 0.2 |  |
| Poland   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 6.8     | 2.0 | 27.1     | 0.9 | 4.5 | 1.2       | 3.5 | 16.0 | 0.1          | 0.7 | 1.6 |  |
| Portugal   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 3.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 4.9     | 0.6 | 100.0    | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.1       | 1.7 | 32.6 | 0.7          | 0.3 | 0.3 |  |
| Sweden   | 0.0         | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 4.1     | 0.9 | 6.5      | 0.1 | 3.5 | 0.0       | 3.4 | 3.3  | 0.5          | 0.5 | 0.3 |  |
| Slovenia   | 1.3         | 0.1 | 0.6 | 7.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 7.1     | 0.8 | 23.2     | 1.1 | 1.4 | 0.3       | 2.6 | 30.9 | 0.4          | 0.6 | 0.4 |  |
| Slovakia   | 0.5         | 0.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 3.0     | 0.6 | 36.1     | 1.2 | 2.8 | 1.8       | 3.3 | 13.2 | 1.3          | 1.5 | 0.5 |  |
| Legend: Legend: D1=age of the respondent; D2=gender; D3=education in years; D4=religiousness; D5=domcile; D6=citizens of the country; W1=state of education in the country; W2=state of health services in the country; E1= household's total net income, all sources; E2= feeling about household's income nowadays; E3=satisfaction with the present state of economy; P1=interest in politics; P2=satisfaction with the national government; P3=Self placement on left right scale; S1=interpersonal trust; S2=interepersonal fairness; and S3=interpersonal helpfulness. |             |     |     |     |     |     |         |     |          |     |     |           |     |      |              |     |     |  |

## Chapter 4

| <b>Appendix 4.1 Reliability Analyses of Welfare Performance and Social Capital</b> |                 |                |                 |                |                 |                |                 |                |
|--|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
|  | QED (ESS-6)     |                | QLD (ESS-6)     |                | QS (ESS-2)      |                | QP (ESS-5)      |                |
|  | Welfare Perform | Social Capital | Welfare Perform | Social Capital | Welfare Perform | Social Capital | Welfare Perform | Social Capital |
| EU-Level   | .70             | .79            | .70             | .78            | .62             | .70            | .71             | .79            |
| Austria  | a               |                | a               |                | .62             | .72            | a               |                |
| Belgium  | .56             | .70            | d               |                | .52             | .59            | .58             | .65            |
| Bulgaria   | .79             | .79            | .71             | .78            | a               |                | .70             | .78            |
| Switzerland  | .61             | .68            | .61             | .68            | .68             | .45            | .58             | .70            |
| Cyprus   | .68             | .78            | .70             | .77            | a               |                | .59             | .85            |
| Czechia  | .75             | .84            | d               |                | .65             | .69            | .63             | .82            |
| Germany  | .62             | .69            | .63             | .69            | .63             | .71            | .66             | .68            |
| Denmark  | d               |                | .56             | .74            | .43             | .69            | .54             | .70            |
| Estonia  | .64             | .72            | .64             | .72            | .69             | .67            | .60             | .71            |
| Spain  | .70             | .69            | .70             | .69            | .68             | .51            | .62             | .60            |
| Finland  | .53             | .73            | .53             | .73            | .53             | .69            | .56             | .73            |
| France   | .56             | .65            | .58             | .65            | c               |                | .61             | .59            |
| UK   | .60             | .73            | .60             | .72            | .61             | .48            | .60             | .70            |
| Greece   | a               |                | a               |                | .73             | .83            | .79             | .83            |
| Croatia  |                 |                |                 |                | a               |                | .75             | .79            |
| Hungary  | .78             | .81            | .78             | .81            | .77             | .53            | .80             | .84            |
| Ireland  | .62             | .78            | .61             | .77            | .53             | .65            | .76             | .79            |
| Iceland  | d               |                | d               |                | c               |                |                 |                |
| Italy  | .64             | .73            | .64             | .73            | d               |                | a               |                |
| Luxembourg   | a               |                | a               |                | e               |                |                 |                |
| Lithuania  | .75             | .81            | .75             | .79            | a               |                | .76             | .76            |
| Netherlands  | .63             | .71            | .64             | .71            | .57             | .61            | .50             | .68            |
| Norway   | d               |                | .49             | .71            | .51             | .50            | .56             | .70            |
| Poland   | .62             | .65            | .62             | .65            | e               |                | .57             | .72            |
| Portugal   | .71             | .76            | .73             | .76            |                 |                | .75             | .72            |
| Sweden   | d               |                | .69             | .74            | .62             | .62            | .58             | .71            |
| Slovenia   | .74             | .74            | d               |                | .64             | .72            | .81             | .78            |
| Slovakia   | .75             | .81            |                 |                | d               |                | .70             | .80            |

**Note:** These countries were dropped due to one or more of the following reasons. *a* not covered in the ESS; *b* removed from the analyses due to model fitness issues; *c* missed data on the quality of schooling; *d* contained very small sample sizes; and *e* were inspected as outliers.

| <b>Appendix 4.2 Distribution of Country-Level Variables</b> |     |             |              |             |             |              |             |             |              |             |
|---|-----|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
|   |     | <b>2012</b> |              |             | <b>2004</b> |              |             | <b>2010</b> |              |             |
|   | PC  | CPI         | GDP          | VC          | CPI         | GDP          | GE          | CPI         | GDP          | GE          |
| <b>EU-Mean</b>  |     | <b>6.4</b>  | <b>33918</b> | <b>1.05</b> | <b>6.4</b>  | <b>27243</b> | <b>1.23</b> | <b>6.3</b>  | <b>34791</b> | <b>1.14</b> |
| Austria   | No  | a           |              |             | 8.4         | 36822        | 1.87        | a           |              |             |
| Belgium   | No  | 7.5         | 44673        | 1.35        | 7.5         | 35364        | 1.88        | 7.1         | 44142        | 1.58        |
| Bulgaria  | Yes | 4.1         | 7393         | 0.40        | a           |              |             | 3.6         | 6810         | 0.11        |
| Switzerland   | No  | 8.6         | 83538        | 1.64        | 9.1         | 53340        | 2.18        | 8.7         | 74606        | 1.88        |
| Cyprus  | No  | 6.6         | 28912        | 1.02        | a           |              |             | 6.3         | 31024        | 1.53        |
| Czechia   | Yes | 4.9         | 19730        | 0.97        | 4.2         | 11686        | 0.86        | 4.6         | 19808        | 0.91        |
| Germany   | No  | 7.9         | 43858        | 1.39        | 8.2         | 34044        | 1.49        | 7.9         | 41532        | 1.57        |
| Denmark   | No  | 9.0         | 58508        | 1.67        | 9.5         | 46512        | 2.31        | 9.3         | 58041        | 2.1         |
| Estonia   | Yes | 6.4         | 17534        | 1.11        | 6.0         | 8913         | 0.92        | 6.5         | 14791        | 1.09        |
| Spain   | No  | 6.5         | 28324        | 1.06        | 7.1         | 24861        | 1.35        | 6.1         | 30503        | 0.99        |
| Finland   | No  | 9.0         | 47711        | 1.60        | 9.7         | 37703        | 2.17        | 9.2         | 46460        | 2.23        |
| France  | No  | 7.1         | 40875        | 1.24        | c           |              |             | 6.8         | 40638        | 1.43        |
| UK  | No  | 7.4         | 42463        | 1.34        | 8.6         | 40290        | 1.89        | 7.6         | 39436        | 1.57        |
| Greece  | No  | a           |              |             | 4.3         | 21955        | 0.81        | 3.5         | 26918        | 0.56        |
| Croatia   | Yes | a           |              |             | a           |              |             | 4.1         | 13924        | 0.62        |
| Hungary   | Yes | 5.5         | 12918        | 0.75        | e           |              |             | 4.7         | 13114        | 0.67        |
| Ireland   | No  | 6.9         | 48918        | 1.32        | 7.5         | 47631        | 1.54        | 8.0         | 48715        | 1.35        |
| Iceland   | No  | 8.2         | 45910        | 1.44        | d           |              |             | a           |              |             |
| Italy   | No  | 4.2         | 35054        | 0.92        | d           |              |             | a           |              |             |
| Lithuania   | Yes | 5.4         | 14339        | 0.93        | a           |              |             | 5.0         | 11957        | 0.74        |
| Luxembourg  | No  | a           |              |             | 8.4         | 75716        | 1.90        | a           |              |             |
| Latvia  | Yes | a           |              |             | 4.0         | 6343         | 0.61        | 4.3         | 11348        | 0.71        |
| Netherlands   | No  | 8.4         | 50073        | 1.61        | 8.7         | 40362        | 2.09        | 8.8         | 50950        | 1.73        |
| Norway  | No  | 8.5         | 101524       | 1.73        | 8.9         | 57604        | 2.08        | 8.6         | 87694        | 1.88        |
| Poland  | Yes | 5.8         | 13146        | 1.06        | e           |              |             | 5.3         | 12600        | 0.64        |
| Portugal  | No  | 6.3         | 20565        | 1.03        | e           |              |             | 6.0         | 22499        | 1.01        |
| Sweden  | No  | 8.8         | 58038        | 1.69        | 9.2         | 42822        | 2.12        | 9.2         | 52869        | 2.00        |
| Slovenia  | Yes | 6.1         | 17460        | 1.00        | 6.0         | 10672        | 0.87        | 6.4         | 16727        | 0.84        |
| Slovakia  | Yes | 4.6         | 22643        | 0.97        | d           |              |             | 4.3         | 23510        | 1.03        |

**Legend:** PC=Post-communist country; VC=Voice and accountability; and GE=Government effectiveness.

**Note:** These countries were dropped due to one or more of the following reasons. *a* not covered in the ESS; *b* removed from the analyses due to model fitness issues; *c* missed data on the quality of schooling; *d* contained very small sample sizes; and *e* were inspected as outliers.

### Appendix 4.3 Correlation Matrix: Quality of Electoral Democracy

#### Individual-Level Variables

|                        | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       | 7       |
|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1. Political trust     | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| 2. Gender              | -.02*** | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |
| 3. Age                 | -.01    | .02***  | 1       |         |         |         |         |
| 4. Education in years  | .07***  | -.02*** | -.22*** | 1       |         |         |         |
| 5. Religiousness       | .09***  | .16***  | .21***  | -.11*** | 1       |         |         |
| 6. Domicile            | .01*    | -.02*** | .05***  | -.17*** | .05***  | 1       |         |
| 7. Citizenship         | .05***  | -.01    | -.07*** | .01     | .07***  | -.08*** | 1       |
| 8. Welfare performance | .32***  | -.05*** | -.04*** | -.02*** | .07***  | .01**   | .04***  |
| 9. Felt income         | -.28*** | .07***  | .05***  | -.21*** | .04***  | -.03*** | .03***  |
| 10. Sat: economy       | .42***  | -.04*** | -.05*** | .05***  | .06***  | -.03*** | .04***  |
| 11. Political interest | -.26*** | .14***  | -.15*** | -.22*** | -.02*** | .03***  | .02***  |
| 12. Sat: Government    | .52***  | -.02*** | -.00    | .04***  | .10***  | -.02*** | .04***  |
| 13. Left right         | .09***  | -.01*** | .01*    | .00     | .11***  | .02**   | -.03*** |
| 14. Social capital     | .29***  | .01*    | -.01*** | .12***  | .04***  | -.00    | -.02**  |

|                        | 8       | 9       | 10      | 11      | 12     | 13     | 14 |
|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|----|
| 8. Welfare performance | 1       |         |         |         |        |        |    |
| 9. Felt income         | -.11*** | 1       |         |         |        |        |    |
| 10. Sat: Economy       | .38***  | -.21*** | 1       |         |        |        |    |
| 11. Political interest | -.00    | .19***  | -.05*** | 1       |        |        |    |
| 12. Sat: government    | .40***  | -.16*** | .61***  | -.09*** | 1      |        |    |
| 13. Left-right         | .11***  | -.08*** | .15***  | .00     | .16*** | 1      |    |
| 14. Social capital     | .23***  | -.17*** | .27***  | -.11*** | .25*** | .04*** | 1  |

#### Country-Level Variables

|                             | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1. Political trust          | 1      |        |        |        |
| 2. Communist past           | .20*** | 1      |        |        |
| 3. Voice and accountability | .37*** | .69*** | 1      |        |
| 4. GDP/10000                | .35*** | .77*** | .86*** | .85*** |
| 4. CPI                      | .37*** | .73*** | .92*** | .80*** |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .



| <b>Appendix 4.4 Correlation Matrix: Quality of Liberal Democracy</b>                                |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|   | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       | 7       |
| 1. Political trust  | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| 2. Gender   | -.02*** | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |
| 3. Age  | -.02**  | .02***  | 1       |         |         |         |         |
| 4. Education in years   | .08***  | -.01*   | -.22*** | 1       |         |         |         |
| 5. Religiousness  | .09***  | .16***  | .22***  | -.10*** | 1       |         |         |
| 6. Domicile   | -.01*   | -.01*   | .06***  | -.16*** | .05***  | 1       |         |
| 7. Citizenship  | .04***  | -.01    | -.07*** | .02***  | .07***  | -.09*** | 1       |
| 8. Welfare performance  | .32***  | -.05*** | -.04*** | .02***  | .08***  | .01**   | .04***  |
| 9. Felt income  | -.30*** | .07***  | .01*    | -.17*** | .03***  | -.03*** | .06***  |
| 10. Sat: economy  | .40***  | -.05*** | -.02*** | .05***  | -.07*** | .02**   | .04***  |
| 11. Political interest  | -.30*** | .15***  | -.14*** | -.22*** | -.02*** | .04***  | .03***  |
| 12. Sat: Government   | .51***  | -.00    | -.00    | .04***  | .10***  | .01*    | .04***  |
| 13. Left right  | .07***  | -.03*** | .06***  | -.03*** | .12***  | .05***  | -.04*** |
| 14. Social capital  | .31***  | .02***  | .02***  | .13***  | -.04*** | .00     | -.02*** |
|   | 8       | 9       | 10      | 11      | 12      | 13      | 14      |
| 8. Welfare performance  | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| 9. Felt income  | -.11*** | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |
| 10. Sat: Economy  | .37***  | -.22*** | 1       |         |         |         |         |
| 11. Political interest  | -.01*   | .23***  | -.05*** | 1       |         |         |         |
| 12. Sat: government   | .39***  | -.17*** | .59***  | -.08*** | 1       |         |         |
| 13. Left-right  | .09***  | -.06*** | .12***  | -.00    | .12***  | 1       |         |
| 14. Social capital  | .26***  | -.18*** | .27***  | -.12*** | .27***  | .02***  | 1       |
| <b>Country-Level Variables</b>  |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|   | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       |         |         |         |
| 1. Political trust  | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| 2. Communist past   | .17***  | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |
| 3. Voice and accountability   | .42***  | .62***  | 1       |         |         |         |         |
| 4. GDP/10000  | .38***  | .65***  | .86***  | 1       |         |         |         |
| 4. CPI  | .42***  | .61***  | .95***  | .77***  | 1       |         |         |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; *** $p \leq .001$ . |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |

### Appendix 4.5 Correlation Matrix: Quality of Schooling

#### Individual-Level Variables

|                        | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       | 7      |
|------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| 1. Political trust     | 1       |         |         |         |         |         |        |
| 2. Gender              | -.04*   | 1       |         |         |         |         |        |
| 3. Age                 | -.03*   | .00     | 1       |         |         |         |        |
| 4. Education in years  | -.04*   | .03     | .80***  | 1       |         |         |        |
| 5. Religiousness       | .10***  | .12***  | -.02    | -.02    | 1       |         |        |
| 6. Domicile            | .01     | .04*    | -.20*** | -.20*** | .04*    | 1       |        |
| 7. Citizenship         | .02     | -.02    | .04*    | -.00    | .13***  | -.10*** | 1      |
| 8. Welfare performance | .32***  | -.10*** | -.12*** | -.12*** | .07***  | .07***  | .07*** |
| 9. Felt income         | -.10*** | .03     | .14***  | .05*    | -.01    | -.13*** | .13*** |
| 10. Sat: economy       | .33***  | -.07**  | -.06**  | -.04*   | .06***  | .03     | .01    |
| 11. Political interest | -.21*** | .10***  | -.22*** | -.23*** | -.05*** | .04*    | .04*   |
| 12. Sat: Government    | .49***  | -.02    | -.07*** | -.07*** | .10***  | .00     | .04*   |
| 13. Left right         | .07***  | -.08*** | -.01    | -.02    | .10***  | .03     | .00    |
| 14. Social capital     | .26***  | -.00    | -.01    | .00     | .05**   | .01     | .00    |

|                        | 8      | 9       | 10     | 11      | 12     | 13  | 14 |
|------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|-----|----|
| 8. Welfare performance | 1      |         |        |         |        |     |    |
| 9. Felt income         | -.04*  | 1       |        |         |        |     |    |
| 10. Sat: Economy       | .36*** | -.16*** | 1      |         |        |     |    |
| 11. Political interest | .07*** | .09***  | -.01   | 1       |        |     |    |
| 12. Sat: government    | .40*** | -.11*** | .57*** | .01     | 1      |     |    |
| 13. Left-right         | .05*** | -.08*** | .10*** | .00     | .10*** | 1   |    |
| 14. Social capital     | .22*** | -.09*** | .25*** | -.04*** | .21*** | .02 | 1  |

#### Country-Level Variables

|                             | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1. Political trust          | 1      |        |        |        |
| 2. Communist past           | .22*** | 1      |        |        |
| 3. Government effectiveness | .30*** | .82*** | 1      |        |
| 4. GDP/10000                | .25*** | .85*** | .90*** | 1      |
| 5. CPI                      | .27*** | .76*** | .95*** | .84*** |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

| <b>Appendix 4.6 Correlation Matrix: Quality of Policing</b> |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>                           |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |
|   | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5      | 6       | 7       |
| 1. Political trust  | 1       |         |         |         |        |         |         |
| 2. Gender   | -.02*** | 1       |         |         |        |         |         |
| 3. Age  | -.00    | .03***  | 1       |         |        |         |         |
| 4. Education in years                                       | .05***  | -.01*   | -.23*** | 1       |        |         |         |
| 5. Religiousness  | .10***  | .18***  | .20***  | -.10*** | 1      |         |         |
| 6. Domicile   | .05***  | -.03*** | .05***  | -.17*** | .05*** | 1       |         |
| 7. Citizenship  | .06***  | -.00    | .07***  | .01**   | .05*** | -.06*** | 1       |
| 8. Welfare performance                                      | .30***  | -.04*** | -.04*** | -.04*** | .08*** | .02***  | .07***  |
| 9. Felt income  | -.31*** | .07***  | .04***  | -.19*** | .03*** | -.06*** | .04***  |
| 10. Sat: economy  | .36***  | -.04*** | -.04**  | .05***  | .06*** | -.00    | .05***  |
| 11. Political interest                                      | -.29*** | .13***  | -.15*** | -.21*** | -.01** | .04***  | .04***  |
| 12. Sat: Government   | .49***  | -.02*** | .00     | .03***  | .09*** | .00     | .05***  |
| 13. Left right  | .08***  | -.03*** | -.03*** | -.01*   | .13*** | .04***  | -.03*** |
| 14. Social capital  | .27***  | .02***  | .00     | .12***  | .05*** | .00     | -.02*** |
|   | 8       | 9       | 10      | 11      | 12     | 13      | 14      |
| 8. Welfare performance                                      | 1       |         |         |         |        |         |         |
| 9. Felt income  | -.09*** | 1       |         |         |        |         |         |
| 10. Sat: Economy  | .35***  | -.18*** | 1       |         |        |         |         |
| 11. Political interest                                      | .00     | .21***  | -.05*** | 1       |        |         |         |
| 12. Sat: government   | .36***  | -.13*** | .55***  | -.09*** | 1      |         |         |
| 13. Left-right  | .08***  | -.06*** | .11***  | -.01*   | .17*** | 1       |         |
| 14. Social capital  | .24***  | -.14*** | .26***  | -.10*** | .23*** | .02***  | 1       |
| <b>Country-Level Variables</b>                              |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |
|   | 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       |        |         |         |
| 1. Political trust  | 1       |         |         |         |        |         |         |
| 2. Communist past   | .23***  | 1       |         |         |        |         |         |
| 3. Government effectiveness                                 | .44***  | .68***  | 1       |         |        |         |         |
| 4. GDP/10000  | .39***  | .74***  | .84***  | 1       |        |         |         |
| 5. CPI  | .43***  | .64***  | .93***  | .80***  | 1      |         |         |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight. \* $p \leq .05$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

## Chapter 5

### Appendix 5.1 Items Measuring Quality of Democracy

| How important you think it is for democracy in general... |   | To what extent you think each of these statements applies in [country]... |   |       |
|---|---|---|---|-------|
| Electoral Expectations                                    |   | Abbr.   | Electoral Performance   | Abbr. |
| 1   | National elections are free and fair  | E1  | National elections are free and fair  | P1    |
| 2   | Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another                   | E2  | Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another               | P2    |
| 3   | Opposition parties are free to criticise the government                               | E3  | Opposition parties are free to criticise the government                           | P3    |
| 4   | Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job             | E4  | Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job         | P4    |
| 5   | The government explains its decisions to voters                                       | E5  | The government explains its decisions to voters                                   | P5    |
| 6   | Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote             | E6  | Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote         | P6    |
| Liberal Expectations                                      |   | Liberal Performance   |   |       |
| 7   | The courts treat everyone the same  | E7  | The courts treat everyone the same  | P7    |
| 8   | The courts able to stop the government acting beyond its authority                    | E7a   |   |       |
| 9   | The rights of minority groups are protected   | E8  | The rights of minority groups are protected                                       | P8    |
| 10  | The media are free to criticise the government  | E9  | The media are free to criticise the government                                    | P9    |
| 11  | Immigrants only get the right to vote in national elections once they become citizens | E9a   |   |       |
| 12  | The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government          | E10   | The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government      | P10   |
| Social Expectations                                       |   | Social Performance  |   |       |
| 13  | The government protects all citizens against poverty                                  | E11   | The government protects all citizens against poverty                              | P11   |
| 14  | The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels                  | E12   | The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels              | P12   |
| Direct Democracy Expectations                             |   | Direct Democracy Performance  |   |       |
| 15  | Citizens have the final say on political issues by voting directly in referendums     | E13   | Citizens have the final say on political issues by voting directly in referendums | P13   |
| External Responsiveness Expectations                      |   | External Responsiveness Performance                                       |   |       |
| 16  | Politicians take into account the views of other European governments                 | E14   | Politicians take into account the views of other European governments             | P14   |

| Appendix 5.2 Missing Values (%) in the Measures of Quality of Democracy  |                         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |                        |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |
|--|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------------|-----|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|--|
|  | Democratic Expectations |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | Democratic Performance |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |
|  | E1                      | E2  | E3  | E4  | E5  | E6  | E7  | E8  | E9  | E10 | P1                     | P2  | P3  | P4   | P5  | P6   | P7  | P8   | P9  | P10 |  |
| Belgium  | 0.8                     | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.2                    | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.0  | 1.7 | 2.0  | 1.1 | 1.6  | 1.8 | 1.3 |  |
| Bulgaria   | 3.2                     | 6.1 | 5.5 | 7.9 | 4.4 | 7.8 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 7.9                    | 9.2 | 6.6 | 10.7 | 6.2 | 8.5  | 6.6 | 7.2  | 6.9 | 9.0 |  |
| Switzerland  | 3.4                     | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 5.3                    | 7.1 | 8.5 | 8.4  | 5.8 | 7.4  | 6.9 | 5.8  | 4.6 | 4.7 |  |
| Cyprus   | 3.0                     | 3.7 | 3.3 | 6.5 | 3.2 | 6.5 | 1.1 | 4.3 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 5.6                    | 8.1 | 4.7 | 11.8 | 6.9 | 7.4  | 8.2 | 5.4  | 4.8 | 5.5 |  |
| Czechia  | 3.4                     | 6.7 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 3.0 | 4.7                    | 7.8 | 6.7 | 6.6  | 3.7 | 5.0  | 4.7 | 8.5  | 5.4 | 5.6 |  |
| Germany  | 1.0                     | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.6                    | 2.1 | 2.2 | 4.9  | 1.9 | 3.1  | 2.7 | 3.1  | 1.1 | 1.4 |  |
| <b>Denmark</b>   | 2.1                     | 2.8 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.6                    | 2.4 | 3.5 | 4.2  | 2.8 | 3.9  | 4.0 | 5.3  | 2.3 | 2.4 |  |
| Estonia  | 2.8                     | 5.9 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 4.4                    | 8.2 | 6.1 | 8.7  | 4.1 | 6.3  | 6.8 | 7.9  | 3.3 | 4.0 |  |
| Spain  | 2.8                     | 4.8 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 4.3                    | 6.6 | 4.2 | 5.1  | 3.8 | 6.6  | 3.1 | 5.9  | 3.6 | 4.3 |  |
| <b>Finland</b>   | 1.5                     | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.1                    | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9  | 2.8 | 2.9  | 2.7 | 3.0  | 2.3 | 2.5 |  |
| France   | 1.5                     | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.9                    | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.8  | 1.4 | 1.7  | 1.9 | 2.8  | 1.2 | 1.5 |  |
| Germany  | 4.4                     | 6.8 | 5.5 | 6.8 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 4.4 | 6.8 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 3.9                    | 6.7 | 5.2 | 7.5  | 5.7 | 7.4  | 5.6 | 8.6  | 4.6 | 6.0 |  |
| Hungary  | 2.9                     | 4.7 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 8.9                    | 8.8 | 7.4 | 10.5 | 6.2 | 8.9  | 7.7 | 5.3  | 7.1 | 6.9 |  |
| Ireland  | 2.4                     | 3.4 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 3.3                    | 5.4 | 2.8 | 4.5  | 4.8 | 6.7  | 5.9 | 6.1  | 2.4 | 4.1 |  |
| Iceland  | 0.9                     | 2.7 | 1.9 | 4.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 2.3                    | 4.3 | 4.3 | 6.0  | 3.9 | 5.1  | 4.3 | 4.3  | 2.7 | 3.2 |  |
| Italy  | 2.4                     | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 4.0                    | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.3  | 3.2 | 4.6  | 4.1 | 5.3  | 4.2 | 3.6 |  |
| Lithuania  | 3.8                     | 6.5 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 2.7 | 8.8 | 3.1 | 7.0 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 5.2                    | 8.7 | 7.2 | 6.7  | 3.6 | 10.3 | 4.3 | 9.8  | 4.4 | 3.8 |  |
| Netherlands  | 1.1                     | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1                    | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.1  | 1.6 | 2.7  | 3.1 | 2.3  | 1.1 | 1.5 |  |
| <b>Norway</b>  | 0.9                     | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3                    | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.4  | 2.2 | 1.9  | 1.7 | 2.5  | 1.2 | 1.7 |  |
| Poland   | 2.7                     | 5.7 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 1.9 | 5.0 | 1.6 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 4.6                    | 6.5 | 5.0 | 7.3  | 3.0 | 6.8  | 3.8 | 14.3 | 3.0 | 3.6 |  |
| Portugal   | 2.2                     | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 3.6 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 6.8                    | 7.3 | 4.2 | 5.6  | 3.1 | 10.2 | 3.6 | 5.0  | 3.9 | 7.0 |  |
| <b>Sweden</b>  | 2.1                     | 2.3 | 3.5 | 5.6 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9                    | 2.8 | 3.8 | 5.8  | 2.8 | 4.4  | 4.0 | 5.1  | 1.7 | 2.6 |  |
| Slovenia   | 3.5                     | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.4                    | 9.2 | 7.5 | 6.3  | 5.6 | 7.7  | 5.2 | 10.3 | 4.4 | 6.5 |  |
| Slovakia   | 1.6                     | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.7                    | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.5  | 1.8 | 2.3  | 2.4 | 2.6  | 1.9 | 2.2 |  |
| <b>Legend:</b> Items E1 to E10 and P1 to P10 correspond to Electoral Expectations and Electoral Performance in Appendix 5.1. |                         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |                        |     |     |      |     |      |     |      |     |     |  |

### Appendix 5.3 Distribution of Quality of Electoral Democracy

|             | Electoral Expectations |       |      |      | Electoral Performance |       |      |      | Electoral Disconfirmation |      |       |      |
|-------------|------------------------|-------|------|------|-----------------------|-------|------|------|---------------------------|------|-------|------|
|             | Min                    | Max   | Mean | SD   | Min                   | Max   | Mean | SD   | Min                       | Max  | Mean  | SD   |
| EU-20       | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.39 | 1.52 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.17 | 2.23 | -10.00                    | 8.00 | -3.22 | 2.65 |
| Belgium     | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.11 | 1.37 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.77 | 1.80 | -9.67                     | 3.33 | -2.34 | 1.98 |
| Bulgaria    | .00                    | 10.00 | 9.09 | 1.30 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.33 | 2.29 | -10.00                    | 4.50 | -4.76 | 2.64 |
| Switzerland | 3.00                   | 10.00 | 8.12 | 1.27 | .00                   | 10.00 | 6.87 | 1.51 | -8.00                     | 4.00 | -1.25 | 1.61 |
| Cyprus      | .00                    | 10.00 | 9.15 | 1.22 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.46 | 2.36 | -10.00                    | 4.33 | -4.70 | 2.57 |
| Czechia     | 1.50                   | 10.00 | 8.18 | 1.61 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.18 | 2.05 | -10.00                    | 7.00 | -3.98 | 2.85 |
| Germany     | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.32 | 1.33 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.52 | 1.90 | -10.00                    | 5.00 | -2.81 | 2.18 |
| Estonia     | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.32 | 1.67 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.39 | 2.12 | -10.00                    | 8.00 | -3.92 | 2.71 |
| Spain       | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.88 | 1.31 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.63 | 2.17 | -10.00                    | 5.67 | -4.25 | 2.54 |
| Finland     | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.08 | 1.25 | .00                   | 10.00 | 6.78 | 1.54 | -8.00                     | 5.67 | -1.31 | 1.66 |
| France      | 3.00                   | 10.00 | 8.48 | 1.36 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.33 | 1.85 | -10.00                    | 5.00 | -3.15 | 2.17 |
| UK          | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.12 | 1.61 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.84 | 2.18 | -10.00                    | 5.33 | -2.28 | 2.42 |
| Hungary     | 1.67                   | 10.00 | 8.74 | 1.55 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.89 | 2.53 | -10.00                    | 6.00 | -3.82 | 3.06 |
| Ireland     | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.17 | 1.73 | .00                   | 10.00 | 6.05 | 2.23 | -10.00                    | 5.50 | -2.11 | 2.50 |
| Italy       | .33                    | 10.00 | 8.90 | 1.32 | .00                   | 10.00 | 3.40 | 2.14 | -10.00                    | 3.67 | -5.51 | 2.64 |
| Lithuania   | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.02 | 1.86 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.20 | 2.15 | -10.00                    | 4.50 | -3.81 | 2.68 |
| Netherlands | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.08 | 1.20 | .00                   | 10.00 | 6.37 | 1.46 | -10.00                    | 4.00 | -1.71 | 1.62 |
| Poland      | .33                    | 10.00 | 8.82 | 1.26 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.10 | 2.07 | -10.00                    | 5.00 | -3.71 | 2.35 |
| Portugal    | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.45 | 1.57 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.23 | 2.15 | -10.00                    | 4.00 | -4.22 | 2.61 |
| Slovenia    | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.47 | 1.46 | .00                   | 10.00 | 4.79 | 2.04 | -10.00                    | 8.00 | -3.68 | 2.49 |
| Slovakia    | .00                    | 10.00 | 8.02 | 1.74 | .00                   | 10.00 | 5.08 | 2.04 | -10.00                    | 7.00 | -2.94 | 2.36 |

**Note:** Data weighted by design weight.

## Chapter 6

| <b>Appendix 6.1 Distribution of Quality of Liberal Democracy</b> |                      |       |      |      |                     |       |      |      |                         |       |       |      |
|--|----------------------|-------|------|------|---------------------|-------|------|------|-------------------------|-------|-------|------|
|  | Liberal Expectations |       |      |      | Liberal Performance |       |      |      | Liberal Disconfirmation |       |       |      |
|  | Min                  | Max   | Mean | SD   | Min                 | Max   | Mean | SD   | Min                     | Max   | Mean  | SD   |
| EU-20  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.78 | 1.47 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.01 | 2.19 | -10.00                  | 10.00 | -2.77 | 2.42 |
| Belgium  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.44 | 1.49 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 5.98 | 1.79 | -10.00                  | 3.33  | -2.46 | 1.98 |
| Switzerland  | 3.00                 | 10.00 | 8.93 | 1.15 | 1.33                | 10.00 | 6.94 | 1.67 | -8.00                   | 4.33  | -1.99 | 1.79 |
| Cyprus   | 2.50                 | 10.00 | 9.06 | 1.34 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.25 | 2.00 | -10.00                  | 5.67  | -2.81 | 2.16 |
| Germany  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 9.23 | 1.13 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.78 | 1.81 | -10.00                  | 6.00  | -2.45 | 1.94 |
| Denmark  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 9.20 | 1.03 | 1.00                | 10.00 | 7.25 | 1.60 | -8.67                   | 3.67  | -1.96 | 1.62 |
| Estonia  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.70 | 1.67 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 5.30 | 2.25 | -10.00                  | 6.67  | -3.38 | 2.70 |
| Spain  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 9.23 | 1.21 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 4.39 | 2.21 | -10.00                  | 3.00  | -4.84 | 2.56 |
| Finland  | 0.33                 | 10.00 | 8.59 | 1.31 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 7.19 | 1.53 | -8.67                   | 4.00  | -1.40 | 1.56 |
| France   | 1.33                 | 10.00 | 8.52 | 1.45 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 5.43 | 1.89 | -10.00                  | 5.00  | -3.09 | 2.21 |
| UK   | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.31 | 1.71 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.33 | 2.07 | -10.00                  | 7.00  | -1.96 | 2.23 |
| Hungary  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.71 | 1.59 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 5.45 | 2.24 | -10.00                  | 4.00  | -3.23 | 2.75 |
| Ireland  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.27 | 1.78 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.46 | 2.10 | -10.00                  | 10.00 | -1.80 | 2.34 |
| Iceland  | 0.67                 | 10.00 | 9.36 | 1.05 | 0.33                | 10.00 | 6.15 | 1.97 | -9.67                   | 6.67  | -3.22 | 2.20 |
| Italy  | 2.33                 | 10.00 | 9.01 | 1.29 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 4.24 | 2.11 | -10.00                  | 2.00  | -4.77 | 2.46 |
| Lithuania  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.23 | 1.87 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 4.73 | 2.08 | -10.00                  | 10.00 | -3.50 | 2.51 |
| Netherlands  | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.55 | 1.31 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 6.58 | 1.51 | -9.33                   | 6.67  | -1.98 | 1.64 |
| Norway   | 1.00                 | 10.00 | 8.99 | 1.11 | 1.33                | 10.00 | 7.50 | 1.48 | -7.33                   | 5.67  | -1.50 | 1.58 |
| Poland   | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 9.25 | 1.14 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 5.24 | 2.04 | -10.00                  | 4.00  | -4.00 | 2.24 |
| Portugal   | 0.00                 | 10.00 | 8.62 | 1.59 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 4.16 | 1.86 | -10.00                  | 6.67  | -4.46 | 2.46 |
| Sweden   | 2.33                 | 10.00 | 9.23 | 1.06 | 0.00                | 10.00 | 7.50 | 2.03 | -10.00                  | 4.00  | -1.73 | 2.05 |
| <b>Note:</b> Data weighted by design weight.                     |                      |       |      |      |                     |       |      |      |                         |       |       |      |

## Chapter 7

### Appendix 7.1 Justice Dimensions/Principles (Rasooli, Zandi, and DeLuca 2019)

| Dimensions of Justice                                 | Justice principles            | Descriptions   |
|---|-------------------------------|--|
| Distributive (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975)             | Equity                        | Outcomes are distributed based on contributions                |
| Procedural (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Leventahal, 1980) | Equality                      | Outcomes are distributed equally                               |
|   | Need                          | Outcomes are distributed based on needs                        |
|   | Consistency                   | Procedures are implemented consistently across people and time |
|   | Voice (or representativeness) | Procedures consider the concerns of all those involved         |
|   | Bias suppression              | Procedures are neutral and avoid personal bias                 |
|   | Accuracy                      | Procedures are based on accurate information                   |
| Interpersonal (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993)    | Correctability                | Procedures are corrected when identified as wrong              |
|   | Ethicality                    | Procedures uphold ethical and moral values                     |
|   | Respect                       | Procedures are implemented sincerely and politely              |
| Informational (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993)    | Propriety                     | Procedures are implemented refraining from improper remarks    |
|   | Truthfulness                  | Procedures are explained honestly                              |
|   | Justification                 | Procedures are explained adequately                            |

### Appendix 7.2 Reliability Analyses of Functional Effectiveness

| Country     | Alpha Scores |
|-------------|--------------|
| EU-17       | .66          |
| Austria     | .74          |
| Belgium     | .53          |
| Switzerland | .61          |
| Czechia     | .69          |
| Germany     | .63          |
| Denmark     | .68          |
| Estonia     | .61          |
| Spain       | .62          |
| Finland     | .58          |
| UK          | .77          |
| Greece      | .78          |
| Hungary     | .37          |
| Ireland     | .57          |
| Luxembourg  | .77          |
| Netherlands | .69          |
| Norway      | .60          |
| Sweden      | .63          |
| Slovenia    | .72          |



| <b>Appendix 7.3 Distribution of Quality of Schooling Amongst Students</b> |                     |      |                          |      |
|---|---------------------|------|--------------------------|------|
| <b>Country</b>  | Procedural Fairness |      | Functional Effectiveness |      |
|   | Mean                | SD   | Mean                     | SD   |
| EU-17   | 3.57                | 1.06 | 8.23                     | 1.88 |
| Austria   | 3.11                | 1.20 | 8.02                     | 2.05 |
| Belgium   | 3.60                | 1.09 | 8.29                     | 1.74 |
| Switzerland   | 3.71                | 1.00 | 8.76                     | 1.60 |
| Czechia   | 3.37                | 1.06 | 7.58                     | 2.24 |
| Germany   | 3.44                | 1.05 | 8.19                     | 1.70 |
| Denmark   | 4.02                | 0.83 | 8.78                     | 1.70 |
| Estonia   | 3.54                | 0.99 | 8.04                     | 1.71 |
| Spain   | 3.75                | 0.96 | 7.98                     | 1.98 |
| Finland   | 3.71                | 0.99 | 8.32                     | 1.57 |
| UK  | 3.74                | 0.98 | 8.65                     | 1.98 |
| Greece  | 3.49                | 1.09 | 7.73                     | 1.99 |
| Ireland   | 3.86                | 0.97 | 8.82                     | 1.57 |
| Luxembourg  | 3.18                | 1.15 | 7.83                     | 2.21 |
| Netherlands   | 3.69                | 0.84 | 8.27                     | 1.74 |
| Norway  | 3.83                | 0.97 | 8.74                     | 1.51 |
| Sweden  | 3.95                | 1.03 | 8.88                     | 1.55 |
| Slovenia  | 3.48                | 1.02 | 7.78                     | 1.81 |

| Appendix 8.1 Missing Values (%) in Quality of Policing  |                      |         |                     |         |         |                          |         |         |
|---|----------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|---------|
|   | Distributive Justice |         | Procedural Fairness |         |         | Functional Effectiveness |         |         |
| Country   | plcvcrp              | plcvcrc | plcrspc             | plcfrdc | plcexdc | Plcpvcr                  | plccbrg | plcarcr |
| EU-24   | 7.4                  | 19.7    | 5.2                 | 8.5     | 9.9     | 3.4                      | 3.6     | 4.1     |
| Belgium   | 2.3                  | 3.1     | 0.6                 | 2.9     | 2.6     | 0.8                      | 0.8     | 0.9     |
| Bulgaria  | 11.3                 | 15.6    | 8.5                 | 17.2    | 18.3    | 6.1                      | 5.6     | 8.3     |
| Switzerland   | 7.9                  | 8.8     | 2.3                 | 6.1     | 6.0     | 3.5                      | 5.2     | 4.3     |
| Cyprus  | 6.7                  | 14.2    | 10.0                | 12.7    | 12.9    | 3.8                      | 3.6     | 5.6     |
| Czechia   | 8.0                  | 12.4    | 10.8                | 12.4    | 13.6    | 3.6                      | 3.7     | 9.4     |
| Germany   | 6.9                  | 9.3     | 5.1                 | 8.3     | 11.3    | 3.4                      | 2.7     | 3.6     |
| Denmark   | 3.2                  | 4.3     | 1.5                 | 3.8     | 6.9     | 3.2                      | 2.2     | 2.3     |
| Estonia   | 8.6                  | 11.0    | 7.3                 | 10.7    | 11.4    | 6.0                      | 5.6     | 6.2     |
| Spain   | 6.7                  | 11.4    | 1.6                 | 5.4     | 6.6     | 3.0                      | 2.5     | 3.1     |
| Finland   | 3.2                  | 5.2     | 1.9                 | 3.4     | 4.4     | 2.2                      | 1.9     | 1.3     |
| France  | 3.5                  | 2.0     | 2.0                 | 4.8     | 3.2     | 0.7                      | 0.9     | 1.2     |
| UK  | 10.2                 | 10.2    | 2.9                 | 5.3     | 9.9     | 4.4                      | 5.8     | 5.5     |
| Greece  | 3.5                  | 5.5     | 4.8                 | 7.6     | 9.8     | 0.4                      | 0.6     | 3.0     |
| Croatia   | 9.2                  | 16.4    | 7.4                 | 11.9    | 12.0    | 2.6                      | 4.9     | 4.8     |
| Hungary   | 19.0                 | 20.2    | 10.8                | 18.4    | 17.6    | 3.7                      | 3.7     | 5.4     |
| Ireland   | 8.5                  | 12.9    | 4.2                 | 4.7     | 9.4     | 3.2                      | 4.2     | 3.8     |
| Lithuania   | 13.0                 | 28.3    | 13.5                | 16.8    | 15.2    | 5.1                      | 5.7     | 5.6     |
| Netherlands   | 3.9                  | 5.6     | 2.3                 | 5.4     | 5.4     | 2.5                      | 2.4     | 1.7     |
| Norway  | 2.1                  | 2.6     | 1.2                 | 2.4     | 5.7     | 1.7                      | 1.2     | 1.7     |
| Poland  | 11.9                 | 24.7    | 10.4                | 12.4    | 15.4    | 4.0                      | 5.0     | 6.2     |
| Portugal  | 10.8                 | 19.4    | 2.5                 | 14.4    | 14.5    | 3.8                      | 3.7     | 7.9     |
| Sweden  | 5.1                  | 5.3     | 3.2                 | 5.6     | 10.2    | 3.7                      | 2.7     | 1.9     |
| Slovenia  | 10.2                 | 16.0    | 9.7                 | 12.3    | 13.6    | 4.6                      | 6.0     | 5.7     |
| Slovakia  | 8.4                  | 17.4    | 12.5                | 14.6    | 15.0    | 5.9                      | 5.6     | 4.6     |
| <b>Legend:</b> plcvcrp=How police treat victims of crime: Rich/poor; plcvcrc=How police treat victims of crime: Different races/ethnic groups; plcrspc=How often do police treat people in country with respect; plcfrdc=How often do police make fair, impartial decisions; plcexdc=How often do the police explain their decisions and actions when asked; plcpvcr=How successful police are at preventing crimes in country; plccbrg=How successful police are at catching house burglars in country; plcarcr=How quickly would police arrive at a violent crime scene near to where you live. |                      |         |                     |         |         |                          |         |         |

| <b>Appendix 8.2 Reliability Analysis of Measures of the Quality of Policing</b> |                      |                     |                          |
|---|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
|   | Distributive Justice | Procedural Fairness | Functional Effectiveness |
| EU-24   | <b>.52</b>           | .72                 | .76                      |
| Belgium   | <b>.44</b>           | .60                 | .68                      |
| Bulgaria  | .60                  | .77                 | .82                      |
| Switzerland   | <b>.52</b>           | .64                 | .68                      |
| Cyprus  | <b>.54</b>           | .76                 | .84                      |
| Czechia   | <b>.53</b>           | .79                 | .77                      |
| Germany   | <b>.51</b>           | .60                 | .66                      |
| Denmark   | <b>.43</b>           | .62                 | .65                      |
| Estonia   | <b>.50</b>           | <b>.56</b>          | .70                      |
| Spain   | <b>.60</b>           | .69                 | .79                      |
| Finland   | <b>.37</b>           | .60                 | .67                      |
| France  | <b>.46</b>           | .60                 | .75                      |
| UK  | <b>.47</b>           | .69                 | .74                      |
| Greece  | <b>.47</b>           | .79                 | .89                      |
| Croatia   | .66                  | .72                 | .83                      |
| Hungary   | .61                  | .67                 | .75                      |
| Ireland   | .60                  | .71                 | .75                      |
| Lithuania   | <b>.48</b>           | .70                 | .80                      |
| Netherlands   | <b>.35</b>           | .60                 | .67                      |
| Norway  | <b>.44</b>           | .62                 | .71                      |
| Poland  | <b>.52</b>           | .72                 | .79                      |
| Portugal  | .67                  | .63                 | .81                      |
| Sweden  | <b>.51</b>           | .61                 | .70                      |
| Slovenia  | <b>.50</b>           | <b>.56</b>          | .78                      |
| Slovakia  | <b>.56</b>           | .71                 | .79                      |

# Résumé détaillé de la thèse

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## Les sources procédurales et fonctionnelles de la confiance politique en Europe

### 1. Introduction

Cette thèse vise à répondre à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure les évaluations procédurales et fonctionnelles de la performance des régimes démocratiques expliquent la confiance politique en Europe ? Elle le fait en accordant une attention particulière aux concepts de qualité de la démocratie et de qualité des services publics. Sur le plan théorique, elle distingue la confiance politique de ses concepts alliés et clarifie le sens qu'elle prend. Elle considère la confiance politique comme l'évaluation cognitive et affective des citoyens selon laquelle le système politique ou certaines de ses parties continueront à fonctionner conformément à leurs attentes, même en l'absence de leur surveillance constante (Easton 1975 : 447). La qualité de la démocratie et la qualité des services publics font référence au jugement des citoyens sur les performances de la démocratie et des services publics, respectivement.

L'examen des origines de la confiance politique est opportun et exigeant. La littérature montre que la perte de confiance dans les institutions politiques a des conséquences importantes sur le fonctionnement d'un système politique ou de certaines de ses parties. Il a été constaté que les États qui manquent de confiance dans les institutions politiques ont tendance à dépenser plus de ressources et à déployer la coercition pour maintenir la loi et l'ordre, ce qui, si la situation continue à se détériorer, pourrait entraîner un renversement de régime et l'effondrement même de l'État (Gilley 2006) ; la montée du soutien aux partis populistes (Geurkink et al. 2020) ; la fraude envers le système fiscal et l'évitement du respect des lois (Marien et Hooghe 2011) ; le vote nul et blanc et le soutien aux partis de droite (Hooghe, Marien et Pauwels 2011) ; le retrait du soutien aux dépenses gouvernementales pour la santé, l'éducation et les programmes d'aide aux mères (Rudolph et Evans 2005) ; l'augmentation des chances de mobilisation politique non conventionnelle (Torcal et Lago 2006). Récemment, plusieurs études, réalisées pour la plupart en Europe dans le contexte de la pandémie de Covid-19, ont montré qu'un niveau élevé de confiance politique est associé au soutien de politiques restrictives, à une plus grande conformité avec la réglementation en matière de soins de santé, à une perception plus faible du risque d'être contaminé par le virus et à un taux de mortalité plus faible (Bargain et Aminjonov 2020 ; Devine et al. 2020 ; Dryhurst et al. 2020 ; Lalot et al. 2020 ; Paolini et al. 2020 ; Weinberg 2020).

Les recherches existantes couvrant les données des deux dernières décennies démontrent, en utilisant des données provenant principalement du World Values Survey, de l'Eurobaromètre, de l'International Social Survey Program, de l'European Values Study et de l'European Social Survey, que la confiance politique est en déclin dans plusieurs pays européens (Bäck et Kestilä, 2009 ; Christensen et Lægreid, 2005 ; Kolczyńska, 2021 ; Mishler et Rose, 2001). Ensemble,

ces études suggèrent que dans les pays d'Europe du Nord et en Suisse, la confiance politique a soit fluctué, soit augmenté. Les démocraties bien établies d'Europe occidentale, telles que la France et le Royaume-Uni, ont connu un déclin de la confiance politique au cours des dernières années. En revanche, ce déclin est plus ancien et plus marqué dans de nombreux pays d'Europe de l'Est, dont la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et la Grèce.

S'écartant des théories existantes qui se concentrent sur les explications socio-psychologiques, socioculturelles et de macro-performance (Mishler et Rose 2001 ; Newton et Norris 1999 ; Norris 2017 ; Nye, Zelikow et King 1997 ; Pharr et Putnam 2000 ; Rose 2011 ; Shockley et al. 2016 ; Torcal et Lago 2006 ; Ulsaner 2018), cette thèse accorde une attention très minutieuse et étroite au rôle de la performance du processus et de la performance des résultats, désignés comme la qualité de la démocratie et la qualité des services publics, pour expliquer la confiance politique. Ainsi, l'originalité de cette thèse réside dans le fait qu'elle cherche à expliquer la relation de la confiance politique avec la qualité de la démocratie et celle des services publics à travers les lentilles de la théorie de l'espérance-disconfirmation et des théories de la micro-performance. La théorie de l'espérance a été largement utilisée dans la littérature sur secteur des services mais n'a pas encore été testée dans les travaux de science politique. De même, les explications de la micro-performance ont été largement utilisées dans la littérature sur la justice pénale et les services éducatifs sous le nom de théorie de la justice procédurale. En mobilisant ces différents courants et types de littérature, cette thèse soutient que les expériences et les perceptions des citoyens concernant la qualité de la démocratie et des services publics jouent un rôle déterminant dans la formation de leur sentiment de confiance politique. La première partie de la thèse fait une distinction entre la qualité de la démocratie électorale et la qualité de la démocratie libérale (Chapitre 5 et Chapitre 6). Ensuite, elle prend la qualité de l'enseignement et la qualité de la police comme principaux cas d'études pour tester ses hypothèses (Chapitre 7 et Chapitre 8).

Le reste de ce résumé est divisé en quatre parties. La section suivante présente quelques clarifications conceptuelles et des attentes théoriques. La troisième section fournit une brève description de la conception de la recherche et de l'opérationnalisation des données employées à partir de l'Enquête sociale européenne (ci-après : ESS). La quatrième section résume les principaux résultats. La dernière section résume les principaux résultats et présente les principales contributions de cette thèse.

## **2. Clarifications conceptuelles et cadre théorique**

Étant donné que cette thèse retrace les effets de la qualité de la démocratie et de la qualité des services publics sur la confiance politique, il est important de définir ces termes avant de démontrer leurs associations théoriques.

### **2.1 La confiance politique**

La confiance politique est une forme de soutien politique allant du diffus au spécifique (Dalton 2004 ; Easton 1965, 1975 ; Fuchs 2007 ; Norris 1999, 2017). Il existe de nombreuses définitions de la confiance politique, et les chercheurs sont toujours divisés entre soutien diffus, spécifique ou un concept intermédiaire. Ce qui semble similaire dans ces définitions est que la confiance

politique reflète les croyances dans la motivation et la capacité des institutions à fonctionner efficacement même en l'absence d'un examen constant (Easton 1975 ; Hetherington 2005 ; Miller 1974 ; Pippa 2011 : 19). Le concept de confiance politique est différent de la légitimité et de la satisfaction politiques et de la satisfaction à l'égard de la démocratie qui sont utilisées alternativement par certains chercheurs (Anderson et Guillory 1997 ; Christensen et Lægreid 2005 ; Kaase 1999 ; G. Van Ryzin 2007). Bien qu'une section de la thèse se penche sur ces controverses (Chapitre 2 : Section 2.2), il est important de noter que la légitimité implique l'obligation d'obéissance et de conformité, alors que la confiance mobilise des croyances affectives. De même, par rapport à la satisfaction qui implique des expériences concrètes et une évaluation rétrospective de la performance d'un objet, la confiance englobe des orientations prospectives et ne repose pas sur des expériences spécifiques ; elle est plutôt construite sur des perceptions de performance.

## **2.2 Qualité de la démocratie et qualité des services publics**

En général, la qualité désigne une évaluation supérieure de la performance d'un produit ou d'un service. Cependant, dans la littérature académique deux versions de la qualité sont débattues et contestées, et des approches par la disconfirmation ou uniquement par la performance sont utilisées. On les appelle l'approche américaine et l'approche nordique (Gronroos 1984). La version axée sur la performance uniquement considère la qualité comme une évaluation supérieure de la performance d'un service. À l'inverse, l'approche par la disconfirmation soutient que la qualité est l'écart entre les attentes et la performance du service. Ainsi, les services de qualité supérieure sont représentés par un écart plus faible entre les attentes et la performance. Enfin, certains politologues considèrent les attentes comme une autre dimension de la qualité. La mise en commun de ces trois courants de la littérature suggère que la qualité de la démocratie peut être comprise en termes d'attentes démocratiques, de performance démocratique et disconfirmation démocratique.


De même, en utilisant les volets des services publics, de la justice pénale et des services éducatifs, cette thèse soutient que la compréhension de la qualité des services publics par les citoyens peut englober leurs jugements sur la justice distributive, l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle. Ensuite, en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la micro-performance, elle émet l'hypothèse que la confiance politique en Europe serait le résultat de l'évaluation par les citoyens de ces trois mesures de la qualité des services publics.

## **2.3 Relation entre la qualité de la démocratie et la confiance politique**

Les trois mesures de la qualité de la démocratie peuvent expliquer la confiance politique de quatre manières. Premièrement, cette relation dépend de la façon dont les citoyens conçoivent les attentes et la confiance. Si les attentes démocratiques représentent une liste d'exigences rationnelles et que la confiance politique reflète leur évaluation affective, alors des attentes plus élevées sont plus susceptibles d'influencer négativement la confiance politique. Inversement, les attentes et la confiance politique pourraient représenter des orientations vers les principes de la démocratie. Une telle congruence de valeurs pourrait fonctionner dans un sens positif. Ainsi, des attentes plus élevées pourraient générer une plus grande confiance dans les institutions politiques. Deuxièmement et troisièmement, dans la perspective du choix rationnel,

on peut supposer que la qualité de la démocratie, tant en termes de performance perçue que d'écart entre la performance démocratique et les attentes démocratiques, influence positivement la confiance politique.

La figure 1 résume le quatrième mécanisme sous l'hypothèse de la théorie de la disconfirmation des attentes. Elle soutient que la disconfirmation démocratique sert de médiateur à la relation entre les attentes démocratiques, la performance démocratique et la confiance politique. Cette disconfirmation peut prendre deux formes. Premièrement, une simple disconfirmation se produit lorsque la disconfirmation sert de médiateur à la relation entre les attentes et la confiance politique, qui se transforme en une disconfirmation complète lorsque le rôle de la performance démocratique est pris en compte.




## 2.4 Relation entre la qualité des services publics et la confiance politique

La théorie de la micro-performance fournit les bases théoriques de l'association entre la qualité des services publics et la confiance politique. La théorie de la micro-performance se concentre sur le rôle des goûts et des expériences des citoyens en ce qui concerne la performance du gouvernement pour les différents services publics (Bouckaert et al. 2002 ; Heintzman et Marson 2005 ; Van de Walle 2004). Pour reprendre les termes de Bouckaert et al. (2002), le jugement du public sur le gouvernement dépend de l'intérêt des citoyens pour l'efficacité et la qualité des services fournis par les agences gouvernementales. Une baisse constante de la performance de ces services peut priver les gouvernements de la confiance des citoyens.

L'amélioration des perceptions et des expériences de la qualité des services publics peut servir de réservoir important de confiance politique.

Les ouvrages consacrés au secteur des services, à la justice pénale et aux services éducatifs soutiennent que la compréhension par les citoyens de la qualité des services publics pourrait englober leurs jugements sur la justice distributive, l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle. La figure 2 présente les principales hypothèses. En d'autres termes, la confiance politique en Europe augmentera avec l'amélioration de la perception des citoyens selon laquelle leurs prestataires de services publics les traitent sans discrimination et équitablement et leur fournissent les services requis de manière efficace.



## 2.4 Variables de contrôle au niveau individuel et au niveau du pays

L'étude utilise cinq ensembles de variables au niveau individuel : des variables démographiques (sexe, âge, religiosité, éducation, domicile et citoyenneté) ; la performance en matière de bien-être (moyenne de l'état des services de santé et d'éducation) ; la satisfaction économique (perception de leur revenu par les ménages et satisfaction à l'égard de l'économie) ; les attitudes politiques (intérêt pour la politique, satisfaction à l'égard du gouvernement et orientation gauche-droite) ; et le capital social (moyenne de l'attention interpersonnelle, de l'équité et de la serviabilité). Enfin, elle prend en compte trois variables au niveau du pays. Le passé communiste est une variable commune à tous les chapitres. La liberté d'expression et la responsabilité et l'efficacité du gouvernement sont considérées comme des variables de



contrôle importantes au niveau du pays pour le premier et les deux derniers chapitres, respectivement.

### **3. Conception de la recherche et opérationnalisation des données**

Cette enquête repose sur un design de recherche quantitatif, qui implique des données quantitatives et mobilise un raisonnement déductif (Creswell et Creswell 2018). La méthode déductive commence par la construction de certains arguments théoriques soutenus par la littérature établie, le développement d'hypothèses et de questions, et l'apport d'un soutien nouveau à ces dernières par l'analyse de données quantitatives.

Cette thèse a utilisé les données de l'Enquête sociale européenne (ESS) (<https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>). Jusqu'à présent, l'ESS a fait l'objet de neuf enquêtes dans 38 pays depuis sa création en 2002. Chacun de ses vagues comprend un module fixe et un module rotatif. Les questions mesurant la confiance politique ainsi qu'une série de variables de

contrôle au niveau individuel sont extraites du module de base. Compte tenu de la distinction entre les services publics et les institutions politiques (Rothstein et Stolle 2008 ; Zmerli 2013) et suivant les travaux établis (Goubin et Hooghe 2020 ; Kestilä-Kekkonen et Söderlund 2016 ; Vilhelsdóttir 2020), cette thèse conçoit la confiance politique comme la confiance dans trois institutions politiques, à savoir le parlement, les partis politiques et les politiciens.

Ensuite, le module rotatif de l'ESS est consacré à des thèmes spécifiques. Les données de la vague six de l'ESS ont été utilisées pour tester la relation entre la qualité de la démocratie et la confiance politique (chapitre 5 et chapitre 6). Notre concept de qualité comprend les attentes, la performance et la disconfirmation. Dix des seize éléments ont été traités et triés dans les mesures de la qualité de la démocratie électorale et de la qualité de la démocratie libérale. Les attentes électorales comprennent un indice moyen des orientations des citoyens vers les trois principes de la démocratie : le fait que les partis politiques proposent des programmes différenciés (offres différenciées), que les gouvernements peu performants soient renvoyés à la suite d'élections (responsabilité verticale) et que les gouvernements expliquent leurs décisions aux électeurs (réactivité). La performance électorale est un indice moyen des jugements des citoyens sur la façon dont ces trois principes sont mis en pratique dans leur propre pays. L'indice de ces derniers est soustrait du premier pour représenter la disconfirmation électorale - une troisième mesure de la qualité de la démocratie électorale. De même, les attentes libérales sont un indice moyen des orientations des citoyens en matière d'État de droit, de droits des minorités et de fiabilité des médias. La performance libérale (Easton 1975 : 447) est un indice moyen de leurs jugements sur la façon dont ces principes de la démocratie libérale sont mis en pratique dans leur pays d'origine. La disconfirmation libérale est calculée en soustrayant ce dernier indice du premier.

Dans le cadre de la théorie de la micro-performance, notre concept de qualité comprend les jugements des citoyens sur la justice distributive, l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle. Les données pour ces mesures dans le contexte de la qualité de la scolarité et de la qualité de la police - en tant qu'exemples de services publics - sont extraites de l'ESS-2 et de

l'ESS-5, respectivement. L'opérationnalisation de la qualité de la scolarité est telle que (1) les items concernant le traitement indiscriminé capturent la justice distributive ; (2) la question concernant le traitement équitable par les enseignants mesure l'équité procédurale ; et (3) un indice à trois items (intérêt pour les élèves, acceptation des critiques des élèves et aide aux élèves) permet de mesurer l'efficacité fonctionnelle des écoles. De même, l'opérationnalisation de la qualité du maintien de l'ordre est telle que (1) les perceptions du profilage économique et racial capturent la justice distributive ; (2) un indice de quatre items (traitement respectueux, équitable, réceptif et sans corruption par la police) mesure la justice procédurale ; et (3) un indice de quatre items (la police prévient les crimes, attrape les cambrioleurs et arrive à temps sur les scènes de crime) capture l'efficacité fonctionnelle.

Conformément à la section 2.4, cinq ensembles de variables de contrôle au niveau individuel et deux au niveau du pays sont ajoutés aux données afin de développer un ensemble de données hiérarchiques dans lequel les observations au niveau individuel sont imbriquées dans les pays contenant les variables contextuelles. Les variables continues sont normalisées afin de faciliter la comparaison entre les diverses mesures de la qualité qui ont été décrites ci-dessus. En termes de méthodes utilisées, nos analyses empiriques débutent avec des statistiques descriptives de la distribution de la confiance politique au niveau macro ainsi que trois mesures de la qualité de la démocratie et des services publics. Ensuite, nous effectuons des régressions bivariées au niveau macro et au niveau micro pour les différents pays européens. Enfin, nous présentons des modèles à effets fixes multivariés et une analyse multi-niveaux.

## 4. Résultats

Les résultats de cette thèse sont basés sur une série d'analyses de niveau macro et de niveau micro ; cependant, cette section présente les résultats des analyses multi-niveaux. Les résultats de l'ANOVA montrent que la confiance politique varie au sein d'un même pays et entre les pays, ce qui justifie l'analyse des données par la modélisation multi-niveaux.


Le tableau 1 rassemble les effets estimés de la qualité de la démocratie et de la qualité des services publics. Il montre que les effets de trois mesures, chacune de la qualité de la démocratie électorale et de la qualité de la démocratie libérale, sont hautement significatifs. Cependant, les relations entre les attentes électorales, les attentes libérales et la confiance politique dépendent de la manière dont elles sont entrées dans l'équation de régression. Lorsqu'elles sont régressées avec la performance électorale, les attentes électorales influencent négativement la confiance politique. Inversement, elles produisent des effets positifs lorsqu'elles sont régressées avec la disconfirmation électorale. De même, l'effet des attentes libérales est négatif lorsqu'elles sont régressées avec les performances libérales et négatif lorsqu'elles sont régressées avec la disconfirmation libérale. Combinés, ces résultats soutiennent les hypothèses selon lesquelles la qualité de la démocratie est importante pour expliquer la confiance politique en Europe.

**Tableau 9.1 Résumé des résultats**

| Qualité de la démocratie électorale | La Confiance Politique |              | Disconfirmation |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
|                                     | Model 1                | Model 2      | Model 3         |
| Attentes électorale                 | -.07 (.01)***          | .09 (.01)*** | -1.24 (.01)***  |
| Performance électorale              | .23 (.01)***           |              |                 |

|  |               |              |                |
|--|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| Disconfirmation électorale   |               | .26 (.01)*** |                |
| <b>Qualité de la démocratie libérale</b>   |               |              |                |
| Attentes libérale  | -.08 (.01)*** | .10 (.01)*** | -1.08 (.01)*** |
| Performance libérale   | .25 (.01)***  |              |                |
| Disconfirmation libérale   |               | .28 (.01)*** |                |
| <b>Qualité de l'éducation</b>  |               |              |                |
| Équité procédurale   | .07 (.03)*    |              |                |
| Efficacité fonctionnelle   | .08 (.03)*    |              |                |
| <b>Qualité de la police</b>  |               |              |                |
| Les pauvres sont moins bien traités  | -.13 (.02)*** |              |                |
| Les personnes de race différente sont moins bien traitées  | .01 (.02)     |              |                |
| Même race traitée plus mal   | .02 (.03)     |              |                |
| Équité procédurale   | .11 (.01)***  |              |                |
| Efficacité fonctionnelle   | .10 (.01)***  |              |                |
| <b>Note :</b> Données pondérées par le poids du modèle. Les entrées MCO sont des estimations du maximum de vraisemblance suivies des erreurs standard entre parenthèses produites par l'analyse multi-niveaux. * $p \leq .05$ ; ** $p \leq .01$ ; et *** $p \leq .001$ . |               |              |                |

Les modèles de disconfirmation plus complets n'ont pas pu être réalisés en raison de la multicollinéarité entre la performance électorale et la disconfirmation électorale et la performance libérale et la disconfirmation libérale. La figure 1 rassemble les coefficients des mesures de la qualité de la démocratie. Elle montre que l'effet médié des attentes électorales via la disconfirmation électorale est de  $-.32$  ( $-1.24 \times .26$ ) alors que son effet direct a un coefficient de  $.09$ . De même, alors que l'effet direct des attentes libérales a un coefficient de  $0,10$ , son effet médié par la disconfirmation libérale est de  $-.30$  ( $-1,08 \times 0,28$ ). Ces résultats suggèrent collectivement que c'est l'interaction complexe entre les attentes démocratiques et la disconfirmation démocratique qui génère des effets négatifs sur la confiance politique.



## 5. Conclusion

Cette thèse a émis l'hypothèse que la qualité des attentes démocratiques électorales et de la démocratie libérale serait associée négativement ou positivement à la confiance politique (H1). Elle a également supposé les effets positifs des attentes démocratiques (H2) et de la

performance démocratique (H3) sur la confiance politique. Elle a ensuite développé un modèle suggérant une interaction complexe entre ces trois mesures de la qualité de la démocratie et de la confiance politique. De même, elle a supposé que la qualité des services publics est indiquée par la justice distributive, l'équité procédurale et l'efficacité fonctionnelle (H1-H3).

Les résultats des analyses des données provenant de trois cycles de l'enquête sociale européenne montrent que la qualité de la démocratie et la qualité des services publics influencent de manière significative la confiance politique. Les attentes démocratiques influencent la confiance politique de manière négative et positive selon la manière dont elles sont prises en compte dans les modèles de régression. Cependant, la performance démocratique et la disconfirmation démocratique ont toutes deux un effet positif sur la confiance politique. De plus, ces résultats soutiennent un modèle de disconfirmation simple où la disconfirmation démocratique sert de médiateur à la relation entre les attentes démocratiques et la confiance politique.

Les résultats soutiennent également l'hypothèse selon laquelle la qualité des services publics affecte la confiance politique, à quelques exceptions près. Premièrement, il n'a pas été possible de tracer les effets de la justice distributive dans le contexte de la qualité de l'enseignement en raison de l'indisponibilité de mesures appropriées. Deuxièmement, on montre qu'une seule mesure de la justice distributive - les préjugés économiques - influence la confiance politique. Les deux autres résultats soutiennent les hypothèses d'effets positifs de l'équité procédurale et de l'efficacité fonctionnelle dans les services de scolarité et de police.

Les résultats résumés ci-dessus ont des implications importantes pour la théorie de la disconfirmation et la littérature sur la confiance politique. Premièrement, les résultats rapportés ci-dessus suggèrent que les attentes démocratiques influencent négativement la confiance politique lorsqu'elles sont régressées avec la performance démocratique ; cette relation devient positive lorsque la première est régressée avec la disconfirmation démocratique. Ils suggèrent également que la performance démocratique et la disconfirmation démocratique influencent toujours positivement la confiance politique. Ensemble, ces résultats s'alignent pleinement sur la littérature existante, principalement produite dans la littérature sur les services aux consommateurs, qui suggère que les attentes ont des effets mitigés sur la confiance et la performance, et que la disconfirmation influence positivement la confiance (James 2009 ; Morgeson 2013 ; Poister et Thomas 2011 ; Van Ryzin 2005).

De plus, il existe un débat dans la littérature sur le secteur des services pour savoir si la performance est un meilleur prédicteur de la confiance/satisfaction que la disconfirmation (Parasuraman et al. 1994). Les résultats de la thèse ouvrent ce débat dans la littérature de science politique en suggérant que la disconfirmation démocratique est un meilleur prédicteur de la confiance politique que la performance démocratique. Enfin, ces résultats fournissent également de nouvelles preuves, issues de la littérature de science politique, de l'approche de la disconfirmation qui a été principalement développée et testée dans la littérature relative au secteur des services (Filtenborg et al. 2017 ; Morgeson 2013 ; Oliver 2010 ; Van Ryzin 2004, 2005). Cependant, en raison d'une forte multicollinéarité entre la performance démocratique et la disconfirmation démocratique, ces résultats ne soutiennent que les modèles de disconfirmation simple, laissant un modèle de disconfirmation plus complet non testé.

Cette thèse montre que la qualité des services publics a des implications importantes pour le système politique dans son ensemble. En d'autres termes, les citoyens, en tant qu'évaluateurs des services publics, souhaitent des institutions plus égalitaires qui bénéficient à tous de manière égale. En plus de les traiter équitablement, ils veulent que certaines institutions, telles que les écoles, leur transmettent et les équipent des connaissances, des compétences et des capacités nécessaires pour obtenir un emploi, mais ils tiennent les institutions politiques responsables des bonnes ou mauvaises performances de leurs écoles. En outre, les pratiques au sein des écoles, notamment la participation en classe, la serviabilité, le fait de formuler des critiques et d'y répondre, leur permettent d'acquérir des compétences civiques transférables à d'autres domaines de la vie, comme la démocratie délibérative ou les pratiques de budgétisation participative. En bref, garantir la justice et l'efficacité de la classe joue un rôle déterminant dans l'établissement de la confiance politique (Claes, Hooghe et Marien 2012).

De même, l'implication de l'étude sur la qualité du maintien de l'ordre est que les citoyens accordent du crédit aux institutions politiques sous la forme d'une confiance politique basée sur leurs jugements des performances de la police. Cela signifie que la confiance politique peut être accrue en contrôlant les facteurs qui induisent un traitement discriminatoire des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique et en garantissant qu'ils seront traités selon des procédures équitables et non corrompues et en améliorant l'efficacité reflétée par la sûreté et la sécurité de la population. Si le travail de la police ne répond pas à ces attentes, les citoyens peuvent punir les forces de police en diminuant leur confiance, en protestant contre elles et en tenant les institutions politiques responsables de la mauvaise qualité du travail de la police. Par conséquent, ils pourraient, à court terme, renvoyer un gouvernement en place aux prochaines élections. Une mauvaise qualité durable du maintien de l'ordre pourrait affaiblir le soutien diffus à un système politique à plus long terme.

Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de cette thèse nous apprennent que les différents gouvernements européens peuvent accroître la confiance politique en améliorant la perception qu'ont les citoyens de la qualité de la démocratie et de la qualité des services publics. Il s'agit de tâches difficiles, car elles impliquent des réformes institutionnelles exigeant des autorités qu'elles soient plus impartiales et cohérentes dans l'exécution des services rendus par le côté input et output du système politique. Cependant, cette thèse souffre de certaines lacunes. Par exemple, il est difficile d'établir la causalité des résultats ci-dessus sur la base de données transversales. Deuxièmement, elle ne repose pas sur une mesure subjective de la disconfirmation qui, si elle avait été disponible, aurait pu être utile pour tester un modèle complet de disconfirmation. Troisièmement, nous n'avons pas pu trouver de mesures alternatives de justice distributive dans le contexte de la qualité de l'enseignement. Enfin, dans ce dernier cas, il n'y avait que 3377 observations provenant de 17 pays. Les études futures pourraient fournir de meilleures informations si elles sont conçues en tenant compte de ces lacunes.